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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the mechanisms used to transfer the management practices of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) to an emerging market economy (EME) context. 
Examining an MNC’s ownership and control of its subsidiaries in a setting of 
institutional resistance, this research focuses on the objectives and processes of the 
MNC’s diffusion of human resource management and industrial relations (HRM-IR) 
“best practice” to standardise subsidiaries’ practices, control their management and 
influence policy developments. 
The case involves a dominant MNC headquarters (HQ) and low-power 
subsidiary actors, with implications for cross-border management practice transfer, 
coordinated actors and conflicts of interest. This study seeks to enhance our 
understanding of the HQ’s systematic circumvention and manipulation of host-
country regulatory barriers, particularly those barriers designed to protect local 
systems, policies and practices from foreign management’s direct control of human 
resources in Indonesian subsidiaries. HQ actors find ways of influencing, 
standardising and changing subsidiaries’ HRM norms, policies and practices. 
This thesis explores the power resources, motivations and strategies of MNC 
actors at inter- and intra-organisational levels in 12 Indonesian automotive 
manufacturing firms that have Japanese (co-)ownership or are part of the Japanese 
producer’s supply chain. Three levels of institutional analysis offer a deeper 
understanding of the mechanisms of cross-border transfer relating to power, politics 
and conflicts in MNCs: (1) HQ actors’ strategies to control foreign subsidiaries’ 
management practices, (2) subsidiary actors’ strategies to maximise the benefits of 
cooperation with MNC’s global networks, and (3) the business group’s proactive 
influence of labour market institutions. The findings are relevant to an understanding 
of the emergence of high-quality production networks in EMEs characterised by 
“weak” and immature institutions, as well as to the transferability of dominant work, 
employment and organisation systems. 
 
Keywords: Power, politics, conflicts, cross-border transfer, absorptive capacity, 
business group, employee and employer organisations, business associations, quasi-
government agencies international human resources management, industrial 
relations, international business, emerging market economy, automotive industry. 
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Summary of the Research 
This thesis explores the mechanisms and outcomes of transferring dominant HRM 
“best practices” to foreign subsidiaries. In this context, HQ actors attempt to increase 
control and ownership while diffusing management practices to subsidiaries. At the 
same time, subsidiary actors seek knowledge, capital and voice to gain legitimate 
influence in MNC global networks. Moreover, local business groups try to maintain 
control and mobilise resources through internal networks to influence micropolitical 
processes and protect local systems. 
Through an actor-centred understanding of the impact of dominant HRM-IR 
practices, this research investigates the implications of three dimensions of corporate 
actors’ power influencing HRM cross-national transfer processes and outcomes at 
macro-, meso- and micro-institutional levels. Furthermore, it reveals significant 
nuances in the HQ’s direct and indirect diffusion of Japanese work, employment and 
organisation systems, and the impact of the strategy and outcomes of Japanese 
production and management systems (Japanisation) on subsidiaries, associations and 
the wider economy of the host country. The existing literature on MNCs tends to 
overlook the role of quasi-governmental agencies and business associations in 
mediating the power of resources, processes and meaning (ideology) in cross-border 
HRM transfer. Agencies in global MNC networks serve the interests of wider MNC 
actors that co-evolve in diffusing dominant HRM-IR practices, further determining 
the mechanisms, processes and impact of transfer. Agencies’ direct involvement in 
contested cross-border transfer is important, as their strategies may circumvent 
conflict and power inequities between HQ and subsidiary actors in a context of host-
country institutional resistance. Moreover, Japanese quasi-government agencies have 
fewer legal constraints than Japanese MNCs, allowing them to operate more 
autonomously. The MNC’s ownership structure and length of presence affect the 
extent of influence and organisational configurations. 
Japanese work, employment and organisational practices promote local actors’ 
participation and commitment by upholding transparency and trust in work systems. 
Thus, these practices influence subsidiary actors’ interest in acquiring and adopting 
them. However, the application of dominant HRM “best practice” may conflict with 
subsidiaries’ existing management practices, norms and cognitive understanding. 
Adding to the complexity of cross-border transfer, business groups closely linked to 
national institutions proactively affect the transfer process to protect local business 
systems. This study provides theoretical support for and new evidence of the 
phenomenon of HQ–subsidiary power interactions and their implications for transfer 
in three automotive sectors—cars, motorcycles and autoparts—in an EME context. 
This thesis makes three contributions to international HRM, industrial relations 
(IR) and international business (IB). First, it examines diverse MNC actors’ power, 
interests and strategies, and the roles of agencies directly involved in the diffusion 
and (re)definition of HRM-IR “best practices” transfer at meso-institutional levels. 
Second, it synthesises the mechanisms and implications of globally accepted 
Japanese work practices in the under-studied EME host-country context of 
Indonesia. Third, it focuses on low-power subsidiary actors, and quasi-governmental 
agencies/business associations in cross-border transfer processes. Theoretically, this 
research confirms the viability of Minbaeva et al.’s (2003), Ferner et al.’s (2012) and 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) theoretical frameworks and applies them to an 
EME setting. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for this Research 
This thesis presents research on the work, employment and organisational practices 
adopted by Japanese-Indonesian joint ventures in Indonesia, and the extent to which 
they influence behaviour in other connected firms. Against a backdrop of 
fundamental institutional changes in Japan and institutional fluidity in Indonesia 
since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to a multi-
layered understanding of the work and employment policies and practices of JMNCs 
operating in Indonesia. 
Whilst Japan’s economy has stagnated over the past two decades, Indonesia’s 
economy has been flourishing. In fact, Japan has been downgraded to the world’s 
third largest economy after the US and China, whereas Indonesia is recognised as a 
newly emerging market economy. In this thesis, to differentiate between emerging 
and developing economies, Cavusgil et al.’s (2005: 5) definition of emerging market 
economies (EMEs) is adopted: 
Emerging markets are countries which are in a transition phase from 
developing to developed markets due to rapid growth and industrialization. 
Hence, markets which have (a) started an economic reform process aimed at 
alleviating problems, for example poverty, poor infrastructure and over-
population, (b) achieved a steady growth in gross national product (GNP) 
per capita, and (c) increased integration in the global economy, may truly be 
called EMs. 
Important institutional changes, greater power distance and dynamic political and 
economic relations between Japan and Indonesia raise questions about whether Japan 
remains a dominant player. Is Japan ascendant—or on the decline? Correspondingly, 
since Indonesia is emerging economically, is it still a peripheral nation? In particular, 
as it is recognised as Southeast Asia’s largest economy, what new power resources 
can be leveraged by actors from this emerging economy that needs to attract foreign 
investment and catch up technologically? 
To address these questions, empirical research is presented to help deepen 
understanding of the impact of institutional changes in home and host countries on 
the cross-border transfer of management practices from the perspectives of power, 
politics and conflicts of interest. This study investigates causal mechanisms in the 
transfer of HRM practices from Japan to Indonesia in the context of Japanese-
11 
Indonesian joint ventures in three automotive manufacturing sectors: cars (Toyota 
and Daihatsu), motorcycles (Honda and Yamaha) and autoparts (Astra Auto Parts). 
Not only do these Indonesian subsidiaries differ in the level of Japanese capital 
investment and length of influence, but also in the types of products they 
manufacture. They demonstrate the extent to which stronger actors within firms 
compete and control low-power actors and investment in human capital. At the same 
time, they illustrate how local organisation systems promote employees’ 
participation and commitment. Four types of Japanese work systems are 
investigated: direct management-union communications; training and skills 
formation systems; employees’ participation and involvement in knowledge transfer, 
and general management-union relations. In applying existing theories of 
international HRM (IHRM) and cross-border knowledge transfer to the context of 
EMEs, this thesis investigates the conditions under which MNCs diffuse dominant 
HRM “best practices” to foreign subsidiaries. Accordingly, it explores how the 
employment and work management practices of MNCs originating from capitalist 
institutions operate in non-coordinated market economies, specifically between an 
industrial capitalist country (Japan) and a newly-emerging market economy 
(Indonesia). 
Indonesia has been described as a “crony capitalist” state (e.g. Khatri et al., 
2006; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). Dieleman and Sachs (2008: 1275) explain 
Indonesian crony capitalism as a “highly symbiotic relationship between its 
institutions and a small group of companies”. The differing capitalist models of 
home and host countries are relevant to this research because, as Lange and Becker-
Ritterspach (2016: 283) suggest, a key approach to studying EME institutions is to 
understand “the nature of socio-political actors and the diverse modes of 
government–business relations”. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate why and how 
actors’ power and micropolitics operate in contested cross-border management 
transfer processes. From the viewpoint of institutional discourse, it is important to 
address the research issues in both home and host institutional contexts in order to 
distinguish systematic differences between Asian business systems in terms of 
varying levels of state direction and business coordination of economic activities 
(e.g. Zhang & Whitley, 2013; Whitley 1999). 
The frameworks of Minbaeva et al. (2003) on IHRM, Ferner et al. (2012) on 
actors’ power and interests in three institutional settings, and Bouquet and 
12 
Birkinshaw (2008) on low-power actors’ motivations (ends) and strategies (means) 
facilitate conceptualisation, examination and exemplification of the HRM “best 
practice” phenomenon across market conditions in different institutional contexts. 
Additionally, this study empirically analyses the implications of the diffusion 
mechanisms of dominant work, employment and organisation “best practices” for 
local labour market institutions. 
Human capital is a particularly significant aspect in comprehending 
interrelationships between features of a country’s institutional and firm 
characteristics, and in identifying the impact of MNC actors’ power capabilities, 
strategies and coordination. However, as Whitley (2005: 117-192) observes, 
“business management systems may change over time, and may be applied 
differently in different economic and geographical contexts”. For example, key 
features of Japanese HRM “best practice” in different types of automotive firms (i.e. 
cars, motorcycles and autoparts) appear to vary in the level of the JMNC’s 
ownership, length of presence and management-influenced operations in Indonesia. 
Whereas much of the existing MNC literature focuses on Toyota and other car 
manufacturers (see Khan et al., 2015; Aoki et al., 2014), this research presents a 
more dynamic and comprehensive picture of Japanese automotive HRM-IR “best 
practices” and its outcomes in the developing automotive industry of Indonesia. It 
tests and develops work, employment and organisational concepts in the EME 
context, illustrating specific sets of MNC actors and their interests and resources. In 
so doing, this study contributes to HRM, IR and IB scholarship, and its setting aligns 
with recent IHRM literature.  Martínez Lucio (2014b: 295) postulates that: 
…environments are changing and evolving in nuanced ways: over time more 
coordinated actors and players are appearing in the international 
employment relations arenas that are beginning to learn to work more 
consistently, building alliances with each other, with the aims of conditioning 
and shaping global capitalism. 
Following Martínez Lucio’s (2014a) discourse, it is appropriate to explore the 
poorly understood topic of contested HRM and practices of “capitalist employment 
relations under Japanese HRM” (Aoki et al., 2014: 2557) in the “crony capitalist” 
context of Indonesia (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Khatri et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
this new IHRM research direction is being taken up by other institutional scholars, 
(e.g. Carney et al., 2018; Fainshmidt et al., 2016; Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016; 
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Kingston, 2013; Thelen, 2010; McGee, 2009). As Martínez Lucio (2014b: 294-259) 
points out: 
The current economic crisis in various parts of the globe may weaken 
regulators as they deal with…capitalist interests, but the question of what 
MNCs do and what they do it to is now an issue of debate and concern… 
MNCs are now increasingly contested spaces. 
In a similar vein, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) note that the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
reshaped the business institutions of Japan and Indonesia, resulting in bubble 
economy and the collapse of Soeharto’s 33-year dictatorship and, importantly, the 
weakening of Indonesian institutions.  
In order to advance scholarship on MNCs and to validate previous theoretical 
contributions, this study extends existing IHRM, IR and IB studies to the specific 
context of an EME. For example, Witt and Redding (2013) argue that the 
mainstream MNC literature “lacks a comprehensive and detailed overview of the 
institutional features of Asian economies”. Aiming to close this gap, this study 
applies Asian business systems theory to emerging Southeast Asian forms of cross-
border management practices and management control. Rosser (2014) and others 
(e.g. Witt & Redding, 2014) have conducted extensive investigations across 
Northeast and Southeast Asia to analyse and identify patterns and characteristics of 
Asian capitalism, extending and elaborating Whitley’s (1992) Asian business 
framework to cover thirteen countries, including Indonesia and Japan. This thesis 
applies the concepts related to actors as well as institutional and organisational 
power to analyse the characteristics, strategies, capabilities and coordination of 
JMNCs that may be reflected in their cross-border management practices. It also 
examines spillovers and linkages shaping host-country labour market institutions. In 
so doing, this explorative study contributes to literature on MNCs by providing a 
deeper understanding of the adaptation of firm-specific core competencies and 
business systems to Asian capitalist systems. 
As has been suggested, further research is necessary to provide refined, in-depth 
analyses of the complexity of EMEs and the diversity of Asian business systems 
(e.g. Lange & Becker-Ritterspach, 2016; Wailes et al., 2016; Wright et al., 2016), 
and particularly under-studied EMEs such as Indonesia (e.g. Carney et al., 2018; 
Dieleman & Widjaja, 2018; Fainshmidt et al., 2016; Meyer & Peng, 2016). Scholars 
also underscore the importance of examining the institutional characteristics of Asian 
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capitalism from a business systems viewpoint (e.g. Rosser, 2014; Whitley, 2014; 
Witt & Redding, 2014; Zhang & Whitley, 2013). This study endeavours to close this 
knowledge gap. 
The selected frameworks for institutions and IHRM (i.e. Minbaeva et al., 2003; 
Ferner et al., 2012; Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008) are relevant because their 
concepts offer analytical frameworks for understanding Asia’s advanced and newly-
emerging forms of market economy capitalism, characteristics and structures of 
institutional features, HRM-IR “best practices”, and the knowledge transfer 
strategies of JMNCs in Indonesia. Specifically, the IB setting in relation to 
production and automotive supply chains in the region may have an impact on both 
local firms and the host country, for example, in the context of human capital 
development and the ability of emerging economies to overcome challenges while 
maintaining competitiveness. In order to disseminate knowledge, capital and 
technology across the economy, Indonesia’s automotive manufacturing industry 
requires access to foreign capital and technology, local knowledge and skills-
intensive manpower. Consequently, Indonesian firms have had to re-formulate their 
institutional business systems, whether market-based, coordinated or cooperative. As 
Rosser (2014: 89) notes, unlike Japanese keiretsu, inter-firm relations in Indonesia 
are “predominantly short-term and non-cooperative in nature”. These differences in 
institutional arrangements constitute distinct Asian business management systems 
that can be analysed through the lens of IHRM practices and actors’ power resources 
and capabilities.  
Some scholars (e.g. Cooke & Kim, 2017; MacKenzie & Martínez Lucio, 2014a; 
Rosser, 2014; Witt, 2014; Juliawan, 2011) observe that the intensification of 
“globalisation” and the 1997 Asian and 2007 global economic recessions appear to 
have had a significant effect on both Japan and Indonesia. This raises questions 
about whether distinctive Japanese work, employment and organisation systems are 
sustainable, to what extent Japanese capitalist approaches remain efficient, and 
whether employment relations under Japanese HRM “best practice” remain relevant. 
Furthermore, the host country’s political and economic coordination may also 
change, progress and stabilise. These conditions may intensify pressure for 
systematic changes in the nature of Japanese and Asian capitalism in relation to 
“how distinctive business management systems become institutionalised in particular 
market economies” (Carney et al., 2009). 
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1.2 Contributions and Research Questions 
This thesis applies the concepts of IHRM, IR and IB to an emerging and under-
studied context. Its theoretical contributions lie in its analysis of links between the 
micropolitics of HQ and subsidiary actors. Also significant is its examination of the 
complexity of MNCs’ cross-border work organisation policies, practices and 
processes at micro and meso levels. Moreover, this study focuses on actors’ power 
resources and their implications for the transfer of dominant HRM-IR “best 
practices” in three areas: (1) the active role of HQ actors in transferring foreign 
knowledge and diffusing management practices; (2) the sources of power of 
industrialising countries and subsidiary actors, which increasingly use power to 
constrain the transfer and gain legitimate status from MNC global networks, and (3) 
the allocation of power and the structure of meso-level influence determining how 
transfer is shaped by MNC actors and business systems. As Almond (2011b: 531) 
points out, IHRM scholarship has failed to explain adequately the relationships 
between MNCs and the geographies in which they operate at sub-national (meso) 
levels. The analysis of this thesis underlines the power resources and progressively 
important role of “sub-national governance actors and institutions” in shaping the 
complexity of cross-border transfer (Almond, 2011b: 533). As Strang and Meyer 
(1993, cited in Almond, 2011b: 534) argue, firms and other actors have increasingly 
become a part of the host effects shaped at sub-national as well as national levels. 
Among the main empirical contributions of this thesis is the revelation of new 
strategies by both HQ and subsidiary actor and an examination of the implications of 
power resources and capacities in shaping, converting and bypassing institutions and 
constraining managerial practices, particularly at micro and meso levels. While each 
of these research areas poses different challenges, these under-explored areas may 
stimulate critical discussions. To meet these objectives, the main research question 
of this thesis is: 
How does the transfer of Japanese work systems through FDI apply in the 
context of late-industrialising countries? 
To dissect and operationalise the above question, this study investigates how cross-
border transfer works in an EME setting and under what conditions such transfer is 
accepted or refused. 
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Each of the three empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) seeks to 
refine the research question. Chapter 6 focuses on how certain HRM practices 
increase absorptive capacity in a situation of institutional distance. Chapter 7 
unpacks how a Japanese MNC (JMNC) exercises its power by bypassing local 
institutional and managerial constraints, and exerting (in)direct influence in order to 
understand how foreign MNC actors wield their power to influence transfer 
processes. Chapter 8 explores how local actors successfully leverage institutions to 
defend local practices and choose selectively from the dominant MNC actor’s 
practices. The focus of the above questions is on how actors’ power resources and 
capacities balance in shaping contested cross-border management transfer processes 
and outcomes. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
In the remainder of this thesis, Chapter 2 explains the theoretical background of the 
study. It outlines the theoretical frameworks of Minbaeva et al. (2003) on IHRM and 
knowledge transfer, Ferner et al. (2012) on actors’ power and interests, and Bouquet 
and Birkinshaw (2008) on low-power actors, and their applicability to this study. 
The epistemology and ontology of critical realism—along with the research design 
and techniques—are discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter is followed by discussions 
of the home- and host-country institutions in Chapter 4. The analysis presented in 
Chapter 5 focuses on the selected cases. 
The empirical findings are presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Each of these three 
chapters also points out contributions to the specific literature. Chapter 6 deals with 
how the intended IHRM practices facilitate knowledge transfer. It examines the 
processes and implications of cross-border transfer at inter- and intra-organisational 
levels. To further understand the conditions of the transfer process, Chapter 7 
investigates the interaction of actors’ power and capacity by offering an analysis of 
MNC actors’ and agencies’ strategy to diffuse dominant HRM-IR practices. Home- 
and host-country effects are incorporated into the analysis, coupled with 
organisational effects to investigate actors’ power, interests and capacities and to 
dissect the causal power affecting transfer mechanisms at macro, meso and micro 
institutional levels. As indicated in subsequent chapters, subsidiary actors may find 
ways to impede the diffusion of dominant work practices. Hence, Chapter 8 
concentrates on low-power actors’ motivations and strategies to gain legitimate 
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influence in global MNC networks. In particular, the analysis indicates how low-
power actors mobilise power resources to respond to dominant MNC practices. 
The thesis concludes with discussions of the findings, the novelty of the study, 
and its empirical contributions to the study of work, employment and organisation in 
the under-explored EME context. It presents the results of comparative multi-site 
analysis to explain the causal mechanisms of cross-border management transfer from 
the perspectives of power, politics and conflict. The final chapter discusses the 
limitations of the study, makes recommendations for future research and highlights 
the relevance of the findings to policy development and managerial practice. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Discussion 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the transfer of Japanese work, employment and organisational 
practices by a JMNC to its subsidiaries in Indonesia and to local firms within the 
same supply chains. It explores how actors respond to the dominant position of the 
Japanese firm, its management practices, control and power. Moreover, it focuses on 
power relationships between the MNC’s headquarters (HQ) and the subsidiaries in 
(de)legitimising the JMNC’s dominant HRM-IR “best practices” in an Asian 
emerging market context. According to Martínez Lucio (2014a: 4) and Delbridge at 
al. (2011): 
The object of IHRM is—in reality— the management of work and 
employment: this means that the dynamics that constitute these in terms of 
representation, worker development, the working environment and regulation 
need to move into the center to provide a wider academic [debate]. 
According to Mackenzie and Martínez Lucio (2014a: 251), “there are competing 
views on how firms should conduct their HR strategies, and in the case of MNCs this 
has now become a question at the center of a range of policy and social debates”. 
Specifically, the central empirical investigation presented in this thesis aligns with 
that of Morgan and Kristensen (2006: 1469, cited in Geppert & Williams, 2016: 141) 
regarding “how far key actors within the subsidiaries are able to participate in 
negotiations with key actors within the headquarters when it comes to cross-national 
transfers of ‘processes, people and resources’”. 
This empirical research applies Minbaeva et al.’s (2003) concepts of IHRM, 
Ferner et al.’s (2012) institutional theory of power resources and Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw’s (2008) motivations (ends) and strategies (means) of low-power 
(subsidiary) actors in framing the cross-border transfer of work, employment and 
organisational practices initiated by a Japanese HQ in an effort to standardise its 
subsidiaries’ management practices. In so doing, this study investigates how various 
actors’ voices may influence responses to the diffusion of dominant work, 
employment and organisation systems. Martínez Lucio (2014b: 295) identifies that 
changing institutions and evolving IHRM nuances have increased MNCs’ 
coordination and control of actors and players in the IHRM and IR arena that 
condition and shape global capitalism. In a similar vein, it is argued that labour 
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market institutional changes in home and host countries, along with differing 
international joint venture (IJV) conditions, explain the institutional specificities of 
MNC configurations, allocations and types of power resources that influence cross-
border management transfer. Variations in the MNC’s foreign stake, degree of 
involvement and length of presence shape the transfer mechanisms and affect 
subsidiaries’ HRM-IR practices and policy development. 
Recent IHRM literature (e.g. Minbaeva & Santangelo, 2018; Wood et al., 2016; 
Kane & Levina, 2017; Minbaeva et al., 2014) stresses that the HR practices of 
employee participation and engagement in knowledge processes are crucial in 
facilitating cross-border management transfer. However, as Ferner et al. (2012: 164) 
assert, there is little sense of what is “at stake” for actors in confronting the 
cognitive, normative and regulative frameworks that must be negotiated when cross-
border practices are transferred, adopted and executed. Low-power actors are 
increasingly seeking to make their voices heard, gain influence and find ways of 
negotiating with dominant HQ actors (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). These debates 
frame this theoretical discussion chapter and demonstrate the applicability to this 
research of the three main theoretical frameworks of Minbaeva et al. (2003), Ferner 
et al. (2012) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008). 
In exploring interactions between MNC actors’ power and interests at three 
different institutional levels, this chapter reviews three key areas of literature. It 
reviews discussions of institutions in general, and of Japanese and Indonesian 
institutions in particular. It also discusses the impact of country- and firm-level 
competitive advantages on the degree to which MNCs disseminate management 
practices across borders, and considers institutional factors addressed by various 
actors (management, employees and unions, government agencies, business 
associations and business groups). Then cross-cultural communication is mentioned 
in terms of various communication features, the three selected theoretical 
frameworks, as well as other relevant strands of institutional theory. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the position and validity of the frameworks and the 
study’s theoretical contributions.  
2.2 Gaps in the Literature: Japanese and Indonesian Institutions 
Meyer and Peng (2016) observe that research examining cross-border management 
transfers in EME contexts remains limited. Most studies focus on cross-cultural 
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differences and how they affect management practices (e.g. Hofstede, 1984 et al.). 
However, as Lange and Becker-Ritterspach (2016) point out, there is as yet little 
systematic knowledge of the impact of cultural differences in work-related values on 
different types of conflict in EME settings. Debates continue over institutional 
duality, relating to the dominant effect of country of origin (Edwards et al., 2007) or 
national business systems (Whitley, 1999). The study presented here follows 
Almond et al.’s (2005) argument that the effects of institutional duality on MNCs’ 
cross-border practices such as work, employment and organisation must be analysed 
within a framework that takes greater account of multiple levels of strategies for 
embeddedness and processes of transfer at different organisational levels. It focuses 
on the capacity, strategy and interaction of actors’ power in comparing two Asian 
business systems: the advanced Northeast Asian system of Japan and the emerging 
Southeast Asian system of Indonesia (Witt & Redding, 2013). Hall and Soskice’s 
(2001) varieties of capitalism (VOC) concept provides a useful reference on the 
distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies, especially pertaining 
to Japan. Nevertheless, the VOC dichotomy is less applicable to this study because 
Asian business systems are distinct from Western capitalist models (Witt & Redding, 
2013), and characteristics of Japan’s coordinated market economy are different even 
from those of Germany. Therefore, this study draws on authors from the school of 
Asian institutional studies, namely Aoki (1988) on Japanese economy, Redding 
(1990) on capitalism in Southeast Asia, and Whitley (1992) on East Asian business 
systems, to examine institutional features and explore various phenomena. It 
investigates differences in education and skills formation, industrial and employment 
relations, inter-firm relations (business groups), internal structures (participatory 
versus top-down), and ownership and corporate governance (family 
entrepreneurship) between Japan and Indonesia that have significant implications for 
home- and host-country business systems theories. 
Since Womack et al.’s (1990) seminal study, institutional and organisational 
researchers have focused on comparing Japanese work, employment and 
organisations with Western, advanced institutions, for example, in the US, UK and 
Germany, and with mainstream EME contexts such as China, India and Korea (e.g. 
Ferner et al., 2011; Bélanger et al., 1999; Kostova et al., 2008; Delbridge, 1995). 
However, Indonesia has been relatively ignored in 20 years of comparative research 
on the “global” production strategies of more than 400 Japanese automobile and 
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electronic manufacturers, specifically, the longitudinal research carried out by the 
Japanese Multinational Enterprise Study Group (JMNESG) and led by Professor 
Tetsuo Abo (2007). In IR scholarship, most organisation studies provide shallow 
conceptualisations of differences in the HRM-IR operations of JMNCs beyond 
Western and advanced countries, and in applications of Japanese management and 
production systems (also known as “Japanisation”, a term coined by Turnbull, 1986) 
that denotes the philosophies of the Toyota production system (TPS), Total Quality 
Management (TQM) and Just-in-Time (JIT) in non-US joint-venture contexts. 
As Hyman (2001) argues, the concept of “institutions” frames not only the 
condition of actions but also the “object of contest”. One example of an object of 
contest in the institutional debate is collective action by work councils and unions, 
which may increase resistance to management transfers (e.g. Almond et al., 2005; 
Ferner et al., 2005). However, actors’ relationships may be quite different in an EME 
setting. Employee representatives (labour unions), government agencies, employers’ 
associations and business groups (BGs) may promote, participate and be involved in 
transfer processes because of the conditions of local labour market institutions and 
the HRM infrastructure. Local actors are interested in technology transfer to upscale 
their capital, knowledge and skills in order to remain competitive. In the IR context, 
gaining high skills may enhance actors’ bargaining power, especially if the structure 
of local labour institutions is perceived as “weak”. In the case of Indonesia, Ford 
(2014) and Kostova and Zaheer (1999) observe that Indonesia’s weak institutions 
may have resulted from the fall of the 33-year Soeharto dictatorship and the impact 
of the 1997 Asian economic turmoil on its economy. Thus, in addition to the global 
financial turmoil, Kostova and Zaheer (1999: 74) refer to an Indonesian 
sociopolitical and economy “cataclysm” that has contributed not only to changes to 
local institutions, business systems and firms’ practices, but also to how the world 
continues to perceive Indonesian institutions, subsidiaries and actors as “weak”. 
Until now, there has been no comprehensive understanding of how prominent global 
work organisations and employment relations practices can be implemented, nor 
how “weak” institutions react to such diffusion. 
Despite the growing body of research on differences in Asian cross-border 
transfer mechanisms and IHRM strategies, insufficient attention has been paid to 
HRM-IR practices in Indonesia, specifically. Since the 1990s, Indonesia has been the 
largest Japanese FDI recipient. It is also the largest Japanese automotive 
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manufacturer and market in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
region. These statistics are indicative of the level of knowledge inflows, as foreign 
capital customarily brings foreign knowledge and technology to the host country. 
Moreover, Indonesia is classified as one of the 13 most rapidly-growing developing 
countries and transition economies globally (e.g. Fainshmidt et al., 2016; Abo, 2015; 
Wright et al., 2005; Hoskisson et al., 2000). To fill a gap in the knowledge transfer 
literature in the EME context, this research investigates how JMNCs diffuse 
knowledge from their knowledge networks and how Indonesian subsidiaries 
assimilate and exploit new knowledge. Conceptually, the emphasis is on 
mechanisms that improve subsidiary employees’ abilities and motivation to adopt 
new knowledge, and on subsidiaries’ HR management practices that facilitate 
knowledge inflows from the JMNC, compared with the inter- and intra-
organisational tools that have been studied in advanced institutional contexts (e.g. 
Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011; Van Wijk et al., 2008; Lenox & King, 2004). 
2.2.1 Institutions and Japanisation 
Building on institutional concepts (Ferner et al., 2012; Kostova et al., 2008; Morgan 
& Kristensen, 2006), this research examines forms of actors’ power resources and 
interests that emerge when MNCs operate in a context of institutional duality. It 
incorporates the intra-organisational environment as a component of institutional 
duality, since in addition to the external environment, subsidiaries are exposed to the 
intra-organisational institutional field, thus conforming to the description of 
“institutional duality” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The logic of JMNC-wide value 
transfer seeks to standardise Indonesian subsidiaries’ HRM-IR practices, which may 
have unintended consequences in creating greater variation, depending on whether 
they are implemented fully, partially or not at all. 
As Nell et al. (2015) suggest, diffusing management practices rooted in an 
advanced economy institution to a less-developed economy is complex, and such 
diffusion is likely to conflict with local institutions, norms and practices. 
Furthermore, high institutional distance may create a degree of tension and a 
complex legitimation process for HQs seeking to convey their interests and diffuse 
their HRM “best practices” to their subsidiaries (Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 
2011). HQs may insist on strategy and practices that contradict subsidiaries’ interests 
and practices, leading to HQ-subsidiary conflicts (Blazejewski et al., 2011). 
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Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011) depict the conditions under which 
subsidiaries may draw on a broad range of strategies, from “boy scout” to 
“subversive” behaviours. 
Following Smith and Meiksins (1995), the current study recognises that MNCs 
are embedded in continuously evolving systems structured at three institutional 
levels: macro, meso and micro. Furthermore, each level has distinct institutional 
processes and varies in the extent to which MNCs’ levels of ownership, strategy and 
behaviour are framed (Birkinshaw et al., 1998). In this context, Kostova et al. (2008: 
1001) contend that “MNCs’ relationships with their institutional environments are 
dynamic, discretionary, symbolic and pro-active”. Taking home-country institutional 
characteristics and MNCs’ institutional relationships together, Oliver (1991, cited in 
Kostova et al., 2008: 1001) postulates that MNCs may experience “varying degrees 
of compliance to institutional pressures”. Thus, this study argues that MNC actors’ 
incorporation of power and interests institutionally legitimises their participation in 
managing, negotiating and constructing the essence of cross-border transfer. 
Subsidiary actors may experience conflict in situations of institutional duality when 
they feel pressure from the HQ to adopt a particular set of practices, while having to 
comply with local institutions (Kostova et al., 2008). 
2.2.2 Overview of Japanese work, employment and organisation institutions 
Historically, Japan has been involved in market-seeking investment. JMNCs have 
been open to making foreign investments and have explored the US, Canada and 
Mexico to serve North American markets—and Germany, the UK and Poland to 
serve European markets. By the 1990s, Southeast Asia had become the epicentre of 
Japanese FDI, while Japan was at the forefront of FDI throughout ASEAN, engaged 
in trading with its former colonies mainly in heavy machinery and household 
appliances. The growth of JMNCs operating in EMEs has led to growing discussion 
of JMNCs’ mechanisms of work, employment and organisational capabilities, and 
“interaction with host-country specificities” in different settings and conditions 
(Hotho & Pedersen, 2012: 251). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and Lam (1997) also 
argue that in comparison to US MNCs, JMNCs’ work organisation systems are more 
tacit and less codified. Such features suggest that JMNCs have less organisational 
capacity to disseminate knowledge and coordinate cross-border transfer. Through 
either gradual, layering or transformational processes, Japanese institutions and HR 
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practices have changed fundamentally (e.g. Endo et al., 2015; Aoki, 2001; Thelen & 
Mahoney, 2009; Dore, 1990). As Sako and Kotosaka (2012) contend, the changes 
have taken place in a piecemeal fashion, layering the old system with new and 
gradual convergence. This not only makes changes difficult to identify, but also 
means that any adverse impact may have been neutralised in the new system. 
Institutional transformations in Japan illustrate a model of incremental change, 
layering the approaches of older institutions by facilitating new strategies while 
leaving old strategies intact (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). For example, the norm of 
“lifetime employment” has remained as it was, while dualism has been reinforced in 
the Japanese labour market, as core employment is layered with new forms of 
contingent employment (Jackson & Miyajima, 2007). These layering and piecemeal 
strategies may be a distinctively Japanese method of exercising power. 
Turnbull’s (1986) concept of Japanese production and IR has been developed by 
various scholars to deepen understanding of the dimensions of lean production, and 
to frame this concept within the paradigm of management control and maintenance 
of workplace peace that is characteristic of Japanisation (e.g. Bratton & Gold, 2017; 
Stewart et al., 2009; Elger & Smith, 1994). However, in the context of institutional 
power held by MNC actors, it has proved difficult to theorise the diffusion of 
Japanisation (e.g. Abo, 2007; Aoki & Dore, 1994; Womack et al., 1990). Moreover, 
as Aoki et at al., (2014) emphasise, existing Japanese management studies lack a 
clear theoretical framework to explain conditions or capture how institutional 
strength, power interactions and characteristics of Japanese HRM models have 
determined the dominant HRM “best practice” phenomenon over the last 30 years. 
Endo et al. (2015) even question whether Japanese HRM “best practice” still matters. 
Aoki et al. (2014: 2551) postulate that “Japanese HRM practice has waned” as a 
consequence of dramatic changes in the ownership structures of JMNCs arising from 
the 1997 Asian economic and 2007 global financial crises. The weakening of 
keiretsu (business affiliation) structures, in particular, has had an impact on specific 
HRM-IR “best practices”. Consequently, management-employee relationships have 
been redefined in JMNC organisations operating both at home and abroad 
(Delbridge et al., 2011). More specific to this study, Martínez Lucio (2014b) 
observes that new investors in the region (notably China and India) and the 
weakening of keiretsu may have resulted in increased JMNC control of subsidiaries. 
As Stewart (2014a) notes, the lean production ideology may be referred to as a lean 
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political economy, because lean working routines underscore resource control, 
burdening workers with the cost of production. Bamber et al., (2014) frame this as 
lean management thinking that improves HRM practices. This situation may 
intensify JMNC management’s use of power to impose the dominant Japanese HRM 
“best practice”, another paradigm of management control practices that increasingly 
clashes with host countries’ institutions and subsidiaries’ HRM practices. 
The Japanese institution and business systems literature indicates that not only 
have Japanese institutions changed over the past 30 years, but the diffusion of 
Japanese cross-border practices has also varied according to the specific business 
objectives of particular host-country institutions (e.g. Amable & Palombarini, 2009; 
Jackson & Miyajima, 2007). Much of the existing literature (e.g. Aoki et al., 2014; 
Abo 2007; Suzuki et al., 2016) suggests that JMNCs do not strictly replicate their 
home-country practices when they go abroad, which raises a number of questions. 
For example, what constitutes cross-border transfer, and under what conditions does 
it differ in inter- and intra-organisational settings? Too little is currently known of 
the transfer mechanisms of Japanese HRM-IR practices in the context of institutional 
changes in home and host countries. 
Elger and Smith (1994) argue that Japanese institutions of work, employment 
and organisations may be reflected in the country’s patterns of business operations 
and spread of FDI. According to Lange and Becker-Ritterspach (2016), in 2013, 
61% of worldwide FDI was targeted at developing countries and emerging markets 
(UNCTAD, 2014). Capital investment may lead to the inward transfer of 
management practice but transferring Japanese HRM-IR “best practices” is 
contested, institutionally embedded. Thus, it should not be assumed that subsidiaries 
will accept it with open arms. 
2.2.3 Overview of Indonesian labour market institutions 
Lechevalier (2014) observes that shortly after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
JMNCs identified new growth regimes and intensified their economic involvement 
in ASEAN regional integration. According to Rahmaddi and Ichihashi (2013), Japan 
has been the major FDI player in Indonesia’s market, and Indonesia has managed to 
attract more FDI than any other ASEAN country since the mid-1990s. This 
development suggests not only that the host country’s institutions may have 
improved, but also that its human capital and business infrastructure may have 
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attracted Japan and JMNCs to invest. In fact, in recent years, several Japanese 
automotive plants have opened and are fully operating under Japanese management 
in Indonesia to serve Southeast Asia’s emerging markets (Reuters, 2016). 
Furthermore, in 2013, the Japanese government, in cooperation with the Japan Bank 
for International Cooperation (JBIC), unveiled a programme to increase and 
accelerate investment in Indonesia. In fact, JBIC labelled Indonesia the new 
automotive manufacturing hub for Southeast Asia (JBIC, 2013). Indonesia has the 
world’s fourth-largest population and is Southeast Asia’s largest economy. Also, its 
promisingly sustainable government has made substantial socioeconomic and 
political structural changes. For these reasons, Indonesia is a key Japanese FDI 
destination for inflows of capital, resources and technology. Therefore, it is relevant 
to investigate the institutions of this host country. 
Since the 1990s, JMNCs’ business objectives have shifted and their business 
dynamism in EMEs has intensified (Kingston, 2013; McGee, 2009). Notably, the 
automotive industry in Indonesia has improved. Autoparts manufactured in 
Indonesia are now increasingly assembled together with other autoparts made, for 
example, in the US and Mexico and labelled “Made by Toyota” (Irawati & Charles, 
2010). This provides a reasonable example of the inflow of knowledge transfer, the 
outcomes of and motivations for JMNC cross-border transfer, and the implications 
of Japanese FDI for the wider local economy (Ferner & Edwards, 1995). 
Of equal importance is the fact that Indonesia has experienced considerable 
socioeconomic development, with substantial reforms to its political structure and IR 
(McGee, 2009; Ford, 2014, 2013). Dhanani et al. (2009) see the country as being 
susceptible to foreign MNCs’ participation in improving local labour market 
institutions. Specifically, since the fall of Soeharto’s regime in 1998, Indonesia’s IR 
has experienced a change in climate as well as regulatory reforms (Booth, 2007, 
1998; Ford, 2000). The collapse of the dictatorship resulted in a more sustainable 
international business environment with increasing organised labour, but power 
remains in the hands of corporations, particularly family oligarchs and business élites 
with previous close connections with the Soeharto regime and national institutions 
(Rosser, 2014; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). Given the host country’s transitional 
democracy, economy and labour market institutions, international business scholars 
(e.g. Meyer & Peng, 2016; Temuri et al., 2016; Deng & Yang, 2015) argue that we 
still do not fully understand this phenomenon in EME contexts beyond China and 
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India. The host country’s labour market institutions have experienced reform and, as 
Martínez Lucio (2014b: 294) observes, MNCs are now increasingly contested 
spaces. 
Within the ASEAN geopolitical economy, following the dictatorship’s demise in 
1998, Indonesia ratified 19 ILO Conventions, including Convention No. 87, 
protecting the right to organise and allowing freedom of association (Ford, 2004; 
Aspinall, 1999; ILO, 1996-2016). Labour market institutions in Indonesia 
experienced remarkable changes, from having no freedom to organise or associate to 
gaining status and constitutional protection to organise (Barry & Wilkinson, 2011; 
Manning, 1998; Rosser, 2014). This dramatic shift illustrates how a change in the 
host country’s structure of HR development and IR policies may prompt new forms 
of institutions that diffuse power resources, in the form of employers’ associations 
and collective action by local BGs. It is also noteworthy that Indonesia is the only 
country in ASEAN that has ratified 19 ILO conventions, yet its institutional systems 
to coordinate human capital with labour and knowledge remain weak, like Malaysia 
and Thailand (Fainshmidt et al., 2018). As a result, Indonesian IR remains 
characterised by exclusionary corporatism, meaning that local actors’ power and 
interests in political participation may reduce the extent and impact of other 
industrial actors’ involvement as employer and employee representatives (Rosser, 
2014; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). Hence, the combination of local business 
associations and state officials has created a distinctive historical, institutional and 
political phenomenon in Indonesian HRM-IR (Ford & Pepinsky, 2013; Ford, 2014). 
Continued exclusionary corporatism in Indonesian IR means that coercion and 
repression of political participation by employers and government reduce the extent 
and impact of employers’ rights (Rosser, 2014). Considering the business élite’s 
close connections with national institutions, policy makers and politicians, Dieleman 
and Sachs (2008) depict Indonesian institutions in terms of “crony capitalism” or 
“cronyism” (Khatri et al., 2006). They argue that “ownership of private and market 
power in the hands of a few large and diversified business groups” explains 
corporate-institutional interactions in emerging economies, and that Indonesia is 
characterised by “a highly symbiotic relationship between its institutions and a small 
group of companies” (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008: 1275-6). In reality, Soeharto’s fall 
did not necessarily take down the regime, nor change the spectrum of dominant 
actors and the business environment in Indonesia. 
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Studies on Indonesian (e.g. Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Ford & Pepinsky, 2014; 
Robison & Hadiz, 2004) and Asian business systems (i.e. Fainshmidt et al. 2018; 
Witt & Redding, 2014) indicate that large, dominant local corporations owned by 
family business groups 1 had close connections with the authoritarian regimes, as 
well as with current policy makers and political actors. This means that, in 
Indonesia’s “weak” host-country institutional setting, the roles and power resources 
of local BGs and social-political actors remain important dimensions of the labour 
market institution because they influence national employment, IR and 
organisational practices, policy development and international business. The power 
of local BGs derives mainly from their close links with national institutions, 
affording them access to the government and the power to influence the national 
rules of the game. In addition, the interests of the BGs examined in the current study 
proactively influence labour market institutions, protecting local systems and 
shaping the national IR system. 
Another salient element of the host country’s labour market institutional change 
is that an established association represents the voice of local employers: the 
employers’ association of Indonesia, APINDO. APINDO’s institutional power 
increased following a government mandate through Presidential Decree No. 6/2013 
naming it as a government partner. This designation enabled it to work closely with 
local and international governments, NGOs and business associations. As a result of 
this decree, APINDO became part of a team of expert international trade 
organisations making recommendations to the government and international 
governing bodies (APINDO, 2015a, 2015b). More specifically, APINDO is not only 
able to access the government on behalf of local firms but has also been granted 
decrees from the president and cabinet ministers allowing its involvement in HRM 
practices, IR regulations and related business activities. Such privileges may add 
another dimension to host-country institutional networks and influence the labour 
market institutions, as APINDO maintains close alliances with the government. 
Similarly, Davis et al.’s (2003) examination of networks of local conglomerates 
reveals that many firms share the same directors, prompting the conclusion that 
APINDO members are well-connected owing to the structural concentration of 
                                                 
1 In this study, the term “business group” is used to describe the business conglomerate’s corporate 
networks in Indonesia. Locally, Astra Automotive Group, a business entity of Astra International, is 
known as an Indonesian conglomerate. It is similar to Japanese keiretsu, South Korean chaebol and 
Indian business networks. 
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powerful organisations in the host country. In a similar vein, Indonesia is recognised 
as having “weak” IR institutions, allowing room for JMNCs to get involved and 
participate in the infrastructure. This perception appears to legitimise the employers’ 
association’s active engagement in the process of influencing the HRM-IR business 
climate (Barry & Wilkinson, 2011). 
In a transitional economy such as Indonesia, established semi-independent 
business associations, namely APINDO and the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce 
(KADIN), play important roles in improving the infrastructure of local businesses 
and labour market institutions. Although their operations are distinct, their 
commitment to and interests in shaping Indonesian labour market institutions cannot 
be separated from those of local subsidiaries. In other words, the presence, 
involvement and establishment of local association actors at the meso-institutional 
level may leverage power resources situated at macro and micro levels, owing to 
their close ties with local government and industries.2 This institutional arrangement 
may align with Ferner et al.’s (2012) contention that the macro- and micro-
institutional levels exhibit particular cross-border transfer mechanism differences. 
Section 2.7 discusses this line of debate in greater detail. Overall, APINDO’s 
important role in the cross-border transfer mechanism lies in promoting local actors’ 
interests to interject in, accept and negotiate MNC practices that may or may not fit 
with local systems and practices. In particular, since well-resourced and well-
connected local actors and firms have alliances with the local government-sponsored 
employer association, these connections have shaped post-dictatorship labour market 
institutions and has had a direct impact on HRM-IR “best practices” transfer, as well 
as the HRM-IR policies and practices of foreign subsidiaries. 
The next section brings in discussions on intercultural communication, general 
institutional debate and home- and host-country issues and relates them to the more 
specific theoretical foundations of this thesis. The theory of IHRM (i.e. Minbaeva et 
al., 2003) is reviewed and applied, MNC actors’ power, interests and resources (i.e. 
Ferner et al., 2012) are discussed, and MNC actors’ motivations and strategies (i.e. 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008) are examined to frame cross-border management 
transfer processes conceptually. 
                                                 
2 Ferner at al. (2012) use the terms “macro-institutional” or “subnational”, whereas the term “meso-
institutional” is used in this study. 
30 
2.3 Implications of Intercultural Communication Processes and Strategies for 
Cross-Border Transfer 
2.3.1 Importance of cross-cultural communications 
International joint ventures (IJVs) raise intercultural communication problems, as 
observed in the literature, but communication is also constrained by power. This 
section explores how previous organisational studies have addressed communication 
processes. Specific attention is given to the process of nemawashi, a philosophy of 
TPS (Nonaka, 1994), and its implications for the promotion of subsidiaries’ 
management-employee communications. This is important in facilitating MNC–
subsidiary interactions, social bonds and cross-cultural communications that lead to 
organisational learning, and particularly tacit knowledge. Subsequently, this section 
examines the application of a particular Japanese intra-cultural organisational 
communication strategy to organisations abroad. In so doing, it investigates the 
complexity of intercultural communication processes and actors’ relationships that 
take place within a specific context of institutional distance. The analysis is at the 
organisational level across management, employees, unions and other agents who 
serve as “communicators” between MNCs and subsidiaries. Through the theoretical 
lenses of organisational learning and cross-cultural communication, this thesis 
explains the strategies used by MNCs to build cross-cultural understanding and 
achieve organisational goals. By focusing on iterative, interactive and context-
dependent communication processes, this theoretical discussion aims to extend 
understanding of intercultural communication by shedding light on cross-border 
management practice transfer processes and mechanisms. 
The focus of this section is on mechanisms of intercultural communication that 
promote inflows of knowledge and nemawashi. While the existing literature 
recognises the cultural diversity of Asian cultures and countries, most studies use a 
single Asian country such as China, Korea or Japan to illustrate Asian culture as a 
whole (see Snell & Hong, 2011; Friedman & Antal, 2005). Similarly, some studies 
approach cross-cultural communications by comparing Asia as a whole with 
German, British or American culture (e.g. Nardon et al., 2011). Such over-
generalisations may lead to stereotyping and exaggeration of the attributes of group 
membership that may seriously affect the sender’s ability to communicate (e.g. 
Taylor & Osland, 2011; Ting-Toomey, 2012). Conceptually, classifying individuals 
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and groups into a single culture, with causal, closely-linked cultural values and 
behaviour, is simplistic and deterministic (Friedman & Antal, 2005). According to 
Tung and Verbeke (2010), the problems associated with assumptions of “spatial 
homogeneity” within a region, which describe broadly associated cultural closeness 
and similarity, may systematically undermine differences within it. Furthermore, 
Fang et al. (2017) maintain that doing business with a country in close proximity 
(e.g. Japan with Indonesia) and with a similar cultural orientation may be just as 
difficult as with a more distant country with a significantly different culture. This is 
referred to as the psychic distance paradox (O’Grady & Lane, 1996; Fang et al., 
2004). O’Grady and Lane (1996) argue that underestimating real cultural distinctions 
may mislead individuals and organisations, particularly when conducting 
international business (e.g. Fenwick et al., 2003). In fact, Hofstede’s (1984) national 
cultural paradigm of Japanese and Indonesian culture in the IHRM context indicates 
that Japanese and Indonesian cultures are very different, particularly with regard to 
cross-cultural communication orientations of power distance, types of shared 
knowledge, and the perceptions and experiences of the two parties (e.g. Nardon et 
al., 2011). This illustrates the complexity of intercultural communication processes 
in cross-border business communications. Also, Nardon et al. (2011: 86) emphasise 
that “culture guides attention and meaning creation is a key component in creating 
understanding across cultures”. This may promote a more effective exchange of 
knowledge to help avoid or minimise cross-cultural misunderstandings. 
Japanese society is meritocratic. Human capital development and training to 
become better workers is valued, and investment in organisational learning leads to 
innovation (Li et al., 2017; Snell & Hong, 2011). In Japan, there is a strong belief 
that all people are born equal and can become anything they like if they work hard 
(Hofstede, 1984). The Japanese work ethic is also associated with the Confucian 
values of education, thrift and hard work for personal growth (e.g. Baumann & 
Winzar, 2017; Kariya, 2009; Rosenbaum & Kariya, 1989). Conversely, Indonesian 
society is characterised by high power distance: its culture is non-meritocratic, and 
wide disparities between the rich and the poor are visible and socially accepted. In 
the organisational context, Indonesian workers expect to be clearly directed by their 
boss or manager. Hofstede (1984) describes Indonesian business communications as 
a classic type of dynamic relationship between guru [teacher, sensei] and student. 
Importantly, communication is indirect, and negative feedback is hidden. This 
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fundamental intercultural communication difference between Japan and Indonesia 
may be best described as conformity versus authority (Li et al., 2017). Figure 2.1 
illustrates Hofstede’s cultural paradigm comparisons for Japan and Indonesia. 
Japanese and Indonesian intercultural communications are an exemplary case of this 
cross-cultural phenomenon. 
 
Figure 2.1: Hofstede’s cultural paradigm comparisons for Japan and Indonesia 
Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/indonesia,japan/ (accessed 27 
October 2017). 
This section reviews communications theory from the perspective of holistic, 
context-specific communication processes. It focuses on capturing iterative and 
interactive processes, and the implications of adopting the Japanese way of 
communication across inter- and intra-organisational affiliate firms operating in 
Indonesia. The remainder of this section focuses on three key areas. First, the extant 
literature is reviewed through the lenses of intercultural communication and 
organisational learning (Heavens & Child, 1999; Taylor & Osland, 2011), 
highlighting important mechanisms through which intercultural communication can 
transform employees’ workplace participation. Second, in advancing the intercultural 
communication concept, a holistic analysis examines cross-cultural modes of 
communication. In addition to management, employees and unions, this analysis 
explores relationships with business associations involved in diffusing Japanese 
dominant HRM “best practice”. Third, in examining organisational learning in 
MNCs, this section investigates the impact of culture on communications in relation 
to the transfer of specific work systems (i.e. TPS, TQM and lean production) across 
organisations with diverse cultural environments, and with different management 
practices resulting from differences in Japanese ownership structure, length of 
presence and management influence. 
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2.3.2 Understanding intercultural communications 
Lusting and Koester (1999: 52) define intercultural communication as “a symbolic 
process in which people from different cultures create shared meanings”. According 
to Alexander et al. (2014), it comprises cultural logics, power dynamics and 
discourse, and is thus embedded in context, history and power. 
According to Ting-Toomey (2012: 18), the interactive objective of intercultural 
communication may be a “symbolic exchange process whereby individuals from 
different cultural communities negotiate shared meanings in an interactive situation”. 
Both senders and recipients interact with their own environment and organisation, as 
well as with their own mental stage (Taylor & Osland, 2011) or, as Nardon et al. 
(2011) put it, cognitive evaluation. Although these interaction processes are never 
simple, interaction is fundamental to ensuring that the flow of tacit knowledge does 
not get lost or disappear. It maintains a connection between sender and recipient and 
entrenches knowledge in the organisational system and its sub-units (Taylor & 
Osland, 2011). Thus, interactive communication processes may be a key factor in 
maintaining the circulation of knowledge and internal development for both 
individuals’ and MNC subsidiaries’ organisational learning. Furthermore, interactive 
intercultural communication is context-dependent, involving tangible and intangible 
elements in encoding and decoding meanings, and conveying a deeper understanding 
of the context of culturally complex settings (Nardon et al., 2011). 
Mutual understanding is key in culturally complex communications, particularly 
when tacit knowledge is involved. However, some intercultural elements tend to 
create misunderstanding, such as language barriers, and differences in 
communication style and value orientation (Ting-Toomey, 2012). In addition, there 
may be a high level of uncertainty between sender and recipient about the context, 
the message, timing and location for introducing new concepts. In other words, 
conveying meaning in a cross-cultural context involves interpretations of language, 
culture and context, which is an iterative, incremental, and sometimes slow process 
for both sender and recipient. Communication is an interactive process of 
exchanging thoughts and ideas that, unsurprisingly, involves emotions “in an effort 
to find common ground” (Nardon et al., 2011: 90). In organisational learning, 
interaction is at the heart of the communication process of motivating and leading 
employees and working with teams (Nardon et al., 2011; Marks & Chillas, 2011). 
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2.3.3 Effect of culture and communication elements on interactions in intercultural 
communications 
The theoretical discussion of this sub-section is based on Nardon et al.’s (2011) work 
on the sequencing of conversational topics, the format of messages and 
conversational formalities. Ordering or sequencing of conversational topics is 
important in intercultural communication. Some cultures prefer to start conversations 
with “small talk” on general or even unrelated topics before getting to the real 
business. Indeed, “small talk” serves a valid function, as it allows understanding to 
be established and may lead to the development of some degree of trust. Nardon et 
al. (2011) describe this as “warming up”. 
Formal processes and channels apply to both verbal and written communication. 
While some cultures emphasise rigid formal communication mechanisms, others are 
used to more flexibility. Some cultures also prefer messages to come through 
“proper” channels of communication, such as written commands and instructions, 
whereas others like to use informal channels, such as associates, friends and family. 
Formal processes and channels help identify trusted sources. How a message is 
constructed may also have a profound impact on how it is received (Nardon et al., 
2011: 91). Business operations tend to use formal communication channels, although 
formal processes and channels may be perceived as a systematic, top-down, less 
interactive communication setting that may discourage employees from participating 
or voicing their views to management. 
Conversational formalities encompass acceptable or preferred formal 
conversational etiquette. Nardon et al. (2011) argue that culture exerts a significant 
influence on communications etiquette, such as using a person’s title as a sign of 
respect or power in a non-egalitarian culture, and how, when and where to speak to 
others. In addition, formal apologies are heavily practised throughout East and 
Southeast Asia, and they are expected in some business situations. Formal apologies 
demonstrate harmony, empathy and acceptance of responsibility, and should not be 
perceived as a sign of weakness, lack of confidence or acceptance of legal 
responsibility (Nardon et al., 2011). This culturally regulated etiquette is also 
observed when making business proposals or requests. 
The gradual introduction and group discussion of ideas in formal settings is best 
illustrated in the Japanese notion of nemawashi (Nardon et al. 2011: 91). In an 
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organisational setting, nemawashi is a process of exploring a formative proposal to 
obtain input from individuals involved in a project, which may include 
organisational stakeholders, with the aim of gaining pre-approval for the proposal 
from as many members as possible. Although nemawashi is a formal communication 
method, it also comprises informal communication processes. The key to the 
nemawashi process is the opportunity for as many members as possible to 
participate. In the event of failure, nemawashi mechanisms prevent people from 
“losing face”. 
2.3.4 Overview of Japanese intercultural communication: Nemawashi 
Nardon et al. (2011: 91) identify nemawashi as a cultural communication protocol 
that encompasses formal, informal and implicit communication (delivering tacit 
knowledge) regulated by culture. In any type of knowledge or mode of transfer, “the 
communication process will be affected by culture” (Taylor and Osland, 2011: 583). 
From a Japanese cultural communication perspective, nemawashi literally means 
“going around the roots”, in the sense of digging around the roots of a tree to prepare 
it for transplantation. In an organisational context, nemawashi is described as the 
first step in the decision-making process in TPS. This process involves sharing 
information with all employees to include their opinions in the decision making, as 
well as allowing changes to be made with the consent of all parties (Toyota GB, 
2013). It also embodies the concept of continuous efficiency improvements seen in 
manufacturing processes. However, Heavens and Child (1999) suggest that the 
Japanese are reticent and formal in communications with strangers, and particularly 
with non-Japanese strangers. 
Taking the contexts of Japanese culture and TPS together, nemawashi is an 
informal process of laying the foundation and building a consensus of opinion before 
making formal changes to a proposal or project. This cultural communication 
element is fundamental to Japanese organisational learning because it enables 
knowledge creation and innovation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Nardon et al. 
(2011) further argue that although nemawashi suits Japan’s highly formal culture, 
informal communications remain essential for intra-organisational communication 
and global competitive success. Hence, it is important to know when and where to 
use formal or informal communication. 
36 
Nemawashi is a meticulously slow-moving decision-making process. As 
Japanese organisational culture does not recognise a single decision maker, all 
decisions must be confirmed by every hierarchal department head before reaching 
top management for approval. Furthermore, the Japanese meritocratic system leads 
to less likelihood of engagement in disruptive economic activity, such as political 
movements and labour union strikes (Li et al., 2017), which is very different from 
the political culture of Indonesia. 
2.3.5 Overview of Indonesian intercultural communication: Musyawarah mufakat 
Musyawarah mufakat (deliberation and consensus) is an Indonesian cultural 
decision-making process safeguarded by the institution, widely practised nationally 
and embedded in both formal and informal business communication settings 
(Kawamura, 2011; Koentjaraningrat, 2009). In fact, musyawarah is one of the five 
pillars of the Indonesian institution3 and mufakat was adopted into the Indonesian 
constitution in 1945, guiding democracy. Therefore, musyawarah mufakat (MM) 
forms the backbone of communication processes and strategy, providing an 
institutional basis for the democratic stability of Indonesia’s cultural diversity 
consisting of more than 750 spoken languages and 300 ethnic groups (Geertz, 1963, 
1973). This intercultural communication may have a significant impact on HQ–
subsidiary communications (e.g. Taylor & Osland, 2011). Some scholars describe 
MM as a form of political culture (e.g. Anderson, 1990; Crouch, 2010; Mizuno, 
2006).4 The musyawarah concept constitutes a process that develops general 
agreement and consensus collectively, resulting in a unanimous decision or mufakat 
(Kawamura, 2011). Theoretically, MM protects minorities’ views from the majority 
(Koentjaraningrat, 1967: 397). However, in practice, “intensive lobbying is 
conducted behind the scenes to find an agreeable point between those who proposed 
and opposed” (Kawamura, 2011: 4). These lobbying processes may determine the 
result. Although the official consensus voting represents a ceremonial type of 
communications protocol (e.g. Nardon et al., 2011), the very fundamental concept of 
MM provides all parties with veto power. While MM has a place in Indonesian 
                                                 
3 This pillar of the State Principles (Pancasila) states that democracy is “guided by the inner wisdom 
of deliberations [permusyawaratan] among representatives”. 
4 For instance, the law states that every decision must be taken unanimously. Koentjaraningrat (2009) 
argues that the manifestation of Indonesian communities is the institution of musyawarah. 
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business communications, questions remain about whether it contradicts or can be 
integrated into the Japanese nemawashi communication orientation. 
2.4 Conceptualising HRM practices in an EME setting 
Wright et al. (2005) observe that since the early 1990s, broader and deeper theories 
of knowledge transfer in EMEs have been developed, while new problems and 
questions have been raised. However, coverage of specific countries and regions has 
been uneven, and understanding of knowledge transfer mechanisms and cross-border 
HRM practices remains subject to considerable debate (e.g. Minbaeva & Santangelo, 
2018; Wood et al., 2016; Foss & Pedersen, 2004). Building on this literature, 
Minbaeva et al.’s (2014) retrospective underscores the significance of the structure 
of HRM practices as drivers of absorptive capacity. They see these practices as 
promoting both the ability and motivation of employees to facilitate cross-border 
knowledge transfer. However, they also note that this knowledge transfer remains an 
empirical challenge, since absorptive capacity must be considered theoretically as a 
dynamic rather than static construct. Following Minbaeva et al. (2014), the 
theoretical framework of the current research seeks to understand the dynamic 
process of knowledge transfer by incorporating the capabilities of the knowledge 
sender (i.e. JMNC) and receivers (i.e. Indonesian subsidiaries) in an EME setting. 
Inspired by the seminal work of Cohen and Levinthal (1990), this research 
distinguishes between inter- and intra-organisational knowledge flows. This 
distinction facilitates a more detailed examination of the nature of the dynamics of 
knowledge transfer from the perspective of both sender and receiver. Moreover, 
existing studies identify various compelling means of organisational control, 
employee motivation and management capability-coordinating knowledge processes 
across EMEs such as China and India (e.g. Deng & Yang, 2015; Mäkelä & Brewster, 
2009). Specifically, Fey and Björkman (2001) argue that continued development of 
EMEs’ HR infrastructure may have an impact on firms’ absorptive capacity. 
Minbaeva et al.’s (2003) concept is applicable to this study because, while inter-
organisational knowledge networks and the structure of subsidiaries’ HR practices 
vary, inter-human relationships must remain at a certain level to maintain knowledge 
inflows. Knowledge transfer mechanisms rely on individual and interpersonal 
interactions (Reiche et al., 2009; Felin and Hesterly, 2007), and when these are 
absent, knowledge transfer is limited (Minbaeva et al., 2014). Minbaeva et al. (2014) 
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speculate that weak interpersonal interactions, in turn, diminish ability, motivation 
and the opportunity for knowledge processes. Previous studies (e.g. Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998) have found that the absorptive capacity 
of receiving units plays the most significant role in knowledge transfer. In order to 
stimulate the adoption and diffusion of knowledge by their subsidiaries, MNCs must 
facilitate communication between organisational units. This mechanism may serve as 
an inter-human interface through which to share expertise and recognise the 
capabilities of Indonesian subsidiaries. Interpersonal interactions form a micro-
foundation for absorptive capacity, enhancing employees’ motivation and their 
ability to interact to adopt and utilise knowledge (Minbaeva et al., 2014). 
The key theoretical application of this study is to provide an understanding of 
the role of subsidiaries in both acquiring and applying new knowledge. Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) suggest that these are critical elements of knowledge transfer for 
organisational learning, as they may lead to the development of new ideas, and 
hence, new organisational behaviour. The essence of organisational learning is to 
bring about changes in organisational outcomes. Furthermore, Minbaeva et al. 
(2003) argue that intended HRM practices enhance organisations’ creation and 
development of absorptive capacity, i.e. employee participation. This involves 
managerial cognition both in facilitating knowledge transfer, and in enhancing 
individuals’ abilities and motivation (e.g. Ahammad et al., 2016; Volberda et al., 
2010). Minbaeva et al. (2003: 586) state that “subsidiaries differ in their absorptive 
capacity and this affects the level of internal knowledge transfer from other MNC 
units”, a view shared by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Gupta and Govindarajan 
(2000). 
According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 128), absorptive capacity is “the 
ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and 
apply it to commercial ends”. Extending this concept, Lane et al. (2001) suggest that 
absorptive capacity is the ability to apply new knowledge, as distinct from merely 
understanding and assimilating it. The current study finds that knowledge inflows 
from Japan occur both within local firms and between the JMNC and its subsidiaries. 
It also explores knowledge transfer within firms that are Japanese/Indonesian joint 
ventures, but which have subsidiaries with no foreign investment. In this case, 
autoparts subsidiaries belong to the same JMNCs’ suppliers (i.e. Toyota and Honda) 
but are fully owned by local management, Astra International. These local autoparts 
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subsidiaries provide an interesting opportunity for comparison, as they have the same 
control issues as other Japanese joint-venture firms and serve the same JMNC clients 
but without Japanese ownership. Details of the empirical data are discussed in 
Chapter 4, and empirical findings on knowledge transfer are presented in Chapter 6 
of this thesis. 
2.4.1 Systematic social integration: inter-organisational MNC knowledge transfer 
networks 
International business scholars have also observed that actors’ interactions in formal 
and informal settings may facilitate knowledge transfer, especially where the 
knowledge sender and recipient are from different cultures and mutual trust is a part 
of the learning environment (e.g. Song, 2014; Volberda et al., 2010). Zahra and 
George (2002) state that a firm’s dynamic capability for a high level of absorptive 
capacity is the result of high organisational knowledge coordination across the 
organisation and its sub-units. Knowledge transformation and exploitation 
capabilities may also be enhanced by systematic social integration (Volberda et al., 
2010), as a consequence of established inter-organisational and inter-human 
relationships that promote the subsidiary’s absorptive capacity. This is because 
systematic social integration may relate to a capacity for knowledge assimilation and 
exploitation, which is important in the EME context. Van Wijk et al. (2008) discuss 
inter-organisational networks in supply chain settings, examining how (intra-
organisational) supply chains gain access to knowledge to facilitate learning 
processes and increase competitiveness. Subsidiaries of the same local BG may also 
compete for both internal resources and external markets. Thus, the current research 
considers that systemic social integration may supplement a local firm’s fewer 
dynamic capabilities within MNC supply chains. 
2.4.2 HRM practices to promote employees’ abilities 
Specific to the discussion of knowledge transfer, the current research examines the 
interactive effect of certain HRM practices that lead to employees’ ability to adopt 
new knowledge. Building on Aguilera (2007) and Minbaeva et al. (2014), this study 
posits that a series of causal relationships exists between the intended HRM practices 
of employee participation and knowledge-sharing in organisational units, which in 
turn influences knowledge-based performance. In so doing, this study explores the 
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implications of the adoption of various facets of Japanese HRM “best practice”. The 
literature in this area has hitherto focused on the broad concept of “Japanisation”. 
However, in order to appreciate the complexities of HRM and knowledge transfer 
together, a more nuanced approach is required. For example, the Japanese work 
organisation philosophy of TPS promotes employees’ participation, motivation and 
commitment by empowering them in their day-to-day working practices. This study 
aims to extend the existing analysis by focusing on particular facets of these 
organisational learning processes, while underlining the important role of inter-
human relationships in interactions between the JMNC and its Indonesian 
subsidiaries. 
Through a comprehensive agenda for investment in training, trainer–trainee 
interactions may shape inter-human relationships (Foss et al., 2013; Lichtenthaler, 
2009; Jansen et al., 2005). Given the nature of shared-ownership relationships, 
IHRM practices entail cross-organisational training programmes, involving 
management and non-management employees and union/employee representatives. 
The training agenda covers technical and non-technical training conducted in various 
settings, from Japanese manufacturing sites to management offices both within and 
outside Japan. However, it is important to delineate the context of this study. The 
Indonesian subsidiaries also have in-house HRM policies and practices, and 
Indonesian HR managers engage with trainees to use their newly-acquired Japanese 
skills and knowledge in a practical context. This is yet another layer of inter-human 
relations affecting interactions between employees’ ability and motivation. It 
suggests that the adoption of Japanisation by Indonesian subsidiaries results from 
inter-human relationships across organisations, influencing employees’ ability and 
motivation. This raises the question of whether the mechanisms through which 
Indonesian subsidiaries’ levels of absorptive capacity to acquire and adopt Japanese 
HRM “best practice” are developed through inter-human and inter-organisational 
relationships. 
2.4.3 HRM practices to promote employees’ motivation 
Another fundamental aspect shaping organisational learning is the structure of 
knowledge utilisation. According to Pfeffer (1998), mechanisms for the influx of 
knowledge are important in motivating employees to use their acquired knowledge 
in the best interests of the organisation. In the context of Japanisation, trust is 
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perceived as a fundamental element of employees’ motivation. Strong motivation is 
based on feelings of trust in inter-human relationships. Thus, HRM “best practices”, 
including internal promotion, performance appraisal and performance-based reward 
systems, are simply mechanisms to motivate employees to contribute their skills and 
knowledge to the organisation. In other words, the essence of such HRM practices is 
the expectation of a positive relationship between organisational systems and 
employee effort, thereby providing strong motivation for employees to use their 
knowledge and skills to their full potential. Indeed, as Van Wijk et al. (2008) 
emphasise, interaction and trust in relationships between management and 
employees are invaluable in shaping employee motivation. This is a second element 
in the concept of absorptive capacity. Minbaeva et al. (2003: 591) maintain that 
“extensive intra-organisational communication is more likely to contribute to 
employees’ motivation”. In this thesis, it is argued that while Japanisation skills and 
knowledge may have a positive impact on employees’ careers and promotion with 
respect to organisational learning, behaviour and change, it is trust and opportunity 
to participate that are more likely to serve as motivators for the adoption of Japanese 
HRM “best practices”. 
Overall, the theoretical frame of cross-border knowledge transfer adopted in this 
study aims to move the debate beyond simply attempting to capture the extent of this 
phenomenon. Rather, it strives to elucidate the nature of knowledge assimilation and 
potential competition, not only between foreign and domestic companies but also 
between the MNC and non-organisational actors, thereby shaping knowledge 
transfer processes in firms with different levels of foreign holdings. The next section 
contextualises the types and allocations of MNC actors’ power and influence in 
cross-border transfer processes. 
2.5 Cross-Border Conflict and Tension at Inter- and Intra-Organisational 
Levels 
In an EME context, subsidiaries are exposed to institutional pressures stemming 
from the external environment (Nell et al., 2015). Pressure may also arise from their 
parent organisations’ institutional requirements, as well as institutional changes 
within the organisation (Almond, 2011b; Ferner & Edwards, 1995). This may 
increase conflict over cross-border transfers at inter- and intra-organisational levels. 
Moreover, subsidiary actors such as management and unions at the firm level retain 
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some scope for practices and interests of their own. The MNC’s HQ issues 
guidelines, and its demands are sometimes negotiated, especially when actors 
possess some degree of influence in relationships with the HQ, particularly at the 
intra-organisational level where subsidiaries have varying levels of relationships and 
sources of power (Edwards et al., 2007). Subsidiaries have a range of possible 
strategic responses to these inter- and intra-institutional pressures. Oliver (1991) 
frames these responses as full cooperation, avoidance (e.g. non-conformity, ritual 
compliance and compromise) and full resistance. He maintains that compromise 
emerges in situations of conflicting institutional demands and expectations, whereas 
a non-cooperation strategy is likely to occur when actors have divergent interests and 
understandings. These differences may occur between inter- and intra-organisational 
values. Subsidiaries may have different understandings of MNC practices and 
processes, and assumptions and definitions motivated by their own interests (Ferner 
et al., 2005). Edwards (1986) argues that relationships between actors and 
workforces are characterised by “structural antagonism”, providing a basis for the 
ongoing exercise of power and resistance. Edwards and Bélanger (2009) describe 
this as a “contested terrain”. Thus, the research presented in this thesis considers the 
variety of actors’ interests, and the sources of power of both the JMNC and 
Indonesian subsidiaries to explore Ferner et al.’s (2012: 167) contention that cross-
border “transfer leads to potential conflicts of institutional rationality that are 
resolved through the deployment of power capabilities”. The next section examines 
actors’ application of power to promote their own interests. 
2.6 Actors’ Power, Capacities and Dimensions 
Ferner et al. (2012) focus on the analysis of how actors’ incorporation of power and 
interests shapes transfer through processes that draw on institutional resources at the 
macro, meso and micro levels of JMNCs and subsidiaries, which is the main concept 
and theoretical point of departure for the present research. In turn, these MNC-
subsidiary power interactions influence transformations and adaptations of practices 
subject to cross-border transfer. On the one hand, HRM “best practices” are 
deployed by dominant JMNC actors to shape, sustain and activate institutions, which 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) describe as “institutional work”. On the other hand, 
established networks, associations and institutions may promote resources that 
enable low-power subsidiary actors to facilitate, block or modify cross-border HRM 
43 
“best practice” transfer (Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski, 2016). This research 
defines the objective of cross-border transfers as the main element of MNCs’ 
internationalisation strategy, and their behaviour as “enacted and socially constructed 
shared understandings and as outcomes of a social process in which the organisation 
and its subunits and actors are actively involved” (Kostova et al., 2008: 1001). In 
addition, this research does not treat cross-border transfers as exogenous constraints; 
rather, it is interested in examining how actors’ power interactions and interests 
shape the process and influence the outcomes of cross-border transfer in the context 
of EME institutions. This study adopts the concept of power defined by Lukes 
(2005: 12) as “a capacity not the exercise of capacity; an [actor] can be powerful by 
satisfying and advancing others’ interests”. Power must be understood in its 
institutional context as “institutional work” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). 
Following Giddens (1984, cited in Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski, 2016: 30), 
“‘Power to’ is related to the enabling, facilitative side of power that holds the 
capacity for action. ‘Power to’ thus captures the productive face of power; it 
‘empowers’ actors to pursue their [legitimate] interests”. 
Moreover, HQs may implement internationalisation strategies to varying 
degrees, and HRM “best practice” transfer and adoption may be modified in the 
course of implementation in the host country. These conditions demonstrate how 
actors utilise power capabilities as resources to legitimise their cognitive 
understanding and interests (Ferner et al., 2012; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Power also works as a constraint on action (Giddens, 1984), and it may prevent 
actors from pursuing and attaining their interests, for example, through restricting 
actors’ scope of action, coercion or manipulation (Becker-Ritterspach & 
Blazejewski, 2016). 
Ferner et al. (2012) view Lukes’s three power dimensions (resources, processes 
and meaning, i.e. ideological power) as actors’ power capabilities that emerge from 
country- and firm-level competitive advantages. Each type of power shapes cross-
border transfer. Specifically, actors’ cognitive, normative and regulative abilities 
frame the transfer environment. Smith and Meiksins (1995) emphasise that 
capitalism and its local forms, in interaction with foreign institutions such as 
Japanese capitalism with Indonesian “crony” capitalism, may create tensions in HQ-
subsidiary relationships, affecting the dynamics of MNCs’ strategy and behaviour. 
The competitiveness of the home country may provide the firm with a source of 
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power (Campbell, 2010), which may be a unique feature of the organisation 
(Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). Power capabilities, incorporated with actors’ interests, 
may potentially allow the dissemination of MNC practices, management 
involvement and ownership structuring. However, the strength of each power 
capability varies across macro, meso and micro levels. MNCs’ international practices 
are contingent on the power and cognitive interests of the actors involved in cross-
border transfer. 
The basis of Ferner et al.’s (2012) concept which frames this research is that 
dialectical relationships between different actors may either promote, manage or 
disregard efforts by HQ actors to disseminate their management practices to 
subsidiaries. In other words, the validity of Ferner et al.’s (2012) concept for this 
study relates to the integration of actors’ sources of power and interests, and how 
these bundled factors play out in cross-national transfer processes. All actors have 
certain power capabilities. Although one side may be stronger than the other, as 
Ferner et al. (2012) point out, HQ actors’ power may not necessarily surpass that of 
subsidiaries. Other important aspects of this concept are allocations of actors’ 
sources of power and how actors utilise them to serve their interests at different 
organisational levels. Consequently, to fundamentally understand the effects of 
actors’ power capabilities and interests on transfer processes, it is argued in this 
study that one needs to assess both capacities and interests together, examine 
allocations of sources of power, and test them at national, subnational and 
organisational levels of practice. This study aims to analyse comprehensively and 
accurately the power and interests of HQ, subsidiary actors and business associations 
directly involved in the transfer of cross-border HRM “best practice” mechanisms 
and their implications. It takes Kostova et al.’s (2008: 995) discussions of MNC 
actors’ power emerging from home- and host-country influences and institutional 
distance as a point of departure to examine “diverse, non-monolithic, fragmented, 
and possibly conflicting” conditions of cross-border practice transfer in an MNC 
context. Acknowledging this stance, the current study follows Ferner et al.’s (2012) 
suggestion that power does not necessarily remain in the hands of the MNC, and that 
actors’ interests are an integral part of power capability (“power to”), with dialectical 
interactions between different actors and levels of institutional analysis. 
At the macro-, meso- and micro-institutional levels, MNC actors have the power 
to shape, sustain and negotiate (Almond, 2011b). In addition, MNC actors’ abilities 
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shape their interests, while cognitive, normative and regulatory norms frame the 
institution of transfer. This is because transfer processes and outcomes are also 
contingent on the cognitive understanding and normative knowledge of the 
knowledge recipients: subsidiary managers, employees and unions. This research 
operationalises Ferner et al.’s (2012) application of Lukes’s (1975) three power 
dimensions as actors’ power capabilities in an EME context as follows: 
• The power of resources includes tertiary education and organisational resources 
such as reputation, capital, investment, knowledge and expertise. It may have a 
dominant effect in leveraging control, i.e. controlling scarce resources (Geppert 
& Williams, 2016). 
• The power of processes involves regulations, policies, laws, internal networks, 
organisational systems, “best practices”, customs and norms. It can be used to 
manage, challenge and/or bargain, i.e. control organisational processes (Geppert 
& Williams, 2016). 
• The power of meaning (i.e. ideological power) encompasses cognitive abilities, 
normative mindsets, codes of practice and international standard operating 
procedures, such as the work organisation and philosophy of the TPS, TQM and 
JIT. This is an important dimension of power in this research, as ideological 
power enables the framing of organisational culture and shared understanding 
and legitimises interests. 
Lukes’s (1975) ideological power dimension has three key implications for this 
study. First, ideological power influences or aims to change actors’ observable 
behaviour in a less contentious way. Second, where circumstances are institutionally 
constrained, dominant actors may be motivated to use a power approach based on 
shared understanding to achieve their objectives. Third, ideological power centres on 
an approach to exchanging understanding that invites actors to participate and 
promotes employee commitment to understanding new knowledge. This is one of 
Minbaeva et al.’s (2003) HRM dimensions that facilitates international knowledge 
transfer. Ferner et al.’s (2012) concept highlights that dialectical relationships 
between different MNC actors may, individually or collectively, promote, manage or 
ignore the inward transfer as a result of evolving affiliate actors’ interests, local 
institutions, and the power to assert legitimate influence to reject or accept them. 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) framework for understanding why and how MNC 
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actors achieve legitimacy can be viewed in connection with Lukes’s (1975) 
ideological power and Ferner et al.’s (2012) three institutional levels of power. As 
Ferner et al. (2012) observe, MNC actors’ power may not necessarily be greater than 
that of affiliate actors. Thus, understanding the power capabilities and processes 
involved in incorporating the power of meaning and how actors’ interests emerge 
may facilitate analysis of how power can be used to diffuse HRM processes and 
outcomes. Actors’ abilities also shape their interests, while cognitive, normative and 
regulatory norms frame mechanisms of resistance or protection. 
Ideological power emphasises shared values and understandings, enabling the 
diffusion of processes by overlaying existing frameworks with foreign/new 
normative ones (Crouch et al., 2009). This approach enables the framing of 
organisational norms and shared understanding, and may delegitimise practice 
(Suddaby & Greenwood 2005; Campbell, 2004). This diffusion mechanism 
perpetuates conditions under which dominant actors establish grounds for 
delegitimising other (low-power) actors’ norms and organisational practices, 
resulting in modification of existing behaviour and acceptance of foreign 
interventions (Hyman, 2001). Such conditions may create conflict, since managing 
meaning by challenging, redefining or discarding others’ management practices 
entails the exercise of power and management of resources, such as capital for 
training and employee commitment to the acquisition of new knowledge. Adding to 
the complexity, an element of control or diffusion may also be exercised by external 
organisations, such as quasi-government agencies and business association alliances 
directly involved in the diffusion process with interests in promoting dominant 
practices. 
Agencies may have different capabilities from MNC actors, enabling them to 
access and engage in diffusion processes inclusively with MNC actors (Mackenzie & 
Martínez Lucio, 2014). Using ideological power, they may circumvent contested 
norms, practices and understandings of dominant HRM-IR “best practices”. The 
power of ideology may create conditions under which a certain norm is admitted and 
valued by other actors (Ferner et al., 2005). This endorses the superior efficacy of 
dominant actors’ management practices, which are thus accorded legitimacy by a 
wide range of Japanese actors and regarded as global “best practice” (Thite et al., 
2012). This suggests that the processes and outcomes of diffusion are contingent on 
who is using the power and how, as well as their objectives for convincing others of 
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the legitimacy of the “best practice” or challenging (de)legitimisation of subsidiary 
actors’ existing practices. Although JMNC affiliate actors retain some scope for 
normative practices and interests of their own, these conditions are likely to increase 
tensions over (re)defining the meaning of HRM “best practice”. 
In addition to Oliver’s (1991) strategic defiance strategies of full cooperation, 
avoidance or full resistance, Ferner et al. (2012) reiterate that ideological power is a 
particularly important dimension that may accommodate subsidiary actors’ 
institutional defiance, constituting the level of understanding and cognitive abilities 
of both senders and recipients of procedures, settings and practices in a given 
context. Even though this process may not be observable, its outcomes may be 
operationalised in the form of permanent changes in behaviour, particularly where 
the JMNC is seeking to redefine and delegitimise subsidiary HRM practices that are 
standard in the host country. As a consequence, the impact of the power of ideology 
in IHRM is sophisticated, multidimensional and difficult to measure (e.g. Clegg, 
2013; Pfeffer, 1992). 
2.7 MNC HQ Actors’ Sources of Power 
Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 discuss the allocation of power, and how it interacts at the 
macro and micro levels respectively. Key sets of actors and power are also identified 
at the meso level (Section 2.7.3) and discussed in greater depth to analyse causal 
links in the diffusion of ideological power in the form of Japanese HRM-IR “best 
practices” transfer processes at the meso level. 
2.7.1 Macro level: home country-specific advantages 
This study contributes to knowledge of how globally recognised management 
practices and coordinated dominant actors’ strategies promote dominant practices in 
EMEs. It should be noted that Japan has a country-specific advantage in that the state 
plays an active role in business alliances as an important contributor to JMNC 
actors’ power. Established international diplomatic relationships also create 
opportunities for JMNCs to engage in business activities in other countries (Smith & 
Meiksins, 1995) and to facilitate agencies’ collaboration. This home country-specific 
advantage allows Japanese HRM “best practice” to spread and gain international 
recognition, which also serves the Japanese government’s interests. These activities 
provide an element of Japanese global competitive advantage because of the 
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coordinated nature of Japanese market institutions (Hall & Soskice, 2001), including 
both financial institutions and quasi-government agencies. In Whitley’s (1992) 
terms, the national business system is specific to the home country. The motivation 
for Japanese coordination, specifically governing and maintaining the existence of 
keiretsu, is that the Japanese spider-web business model is both an asset and a source 
of the Japanese competitive edge (Dyer, 1996). Hence, diffusion of management 
practices may be partly inspired by country-specific advantages exploited by JMNC 
actors (Buckley et al., 2012) and by government alliances with agencies to propagate 
Japanese HRM “best practice” abroad, consistent with JMNC and Japanese lean 
management ideology. 
Japanese industrial development is characterised by imports of raw materials 
and exports of finished goods (Ramamurti, 2012; Wilkins, 1986). Owing to the 
limitations of its natural resources and home market, Japan has been highly 
dependent on overseas trade, and since 1914, Japanese industrial development has 
surpassed that of other Asian countries, including Indonesia. In an era of 
internationalisation of capital, the Japanese government is following similar 
economic strategies to Western countries in opening up its economy and re-aligning 
economic power. As in Germany and the USA, the Japanese model is competitive. 
Japan is a dominant country in terms of socioeconomic, political and industrial 
development. As the world’s third-largest economy after the USA and China (Smith, 
2018, reported in World Economic Forum), Japan remains a capital importer, 
supported by political stability at home. Given its economic power and industrial 
development, Japan dominates countries with weak institutions. Hoskisson et al. 
(2000) describe the Japanese developed economy as having less institutional risk and 
uncertainty in comparison with EMEs, whereas greater institutional volatility may be 
perceived as a competitive disadvantage of host countries (Meyer & Peng, 2016; 
Meyer et al., 2009). Political tension, social unrest, as manifested by demonstrations 
and strikes, may also disrupt the labour force and supply chains, contributing to a 
country’s institutional instability (Chung & Beamish, 2005). 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis is relevant to this study for the following 
reasons. First, it led to the collapse of Soeharto’s dictatorship, which had an impact 
on local socioeconomic and political affairs. Second, it led to political and economic 
reforms that have had a positive effect on the local economy and the international 
business environment. Third, workers gained rights to organise, and freedom of 
49 
expression is now protected by national institutions. As a result of the reforms, 
Indonesia has been recognised as an EME since 2013. As shown in Figure 2.2, 
following the Asian and global financial recessions, Indonesia’s GDP growth was 
7.2% in 1990, and 5.1% in 2017, in comparison to Japan’s 4.9% and 1.7% in the 
same years. Indonesia experienced a greater economic recession than Japan during 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. However, since then, its GDP has steadily grown and 
is outperforming Japan, as Japan experienced the 2008 global financial recession 
more acutely. This suggests that economic changes have occurred, and that JMNCs 
may need to change how they conduct business in the host country. Of equal 
importance, these changes may have become vehicles for Indonesian actors to 
negotiate with the dominant Japanese. 
 
Figure 2.2: Indonesia Japan GDP comparison Growth 
(Source: the World Bank Group, national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files 
1990-2017) 
The 1997 crisis tested the competitiveness of both Japanese and Indonesian 
economies, as they faced tough choices in steering their economies, not just to avoid 
the crisis but also to remain internationally competitive. One option to overcome 
such crises is to restructure investment policy in order to stabilise the national 
economy and attract investors. While foreign investors see deregulation as an 
opportunity, relaxing policies may jeopardise national competitive advantage. 
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Therefore, institutional changes resulting from deregulation may have adverse 
impacts on a country’s political economic environment. 
Another source of national competitive advantage derives from systematic 
business alliances between banks, the state and other economic actors. These 
alliances are socially constructed, systematically reproduced and specific to the 
national environment. In the context of Japan, Hall and Soskice (2001) note that the 
state plays an active role in business alliances as important contributors to Japanese 
power sources and coordination in establishing institutional support abroad. 
Elements of this Japanese competitive advantage transfer to the Japanese model 
which, inspired partially by country-specific advantages and exploited by Japanese 
enterprises, serves as a source of competitive strength for JMNCs (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Aoki & Dore, 1994). Gao (2005) maintains that the state develops its 
interests by promoting diplomatic relationships with other countries and spreading 
investment abroad. Buckley et al. (2012) suggest that national competitive 
advantages from advanced macro-economic institutions may provide MNCs with a 
competitive advantage, but only if they use and internalise them. 
2.7.2 Micro level: firm-specific advantages 
This study contributes at the micro level of analysis by illustrating how HQ actors 
manage to maintain their dominant management status and establish institutional 
support outside the home country. Stewart (2014) argues that the Japanese method of 
production was regarded as a “new” concept because it introduced employees’ 
commitment to and participation in Japanese work organisation, the kaizen 
philosophy of lean management and production. Kaizen created tensions with 
existing standards of production, namely the German and American models of 
Fordism and Taylorism (Smith & Elger, 1994). Furthermore, Martínez Lucio 
(2014a) identifies lean management and production systems as a dominant ideology 
and a set of practices that have been accepted by, and often transformed, work 
practices globally. Drawing on 30 years of research on the global transfer of 
Japanisation to the Americas, Europe and Asia, Abo (2007) reveals that the cognitive 
rationale for “best practice” is the biggest challenge to transferring both the 
philosophy and the concept of lean management and production. MacKenzie and 
Martínez Lucio (2014: 251) postulate that, in response to external (host-country) 
regulation, “MNCs create their own idiosyncratic management systems internalizing 
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their strategies to create systems that respond to internal business and operational 
requirements”. In other words, through agencies, the MNC engages in contested 
micro-political processes to control subsidiaries. According to Morgan and 
Kristensen (2006, cited in Geppert & Williams, 2016: 141), “by referring to MNCs’ 
contested spaces, they thus put powerful key actors within headquarters and 
subsidiaries in the driving seat”. This thesis identifies not only who these actors are, 
but also how and what types of power they use to engage in micropolitical games 
with both HQ and subsidiary actors. Furthermore, coordinated state-corporation 
investment infrastructures institutionally monitor and provide resources to maintain 
the fundamental Japanese management ideology, thereby engaging in the 
management of meaning, i.e. the ideology of lean production (e.g. MacKenzie & 
Martínez Lucio, 2014; Clegg, 2013). 
The Japanese lean and TPS production models are examples of the globally 
recognised Japanisation ideology conveyed by the state, Japanese firms and actors, 
translating country-specific advantage into firm-level competitive advantage. 
Diffusion processes abroad, particularly in the host-country context, are perceived as 
weak. Delbridge et al. (2011) and Stewart (2014) suggest that these processes 
constitute organisational power resources that contribute to the dominant effect of 
JMNCs. Moreover, the JMNC’s strategies remain connected with its home political 
and economic institutions. This suggests that JMNC-specific advantages inevitably 
contribute to HQ actors’ power resources and interests in (de)legitimising HRM 
“best practice”, supported by institutions at home and in the JMNC’s global network. 
As Japan is a trade-orientated nation, JMNCs are familiar with the complexities 
of doing business overseas (Wilkins, 1986). Indeed, Japanese firms are intensifying 
their business investments in EMEs, with no sign of reducing their efforts to diffuse 
Japanisation (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). Product market, firm size and the structure 
of production technology are some of the firm-level competitive advantages that 
influence work, employment and organisational practices. A classic example of a 
firm-specific advantage is the lean production model, although some scholars (e.g. 
Stewart, 2014; Duran, 2007) question how the lean capitalist model of HRM “best 
practice” can fit into local business systems. Lean and innovation-mediated Japanese 
production concepts gained a global reputation and were identified as new standard 
practices transferable to the West (e.g. Kenney & Florida, 1993; Vogel, 1981; 
Womack et al., 1990). This model originated from the Japanese experience, 
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developed at Toyota and spread to other Japanese enterprises at home and abroad. 
Japanese industrialisation processes were internalised in Japanese firms and have 
become a source of competitive advantage, even for firms operating abroad. 
 However, previous research has identified potential difficulties in transferring 
the concept of lean production, such as technical support and the cognitive rationale 
for the system (Abo, 2015, 2007). Therefore, the international business infrastructure 
plays a significant role in propagating the Japanese model outside Japan, for 
example, through stationing personnel abroad and establishing internal networks 
such as business organisations, alliances and agencies, both to facilitate the 
dissemination of Japanisation and to enhance JMNCs’ power capabilities. This 
infrastructure not only helps to overcome the limited experience of Japanese 
management in understanding different regulations, customs and norms, but also 
provides systematic support for practice transfer and maintains the competitiveness 
of the Japanese model. As Berggren (1992) argues, adopting a lean production 
system requires the strict adoption of Japanese work organisation; it has its own 
“prescriptions” for making the model work. Nevertheless, with its combination of 
innovation, human-centred production and working conditions, the Japanese model 
has appeal as an HRM “best practice” and has been widely adopted (e.g. Bratton & 
Gold, 2017; Blyton & Turnbull, 2004; Berggren, 1992; Smith & Meiksins, 1995). 
Thus, the work organisation of lean, TQM and JIT, and capitalist ER under the 
Japanese HRM system are organisational resources that contribute to the dominant 
effect of JMNCs. Moreover, Japanese practices transferred overseas remain 
connected with the Japanese socioeconomic context, with coordination between 
government, quasi-government agencies and JMNCs. In other words, home-country 
coordinated market economy institutions inevitably contribute to Japanese actors’ 
source of power. 
Organisational theorists such as Geppert et al. (2016) and Dörrenbächer et al. 
(2011) assert that HQ actors may use their power resources and capabilities to 
impose their own organisational interests on subsidiaries. It is argued in this thesis 
that an additional institutional-level assessment, or in Ferner et al.’s (2012) words, a 
“subnational” level of analysis, is necessary to stimulate subsidiaries’ understanding 
of the adoption of HQ practices. Becker-Ritterspach and Blazejewski (2016: 29) 
make the case that a micropolitical strategy, as “the strategic employment of power”, 
is necessary to understand the substance of power capabilities. Micropolitics is rather 
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different from the institutional approach, but it may be a key concept for examining 
organisational politics. Becker-Ritterspach and Blazejewski’s (2016) argument is 
applicable to this study for three reasons. First, channels or platforms that mediate 
the interaction of actors’ power capabilities and interests will minimise and 
potentially avoid tensions that have adverse impacts on the transfer. Second, actors’ 
power at the meso level allows home and firm competitive advantages to be 
reproduced across borders and provides support for both HQ and subsidiary actors. 
Third, micropolitics raises a need to analyse the meso-institutional level, as 
discussed in the next sub-section. 
2.7.3 Meso level: interactions between country- and firm-level advantages 
The contributions of the meso-level analysis of this study are twofold: the analysis 
contextualises power interactions between macro and micro levels and investigates 
the important role of business associations and the strategy to diffuse dominant 
management practices to subsidiaries. To examine how country- and firm-specific 
advantages may have dominant effects in legitimising MNCs’ interests, enabling 
them to diffuse their practices across borders, this section examines interactions 
between HQ and subsidiary interests. According to Ferner et al. (2012), the 
constellation of country and firm competitive advantages will determine the “stance” 
of organisational capabilities; however, actors’ interests may shape transfer 
outcomes, particularly when the HQ’s interests are transferred to a host country with 
significantly different institutions. Therefore, Ferner et al. (2012) ask “who are the 
relevant MNC actors in the situation of institutional duality and transfer?” Similarly, 
Martínez Lucio (2014b) questions how actors coordinate and who the players are 
who engage in more systematic MNC control. 
Within macro- and micro-institutional settings, Ferner et al.’s (2012) brief 
explanation of subnational institutional settings gives an overview of the role of local 
governance networks that generate organisational skills. This study investigates the 
causes and effects of Japanese employment systems by looking at quasi-government 
agencies (and their coordination with semi-independent local business associations, 
see sections 4.7 and 4.8) at the meso level; it also looks at how their roles contribute 
to cross-border management transfer. Japanese organisations have experienced 
increasing meso-level institutional pressure that has affected corporate strategy 
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(Morris et al., 2018), but we still do not fully understand whether and how a JMNC’s 
strategic choices (corporate effects) at the meso level affect its operations overseas. 
Delbridge et al. (2011) argue that non-organisational actors such as employers’ 
associations involved in regulatory and normative frameworks deserve some 
attention. It is argued in this thesis that MNCs’ internal networks, through business 
associations, employees’ and employers’ associations and governing bodies, are also 
involved, and in some cases play an important role in cross-border HRM transfer. In 
particular, the business associations are able to feed in their power capacities and 
frame the mechanisms for transfer. They also form cross-border alliances with state, 
industry and non-state agencies to enhance their own organisational capabilities. 
Thus, in meso-institutional settings, interactions between country- and firm-level 
competitive advantages may offer new avenues for institutions to accommodate 
tensions between the power capacities and interests of the HQ and its subsidiaries. 
Actors’ deployment of power may create resistance or contestation, a “clash of 
rationalities” that affects the transfer process (Ferner et al., 2012; Kostova et al., 
2008; Lukes, 2005). Actors may either individually or collectively engage in 
coalition or opposition to accept, negotiate or reject the transfer. Although Ferner et 
al. (2012) postulate that the outcomes of cross-border transfers of practice in 
contexts of institutional duality are contingent on constellations of institutional 
distance and macro- and micro-level power capacities, they have not 
comprehensively addressed the power of business associations and employer 
organisations in the subnational institutional setting. In this thesis it is argued that 
meso-institutional power capacities influence institutions of work, constructing 
institutional variants and mitigating dominance effects and institutional distance. 
Establishing business associations that partner with home and host countries to 
promote HQ–subsidiary relationships may be crucial to ensuring a smooth transfer. 
Interactions between macro- and micro-institutional advantages are dynamic; hence, 
meso-institutions may mediate country- and firm-level competitive advantages. 
Streeck and Thelen (2005) postulate that institutional “layering” and “conversion” 
subtly modify the strength of power capacities into a shared-understanding type of 
approach. Thus, business associations’ power capacities support the transfer by 
removing or circumventing obstacles. Home and firm competitiveness are engaged 
in dialectic relationships to internalise practices. Business associations’ power 
capacities potentially modify and neutralise resistance to and tension with 
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subsidiaries’ interests by focusing on shared cognitive business strategy frameworks. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates power capacities in macro-, meso- and micro-institutional 
settings. At the meso level, the business association’s power capacities are deployed 
to mediate, circumvent or even avoid tensions in the transfer processes, whereas at 
the micro level, both HQ and subsidiary may leverage their power capacities. This is 
contingent on the environment of the transfer and the type of power deployed. 
2.7.4 Importance of meso-level ideological power in legitimising HRM “best 
practice” transfer 
It is argued in this thesis that the significance of the meso-level structures of 
ideological power, i.e. the application of Lukes’s (1975) power of meaning, has been 
overlooked. Specifically, there is as yet no adequate understanding of how the meso-
political influences of MNC actors—whose mission is to diffuse HRM “best 
practice” outside the MNC’s home institution, and who have been granted access to 
involvement in transfer processes—are legitimised. In addition, Ferner et al.’s (2012) 
subnational power resource settings have not been fully examined. Associations and 
state agencies develop systematic strategies, which become more important where 
macro- and micro-level channels of influence are institutionally limited. 
In light of the TPS implementation of mechanisms of dominance, this research 
extends Stewart’s (2014) “lean management” practices argument to the first, second 
and third tiers of Japanese automotive subsidiaries and supply chains and examines 
their power capacities to circumvent institutional resistance at macro, meso and 
micro levels. Ferner et al. (2012: 170) argue that “a macro-institutional level of 
analysis may be inappropriate”, whereas a subnational analysis offers an overarching 
perspective on national institutional factors and the subnational niches and variants 
in which they are located (Almond, 2011b). Geppert and Dörrenbächer (2014) and 
Kostova et al. (2008) point out that this contested power rationale at the meso level 
has not yet been fully investigated. Taking these existing gaps together, the current 
research aims to understand the dominant Japanese “lean management” practices 
being transferred, carried out by business associations and mandated by Japanese 
institutions and JMNCs (i.e. quasi-government agencies), and transfer processes at 
the meso level. Figure 2.3 shows the operation of three power dimensions at three 
institutional levels, and the importance of meso-institutional settings in the EME 
context. 
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Table 2.1: Power capacities 
 Headquarters (HQ) and Subsidiary (SUB) Power 
Capacities 
Institutional 
Settings 
Resources Processes Meaning 
(Ideology) 
Macro HQ 
SUB 
HQ 
SUB 
HQ 
SUB 
Meso Mediating/Circumventing/Removing Tension 
Micro HQ 
SUB 
HQ 
SUB 
HQ 
SUB 
 (Source: Author’s own model) 
Application of Ferner et al.’s (2012) propositions and the empirical findings of 
this study of an EME setting are discussed in Chapter 7. The next section reviews the 
concept of the ends and means of subsidiary actors and business associates in 
responding to the diffusion of dominant HRM “best practice” transfer. 
2.8 Low-Power Subsidiary Actors’ Motivations and Strategies 
To further assess low-power subsidiary actors’ use of sources of power as balancing 
or defensive mechanisms, this research explores Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) 
concept of actors’ motivations (ends) and strategies (means) in seeking to influence 
their corporate networks to protect their own institutions. Established management-
employee relationships between dominant and low-power actors are relevant because 
local actors’ motivation and strategies are constrained by certain conditions but are 
also a dynamic, evolving force.5 Local actors may have sources of power, mainly at 
the micro and meso levels, because EMEs are experiencing greater variation and 
frequency in the evolution of institutional change, resulting from international and 
national political-economic transitions (e.g. Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2016; 
Meyer & Peng, 2016). Consequently, these local actors’ sources of power are 
emerging in various sectors. Equally, subsidiary actors are interested in improving 
their organisations and overall local labour market institutions to enhance their 
sources of power and capabilities. Thus, actors seeking to gain a legitimate voice in 
                                                 
5 This study does not assume that dominant power resides with HQ actors. 
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their corporate networks to protect their own practices must make a deliberate choice 
to ignore, accept or modify the JMNC’s HRM “best practice”. In the presence of 
diverse affiliate–MNC relationships, ownership structures and interests, low-power 
subsidiary actors often engage in political alliances with associations, institutions 
and business associations to gain power and legitimise their voice over JMNCs 
(Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005). Morgan and Kristensen’s (2006) concept of the MNC 
describes actor alliances using tactics to either establish, co-ally or re-construct their 
means. Micropolitical coalition strategies at the firm level are crucial, not only as 
indicators of lower-power actors’ participation but also in building political alliances 
from the bottom up to pursue their objective of gaining legitimate influence. In other 
words, local BGs, management, and employees’ and employers’ associations use 
mechanisms of micro-coalition building to strengthen their positions in the corporate 
system. However, coalition-building tactics are complex, and reinforce 
interrelationships with other actors.6 
The current research applies Bouquet and Birskinshaw’s (2008) theory to an 
EME context in which low-power subsidiary actors struggle to improve weak labour 
market institutions. Centred on the interaction of local BGs’ power, resources and 
capabilities between JMNCs’ HQ and Indonesian subsidiaries, this study aims to 
advance understanding of the concept of low-power actors’ management of power to 
gain influence, legitimacy and centrality in the MNC network from two perspectives: 
motivation (ends) and strategy (means). This research sees subsidiaries’ objectives 
and methods as a dynamic force operating within the institutional constraints of the 
business setting, where low-power (subsidiary) actors are characterised as 
disadvantaged or in a low-status position vis-à-vis other actors (Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw, 2008). The significance of this study is that the local BG’s proactive 
role in coalition-building efforts with local subsidiary actors (management, unions, 
employers’ associations and government) requires an understanding of the art of 
political processes, involving prominent local stakeholders in managing critical 
resources and gaining centrality. Through micropolitical analysis, the research 
presented in this thesis untangles the complexity of power interactions by examining 
both the objectives of local actors, and the strategies they pursue to achieve these 
objectives at the organisational level. In so doing, this study not only contextualises 
                                                 
6 This organisational tool is especially important for lower-tier subsidiaries with constraints on 
sources of power and a lack of means. 
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low-power actors’ voices, but also reveals new evidence on local BGs’ interests and 
proactive involvement in influencing the host-country HRM-IR rules of the game in 
the EME setting. 
The MNC literature falls short of providing theoretical explanations and 
empirical evidence of the involvement of local BGs as architects of the power and 
control of corporate management practices, and causal links between power and the 
outcomes of practice transfer in EME settings (e.g. MacKenzie & Martínez Lucio, 
2014). Furthermore, MNC actors’ (management and labour unions’) complex 
strategisation of their objectives to achieve legitimacy has not yet been fully 
addressed. While some literature focuses on the autonomy of a particular actor 
(management) in centralising and legitimising its commitment (e.g. Kawai & 
Strange, 2014), other studies focus on antagonism between management and unions 
in terms of power (e.g. Gammelgaard et al., 2012). In general, the MNC literature 
characterises dynamic management–union interactions as a product of resistance, 
and their relationships as a form of reconciliation to gain influence. Furthermore, 
much of the MNC literature concentrates on the motivation and roles of MNCs’ 
management, HR managers’ roles and cross-border networks in gaining influence 
(e.g. Farndale et al., 2010; Ferner et al., 2011; Hong et al., 2009). However, further 
understandings have emerged of the importance of local subsidiaries’ autonomy in 
managing local HRM-IR matters (e.g. Lazarova et al., 2017). 
In applying Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) concept, this study empirically 
constructs the critical determinants of three core low-power subsidiary actors’ 
motivations and capacity to gain legitimacy and influence in MNC global networks, 
facilitated by a local BG closely linked with local institutions which controls the 
local lead corporation’s management. The multi-faceted conditions in which low-
power actors interact with the BG result in what many perceive to be a positive, 
supportive environment enabling low-power actors to raise their voices against 
dominant MNC HQ actors. However, since the actors’ relationships are usually 
“tight constellations of mutually supportive elements”, Birkinshaw (1997) points out 
that there is no linear causality. This study does not assume that coalition efforts 
(especially a union joining with business group management) reduce power 
inequality. The importance here is that the BG’s facilitation of conditions that 
support local actors constitutes a power resource, as established institutional 
networks evolve into micropolitical alliances. Importantly, the presence of a BG 
59 
controlling the subsidiary’s management may facilitate each subordinate actor’s use 
of legitimate resources. In return, the BG must gain legitimacy from local actors in 
order to have any prospect of gaining legitimacy from the HQ. Thus, due to an 
inefficient local market, the BG’s commitment, participation and presence have a 
broader impact, not only on local actors’ strategies for raising their voices and how 
they pursue their means and objectives, but also on how local actors negotiate 
efficiently with JMNC corporate actors. As Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) note, this 
means that the BG’s influence may shape, sustain and activate low-power actors and 
their distinct characteristics. Through the lens of institutional, organisational and 
MNC scholarship, this research theoretically frames MNC–subsidiary actors’ power 
interactions in relation to advancing and protecting the host country’s labour market 
institutions. 
2.9 Theoretical Setting: Power Interactions in a Weak Institutional Setting 
Organisational and international business scholars (e.g. Meyer et al., 2011; 
Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005) theorise that local actors engage in political games of 
micropolitical alliances as an organisational tool to influence MNC decisions and 
optimise their tactics, moving beyond discourses of local actors gaining attention 
from the MNC. Institutional theorists (e.g. Dieleman & Sachs, 2008: Khatri et al., 
2006; Robison & Hadiz, 2004) depict the most powerful actor as an important 
feature in understanding institutions in an EME setting, as exemplified by the role of 
a BG’s good connections with national institutions. Micropolitical tactics enable 
low-power actors to feed their organisational agendas into “existing circuits of 
power” (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 479). Equally important, local BGs have 
interests as well as means to influence (i.e. maintain, protect and advance) local 
HRM-IR systems. This suggests that local institutions need an infrastructure of local 
networks, as rapid local institutional changes and less-developed infrastructures 
present challenges to the international business environment (Meyer & Peng, 2016). 
So far, local actors may have preferred to use the tactic of micropolitical alliances 
(among local actors) as a means. However, Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) observe 
that to make a critical set of strategies work successfully, trade-offs are inevitable in 
managing desirable objectives and the means of negotiating. Conceptualising actors’ 
power interactions in this particular context provides an understanding of how flows 
of influence between actors may easily change their power resources and have an 
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impact on management practices. In short, this research investigates efficient 
approaches used by low-power actors to gain influence in the MNC’s global 
networks. Sections 2.9 and 2.10 explain how local actors gain legitimacy and what 
coordinated strategy options they may have. 
2.10 Importance of Legitimacy for Local Actors 
Weber (2009, cited in Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 480) defines legitimacy as “a 
form of social approval that facilitates the acquisition of power because it determines 
how social actors are understood and evaluated”. Meyer and Rowan (2015: 50) 
observe that the “lack of acceptable legitimated accounts of their activities” make 
them “more vulnerable to claims that they [low-power actors] are negligent, 
irrational or unnecessary”. Therefore, from the local actors’ perspective, taking 
action to achieve legitimacy with people in positions of authority is extremely 
important for their organisation, identity and interests. Legitimacy permits local 
actors to raise their voices and exert influence over the dominant authoritative power 
actors. A critical factor explaining local actors’ legitimacy objective is their 
recognition that their own home business environment has become less competitive 
or that they have failed to develop their capacity to keep up with the MNC’s 
performance expectations. Local actors may see the lack of home-country 
institutions, with complex and fragmented regulations, policies and infrastructural 
systems, as raising risks, and the MNC may perceive such host-country conditions as 
detrimental (e.g. Peng et al., 2008; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999).  
These legitimacy factors have two significant implications for this study. First, 
although local actors see their home institutions as being on the periphery of the 
MNC’s institutions (Harzing & Noorderhaven, 2006), it should not be assumed that 
their activities are perceived to be insignificant. In particular, when the subsidiaries’ 
business environment improves, and labour market institutional changes gain 
credibility in the eyes of the MNC’s authoritative decision makers, local BGs will be 
motivated to become involved and mobilise their local subsidiaries’ means and ends 
by forming alliances in response to HQ actors’ dominant practices. Second, when 
local actors recognise the beginnings of change in the foreign MNC’s investment 
outlook, their competitiveness may be less credible than when the MNC established 
the partnership, or there may be disproportionate FDI compared with the initial 
endowment. As El-Erian (2016) observes, more developed economies remain in a 
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“low-level growth equilibrium”. For example, as a result of Japan’s declining 
economic performance in the global financial world, and with intense competition 
from other countries such as China, the JMNC may be compelled to re-establish 
shareholdings that redefine its relationships with local subsidiaries and BGs (Sako & 
Kotosaka, 2012). Furthermore, in light of the effects of the 1997 Asian financial 
recession and the bursting of the economic bubble, Endo et al. (2015) investigate the 
relevance of Japanese work, employment and organisation in management 
scholarship. As the world’s thirdlargest economy, does learning from Japan and 
Japan as the “Number One” still matter? (e.g. Aoki et al., 2014; Oliver & Wilkinson 
1992; Vogel, 1979). This current study investigates how the JMNC uses its 
(remaining) power to diffuse its dominant HRM “best practice” to subsidiaries. 
Hence, the changing business environment of both subordinate actors and the MNC 
HQ leads to opportunities for negotiation and potential trade-offs. 
2.11 Local Actors’ Engagement in Political Games: Coalition Building 
Morgan and Kristensen (2006) view MNCs in terms of highly complex formal and 
informal relationships with inside and outside actors, associations and 
representatives that constitute “micropolitical power” at different levels, shaping 
power processes. Martínez Lucio (2014b: 295) suggests that MNCs are “increasingly 
contested spaces” relative to the coordination and control of local subsidiaries, 
conditioning and shaping local institutions. Similarly, the institutional and MNC 
literature (e.g. Carney et al., 2018; Fainshmidt et al., 2016; Whitley & Zhang, 2016) 
indicates how local actors participate in political games to pursue their objectives. In 
particular, the practices of the local lead corporation’s management (comprised of 
BGs) support the positions of subsidiaries in the corporate system. Drawing on the 
local institutional context, the coalition-building efforts of management, employees, 
unions and local institutions and associations strengthen their bargaining power with 
the HQ. The BG lobbies actors who are seeking to gain legitimacy. Whereas one 
actor may lack resources, another may have inadequate capabilities. In such 
situations, low-power actors require enabling sponsorship, and this is where trade-off 
opportunities also occur within the home country. In this micropolitical context, the 
BG manages the local lead corporation’s subsidiaries (based on the ownership 
structure), recognises the objectives and identifies the necessary resources to pave 
the way for local actors to raise their voices. 
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The benefit to the BG is that it protects its established position with both the 
foreign owner and local subsidiaries. Collective modes of action are orchestrated by 
the local BG. Mobilising local actors, industry alliances, governments and 
associations is key to maintaining and developing coalitions (Barnett et al. , 2000; 
Westley et al., 2009). In so doing, BGs can maintain their existing power, 
demonstrate their important role in overseeing local institutions, and validate their 
ownership structure in certain sectors (e.g. Driffield et al., 2007). However, this 
process is complex, and coalition-building tactics may be impeded by intra-
organisational inertia. For example, local subsidiaries’ HRM practices and IR 
policies may be at stake and contested in terms of relationships between management 
and employees. In such situations, the local lead-corporation’s management must 
usually make certain adjustments. 
To further examine low-power subsidiary actors’ strategy, the current study 
considers Money’s (1998) two types of coalition-building efforts, with broader and 
narrower objectives, pursued by conglomerates to form relationships. The broad 
type involves “the formation of a relationship which in a broad sense of purpose 
exists” (Money, 1998, cited in Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008: 497). Coalition 
building brings together all actors’ objectives to counteract dominant actors, for 
example, by advancing management practices to improve working conditions and 
employee skills. The second type of coalition strategy involves the formation of 
relationships with narrower objectives for a particular local or other non-
organisational actor, such as an association or government agency, with a specific 
objective linked to the lead corporation’s management. These broader and narrower 
coalition-building tactics require a particular coalition of workers, associations and 
government groups to manage the MNC’s authoritative decisions. A common feature 
of these two micropolitical coalition-building strategies is that local actors increase 
their visibility and strengthen their interpersonal relationships. The validity of 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) proposition and the empirical findings of this 
study are discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
As the object of contest, actors from home and host countries have different 
interests constructed and shaped by their particular institutional contexts (Morgan & 
Kristensen, 2006), and scholars have identified various actors’ interests and power 
capabilities to challenge the transfer process. For instance, whereas Edwards et al. 
(2007) postulate differences on the basis of organisational politics, Ferner et al. 
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(2005) look at micropolitical approaches from an IR perspective. These two 
institutional theory debates suggest that examining the inward transfer of dominant 
HQ management practices to low-power subsidiaries in an EME context is 
important. Clearly there is a need for further exploration beyond the context of 
Western and advanced institutions. The current study adopts an IR lens through 
which to examine not only micropolitical approaches to management-labour 
relations, but also the proactive role of agencies and employer associations in 
shaping local labour market institutions. 
Ferner et al. (2005) argue that subsidiaries in less advanced countries expect to 
have less power as a result of their weak institutions and may be interested in 
adopting practices from firms based in countries with stronger institutions or more 
dominant economies. However, scholars have produced little explanation for 
dynamic interactions in HQ–subsidiary power relations. Furthermore, knowledge of 
the structure of HRM practices, employees’ abilities and motivations, and actors’ 
power capacities in relation to cross-border transfer remains rudimentary, and using 
different methods, notably in-depth case studies, may deepen our understanding 
(Minbaeva et al., 2014; Ferner et al., 2011). This study explores the importance of 
HRM in power interactions mediating transfer and explains the source and role of 
actors’ powers capacities and how they play out in institutions in the automotive 
sector, across subsidiary manufacturers of cars, motorcycles and autoparts. 
2.12 Conclusion 
Changes in the political economy of home and host countries reflect the complexity 
and uncertainty of the international business environment in which MNCs operate. In 
EME countries, such as Indonesia, Mexico and Brazil, FDI and foreign MNCs are 
playing an increasingly important role in developing local firms, as well as the wider 
industrial economy. As a result, the expectation is that MNC power will rest mainly 
in the hands of foreign investors, because EMEs are seeking to adopt MNCs’ 
practices quickly and are interested in following the authority of foreign firms and 
investors. Nevertheless, cross-border transfers of foreign knowledge are not limited 
to the capabilities of the HQ, and they may be contested (e.g. Geppert & Williams, 
2016; Clark & Geppert, 2011; Becker-Ritterspach & Dörrenbächer, 2011; Morgan & 
Kristensen, 2006). The complexity may be attributable to relationships between 
actors, varying interests and balances of power between the MNC and subsidiaries, 
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and the involvement of quasi-government agencies, as well as the role of BGs in 
influencing the transfer process (as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8). 
It is recognised in this thesis that an advanced economy such as Japan has 
institutional advantages over less-developed countries such as Indonesia, and that 
therefore, as the existing literature suggests (e.g. Whitley & Zhang, 2016; Rosser, 
2014; Aoki et al., 2014; Delbridge et al., 2011), much of the power lies in the hands 
of JMNCs. Nevertheless, the case will be made that the labour market institutions of 
the host country may be redefined, incentivizing local actors to gain status and 
expertise in MNCs’ global networks. This study not only examines changes in the 
home country, but also investigates changes in the host country’s labour market 
institutions, the development of the host country’s political economy, and 
improvements to its HRM-IR infrastructure since the 2007 global financial 
recession. 
The theoretical roots of this thesis lie in research on institutions, work (industrial 
relations) and organisations. To understand the complexity of inconsistent forces 
among the various actors, it draws on nuances suggested by Minbaeva et al. (2003) 
on intended HRM practices for the development of knowledge transfer; Ferner et 
al.’s (2012) constructs of power resources and actors’ interests at macro, subnational 
and micro levels, which are strongly subject to host-country influence; and Bouquet 
and Birkinshaw’s (2008) motivations (ends) and strategies (means) through which 
low-power (subsidiary) actors gain legitimacy within the dominant HRM and cross-
border transfer paradigm. Overall, these three chosen concepts focus on subsidiaries. 
Moreover, since both Ferner et al. (2012) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) 
underscore the importance of different actors’ power capacities, interests and 
strategies in shaping cross-border management transfer processes, their concepts can 
be combined, as illustrated in this chapter and more explicitly in Chapter 7. It is 
important to show that Ferner et al.’s (2012) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) 
concepts are complementary, offering opportunities for a more comprehensive 
analysis. For example, while Ferner et al. (2012) focus on actors’ interests at three 
institutional levels of analysis, Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) look at actors’ 
motivations and strategies. However, the latter do not show how these two 
dimensions play out at different levels of institutional analysis, while the former 
might add the means of actors (strategy) into the framework to investigate the 
operationalisation of actors’ power capabilities and interests, i.e. how actors’ power 
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capacities, interests and motivations influence mechanisms of cross-border 
management transfer. The theoretical basis for combining the two is the 
manifestation of power associated with causality, control, power sources and power 
means (e.g. Blazejewski & Becket-Ritterspach, 2016; Dörrenbächer & 
Gammelgaard, 2011). However, the Kostovian, neo-intuitionalist approach to 
transfer processes in MNCs is less valid for this study, since Kostova (1999) focuses 
on the failure of home- and host-country institutional distance effects to assess 
transfer processes accurately. The concept also fails to investigate MNCs’ use of 
power capacities, interests and strategies across a range of dimensions (e.g. cross-
border, nationally, subnationally and within their own organisations), which 
influences transfer processes and outcomes at different institutional levels, rather 
than just the macro or general country profile level (Geppert & Williams, 2016). 
Thus, the IHRM and institutional approaches of Minbaeva et al. (2003), Ferner et al. 
(2012) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) are more useful for this study. 
By exploring these nuances and consolidating theoretical threads from each of 
these frameworks, this research contributes theoretically to institutionalist and 
micropolitical schools by drawing on power-based theory to investigate actors’ 
power capacities, and contextualising business associations’ power capacities where 
MNCs operate in an institutionally constrained context. In so doing, this study 
identifies the “other actor groups [who] may also be involved in influencing the 
transfer process in practice” (Ferner et al., 2012; Geppert & Williams, 2016: 157). 
While the empirical contributions of this research lie in examining actors’ 
motivations, interests and strategies as dimensions of subsidiaries’ influence of the 
process and outcomes of HRM-IR cross-border transfer, one could also argue that 
they extend Blazejewski’s (2009) findings relating not only to why local actors 
respond to HQs in different ways, but also to how they gain legitimate status in 
global MNC networks. 
In general, this study responds to the contention of Bamber et al. (2016), 
Sparrow et al. (2016) and Bjorkman and Lervick (2007) that the HR literature has 
struggled to operationalise cross-border HRM-IR practices in the cross-national 
context. It does so in a setting suggested by Pinkham and Peng (2017), Meyer and 
Peng (2016), Xu and Meyer (2012) and Wright et al. (2005), who underscore the 
importance of institutional voids in EMEs, and by Becker-Ritterspach et al. (2016) in 
relation to understanding actors’ power, interests and strategy from a micropolitical 
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perspective. Also, in investigating “the divergence of interests, power inequalities 
and structured antagonism of capitalist employment relations under Japanese HRM” 
(Aoki et al., 2014: 2557), this study follows Martínez Lucio’s (2014b) IHRM 
approach to political economy and MNCs’ control over subsidiaries. 
In summary, to minimise the theoretical gap in the literature on MNCs, this 
study applies the theoretical frameworks of Minbaeva et al. (2003), Ferner et al. 
(2012) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) to examine cross-national transfers 
initiated by Japanese actors across the Japanese automotive industry at three levels of 
analysis in subsidiaries operating in the EME setting of Indonesia. These institutions 
and IHRM frameworks facilitate investigation of how the corporate power, interests 
and strategies of MNC actors shape cross-border transfer and the adoption of 
internationalisation embedded in practice, through processes that draw on the 
institutional resources of the MNC in the home country and of subsidiaries in the 
host country. In particular, the study examines how actors’ power relations in 
MNCs’ HRM-IR influence the transfer of JMNCs’ practices to Indonesian 
subsidiaries. 
Applying the three theoretical frameworks to the diffusion of Japanisation in the 
EME setting of Indonesia is appropriate for current institutional debates, as it 
provides a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms and impact of contested 
cross-border management transfers controlled by HQs, and how subsidiaries respond 
to them. Almond et al. (2005) observe that micro-level qualitative research on 
institutional frameworks allows for an examination of the established reasoning 
logics of actors’ interests and approaches to persuading subsidiaries. Therefore, 
multi-level empirical analysis is conducted to examine the importance of actors’ 
power interactions and capabilities relative to inward knowledge transfer processes 
in inter-firm and intra-firm HRM practices at macro-, meso- and micro-institutional 
levels. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Methods 
This thesis applies the critical realist (CR) theory-building approach of existing 
MNC theory to an EME in Southeast Asia. In the CR approach, what can be claimed 
as knowledge distinguishes between what is happening and what is taken for 
granted—similar to natural scientific phenomena. This study draws on an empirical 
exploration of the phenomena of work, employment and organisation through the 
lenses of IHRM, IR and IB, by applying the conceptual and analytical research tools 
of CR. 
The research methodology of this study proceeds from epistemology (what we 
know) and ontology (what is real), with an emphasis on causal explanations 
(mechanisms in their context) and discourse analysis to conceptualise the diffusion 
processes of cross-border management practices. This chapter explains the research 
methodology and design. It provides details of the research setting, the processes 
involved in analysing the data, gaining access, and conducting semi-structured 
interviews. In addition, it briefly addresses funding issues. This chapter aims to 
demonstrate the applicability of CR as well as the importance of the researcher’s 
reflections on new perspectives that contribute to the development of CR. It explains 
the concept of CR and delineates its applicability to the ideas and real examples 
derived from subsequent discussions. Chapter 3 concludes with highlights of features 
of CR that are pragmatically important to this thesis and to theory building in 
organisational research more generally. 
3.1 Epistemological and Ontological Stance: Critical Realism 
CR is appropriate for this thesis because it enables the generation of causal 
mechanisms, coupled with abduction and reintroduction to develop explanations of 
these mechanisms and implications of changes in “nature” (Edwards et al., 2014; 
Vincent & O’Mahoney, 2018). This study aims to understand changes to work, 
employment and organisation. Bhaskar’s (1978) CR approach suggests that the 
fundamental task of conducting social science research is to address “a stratified and 
open system of emergent entities”. Vincent and O’Mahoney (2018: 2) indicate that 
CR is applied to a specific entity of a causal mechanism in the context of 
organisation studies: “The social world is full of powers, the actualization of which 
is often retarded by other powers within the open systems in which they are located.” 
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Vincent and O’Mahoney (2018) offer the example of the impact of wages on 
labour markets to illustrate the potential for one entity to act upon another, making 
clear that the power of the CR stance does not lie in sociological concepts of power; 
rather, the metatheoretical power of this thesis can be found in addressing the 
concept of corporate power. This chapter assesses interactions of power, namely, the 
power to (empowerment) develop better explanations of causal mechanisms, by 
exploring three types of corporate power. The power to in the epistemological and 
ontological stance of CR relates to the fact that although power may exist, “this 
power may be exercised by the power being triggered; yet this power may or may 
not be actualized because there may be countervailing powers” (Vincent & 
O’Mahoney, 2018: 4). As such, this thesis is theoretically informed by organisation 
studies in considering why and how MNC actors use their power capabilities to 
diffuse, influence and respond to an MNC’s cross-border transfer of HRM “best 
practices” and their outcomes in EME labour market institutions.  
The setting for this research is compatible with a CR stance. In terms of the 
causal power of entities, the interaction of one entity with another causes change or, 
borrowing Vincent and O’Mahoney’s (2018: 4) phrase, “transforms entities”. 
Furthermore, applying Danermark et al.’s (2002: 5) intuition that “the world is 
structured, differentiated, stratified and changing” to the research setting of this 
thesis reveals that both MNC and subsidiary actors experience pressures that enable 
them to respond to (institutionally embedded) changes. 
Ontology departs from the question of how reality is constructed, while 
epistemology relates to how knowledge can be acquired—i.e. “how we can know 
that we know” (Danermark et al., 2002). As Bhaskar (1978: 13) puts it, “what 
properties do societies and people possess that might make them possible objects for 
knowledge?” It is also necessary to establish a theoretical foundation to guide the 
direction of the research. However, theory and method should not deemed  separate 
entities, as empirical analyses can depart from theory building and analysis of the 
theoretical definition (Danermark et al., 2002). Quantitative and qualitative research 
methods employ a broad array of methodological tools which can often be combined 
to produce rigorous research projects. As Danermark et al. (2002: 2) argue, 
ontological and epistemological dimensions are like “critical methodological 
pluralism”. Since this research examines the impact of power, politics and conflicts 
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of interest in work—as well as employment and organisational management—
society as an open system must be understood to be different from a natural science. 
CR combines ontology and epistemology with implicit assumptions. In this 
vein, the current research adopts a historical perspective on Japanese and Indonesian 
labour market institutions in relation to key events that have contributed to changes 
in institutions: specifically, the 1997 Asian and 2007 global financial crises. This 
approach uses institutional analysis to examine causal sequences in how mechanisms 
and contexts interact. It sets out from a specific time to understand the conditions of 
change, and where and what prompted the change. Social science scholars, (e.g. 
Morris et al., 2018; Endo et al., 2015; Aoki et al., 2014; Smith & Elger, 2014; Sako 
& Kotosaka, 2012) observe that Japan experienced a prolonged lost decade, perhaps 
as a result of declining Japanese power and reduced interest in studying Japan 
alongside the rise of China as an economic power which may also have boosted 
interest in studying China (e.g. Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016). Therefore, this 
thesis does not take for granted the significance of Japan’s fundamental strength in 
innovation and its critical contributions to Southeast Asian’s sociopolitical, 
economic and IB environmental development, factors which have enabled it to 
compete with the American and German models. It makes that case that studying the 
“divergence of interests, power inequalities, and ‘structured antagonism’ of capitalist 
employment relations under Japanese HRM” (Aoki et al., 2014: 2557) remains 
relevant, timely and appropriate. According to Smith and Elger (2012: 3): 
Capitalism has systematic force; but in actual capitalist societies, social 
relations have different empirical expressions (French, Chinese or Japanese 
forms for example); in actual events in time, agents are responding to 
pressures and forces in – context-dependent – ways which unite them (or 
make their actions intelligible) as agents (workers, managers) with other 
agents (workers and managers in other countries). 
This suggests the applicability of the distinctive philosophical ontological approach 
of CR in understanding various aspects of the multi-layered social world that affect a 
“thing” in a certain context. This includes the research design, the process of 
conducting interviews and the data analysis in an empirical and actual and real 
context. Smith and Elger (2012: 4) further clarify that “A key feature of critical 
realism is it stresses a layered ontology to social reality,” with empirical (sensory 
experiences), actual (action in events) and real (causal power separate but not always 
evident in empirical and actual) manifestations. The empirical element here is 
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observable events: “actual” constitutes existing materials, substances and events that 
have occurred. Without “structures and mechanisms” (Elder-Vass, 2010: 44), these 
events may (partially) occur and therefore be unobservable. From the ontological 
standpoint of CR, they will not be considered as real. 
This thesis examines the Japanese capitalist system, socioeconomic and political 
actors and social relations in the context of institutional changes in home and host 
countries, and how MNC actors interact, negotiate and strategise in response to these 
changes. What the notion of “taken-for-granted” Japanisation means to non-Western 
and advanced contexts is not yet fully understood. Thus, this study attempts to 
broaden IHRM, IR and IB research understandings of Japan and JMNCs (e.g. 
Bamber et al., 2016; Martínez Lucio, 2014a; Witt & Redding, 2014). The objective 
is to investigate a previously unexplored area to deepen our appreciation of the 
global Japanese management systems discourse beyond advanced industrial 
economic contexts. Aligned with CR, appropriate questions include the different 
impacts of Japanese FDI on the lives of other societies, i.e. on Indonesian workers in 
Japanese subsidiaries compared to their counterparts in other local and foreign firms 
operating in Indonesia, and how Indonesian workers critically perceive the JMNC’s 
work environment and lean ideology. 
The CR approach, while epistemologically cautious, validates knowledge of 
reality; it is interested in producing knowledge about the real world, including causal 
mechanisms in institutional processes. Danermark et al. (2002) suggest that causal 
mechanisms are an analytical tool to expand our understanding of the nature of 
society in different settings. This study questions how “real” institutional changes 
can be explained and how knowledge can be obtained from them. Although it is also 
argued that “reality is always fallible” (Danermark et al., 2002: 10), the theoretical 
framework and methodological research instruments can be used to examine which 
theories have implications for understanding reality. 
In studies of IHRM and MNCs, it is increasingly accepted that organisational 
behaviour is of relevance to IB (e.g. Crouch, 2005; Morgan et al., 2010; Thelen, 
2010). Critical realists view the research process as “the relations between the real 
world and the concepts we form” or “the relations between knowledge and the object 
of knowledge” (e.g. Danermark et al., 2002: 10). In other words, reality has an 
“objective existence”, yet the precondition of knowledge is conceptually mediated. 
Simply put, facts are “theory-dependent” but are not “theory-determined” (e.g. 
71 
Danermark et al., 2002: 10). For instance, within “truth” there is a link with reality. 
Importantly, as Thelen (2010) suggests, information gathered from a large dataset 
should not be perceived as a comprehensive picture of “reality”. Thus, it is necessary 
to use a wide spectrum of methods, conceptualise the phenomenon of reality gleaned 
from the data, conduct rigorous research and re-test the findings. 
3.1.1 Underpinning of ontology: Mechanism, process and context 
Philosophically, the conceptual approach of CR requires a cyclical process to 
observe a phenomenon through different lenses. It should not stop at what is initially 
seen as “real”. The breadth of the existing literature on the Japanese business system 
demonstrates that scholars have devoted considerable time to studying it. This raises 
questions about how JMNCs became a “global” phenomenon, and how Japanese 
management and production systems became globally recognised by both scholars 
and business practitioners. More critical questions include whether widespread 
Japanisation is diverging from “classical” Japanese employment “best practices”, 
whether Japanese institutions are upholding such practices in certain host countries 
such as Indonesia, whether and why JMNCs offer a good model for Indonesian 
firms, and to what extent Japanese capitalist systems can be applied to other 
contexts. 
In investigating these nuances, CR is distinct from positivism. Social scientists 
may claim to know “something” and may acknowledge that “something” does exist; 
but one should not rely entirely on something one claims to know as knowledge. 
Thus, dominant JMNC practices are appropriate as a case study to explore how 
mechanisms and contexts interact in different institutional settings. The research 
design of this thesis aims to probe mechanisms and processes to explain why 
changes happen, and why actors behave as they do, drawing explanations (theories) 
from insights, and identifying transfactual elements that may be hidden in the 
mechanisms and processes of cross-border transfer. According to Burawoy (1998: 
14), reflexive research is an intervention to reveal “the hidden sector of the 
participant’s world”. The theory building of CR generalises from an empirical to a 
theoretical stance (Danermark et al., 2002; Vincent & O’Mahoney, 2018). 
Following Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007), the theory-building discourse of 
this thesis centres around learning about existing theory, scrutinising relevant 
literature and framing research questions pertaining to institutional theory within a 
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larger stream of IHRM, IR and IB. This thesis is informed mainly by organisation 
studies (e.g. Ferner et al., 2012; Lukes, 2005, 1975), institutional theory (e.g. Ferner 
et al., 2005; Edwards et al., 2007; Whitley, 1999), the literature on MNC–subsidiary 
politics and power (e.g. Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Minbaeva & Santangelo, 
2018; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Khan et al., 2015; Almond, 2011a) and IHRM (e.g. 
Delbridge et al., 2011; Bamber et al., 2016; Martinez Lucio, 2014a) to comprehend 
the importance of actors’ power capabilities in diffusing management practices. 
Following scholars such as Bamber et al. (2016), Fainshmidt et al. (2016) and Meyer 
and Peng (2014), this thesis strives to move beyond both advanced industrial 
contexts and mainstream EMEs such as China and India (e.g. Jürgens & 
Krzywdzinski, 2016). 
To understand how existing theory can be extended to a new setting and to 
demonstrate why the research has positive implications, Whetten (1989) suggests 
that a qualitative approach may be considered as an appropriate method to 
investigate the application of theory and to validate the link between theory-building 
and empirical studies (see also Cassell et al., 2018; Edwards et al., 2014; Balogun et 
al., 2011; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Furthermore, in developing existing 
concepts, this research adopts a qualitative rather than quantitative approach 
(Morgan et al., 2010) for three reasons. First, statistical data are extremely difficult 
to obtain in certain contexts such as Indonesia (Witt and Reading, 2013). Second, 
Fainshmidt et al.’s (2016) recent work on institutions in Indonesia suggests that a 
deeper approach to studying actors’ interactions can be achieved by analysing their 
views and interpersonal interactions. Third, a qualitative approach has been used for 
similar foundational works on varieties of capitalism and Asian business systems 
(e.g. Whitley, 1992; Witt & Redding, 2014; Hall & Soskice, 2001). Along with the 
three main IR actors, the data cover other interest groups, namely business groups 
(conglomerates), employers’ associations, quasi-government agencies and NGOs. 
Oligarchical BGs remain influential in the ownership and corporate governance 
structure of Indonesia’s institutions, especially where local government remains 
weak (e.g. Fainshmidt et al., 2016; Temouri et al., 2016; Ford, 2014; Witt & 
Redding, 2013; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). Overall, Vincent and O’Mahoney (2018) 
assert that case studies are the most common and arguably most useful method for 
CR research, using methods such as interviews, observations, focus groups and 
literature reviews (e.g. Vincent & Wapshott, 2014). Existing explorations using case-
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study methods offer guidance on how to apply CR, while leaving room for new 
insights into existing research. 
3.2 Research Methods 
In applying an exploratory, inductive and deductive research methodology, this study 
follows five core tenets of grounded theory, based on Glaser and Strauss’s (2009) 
work and extending Gligor et al.’s (2015) theory. An inductive approach is suited to 
generating new theory, exploring new phenomena emerging from the data, and 
conducting analysis to explore important aspects of transfer processes in a given 
context (see Chapter 6). In contrast, a deductive qualitative approach is more 
applicable to the analysis discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 because it applies existing 
theory to a context (sensitising concepts) and extends the theory by adding new 
empirical dimensions. The deductive approach facilitates the connection of data with 
theory, analysed from different perspectives. The presentation of of the findings 
begins with an inductive approach in Chapter 6. This allows direct observations and 
analysis to reveal interactions between actors in their natural working environment. 
This is followed by a deductive orientation to theory to explore general causality in 
Chapters 7 and 8. The deductive approach requires clear research objectives, using 
the method(s) best suited for exploring an emerging area of study and answering the 
research questions. Hence, this approach strengthens the generalisability of the 
findings to existing theory. 
To address the research questions, this thesis focuses on the largest automotive 
firm in Indonesia. This is an explorative study of a single multi-site case of cars, 
motorcycles and autoparts under the management of a single local BG, Astra 
International. This focus allows not only a comprehensive analysis of dynamic, 
multi-faceted processes and interactions but also an in-depth investigation of the 
conditions that prompt diverse corporate strategies (e.g. Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 
2016; Vincent & Wapshott, 2014; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). As Siggelkow (2007) 
argues, a single case permits the researcher to observe directly and in detail how 
interactions occur between actors at inter- and intra-organisational levels, and 
between firms and institutions at macro, meso and micro levels. Sociopolitical actors 
in the chosen cases actively shape the host country’s labour market institutions. The 
automotive industry in an EME setting was chosen due to the degree to which 
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inward capital, knowledge transfer and interactions between dominant and low-
power actors are “transparently observable”(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), a case study approach is fitting for new topic 
areas and is tightly linked to data and theory. This thesis draws on in-depth, 
qualitative research on three automotive joint-venture multi-site case studies of car, 
motorcycle and autoparts manufacturers, produced through two phases of data 
collection in Indonesia and Japan. The fieldwork in each phase and country was 
informed by two clear research objectives: (1) to explore how mechanisms of 
transfer and contexts interact and develop over time and (2) to examine conditions 
that support or reject the transfer. Adopting a qualitative approach enabled an 
understanding of inter- and intra-organisational institutions, practices and behaviour 
in new competitive environments in relation to JMNCs in Indonesia (e.g. Almond & 
Connolly, forthcoming). 
The current research investigates the impact of dynamic inter-human 
relationships on the development of HRM practices that facilitate international 
knowledge transfer (see Chapter 6). The qualitative research design enables 
subtleties to be captured in the inter-human relationships that prompt inter- and intra-
organisational capabilities and motivation. Evidently, some nuances can only be 
gleaned by engaging in discussions and talking to people. Smith and Elger (2018: 5) 
argue that “interviews are an interactive method—a dialog where the meanings, 
explanations and emotions articulated by interviewees are taken seriously by 
researchers”. The interview process provided the researcher with direct access to 
participants’ opinions, attitudes and accounts of their experiences of events and 
activities (Smith & Elger, 2018). The social act of communication among human 
actors, the mutual construction of meanings and narratives (Burawoy, 1998), and the 
possibility for the joint construction of knowledge are essential elements of social 
research methods. From a constructionist view, Holstein and Gubrium (1997: 122) 
suggest that active interviews construct meanings and narrative analysis by 
“activating, stimulating and cultivating” the subject’s interpretive capabilities. 
The car, motorcycle and autoparts case studies examined in this thesis provide 
an ideal setting to explore three puzzling IHRM discourses: dominant versus existing 
systems, different actors’ power, interests and strategies, and HQ–subsidiary 
relations. It was also important to examine the variety of actors’ power resources and 
allocations, because this allowed causal processes to be traced in order to 
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operationalise the implications for management meaning and to compare MNC 
actors’ power in eleven case-study organisations. 
Furthermore, in investigating conflicts over the ideology of HRM-IR “best 
practices” at the micro level, it was not enough simply to visit the plants to determine 
whether a Japanese or Indonesian model prevailed. To examine more extensively 
why actors “appeared” to agree to accept Japanisation but implemented profoundly 
different HRM-IR practices, it was necessary to study allocations of power, the types 
of actors involved and how conflicts were negotiated (see Chapter 7). Hence, data 
were gathered from management as well as from Japanese and Indonesian agency 
actors directly involved in cross-border management transfer processes. Adopting a 
qualitative approach also facilitated the examination of interactions between actors at 
micro-organisational levels, including interactions within organisational units and 
within associations. Furthermore, this approach helps reveal how low-power actors 
engage in political processes to gain legitimate status in the MNC’s global network 
(see Chapter 8). Presented in Table 3.1 is an outline of the research design and 
components of specific data used to answer the research questions in Chapters 6, 7 
and 8. 
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Table: 3.1 Outlined of Chapters 6, 7 and 8 research questions and data used 
Chapter Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 
RQ 
How do HQ-subsidiary inter-
organisational interactions, and forms of 
direct control, affects subsidiaries’ ability 
and motivation for knowledge 
absorption?7 
How do MNC and subsidiary actors 
mobilise macro, meso and micro sources 
of power to promote their preferred HRM 
practices?  
How do local business groups engage 
with local actors in order to establish 
their legitimacy with foreign 
multinationals? 
Primary data 
 Toyota, Honda and seven autoparts 
companies,8 HIDA and APINDO  
 102 interviews: 10 Astra 
management; 12 cars (5 
management+7 employees); 25 
motorcycles (10 management+15 
employees); 30 autoparts (8 
management+22 employees); 15 
business associations and 10 Japanese 
expatriates  
 Group interviews with Honda, Aisin 
and Denso Indonesia 
 Observations in all workplaces, ATC, 
organisations and three union offices 
in Indonesia 
 Toyota, Honda and eight autoparts,9 
HIDA, APINDO and KADIN 
 110 interviews: 10 Astra 
management; 12 cars (5 
management+7 employees); 25 
motorcycles (10 management+ 15 
employees); 35 autoparts (15 
management+20 employees); 15 
business associations and 13 Japanese 
expatriates 
 Group interviews with Astra, Honda, 
Aisin and Denso Indonesia 
 Observations in all workplaces, ATC, 
organisations and three union offices 
in Indonesia 
Observation in HIDA Japan 
 Business groups (Astra and Lippo), 
cars (Toyota and Daihatsu), 
motorcycles (Honda and Yamaha) 
and eight autoparts, HIDA, APINDO, 
KADIN and NGOs 
 127 interviews: 12 management (7 
Astra+5 Lippo); 17 cars (7 
management+10 employees); 33 
motorcycles (15 management+18 
employees); 35 autoparts (15 
management+20 employees); 15 
business associations and 15 Japanese 
expatriates  
 Group interviews with Astra, Honda, 
Aisin and Denso Indonesia 
 Observations in all workplaces and 
organisations in Indonesia 
 Observation in HIDA Japan 
                                                 
7 For the presentation of this table, RQ 2 and 3 are not listed in this table  
8 Musashi, Denso, Aisin, Federal Nittan, Kayaba, Adiwira Plastik and Indokarlo Perkasa 
9 Musashi, Denso, Aisin, Federal Nittan, Showa, Kayaba, Indokarlo Perkasa and Adiwira Plastik 
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The interweaving of MNC actors and agency alliances sheds light on MNC 
strategy and expands IHRM scholarship. Thus, these qualitative methods provided a 
foundation for applying Minbaeva et al.’s (2003), Ferner et al.’s (2012) and Bouquet 
and Birkinshaw’s (2008) concepts in an EME context. 
This multi-pronged empirical case study centres on the sources of power of 
multiple actors (management, employees and unions), in addition to three Japanese 
and three Indonesian business associations directly involved in the process of 
diffusing practices to the Indonesian automotive industry. In so doing, the researcher 
maximised variation within the cases, and compared and sought out unique cases 
that might offer novel dimensions to the study (Almond & Connolly, forthcoming). 
In Burawoy’s (1998) terms, this technique is described as theoretical sampling. The 
study examined different structures of ownership, the level of influence and the 
length of partnership of each car, motorcycle and autoparts subsidiary to understand 
the use of power in balancing dominant actors and legitimising HRM-IR “best 
practices”. The 12 case study organisations represented a reasonably diverse sample 
in terms of their capacity to execute both the Japanese lean production and lean 
management ideology. These different organisational settings illustrate the 
paradigmatic case of dominant versus low-power MNC actors represented in 
qualitative studies (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Understanding organisational 
phenomena throughout the supply chain through automotive case studies offered a 
valid approach to building theory from cases (e.g. Khan et al., 2015; Aoki et al., 
2014; Voss et al., 2002; Meredith, 1998). It was important to analyse both the 
complex array of context(s) that influence patterns of behaviour in organisational 
entities (“upwards”) and the complex sets of behaviours in interacting sub-units 
(“downwards”) (Vincent & Wapshott, 2014). Accordingly, the eight selected AOP 
sub-units had different tier classifications, allowing ample empirical evidence to be 
collected on the quality of Japanese lean ideology from direct and indirect JMNC 
subsidiaries in the autoparts supply chain. Consequently, the implicit comparison of 
multi-site cases, drawing upon IHRM, IR and IB frameworks, reveals the complexity 
of work and employment contexts. Such a comparison enables the researcher “to 
explore the macrofoundations of microprocesses” (Burawoy, 2009: 12). The 
automotive plants, with large labour forces and high levels of capital, were crucial to 
this thesis, as investment structures pertaining to managing resources and capital 
demonstrated not only the power of Japanese management in various aspects but also 
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a clear pattern of actors’ strategies to sustain or accept Japanese influence in practice 
(Endo et al., 2015). Examining different understandings of HRM-IR “best practices” 
and their appropriateness to different actors enabled the author to carry out in-depth 
research and analyse the power of management ideology capabilities at three 
analytical levels. 
A qualitative design was appropriate for this exploratory study, as it elicited 
descriptive evidence of research participants’ personal understandings and views 
based on real-world experiences. The firm-level data offer deeper theoretical insights 
into the major impact on employment structures of “transitional” (e.g. from 
dictatorship to liberalised IR institution) market economy factors across different 
types of working practices. Such institutional changes have been identified in 
previous studies of the post-Asian and global financial crises (e.g. Casez & Verick, 
2013; Morgan et al., 2010) in both home- and host-country labour market 
institutions. In addition to primary sources, data were gathered from secondary 
sources. 
3.3 Research Design 
The research design of this thesis centres on examining why things happen, and takes 
a theory-based approach to elucidate the process of change (Vincent & O’Mahoney, 
2018; Danermark et al., 2002). A CR approach moves from empirical data to 
theoretical generalisations applied to the context, using triangulation to make many 
different data comparisons (Saka-Helmhout, 2014). However, Vincent and 
O’Mahoney (2018) emphasise that empirical evidence prompts actualisation 
(conceptualisation) of the mechanism. Following Ackroyd (2009) and Miles et al. 
(2014), the triangulation and reliability of this thesis rest on comprehensive data 
covering stakeholders, societies and non-MNC actors and collected from various 
participants, including management, employees, and union and agency 
representatives. Thus, the empirical evidence prompts the researcher to seek reasons 
(rather than empirical instances), asking why something happens and under what 
conditions (Vincent & O’Mahoney, 2018). As Yin (1994, 2013) suggests, case 
studies validate theory in cross-sectoral settings to provide empirical insights. A 
case-study approach is an appropriate research design for this thesis, as it not only 
facilitates an in-depth exploration of a JMNC case but also suggests causal 
mechanisms from the empirical data. 
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Importantly, the validity of researcher–participant communication was 
established before, during and after data collection. In-depth interviews and 
descriptive techniques were used to investigate and analyse the data. Following 
Smith and Elger (2018), an active interviewing method was fundamental. 
Investigative and analytically-informed to generate new insights, this technique 
concentrates on specific events and examples, encourages interviewees to compare 
their experiences of different settings, times and situations (Burawoy, 1998), and 
probes for details and implications. During the interview process, it was imperative 
that the researcher remain cognizant of whether the interviewee had previous 
experience of participating or being interviewed in similar settings because it might 
influence multiple meanings; in other words, the participant’s interpretation might 
standardise the question, undermining the reliability of the research (Burawoy, 
1998). As an active interviewer, the researcher was well-prepared and rehearsed, 
with a clear objective prior to interviewing. 
A rigorous process was used to design open-ended interview questions. The 
questions were administered in English, and a set of secondary interview questions 
was prepared and presented in the native language. In designing interview questions, 
the researcher studied the organisations, relied on secondary data (e.g. organisation 
profiles and structure, historical and archival, financial reports and statements, and 
current news reports from reliable sources). To maintain ethical research standards, 
interview questions were discussed with thesis supervisors prior to the interviews. In 
the second phase data collection and follow-up interviews with research participants 
in Japan and Indonesia, the direct observation serves as background knowledge for 
the formulation of the questions. It has been a common practice that organisations 
granting access seek to review the interview questions. In compliance with this 
request, the researcher sent the outline of interview questions in advance, along with 
the objectives of the interviews. See Appendix A for the interview guides of the 
semi-structured interviews. The focus of these interviews was on exploring the 
participants’ answers in greater depth and eliciting their views on aspects of 
Japanisation, transfer mechanisms and challenges in diffusing and accepting HRM-
IR “best practices”.  
This thesis presents the data in two formats: narrative results of data analysis 
and short narratives within the text, including direct quotations from interviewees. 
The data analysis is presented with empirical evidence to integrate the research 
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content into the theoretical base (Welch et al., 2011). This method, which establishes 
links between qualitative research and empirical research, is particularly valid in 
organisational studies, as it captures cross-cultural nuances in the participants’ 
comments (Birkinshaw et al., 2011; Corley & Gioia, 2011). 
3.3.1 Data collection 
Data were collected between November 2014 and September 2016 through one-to-
one interviews, group interviews, site visits, and observations of manufacturing 
plants and organisations in Japan and Indonesia. The overall purpose was to 
understand the meaning of “Japanisation” according to the research participants’ 
understandings, views and firsthand experiences. Direct observations enabled the 
researcher to extract empirical data from observable events and to witness the 
conditions that led to different results. The value of site visits and observations lies 
in the opportunity to understand specific nuances in a specific context, thus aiding in 
the formulation of further interview questions and the general development of the 
thesis. The robust data gathered through this process of discovery serves as an 
integral component of the current research, as it lends itself to a multi-layered 
analysis. O’Mahoney and Vincent (2014) describe this method as finding similar 
processes in related situations, such as re-describing what the researcher has 
observed. This method facilitated a comprehensive micro-analysis of dominant 
HRM-IR “best practices” diffusion processes and outcomes at the inter- and intra-
organisational levels because it included MNC actors in first-, second- and third-tier 
car, motorcycle and autoparts sectors, and agencies representing management, 
employees and unions, as well as business representatives and expatriates. Actors’ 
power capabilities at macro-, meso- and micro-institutional levels were analysed to 
understand the impact of real institutional changes, real situations and real contexts. 
This research involved several Japanese (quasi-government) agencies, including 
the Overseas Human Resources and Industry Development Association (HIDA)10 
and the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), the Institute of Developing 
Economies (IDE), IDE-JETRO. It also involved semi-independent Indonesian 
business associations, including the Employer’s Association of Indonesia 
(APINDO), the APINDO Training Center (ATC) and the Chamber of Commerce 
                                                 
10 From 1 July 2017, HIDA changed its name to the Association for Overseas Technical Cooperation 
and Sustainable Partnerships (AOTS) (http://www.aots.jp/hida/en/, accessed 12 October 2007), but 
this thesis refers to it by the name used when the data collection was conducted. 
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(KADIN). In this study, these six Japanese and Indonesian organisations are referred 
to as semi-independent business associations. Access to these cross-organisational 
actors provided opportunities to collect pertinent data related to political alliance 
strategies (Gioia et al., 2013). The main HR participants were selected based on their 
knowledge and experience of managing HR in their organisations and HR training in 
Japan, as well as local trainings administered by ATC. The employee participants 
were chosen primarily for their experience of Japanisation activities in Japan and 
with their own workforces and organisations. The Japanese business association 
participants’ selection was based on their direct participation in undertaking projects 
or assignments, and their experience in facilitating training for both Japanese 
expatriates sent to serve Southeast Asian subsidiaries and Indonesian trainees sent to 
Japan. Finally, the selection of Indonesian business association participants was 
determined by their role and experience of HRM-IR practices and employment 
relations (ER) policies in the automotive sector. All of APINDO and the Association 
of Indonesia automotive Industries (GAIKINDO) of Indonesia gained management 
and production training administered by HIDA and coordinated with APINDO and 
local management. Additionally, all of the Japanese participants gained and/or 
involved training for Indonesians coordinated with HIDA and their own 
organisations in Japan.  
One-to-one interviews: Access was granted to conduct interviews with Japanese 
and Indonesian actors who had close relationships with the state and corporations in 
home and host countries. Each interview was scheduled to last 60 to 90 minutes. Of 
the 127 participants (12 in Astra, 12 in Toyota, five in Daihatsu, 25 in Honda, eight 
in Yamaha, 30 in AOP and 35 in business associations), 90 had participated in 
formal training facilitated by HIDA and APINDO in Japan, Thailand and Indonesia. 
To triangulate the findings, interviews were also conducted with other stakeholders, 
including unions, namely the All Indonesian Workers Union Confederation (KSPSI), 
Confederation of Indonesian Prosperity Labour Union (KSBI), Indonesian Trade 
Union Confederation (KSPI) and the Confederation of Indonesian Metal Workers 
(KSPMI), as along with non-affiliated union and International Labour Organization 
(ILO) representatives. To mitigate potential bias, copious interviews were conducted 
with individuals from a wide range of hierarchical levels and functional business 
areas. 
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Group interviews: Group interviews were conducted with two groups from 
Honda (7-30 participants), three groups from AOP consisting of various AOP 
employees and unions (5-25 participants) and two Astra management groups (5-8 
participants). Initially, the group interviews were scheduled for 90 minutes but lasted 
180 minutes. The time was extended to accommodate the engagement of research 
participants in free-flowing discussions on specific issues in specific contexts. While 
the group interviews comprised participants from the same organisation, 
interviewees were also able to express their views and compare experiences and 
events outside their own working environment. The data gathered from these focus 
groups were then analysed using configurational analysis techniques to cull 
particular changes and contextualise the conditions that had affected local 
organisations’ activities (e.g. Vincent & Wapshott, 2014). 
Direct observation: In addition to allowing the researcher access to individual 
research participants, site visits and observations are useful for gaining insights into 
the organisations themselves (e.g. degree of social engagement, the historical 
innovation and establishment of workplace practices). Access was granted to observe 
directly the implementation of Japanisation in Karawang International Industrial City 
(KIIC) and Sunter, Indonesia, specifically, Toyota (one full day in Plant 1 and one 
full day in subsidiary management office), Honda (three full days in three separate 
days) and AOP (five full days in different locations, i.e. Denso Aisin, Kayaba, Indo 
Karlo and Adiwira Plastik) manufacturing plants and in HR and union offices and 
facilities. In Japan, the researcher observed the Toyota factory (one full day) and 
other sites, such as three full days in HIDA’s Tokyo training centre and one full day 
in JETRO. These visits constituted valuable aspects of the author’s process of thesis 
discovery. The main Indonesian HR participants were selected based on their 
knowledge, views and experiences of managing HR-IR in their firms and of HR-IR 
training in Japan. Selection of employees was determined by their management and 
production system experiences and knowledge: technical and non-technical training 
experiences and implementation of Japanisation. The main criterion for choosing 
Japanese agency participants was their involvement and experience in facilitating 
training for Indonesian subsidiaries. Out of 85 Indonesian participants, 65 had gained 
technical and non-technical training on Japanisation in Japan, Thailand and 
Indonesia, including HR, IR, management, leadership, organisation and designing 
management-employee communications. 
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Additional data were gathered from the subsidiaries’ union and employee 
representatives. All three major Indonesian trade union confederations—the All 
Indonesian Workers Union Confederation (KSPSI), the Confederation of Indonesian 
Metal Workers (KSPMI) and the Indonesian Trade Union Confederation (KSPI)—
granted access and interviews. Furthermore, the researcher secured rare access to 
observe training for all workers from the designated International Industrial City 
Manufacturer at the union’s historical “Omah Buruh” site, the birthplace of the 
labour movement, and part of Astra Automotive Group’s union assembly. It should 
be noted that this national site has increasingly limited researchers’ access. 
Foreigners are particularly distrusted, as union members have felt that research 
findings generally serve the interests of the funding organisations. Besides this 
perception of bias, it is felt that most researchers have failed to produce compelling 
studies to further understanding of union activities as a whole.  
In an effort to maintain a high level of research ethics and trust, the researcher 
has been transparent, clearly declaring details regarding the financial support, the 
research institute and the objective of the research to the key union participants.  
Interestingly, an increasing number of international NGOs (e.g. ILO) and quasi-
government agencies are keen on observing labour union activities in “Omah 
Buruh”, and they wish to conduct training workshops to educate local labour unions 
about organisation, leadership and employee participation. In addition, local labour 
unions mobilise their voices, strategies and picketing agenda at that site.  Indeed, 
these site visits and observations are important aspects in the discovery process of 
the thesis.  
By upholding stringent research ethics, and maintaining research participant 
trust and professional communication, the researcher was also able to conduct face-
to-face interviews with formerly imprisoned labour activists who had been jailed 
during the 33-year Soeharto dictatorship when local labourers were struggling to 
gain freedom to organise. In addition to HR professionals, business managers, 
employees and unions, the researcher interviewed representatives of Japanese and 
non-Japanese agencies such as the ILO, HIDA and IDE-JETRO. These agency 
participants had experience in facilitating and/or had been involved in Japanese HR 
model training for Japanese and Indonesian participants. The researcher also had 
opportunities to observe Japanisation training in HIDA and the operationalisation of 
Toyota work systems in Toyota, Japan. 
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3.3.2 Premise of the extended case method  
According to Burawoy (1998: 5), the extended case method, a reflexive social 
science research approach, moves from the micro to the macro to build on pre-
existing theory. Presentation of the analytical findings of this thesis goes from 
understanding the transfer processes at inter- and intra-organisational levels (Chapter 
6), to examining transfer mechanisms at macro-, meso- and micro-institutional levels 
(Chapter 7), and then further investigating low-power actors strategies that aim to 
influence the global MNC network (Chapter 8). Accordingly, in setting out the 
problems in the three chapters, multi-site cases are used based on the research focus 
and the appropriateness of the cases. This method brings “reflective understanding” 
of the explanatory and interpretive research method to raise to the level of explicit 
analysis (Burawoy, 1998: 6). Data were collected from the single multi-site case of 
Astra International and its subsidiary businesses. Amongst the car, motorcycle and 
autoparts cases, specific cases were included, for example, for control purposes, or 
removed because they elicited no observations related to the specific research 
questions. Details of the research settings of the cases are discussed in Chapters 6, 7 
and 8 (see Table 3.1 for the outlined of specific cases and data used for each 
chapter). The analysis is structured in this way in order to demonstrate the 
applicability of the combination of theory and data to explain what was observed 
(e.g. Vincent & Wapshott, 2014). Different voices in different settings and situations, 
crossed organisation members (research participants), and various languages and 
cultures (e.g. Almond & Connolly, forthcoming) offer a multiplicity of data sources 
and thus a robust, multi-layered picture of the actual world. 
The qualitative data capture in-depth observations of cross-organisational HRM-
IR practices, influences and nuances in multiple actors’ views of home and host 
countries (Corley & Gioia, 2011; Delbridge et al., 2011). This discourse-based 
approach deepens understanding of the processes and outcomes of acceptance of and 
resistance to transfer occurring in the subsidiaries (Balogun et al., 2011) and 
autoparts suppliers (Khan et al., 2015; Pulignano, 2002). Both inductive (Chapter 6) 
and deductive (Chapters 7 and 8) reasoning approaches generate causal explanations 
of change phenomena in management transfers in the specific context of power, 
politics and conflict (Klag & Langley, 2013). Consequently, both approaches are 
appropriate for this thesis. 
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A three-stage analysis was carried out, entailing the construction of episodic 
MNC interventions, general analysis of the adoption of JMNC norms, practices and 
regulations, and use of secondary case data. Through a three-cycle coding process, 
first-order concepts, second-order themes, and aggregated dimensions (Saldaña, 
2015; Miles & Huberman, 1994), the data were analysed and key themes were 
constructed. Then the data were systematically broken down and the analyses were 
refined to develop a conceptual picture, formulate strict standards and articulate 
insights. Initial coding was important to search for necessary and sufficient 
conditions to articulate the context of causal conditions and outcomes (e.g. Saka-
Helmhout, 2014). This iterative three-cycle coding process was an ongoing cyclical 
data analysis process. It proved to be very useful in illustrating, uncluttering and 
understanding different organisational practices in the twelve firms. The coding 
framework is presented in Appendix B: Data Structure. 
Whetten (1989) suggests that in order to understand how existing theory can be 
extended to a new setting and to demonstrate why the research conducted has 
positive implications, a qualitative approach may be considered as an appropriate 
method to investigate the application of the theoretical contexts and to validate the 
link between theory-building and empirical studies. The result of the third-cycle 
coding led to more in-depth thinking about strategy. A table consisting of a list of 
quotes in Bahasa Indonesian with English translations allowed the researcher to 
operationalise and conduct in-depth analysis. This table served as a blueprint for the 
data, moving from raw to useful data and differentiating between “noise” and 
evidence of a phenomenon important to this study. Through the technical data 
analysis process, the researcher was able to refine the data’s usefulness and 
conceptualise it in ways that would support the argument of the topic under 
discussion. Throughout the writing process, the NVivo 11 feature of concept 
mapping was used to aid in conceptualising and re-conceptualising the data. The 
usefulness of computer software is discussed in Section 3.4.6. 
Coding and re-coding the data and field notes into emergent categories aided the 
researcher in further analysing the observations as a research background (e.g. 
Saldaña, 2015). The interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesian, Javanese, 
Japanese and English. Having lived for a time and experienced higher education in 
Indonesia and Japan, the researcher is proficient in these languages and exposed to 
the local cultures. To maintain the rich authenticity of the content, the data were 
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initially analysed in the native language and subsequently coded in English using 
NVivo. The results of this study are presented through short narratives in the text, 
including direct quotations from interviewees. Following Welch et al. (2011), the 
data analysis is presented with empirical evidence to integrate the research content 
into the theoretical base. This method, which establishes a link between explorative 
qualitative and empirical research, is especially valid in IHRM studies, as it captures 
cross-cultural nuances in the participants’ comments (e.g. Almond & Connolly, 
forthcoming; Birkinshaw et al., 2011; Corley & Gioia, 2011). It was effective for 
analysing and developing a contextual understanding of the effects of institutional 
resistance on the various MNC actors, and on HRM-IR diffusion processes and 
outcomes. To maintain anonymity, the precise job titles of research participants are 
omitted from the excerpts. 
Multidimensional analysis (inter- and intra-organisational, and macro-, meso- 
and micro-level) enabled the influence of internal structure on organisational strategy 
and actors’ power interactions to be operationalised. All three main case studies 
(Toyota, Honda and AOP) have different organisational mechanisms associated with 
dynamic capabilities for knowledge transfer and coordination. Also, inter-
organisational relationships between the MNC and subsidiaries vary, for example, in 
the level of Japanese capital investment, length of presence and management 
involvement, i.e. control and influence. However, there is less variation in intra-
organisational relationships between Astra and the three firms. Thus, these 
organisational characteristics provided appropriate case studies through which to 
construct research questions and investigate different mechanisms of knowledge 
inflow across the automotive sector. 
3.3.3 Interviewing élite and non-élite 
This study includes an examination of dynamic relationships between élite (i.e. 
APINDO’s board of directors and management, and corporate executives) and non-
élite actors (employees, unions and agencies). A study of élites provided a 
conceptual understanding of the empirical research relating to the influence of élite 
board members’ coordination activities on organisational structures and functions. 
APINDO has a formal mandate to develop, protect and control local labour market 
institutions. This study adopted Odendahl and Shaw’s (2002) and Hertz and Imber’s 
(1995) method of élite interviewing, a qualitative research method involving in-
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depth interviews with influential executives and senior and middle management with 
considerable industry experience and broad networks of professional relationships. 
The purpose was to understand their experiences and perspectives to deepen the 
research findings. As Barry and Wilkinson (2011) note, interviewing élite board 
members of employers’ associations is challenging, and differs from non-élite 
interviewing, particularly with respect to the depth of interviews, access, power, 
openness and feedback (see also Welch et al., 2002; Bengtsson et al., 1997; Useem, 
1984). It should be noted that the inherent nature of élites makes them difficult to 
study, since they establish barriers that set their members apart from the rest of 
society (e.g. Morse, 2018; Stephens, 2007; Kezar, 2003). As other scholars have 
observed, this is one reason why such studies are still relatively uncommon in social 
science research (e.g. Welch et al., 2002; Hertz & Imber, 1995; Traxler, 1995; 
Ostrander, 1993). This problem also applies to the study of employers’ associations 
and corporate élites (Taylor et al., 2015). Nevertheless, it was important to interview 
élites in this study because of their established systematic networks with enterprises, 
government, associations and unions (adversarial), and their roles, involvement and 
interwoven actor relationships in a setting with changing and unstable labour market 
institutions. 
One focus of this thesis is a case study of the APINDO organisation’s élite 
(APINDO’s board of directors, HR and IR executives and directors), and its impact 
on possible non-élite actions and the structure of Indonesian IR. Following Welch et 
al. (2002) and Kumar et al. (1993), in order to understand élites’ knowledge, 
experiences and perspectives on organisational issues, as well as their relationships 
with the non-élite, data were collected from in-depth, semi-structured telephone 
interviews, “face-to-face verbal interchanges” (e.g. Harvey, 2011; Stephens, 2007) 
and corporate visits and interviews conducted between July 2014 and October 2016 
in Indonesia and Japan.  The interviewer visited APINDO’s central office, ATC and 
the current main post of the élite (outside Astra and APINDO offices) in Jakarta, 
Indonesia and the APINDO network in Japan. The primary data comprised 
interviews with 25 élite members (HR managers, IR directors, APINDO board 
members and ATC). The élite interviewees were all male, had occupied an executive 
or senior management position for no fewer than five years, had a functional 
responsibility in their own area of expertise with high organisational status, and had 
substantial experience and depth of knowledge. Furthermore, they all possessed a 
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broad network of professional and business personal relationships and had had 
considerable international exposure, for example, through conferences and training 
with the ILO, other employer organisations and chambers of commerce. Both the 
gathered data and the interview experience itself were important in providing the 
researcher with a better understanding of the power, politics and conflicts from élite 
and non-élite perspectives in their own natural environments (e.g. Mikecz, 2012; 
Morse, 2018). 
3.4 Themes of Research Questions 
The work and employment (industrial relations), and organisational strategies of 
MNCs were the two broad themes of this study, similar to those discussed by 
Whitley (2000) and explored by Whitley et al. (2003), in order to understand the 
application, adaptation and impact of Japanese MNCs’ capitalist practices in the 
automotive manufacturing industry of the host country. These areas of inquiry 
enabled investigations of both cross-border transfer processes and IHRM structures. 
In so doing, the analysis aimed to gain insights into the key characteristics of 
globally recognised HRM-IR “best practices” in the context of institutional analysis 
of the home country, as well as analysis of the host country’s IR systems and 
subsidiary actors’ responses to the diffusion. In particular, the research questions 
were designed to distinguish between firm-level practices and societal features in the 
areas of skills development (e.g. education and training, on-the-job training and 
knowledge transfer), organisation (e.g. functional and task flexibility, management 
control and “lean” management), and industrial relations (e.g. communication, 
negotiation and bargaining, employee participation and representation). 
3.4.1 Operationalisation: Gaining access to the data 
Japanese management systems of work, employment and labour-capital relations 
may be reflected in the pattern of business investments, operations and spread of 
Japanese FDI (see, e.g. Aoki et al., 2014; Almond & González Menéndez, 2014a; 
Stewart, 2014; Aoki, 2010; Whitley, 1992). According to Sayer (2000: 19), “data 
collection and methodological choices should depend on the nature of the object of 
study and what one wants to learn about it”. This section discusses the practical 
problems of obtaining access, gathering firm-level data and selecting appropriate 
case studies relative to the research design. 
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3.4.2 The “art” of negotiating access 
Extensive literature discusses how to gain access. However, conceptualising one’s 
own experience, intuition and reflexivity enabled the researcher to understand the 
“art” of negotiating access, the objectives and the information being sought about the 
subject. Vincent and O’Mahoney (2014) make the case that CR does not prescribe 
which methods are suitable for investigating problems because it equips the 
researcher with philosophically informed methodologies to generate new insights. 
The key to operationalising CR in this type of research is to have a clear analytical 
target, and to understand causal mechanisms and conditions or processes. 
Early in the data collection process, in November and December 2014, Japanese 
organisations were contacted via email and online request forms. The Japanese 
associations and organisations were the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN 
and East Asia (ERIA), IDE-JETRO, ASEAN, Indonesia, HIDA, the Japan 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC), the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC), the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI), and Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) policy. All responded to the request by expressing their 
willingness to participate or pointing the researcher in another direction. A few 
agreed to complete initial questionnaires in English by email, and some were willing 
to complete a follow-up questionnaire, while two organisations agreed to give 
telephone interviews. Unfortunately, none of the Japanese automotive and 
electronics firms contacted (Nissan, Toyota, Mitsubishi, Honda, Yamaha, Kawasaki, 
Suzuki, Sonny and Toshiba) were willing to participate, despite internal referrals. 
This confirms the experiences of many Japanese and non-Japanese scholars who 
have found it very difficult to gain access to Japanese firms and engage them in 
external research. In October 2015, the researcher attended a Mitsubishi Corporation 
presentation at an Alumni Association Event run by the Japan Exchange and 
Teaching Programme at its London headquarters management office. There, the 
researcher approached a Mitsubishi branch HR director to convey the importance of 
participating. The Mitsubishi representative contacted Mitsubishi internally in both 
Japan and Indonesia. However, after a number of follow-up emails and phone calls, 
the results were disappointing. 
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The researcher then contacted participants in Indonesia. Since a key strand of 
the research was an understanding of the impact of MNCs operating in Indonesia, the 
researcher contacted the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) to gain 
access through business and official referrals and direct contacts. Based on 
discussions with BKPM, it appeared that the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (KADIN) would be ideal contacts to approach, owing to its direct 
involvement and business relationships with JMNCs, IDE-JETRO and HIDA. 
Unfortunately, the researcher did not have an internal referral for KADIN. 
Consequently, this lead reached a dead end. However, analysis of KADIN’s website 
and archives revealed that APINDO (the employers’ association) lists international 
and national MNCs on its website. The researcher emailed the office of the secretary 
and director of APINDO, which yielded some results, and by October 2014, the first 
four APINDO interviews had been completed. The participants’ roles, capacities and 
experiences as HR-IR directors shed light on the research design. These four 
participants were members of APINDO and had had opportunities to attend HRM-IR 
training in Japan and other countries administered by APINDO Indonesia and HIDA 
Japan. APINDO referred to them as “champions”. They had been selected, received 
training in Japan and returned to Indonesia in order to distribute their knowledge of 
Japanisation to their Indonesian colleagues. In addition, the results of secondary data 
analysis and six hours of interviews suggested that APINDO focuses on advancing 
Indonesia’s IR and HRM systems. APINDO is the only officially recognised 
employers’ organisation in Indonesia, mandated by KADIN to deal specifically with 
HRM-IR matters. 
3.4.3 Researcher’s own data collection experiences, intuition and reflexivity 
The art of negotiating access crystallised as the researcher spoke informally with a 
fellow Warwick student about the difficulty of gaining access. She reported that she 
had started by contacting her networks through social media, i.e. BlackBerry 
Messenger, WhatsApp and LINE. This was a first lesson in communication. The 
researcher subsequently learned that in the “real” world (bringing the CR perspective 
into practice) Indonesian participants are not keen on email and formal types of 
communication prior to engaging in face-to-face discussions. Rather, they prefer the 
conciseness and informality of social media. Furthermore, this fellow Warwick 
student had acted as a “gatekeeper”, enabling participants to open up and connect 
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throughout initial interviews, building trusting relationships and understanding the 
“real” world of business. Such spontaneous conversations may make a huge 
difference to successful access negotiation. In particular, the researcher had already 
exhausted formal types of communication and had reached out to professional 
networks, whereas informal and unstructured discussions might have been a more 
fruitful way of gaining research access. Indeed, the classic snowballing approach to 
data access is important in practice. The CR philosophical discourse enabled the 
researcher to observe real-world “reality” and determine which taken-for-granted, 
(in)formal types of communication worked best with different research participants. 
After three months of interviews, the researcher was able to contact the union 
secretary of the Confederation of Indonesian Metal Workers (KSPMI) by emailing a 
one-page letterheaded invitation highlighting the importance of KSPMI’s 
participation in the research and underlining the code of research ethics. After a 
second follow-up, access was gained and contact information was obtained for the 
branch secretary of KSPMI and an SPMI local chapter president, who worked for 
two AOP subsidiaries, Indokarlo Perkasa and Denso respectively. They found the 
interview questions very interesting and understood the importance of their 
participation. As a result, they became gatekeepers to gaining access to union 
members, fellow workers and their management. Owing to time differences and 
access to appropriate and adequate offices, the interviews were conducted as early as 
08:00 GMT (00:00 Indonesian local time), including some weekends and holidays. 
3.4.4 Process of selecting case studies 
The selected case study subsidiaries had a JMNC HQ in Japan and local parent firms 
(Astra and Lippo) in Indonesia (as well as two non-Japanese-owned autoparts supply 
chains, Indokarlo Perkasa and Adiwira Plastik) with varying levels of involvement 
of the Japanese MNC and agencies across the subsidiaries. They were selected for 
the study because they represented a reasonably diverse sample in terms of the types 
of manufactured products, organisational strategy, Japanese HRM “best practices” 
and management control. 
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Table 3.2: Case studies of car, motorcycle and autoparts subsidiaries 
 
These firms also varied in their management-union relations and in their 
capacity for and processes to absorb Japanisation and the JMNC’s HR practices. 
Toyota, Daihatsu, Honda and AOP are subsidiaries of Astra International 
Automotive Group. Details of the selected case studies are given in Table 3.1. 
The interviews with APINDO shed light on what was occurring within the 
organisation and its HRM-IR climate. On the basis of interviews with members of 
APINDO, the researcher reflected on his own experiences and intuition (e.g. 
Burawoy, 1998) in using the same snowballing data collection approach for 
management audiences as had successfully been used to gain access to the labour 
unions and Japanese participants. One APINDO participant was director of Astra 
International’s IR and HRM team and became a “gatekeeper” to Astra, granting 
access to three major automotive manufacturing subsidiaries: Toyota, Honda and 
AOP. In particular, actors’ interactions made them appropriate case studies to 
examine the strategies adopted by the Japanese HQ and business associations to 
control, manage and influence subsidiaries’ HRM-IR, and subsidiary actors’ 
responses in terms of seeking to acquire certain foreign practices whilst protecting 
local systems. 
Firm Japanese 
ownership 
Japanese 
presence 
Manufacturing 
Toyota 95% 1971 Cars 
Daihatsu 62% 1992 Cars 
Honda Motor 50% 1971 Motorcycles 
Yamaha Motor 90% 1974 Motorcycles 
Musashi 78% 1996 2nd tier autoparts 
Denso 75% 1978 1st tier autoparts 
Aisin 66% 1995 1st tier autoparts 
Federal Nittan 60% 1995 1st tier autoparts 
Showa 55% 1980 2nd tier autoparts 
Kayaba 50% 1976 2nd tier autoparts 
Indokarlo Perkasa 0% - 3rd tier autoparts 
Adiwira Plastik 0% - 3rd tier autoparts 
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3.4.5 Resources and opportunities to conduct observation and interviews in the 
workplaces 
At the initial data collection stage, key informants in the selected case study 
organisations were contacted by email. The first ten informants liaised with their 
colleagues, and personal recommendations resulted in gaining access to conduct 85 
interviews. Data were collected through video-call interviews, followed by face-to-
face interviews, study groups and on-site visits to the firms and plants in Japan and 
Indonesia. The individual and group interview sessions were conducted in Bahasa 
Indonesia, Javanese, Japanese and English. To maintain the robustness and 
authenticity of the context, the data were initially analysed in the native language, 
while the final results are presented in English. The objective of each data collection 
phase was to understand the structure, applicability and implications of inward 
knowledge transfer and to contextualise the research. 
The first phase of data collection targeted Indonesian research participants, 
while the objective of the second phase was mainly to gather more balanced data and 
target Japanese research participants. The results of the first phase of data analysis 
were crucial to the development of the research and the direction of the second phase 
of data collection in Japan. As Wright et al. (2005) observe, empirical research in 
EME settings presents greater challenges regarding access to reliable archival data 
compared with developed economies. The two phases of data collection offered 
dynamic academic experiences. 
Conducting first-phase data collection in West Java, Indonesia required 
appropriate funding. Given the limitations of funding, the fieldwork was combined 
with participation in a conference. The 4th Annual Southeast Asian Studies 
Symposium in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia provided an opportunity to travel to the 
area, which helped with travel costs. In addition, the researcher received external 
funding from Research and Development Management (RADMA), which supports 
student projects. As with other research projects, securing funding is a crucial 
enabling factor, especially if the research involves interviews, observations and site 
visits in different countries, as in this study. For example, lack of funding was one 
reason for Abo’s (2007) team failing to continue their comparative research on the 
application of Japanisation to countries including Indonesia. Professor Hiroshi 
Itagaki, one of the authors and key researchers, acknowledged: 
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In the early 1990s, when they [Abo’s team] planned a fieldwork in Southeast 
Asia and applied for a fund, Indonesia was included. But the fund, which they 
originally applied for three years, was cut to two years’ budget, and due to 
the limit of the budget, they needed to choose priorities among the countries 
that they originally planned to visit, i.e. Thailand and Malaysia (personal 
communication, 27 August 2018). 
The results of the first phase of data collection were crucial to the success of this 
research project and to the direction of the second phase of data collection in Japan. 
Observations and interviews were conducted with Astra and Lippo, Japanese 
subsidiaries under local business group management. These met the objective of 
understanding the implementation, constraints and impact of the JMNC’s HRM 
practices in Indonesian subsidiaries. Astra Automotive Group granted access for this 
first phase of data collection, resulting in in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
management (n=8), HR personnel (n=10), employees (n=30), union representatives 
(n=25) and employer representatives (n=5). In the UK, data collection was 
successfully completed between October and December 2014, comprising telephone 
interviews with Japanese business expatriates, business association representatives, 
governing bodies and NGOs, including JETRO (n=2), JETRO-IDE (n=3), JICA 
(n=1) and HIDA (n=1). These participants had direct knowledge and/or experience 
of training, researching and conducting business in Indonesia. Table 3.2 summarises 
the first-phase data collection. 
Table 3.3: Summary of first-phase data collection 
Activity Number of participants 
Telephone interviews 30 
Face-to-face individual interviews 50 
Face-to-face group interviews 6 groups of 45 
Transcriptions 65 audio files 
Questionnaires 6 respondents 
 
As a result of the first phase of data collection, and previous telephone interviews 
and email exchanges with research participants, the researcher negotiated access to 
Japanese automotive and organisational representatives in Japan, including IDE-
JETRO, the Japanese JICA and HIDA. 
In the second phase of data collection, the researcher benefited financially from 
a small research grant from the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation to carry out 
research in Japan. Research access was facilitated by the research networks of IDE-
JETRO, HIDA and Indonesian former trainees, as well as Japanese researchers who 
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had carried out decades of research on Japan-Indonesia. Gaining rare access can be 
difficult, and the key to success lies in being flexible and persistent, as proved by the 
first phase of data collection (85 interviews), in which interviews were completed 
with 37 Japanese and Indonesian research participants and observations undertaken 
in eight Indonesian subsidiary plants. The second phase, conducted in September 
2016, involved interviews and observations in automotive and autoparts firms, 
museums, agencies and trade-related organisations in Tokyo, Nagoya and Kansai 
regions. The aim of this second phase was to gain further understanding and 
insightful perspectives from Japanese HR practitioners, business managers, 
expatriates, and union and agency representatives with direct knowledge and/or 
experience of conducting business and/or training in Indonesia and ASEAN. The 
fieldwork in Japan also permitted the researcher to re-access firms and organisations 
in Indonesia. This two-fold investigation facilitated an examination of the 
motivations of JMNCs operating and conducting business in Indonesia, and analysis 
of the applicability, implementation and impact of Japanese management and 
production systems to the Indonesian context. Overall, from both phases of data 
collection, qualitative data were gathered from 127 interviews with diverse 
participants. Table 3.4 summarises the 1st and 2nd phase data collection 
Table 3.4: Summary of phases 1 and 2 data collection 
Organisations/Associations Number of 
Participants 
Astra International 12 
Toyota and Daihatsu Cars 17 
Honda and Yamaha Motorcycles 33 
Autoparts 35 
Japanese business associations and Japanese expatriates 15 
Indonesian business associations 15 
 
3.4.6 Language transcription, analysis and organisation of data using NVivo 
software 
The researcher’s fluency in Japanese, Bahasa Indonesia, Malaysian and Javanese 
provided an advantage in operationalising and administering the data collection. 
Both language and cross-cultural skills were also useful in obtaining access—and 
analysing data, as well as for understanding various Japanese technical terms 
explained by research participants, and Japanese signs posted in the subsidiaries’ 
96 
workplaces. Understanding both Japanese and Indonesian culture enabled 
differentiation between the Japanese and Indonesian types of work culture evident in 
the management offices, employees’ facilities and union offices, as well as at 
production sites. 
Audio files from the interviews were transcribed, and the data were analysed 
using NVivo software. The researcher attended NVivo training on campus, consulted 
experts and watched YouTube Nvivo presentations throughout the coding process in 
order to enhance software analysis skills. Given the nature of the data gathered, 
three-cycle coding was able to provide better organisation and results. The three-
cycle coding and iterative analysis process were accompanied by readings of 
methodological and data analysis literature (e.g. Saldaña, 2009, 2012, 2015; 
Silverman, 2006; Miles et al., 2014; Bazeley & Jackson, 2013), and attendance at 
events on and off campus on research methods and methodology, international 
business and Japanese studies. These resources provided a clear understanding of 
why and how to conduct coding using NVivo, and to conceptualise data 
qualitatively. The aim of each cycle of coding and analysis was to organise, re-code 
and interpret the data conceptually. The focus was on exploring the participants’ 
responses to the semi-structured interview questions in greater depth, and 
particularly their views on Japanese management practices and management 
technology transplantations. Thus, an explorative approach was applied to analysing 
the richness of the data, which led the direction of the research. Owing to the quality 
of the voice or noise interference during the recording, some of the recorded 
interviews could not be transcribed. The researcher re-listened to the audio files to 
ensure accurate transcription and to manage some defective parts of the recordings. 
Although there were some minor technical issues with the software and hardware, 
the problems were solved and the data were saved. 
English and Japanese were used in conducting telephone, Skype, LINE and 
Whatsapp telephone interviews with Japanese and Indonesian interviewees. The 
majority of interviews with research participants in Indonesia were conducted in 
Bahasa Indonesia. Interviewees and the interviewer spoke the official Indonesian 
national language, Bahasa Indonesia and local languages. In the fieldwork, 
Indonesian, Javanese and other local languages (dialects) were used. The interviewer 
is fluent in Indonesian, Javanese (and some local dialects) and proficient in Japanese. 
The researcher had learnt informal Japanese while growing up in Indonesia, 
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specifically on the islands of Java and Bali. Formal Japanese language and cultural 
training followed several years later  at McMaster University in Canada, with a one-
year formal exchange at Osaka University Japan, and at the University of Oxford. 
To minimise the loss of original meaning from the data, all data were transcribed 
in the original languages. Telephone and video interviews were conducted on 
Warwick Business School’s premises. Observations and interviews in Indonesia 
were carried out in the interviewees’ workplaces, offices and training sites and in 
union offices. 
3.5 Conclusion 
As existing organisation studies on power, politics and conflicting interests suggest 
(e.g. Becker-Ritterspach, 2016; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Morgan & Kristensen, 
2006), the epistemological and ontological insights of critical realism provide tools 
to investigate real causal effects, entities and observable issues to understand 
phenomena relating to changes to work, employment and organisation (e.g. Vincent 
& O’Mahoney, 2018; Smith & Elger, 2014). The CR approach is always challenging 
and has been criticised no less than alternative approaches such as positivism, 
interactionism, sociomaterialism and constructivism (Vincent & O’Mahoney, 2018). 
In particular, studies have indicated the difficulty of operationalising CR nuances in 
sociological research. Challenges often result in failing to identify actual entities, 
properties, causal mechanisms and effects to draw fresh insights. Although CR does 
not suggest specific research methods for specific issues, it does offer clear 
guidelines on issues such as active interviewing and investigation techniques, as 
used in this study. 
The philosophical approaches of abduction and retroduction, which do not 
constrain the process to the traditional qualitative/quantitative dichotomy, generated 
new insights through the distinctively CR approach applied in this study. The 
epistemological and ontological approaches of CR were particularly applicable to 
this study because the researcher’s own experience and intuition were reflected in the 
objectives of study, beyond what scholarly intuition might call “common sense”. 
Section 3.4 has demonstrated the importance of features of active CR interviewing 
(i.e. the art of interviewing non-élite and élite), investigation and analysis with 
respect to gaining access to data (i.e. reflections on the researcher’s own experiences 
led to more consciously selected research methods and techniques), and upholding 
98 
important ethical issues, such as access, confidentiality and the protection of 
informants (Macdonald & Hellgren, 2004; Smith & Elger, 2018). This thesis adopts 
a relatively new development of CR to examine both the causes and means of 
institutional change (e.g. Vincent & O’Mahoney, 2018; Ram et al., 2008; Sayer, 
2010). Thus, this work is positioned within an under-studied stream of social 
research (e.g. Almond & Connolly, forthcoming), drawing fresh insights from the 
wider literature (e.g. Ferner et al., 2012; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) and 
addressing the operational challenges of CR in the social science research 
community. In short, the operationalisation of this research design lies in its iterative 
and deep form of comparative analysis of multi-site cases to contextualise 
understanding of work, employment and organisation in a newly industrialised 
country setting. 
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Chapter 4: Country and Institutional Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses important features of home- and host-country institutions, the 
business environment, and the power, politics and interests of MNC management. It 
concludes by exploring the roles of semi-independent business associations in 
responding to institutional changes and constraints. 
4.2. Overview of Japanese Work Systems and Cross-Border Business Outlook 
The lean production system, characterised by just-in-time production and continuous 
improvement of production procedures, has provided the Japanese automobile 
industry with a global competitive advantage, transforming the Fordist mass-
production systems of North America and Europe (e.g. Womack et al., 1990; Elger 
& Smith, 1994; Lechevalier, 2014; Stewart et al., 2016). A skilled and committed 
workforce has been the conduit for enhancing the productivity and competitiveness 
of lean production innovation (Elger & Smith, 1994). As noted above, features of the 
Japanese work, employment and organisation model have been identified in previous 
research on the automotive industry. Japan’s globally accepted practices and 
innovation are also important for the development of Indonesia’s automotive 
industry and are therefore important to this thesis. Accordingly, to understand the 
scale of change of Japanese automotive firms in Indonesia, JMNCs’ work and 
employment practices in Japan and Indonesia are examined in depth through the 
lenses of actors’ power, politics and conflicts of interest. The Japanese model of 
work, organisation and labour–capital relations may be reflected in the pattern of 
business operations and the spread of Japanese FDI (e.g. Elger & Smith, 1994; 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Morgan, 2009). Thus, this thesis aims to elucidate the 
diffusion and implications of the Japanese model, as well as international influences 
on Japanese management practices beyond the European and US contexts. This 
chapter focuses on the applicability of the three classical pillars of the Japanese 
model—employment relations, functional flexibility and enterprise training—which 
have represented the “best model” of Japanisation since the 1950s (e.g. Elger & 
Smith, 1994). 
Over the past 30 years, not only have Japanese institutions changed (e.g. 
Lechevalier, 2014; Amable & Palombarini, 2009; Jackson & Miyajima, 2007), but 
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the literature on Japan has further complicated understanding of Japanese 
institutions. Lechevalier (2014) suggests revisiting “contemporary Japanese society” 
(see also Cooke & Kim, 2017; Bamber et al., 2016; Stewart, 2014; Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005) and the “classical model” to theoretically analyse and investigate 
institutional changes (e.g. Morris et al., 2018; Whitely, 2014; Almond, 2011a; 
Whitley et al., 2003; Wood & Lane, 2011; Morgan et al., 2010). 
The bursting of the Japanese economic bubble in the 1990s changed the focus of 
academic discourse on the impact of Japanese firms in their institutional context and 
on FDI in host countries (Endo et al., 2015; Witt & Redding, 2014). Recent research 
is focusing on linking corporate strategy with FDI, rather than on evaluating “best 
practice” (Endo et al., 2015). Nevertheless, since the early 1990s, most Japanese 
research studies have focused on advanced and mainstream EME countries, namely 
the USA, the EU, China and India, while a research gap remains regarding some 
Southeast Asian regions (see e.g. Cooke & Kim, 2017; Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 
2016; Debrah et al., 2000). This is particularly so in the case of Indonesia, which has 
been the largest Japanese FDI recipient since the 1950s and is the largest Japanese 
automotive market in ASEAN. An emerging stream of research is concentrating on 
the spillover of Japanese corporate strategy, management practice and the process of 
institutionalisation to understand Japanese firms’ motivations and how their role in 
host countries’ economies impedes dominant HRM “best practice”. Following Endo 
et al. (2015), this chapter systematically examines emerging discourses on 
international inter-firm relations through the process of FDI. It also investigates 
changes to features of Japanese HRM “best practice” and corporate strategy 
practices made to increase management control, economic impact and human capital 
development in Indonesia. 
Historically, JMNCs sought resources in Southeast Asia and entered Indonesia 
with the intention of securing raw materials and taking advantage of cheap labour in 
offshore production (Holmes et al., 2013). In fact, Japan has been the major FDI 
player in Indonesia, and Southeast Asia (including Indonesia) has been the largest 
Japanese FDI recipient since the 1970s (e.g. Lechevalier, 2014). Shortly after the 
Asian financial crisis, JMNCs adopted new growth regimes and intensified their 
economic involvement in ASEAN’s regional integration. In Japan, the production 
paradigm is characterised by high value-added products, particularly in the 
automotive industry (e.g. Irawati & Charles, 2010), which raises a number of 
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questions. How is this paradigm being disseminated abroad? Have JMNCs moved 
beyond a focus on cheap labour and raw materials in their investments in Southeast 
Asia, and are they now actively disseminating higher value-added production 
paradigms? Are JMNCs in Indonesia pursuing lower/higher value-added production 
regimes, and how is this being affected by institutional changes? 
4.3 Overview of Japan’s Background 
The Japanese employment institution is a constellation of norms, policies and 
regulations that influence the operations and structure of JMNCs at home and abroad 
(e.g. Vogel, 2006). In order to conduct a theoretical analysis of the complexity of 
Japanese institutions that encapsulates scholarly debate, the theoretical discourse can 
be organised into four strands. First, some scholars argue that Japanese institutions 
have changed fundamentally through a gradual layering or transformation process 
(e.g. Aoki, 2010; Thelen & Mahoney, 2009; Dore, 1990). As Sako and Kotosaka 
(2012) assert, Japanese institutional transformation is characterised by a piecemeal 
process, layering the old system with the new, and gradual convergence. This is not 
only difficult to identify, but may also have adverse ramifications on the new system 
(e.g. Morgan et al., 2010). Second, Japan is very different from other coordinated 
market economies, such as the USA, UK and Germany, and its institutions remain 
isolated in their own national environment (e.g. Aoki et al., 2014; Lechevalier, 2014; 
Morgan et al., 2010; Kingston, 2013; Vogel, 2006). Since the 1980s, JMNCs have 
extended their international presence beyond Europe and North America. 
Nevertheless, studies of Japan from either a national or a comparative perspective 
seem to have focused only on advanced industrial countries such as the USA, the UK 
and Germany (e.g. Gospel & Pendleton, 2005; Thelen, 2010). Third, certain 
Japanese institutions have influenced the main aspects of JMNCs’ organisation, such 
as their operational and strategic choices (e.g. Amable, 2003; Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Thelen & Mahoney, 2009). Lastly, these changes relate to internationalisation 
triggered either by socioeconomic change or by transnational production networks as 
a result of heightened international competition from China (Sako & Kotosaka, 
2012). JMNCs have exploited American and European markets and have 
subsequently adapted to the customs of local institutions. However, this thesis aims 
to advance understanding of Japanisation specifically through Japanese HRM “best 
practice” in cross-border transfer and management control. It conducts an empirical 
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examination of the mechanisms, implications and various applications and 
interpretations of Japanisation in the context of institutional duality. This explorative 
study of institutionalism aims to provide a better understanding of the implications 
of JMNCs in a specific EME context and to expand the international breadth of 
Japanese business management studies. 
Historically, Japan has been interested in inward investment,11 and by the 1990s, 
Southeast Asia had become the centre of Japanese FDI (ASH Center, 2011; 
Rahmaddi & Ichihashi, 2013). This provides a research ground beyond European 
and US markets, particularly in terms of understanding the home-country effect of 
JMNCs in Indonesia and how JMNCs interact with the host country. Furthermore, in 
the past three decades or so, a limited number of similar studies has been conducted 
outside North America and Western European countries (e.g. Thelen & Mahoney, 
2009; Morgan et al., 2010; Thelen, 2010). For instance, the Japanese Multinational 
Enterprise Study Group (JMNESG), directed by Tetsuo Abo (2007), is conducting a 
20-year study on how Japanese manufacturers operate overseas, focusing on the 
transferability of Japanese production systems and HRM (Kawamura, 2011).12 While 
their study has examined an automotive plant in Thailand, it has not included any 
plants in Indonesia or Malaysia. JMNESG has as yet failed to highlight the 
importance of the Southeast Asian market economy and has ignored Indonesia in 
particular. 
Japan has been at the forefront of FDI throughout ASEAN, engaging in trade 
mainly through automotive manufacturing, heavy machinery and household 
appliances. This has led to growing discussion of cross-national labour market 
institutional arrangements (Thelen, 2010), such as the “three pillars” of Japanese 
industrial relations and JMNCs’ “mechanisms, work, practices and organisational 
capabilities and interaction with host-country specificities” in different settings and 
conditions (Hotho & Pedersen, 2012: 251). Although JMNCs have operated 
successfully in Indonesia, these operations remain largely unexplored (e.g. Carney et 
al., 2018; Fainshmidt et al., 2016; Irawati, 2011). 
                                                 
11 Japanese MNCs are open to investment abroad. They have explored the USA, Canada and Mexico 
to serve North American markets, and Germany, UK and Poland to serve European markets. 
12 This survey-based study has interviewed Japanese management in some parts of ASEAN, including 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
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4.4 Overview of Indonesia’s Business Environment 
Japan has been the major FDI player in Indonesia, and Indonesia has managed to 
attract the greatest FDI in ASEAN since the mid-1990s (e.g. Rosser, 2014; 
Rahmaddi & Ichihashi, 2013; Booth, 1998). In recent years, several Japanese 
automotive plants have opened in Indonesia and are fully operating under Japanese 
management to serve Southeast Asia’s emerging markets (see Nikkei, 2018). Since 
the 1990s, JMNCs’ business objectives have shifted and intensified in ASEAN 
(McGee, 2009; Kingston, 2013). No longer do companies simply extract natural 
resources and return finished products to Indonesia; increasingly, products made in 
Indonesia are tailored to the Indonesian market and are also marketed to other EME 
countries, such as the so-called BRICS nations (e.g. Surdu et al., 2018; Jürgens & 
Krzywdzinski, 2016). This raises questions about the extent to which JMNCs are 
shifting from a market-driven to an efficiency-driven model. 
This explorative research investigates institutional changes in Indonesia, and the 
progress and challenges facing foreign MNCs entering EMEs, as well as how 
transformational challenges affect how they operate in Indonesia. Indonesia may 
potentially lose ground to Malaysia and Thailand due to over-reliance on natural 
resources and alarming under-investment in human capital (ASH Center, 2011). In 
fact, Indonesia spends less than 0.05% of its GDP on human capital development, 
including areas such as education, health and R&D. Since the fall of Soeharto’s 
regime in 1998, change and institutional transformation in Indonesia have emerged 
as new research themes (e.g. Casez & Verick, 2013; Nehru, 2013; Dhanani et al., 
2009; Booth, 1998). Thus, this thesis examines the behaviour of MNCs in newly-
emerging EMEs and aims to fill a knowledge gap in IHRM, IR and IB research in 
the context of labour market institutional changes and challenges in the labour 
market since the 1997 Asian financial crisis (e.g. Morgan et al., 2010; Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2010). 
The importance of the 1997 Asian financial recession to this thesis is that it has 
redefined the socioeconomic and political environments of both Japan and Indonesia. 
The Japanese economy has experienced greater turbulence, raising debates about 
whether it is still an important player in the global economy. In contrast, emerging 
economy countries such as Indonesia were previously treated as developing 
economy nations, but political economic reformation has had a positive impact on 
104 
the local economy. While Japan has experienced stagnation, Indonesia’s outlook is 
improving, suggesting shifts of power in this dynamic situation. This is a compelling 
case through which to explore conditions that facilitate inward transfer and enable 
the JMNC to maintain its dominance in the largest ASEAN 
manufacturing/assembling nation. 
4.5 Overview of Indonesia’s Background 
In 1967, following a wave of political reforms, Indonesia underwent economic 
changes that resulted in economic growth reliant primarily on commodities (Dhanani 
et al., 2009; Nehru, 2013). Furthermore, in the mid-1990s, the Indonesian economy 
not only experienced rapid development, but also earned a reputation as a high-
performing economic actor in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g. Casez & Verick, 2013; 
ASH Center, 2011; Booth, 1998). Although it appeared that Indonesia’s labour 
market institutions would be ill-prepared to respond to the aftershocks of economic 
crises (e.g. Casez & Verick, 2013; Schuler et al., 2012; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), 
recent studies indicate that the Indonesian economy has been resilient to the global 
crisis, and that its performance also recovered strongly in 2009 and has continued to 
grow, with GDP growth rising from 5.7% to 6.2% in 2010 and to 6.5% in 2011 
(Nehru, 2013). 
Over a period of ten years, Indonesia has managed to reorientate its politics and 
economy toward transparent democratisation and decentralisation of the federal 
government. Recent research suggests that the Indonesian economy has been out-
performing others, due in part to its growing middle-class population, large domestic 
markets and commodities exports (e.g. Fainshmidt et al., 2018; Ford, 2014; Casez & 
Verick, 2013; Irawati & Charles, 2010). Continued economic growth through 
episodes of crisis and prolonged structural labour market challenges has stimulated 
research discussions seeking to understand how Indonesia’s environment has 
influenced JMNCs operating in the country. Indonesia’s IR has experienced cultural 
and regulatory changes (i.e. Caraway & Ford, 2017; Ford, 2014, 2000; Rosser, 
2014), such as the introduction of fixed-term contracts and subcontracting to 
promote labour flexibility (Dhanani et al., 2009). Indonesia’s New Order regimes 
developed an IR system called “Pancasila industrial relations” (hubungan industrial 
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Pancasila) (Ford, 2000), “a modern concept” of a 1920s system, to attempt to order 
and structure unity across Indonesia’s diverse archipelagos (Reeve, 1985: 25).13 
Unlike some advanced industrial economies such as Japan, the Asian and global 
financial crises have not substantially changed labour market trends in Indonesia 
(Casez & Verick, 2013). However, although it has managed to sustain overall 
economic development, it has yet to reduce informal employment and has failed to 
promote skills-intensive job markets. While Japan has experienced increasing 
numerical flexibility (e.g. Sako & Kotosaka, 2012; Sako & Satō, 1997), precarious 
types of employment have increased in Indonesia’s labour markets (Casez & Verick, 
2013) in response to the demand for global economic integration. These appear in 
the form of home-country effects promoted by MNCs. Moreover, the global 
financial crisis has had a substantial impact on the labour market structure, which has 
failed to generate sufficient formal-sector and high-skilled intensive types of 
employment in manufacturing industries. As a result, Indonesia’s economic 
development is over-reliant on natural resources consumed by resource-based 
industries, and on employment in labour-intensive manufactured goods (Dhanani et 
al., 2009). High-skill and capital-intensive technology-based industries that promote 
sustainable economic growth while advancing human capital skills and development 
play a key role in increasing the capacity of EMEs. However, Indonesia is not yet at 
this stage. The interaction of home- and host-country effects may have an impact not 
only on labour market institutions, but also on socioeconomic and societal 
institutions and the business environment (e.g. Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Hotho & 
Pedersen, 2012; Meyer & Peng, 2009). 
4.6 Applicability of Institutional Theory 
Analysis of the nature of institutions is aligned with Hotho and Pedersen’s (2012) 
discourse on the “rules of the game”. They seek to explain the conditions of national 
institutional frameworks (Morgan et al., 2010), and how these qualities support 
institutional change whilst underpinning MNCs’ operational strategies and 
behaviour. These analytical tools and theoretical foundations enable an examination 
of how home institutions influence JMNCs in Indonesia, and how changes in 
                                                 
13 Pancasila is Indonesia’s constitutional ideology, which consists of five pillars: belief in the 
divinity/almighty God; respect for humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the 
principle of deliberation to reach a consensus; and the realisation of social justice (Ford, 2000). This 
concept has a European political basis. 
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Indonesian host institutions interact with Japanese home institutions. Hence, this 
thesis begins with a broader discussion of aspects of institutions at the national level, 
and then narrows this down to the institutional context of an organisation in the 
country of origin, and how a particular MNC operates in two different countries with 
different institutional environments (see Chapter 2). 
According to Jackson (2009: 625), institutional patterns are a constellation of the 
“social organisation of market activities, networks and internal linkages within 
firms”. However, although Scott (1995) postulates that “institutions act as 
regulatory, normative or representational pressures that lead firms to adopt similar 
characteristics” (Jackson, 2007: 608), “institutions do not tightly define the scripts 
that actors can follow” (Morgan, 2004, cited in Morgan et al., 2005: 7). Whitley 
(2005) suggests that in EMEs, states may play an affirmative role in promoting 
homogeneous practices across firms by legitimising certain institutional forms 
(Jackson, 2009). As a consequence, states often exercise their legislative power to 
coordinate institutional consistency at the national level. They must also evaluate 
their administrative capacities, and market conditions that contest their state powers. 
Therefore, governmental limitations may amplify organisational capacities and firm-
specific capabilities, leading organisations to seek self-reinforcing opportunities. 
This reality may fundamentally re-shape JMNCs’ institutions, for instance by 
redefining “dualistic” labour market institutions embedded in firms’ business 
strategies (Dore, 1990). Morgan (2004) suggests that the nature of the national 
institutional context may be constitutive of the international context, depending on 
the degree of “fit” and interaction between institutions (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; 
Morgan et al., 2010), and specifically how MNCs use their capital. Referring to 
JMNCs in Indonesia, Whitley (2005) adds that, since JMNCs’ cross-national 
coordination, planning and innovation are based on home-country routines, 
competences appear in “managerially coordinated types of MNCs” beyond Japan. 
Jackson (2009) suggests that the varied nature of institutional regimes across market 
economies may diversify patterns and operations. This may be extended to 
promoting a variety of transformational organisational capabilities across national 
boundaries, and it is thus important to explore interactions between these changes 
(Morgan et al., 2005). 
This study examines how the collective voice of local employers’ associations is 
increasingly using power and micropolitical tactics in response to changes in foreign 
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MNC practices and local labour market institutions. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 discuss the 
roles and strategies of government agencies, and interactions between Japanese and 
Indonesian agencies. 
4.7 Constraints on Collective Action by Employers’ Associations: The Case of 
APINDO in Indonesia 
This thesis empirically analyses how the structure of an employers’ organisation 
affects the power and political processes of employers’ collective interests in shaping 
the national labour market institutions and business environment. It focuses on 
APINDO, the only employers’ association in Indonesia, and presents a detailed 
analysis of structural power asymmetry in the forms of collective IR preferred by the 
labour market and employers’ associations. In contrast to Traxler’s (2008) 
observation of employers’ confederations in the UK and Canada, APINDO 
participates extensively in the development of national policy and governance, and 
influences the IR framework. This is feasible primarily because Indonesia’s national 
institutions are weaker and less structured than those of advanced industrial countries 
(e.g. Barry & Wilkinson, 2011; Sheldon & Thornthwaite, 1999; Traxler, 2008). The 
extant IR literature also suggests that employers’ collectives are a strategic 
organisational choice (e.g. Jun et al., 2018; Thornthwaite & Sheldon, 2012; Heery & 
Simms, 2010; Sheldon, 1999), particularly where there is a lack of organised 
business representation in the collective employers’ voice (e.g. Sheldon et al., 2018; 
Traxler, 1999). 
An employers’ organisation is an association of employers with common 
interests involved in the key activities of representing various categories of members 
and practices, recruiting members, and governing members with respect to collective 
decisions (Traxler, 1996). Existing studies of employers’ associations focus on the 
complexity of state and union powers (e.g. Behrens, 2004; Heery & Simms, 2010). 
For instance, governmental influence over the capacity for employers to organise and 
the density of union membership have significant consequences for the shape of 
employers’ organisations (e.g. Barry & Wilkinson, 2011; Traxler, 2008). 
APINDO is the only officially recognised employers’ organisation in Indonesia 
(e.g. Ford, 2004; ILO, 2016; Manning & Roesad, 2007). It refers to itself as 
“independent” (Ford, 2013; Mizuno, 2005), but this is questionable since its 
management comprises both employers and (active and former) government 
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officials. This involvement of employers and state officials is a unique aspect of this 
case study, since employers’ organisations are traditionally separate from 
government bodies, and employers usually lobby the state in addition to engaging in 
collective bargaining with unions (e.g. Thornthwaite & Sheldon, 2012; Traxler, 
2008). 
The context of APINDO and Indonesia offers an opportunity to examine 
employer-organised collective voice as a result of the recent political transformation 
of labour in “the rise of the union movement” (Traxler, 2008: 238). Following the 
collapse of the Soeharto dictatorship in 1998 (Aspinall, 1999), the ILO ratified 
Convention No. 87, protecting the right to organise and allowing freedom of 
association (Ford, 2004). Thus, recent changes in the structure of HR and IR 
developments have prompted new forms of employers’ organisation and collective 
voice in Southeast Asia’s largest EME (e.g. Barry & Wilkinson, 2011; Manning, 
1998; Rosser, 2013; Sheldon & Thornthwaite, 1999). As Traxler (2008: 238) points 
out, employers’ associations “have become increasingly reactive to the state because 
their viability ever more depends on supportive national regulations”. Accordingly, 
this thesis examines how APINDO has been structured around the organisation of 
political interests to influence national IR policies and the business environment 
through its member roles, networks and power. In so doing, this research sheds light 
on the role and influence of employers’ associations in cross-border HRM “best 
practice” transfer processes and outcomes. 
APINDO’s history is intertwined with the political power of the Soeharto 
dictatorship in Indonesia. From the late 1960s, Soeharto’s administration 
endeavoured to establish and consolidate an employers’ association that would play 
an important role in government negotiations (e.g. Ford, 2013; Manning, 1998; 
Mizuno, 2005; Quinn, 2003). Prior to this regime, there had been an alliance 
between the Golkar political party (the oldest state-sponsored party), local 
bureaucrats and the business élite. This regime became deeply embedded in the 
Indonesian political economy during the Soeharto regime (e.g. Dieleman & Sachs, 
2018; Isaac et al., 2008). As a result, Indonesian IR was characterised by 
exclusionary corporatism. The alliance between government and corporate leaders, 
originating in 1952 as the Employers’ Council on Socio-Economic Affairs (PUSPI), 
was renamed APINDO in 1985 (Mizuno, 2005). Also known as the Indonesian 
Employers’ Association, APINDO is the only employers’ collective association 
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recognised in Indonesia (ILO, 2016). It is based in Jakarta, with over 400 members, 
branches throughout Indonesia’s 26 provinces and 173 district boards (APINDO, 
2016). According to Bell (1994), employers’ associations have shifted their 
resources toward the establishment and development of political influence. From a 
political economic perspective, Thelen (2004) and Swenson (2002) support this 
view. Therefore, with its combination of employers and state officials, APINDO is 
deeply influenced by its historical, cultural and political background. 
APINDO cannot be regarded as representing solely employers’ interests. Since 
the 2000s, its board members have included active and non-active state officials, as 
well as active HR and IR company directors with a wealth of government networks 
(APINDO, 2015b; Ford, 2013; Mizuno, 2005). For example, Indonesia’s ministers of 
trade and manpower have served as general chairmen (APINDO, 2015a), and both 
the current president and vice-president of Indonesia have served as executive 
members of the board of directors. Mr Yusuf Kala, vice-president of Indonesia, is an 
honorary chairman (APINDO, 2016; Mizuno, 2005).14 
APINDO received a government mandate through Presidential Decree No. 
6/2013, which named it as a government partner, enabling it to sponsor and further 
lobby the government. As a consequence of this decree, APINDO became part of a 
team of expert international trade organisations making recommendations to the 
government and international governing bodies (APINDO, 2015a, 2015b). This is 
significant because APINDO is a collective of private businesses, whereas its 
collective voice in the form of recommendations is influential mainly at the national 
level—and perhaps even at the international level in terms of organisations engaging 
in business with Indonesia. It has a wider impact on the national economy by 
maintaining and even increasing its coordination capacity. The non-IR-related 
Decree No. 6/2013 further strengthened APINDO’s strategic business superiority, 
enabling it to control a wide range of labour market-related areas such as trade and 
investment (Müller-Jentsch, 1988). 
APINDO is unique amongst employers’ organisations for lobbying government 
and being involved in drafting labour laws, indicating that its key activity is political 
campaigning. Its strong political ties imply that it is not the “independent” 
employers’ association it claims to be, since it engages in political activity at national 
                                                 
14 APINDO’s organisational structure is available at http://apindo.or.id/en/about/struktur-organisasi 
(accessed 3 October 2016). 
110 
and regional levels (e.g. Ford, 2013; Mizuno, 2005). The government has stated that 
“there are several matters that must be transferred/assigned to other parties 
(employers)” (APINDO, 2015a, 2015b), which suggests that it may appoint 
APINDO to oversee the implementation and enforcement of law. For instance, 
APINDO reportedly engages in an informal “social protocol” framework. These 
activities serve to legitimise its organisational political movement and power and 
may be a source of membership inspiration and strategic competitive advantage. The 
employers’ association has welcomed this strong commitment to governmental law 
enforcement. This commitment appears to emanate from established business–
government networks, through which APINDO’s practices, whether out of 
obligation or as a result of its own power, protect the government’s interests 
(MacIntyre, 1994). APINDO’s board members’ interests are marketed as collective 
interests, formulated in terms of APINDO’s goals. Given its organisational structure 
and the government’s decrees and statements, IR actors such as non-member 
employers may perceive APINDO to be an extension of government control, 
contrary to its claim to be an independent industrial actor. Accordingly, it is referred 
to in this thesis as a semi-independent business association. 
APINDO’s direct involvement in relation to the logic of the collective is 
significant in terms of how it was established and is maintained in the face of 
employers’ self-interests. Initially, it was formed as a communications channel for 
employers to respond and react to unions and government: to “adopt the same steps 
[as unions] in resolving problems of employers, employees and government” 
(APINDO, 2016). This was a similar motivation to that of other employers’ 
associations established in, for example, the UK, Canada, Australia and China (e.g. 
Barry & You, 2018; Sheldon et al., 2016; Jun et al., 2016; Sheldon & Thornthwaite, 
1999; Traxler, 2008; Plowman, 1988). APINDO’s management believes that 
inconsistent regulations, low productivity and increased labour demands exert an 
adverse impact on the Indonesian business climate (e.g. APINDO, 2015b; Barry & 
Wilkinson, 2011), suggesting that Indonesia has weak IR institutions. As 
contextualised by Barry and Wilkinson (2011), this institutional fragility appears to 
legitimise APINDO’s active engagement in the process of reinventing IR. This may 
create high economic costs and decrease competitive investment in order to “balance 
the power of organised employee representatives that have an effect on the 
Indonesian business climate” (e.g. Sheldon et al., 2018; Traxler, 2008). 
111 
APINDO also promotes “self-regulation” based on business codes of conduct 
developed by in-house expertise. This self-designed framework may be interpreted 
as good IR practice, to which it expects its member businesses to adhere (see, for 
example, Sheldon & Thornthwaite, 2005; Traxler, 2008). Applying the logic of 
APINDO’s collective action to politics, power and conflicts of interest, its 
representation of interests is a collective good, whereas its services are private goods 
(Traxler, 2008). 
Financial resources are a significant factor in the promotion, development and 
transformation of the political landscape. Significantly, APINDO’s members’ use of 
these resources allows it to construct a political landscape that suits its organisational 
interests, enabling it to respond to the government as well as unions. APINDO’s 
networks and resources enable board members to determine where, how and who are 
financially sponsored. Its organisational structure and business systems suggest that 
it is centrally involved and dominates much of the government’s policy and practice, 
similar to employers’ associations in New Zealand between 1984 and 1990 (Sheldon 
& Thornthwaite, 1999). In Traxler’s (1996) terms, the business framework can be 
characterised as collective action by APINDO to recruit and sponsor members of 
parliament (i.e. partnering with the government) as a means of managing and taking 
an active part in the rules of the IR game. 
One significant incentive for local employers to be part of APINDO is its heavy 
investment in developing its members’ knowledge of IR and HR. It increasingly 
conducts training and development in collaboration with international institutions 
and organisations such as the ILO and HIDA. APINDO has established a Training 
Centre (ATC) to provide services that include training and certification, and ATC 
and HIDA have established an HR-IR training programme. ATC offers external 
training to employers, while also bringing some of APINDO’s members into training 
sessions and workshops where they can share their knowledge and experience of 
industrial training overseas, for example, in Japan. Furthermore, at the national level, 
ATC runs an annual Indonesian IR conference, which aims to encourage open 
dialogue and discussion of ATC’s recommendations to the government. ATC’s 
training programmes are designed to attract HR managers, rather than employee 
representatives or unions, to participate in training and research aimed at promoting 
a harmonious IR environment and maintaining a competitive business climate. Its 
objective is to establish harmonious IR and a sustainable and conducive climate for 
112 
national investment. However, at the macro and micro levels, the tension between 
employer associations and employees’ representatives remains contentious. 
APINDO appears to act as an extension of government, rather than reacting to it. 
Thus, its power and political approach shape national labour market institutions. 
The importance of APINDO’s direct role in the cross-border transfer process 
lies in ATC’s collaboration with Japanese quasi-government agencies in HR/IR 
training and development, namely HIDA and IDE-JETRO. Furthermore, Japanese 
agencies also actively engage in direct communications and get involved in HR/IR 
issues with Indonesian employees and labour unions. This suggests clear interactions 
between Japanese agencies and Indonesian semi-independent business associations, 
as well as subsidiaries’ employees in cross-border HRM “best practice” transfer. 
APINDO appears to act as an extension of government, rather than a reacting to it. 
Thus, its power and political approach shape national labour market institutions. 
4.8 Japanese and Indonesian Business Associations’ Interaction at Sub-National 
Institutional Level 
Business associations’ organisational structures entail collections of interests of 
various organisations, private enterprises and governments; although they do not 
represent any MNC actors per se, their operations may represent certain elements of 
these. Evidently, the allocation of both Japanese and Indonesian business association 
actors’ power resources and expertise are at the meso level. Consequently, business 
associations are of relevance here, as their strategic positions enable them to distil 
power. This thesis argues that at sub-national (meso-institutional) level, power 
influences MNC–subsidiary relationships by constructing power variants and 
mitigating dominance effects. Although the cross-border processes appear 
consensual at the macro level, there are divergent views at the micro level. Thus, at 
the meso level, it is important to address internal and external pressures that are not 
yet fully understood, in terms of actors’ power and control (e.g. Almond, 2011b; 
Ferner et al., 2004). 
Institutionally, Japanese business associations’ roles and objectives are protected 
by the host country’s institutions (international bilateral agreements) and operate 
according to JMNC and governmental investment policies. In fact, business 
associations are in the “strategic” position (a term used by Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999) of having formal capacity to forge cross-border, cross-organisational alliances 
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with the state, business organisations, and non-state organisations and governing 
bodies. These include local governance networks involved in regulatory frameworks 
(Delbridge et al., 2011). These strategies at the meso level enhance strategic actors’ 
agency in using sources of ideological power as a vehicle to deliver their objectives. 
Japanese quasi-government agencies (HIDA and IDE-JETRO) and business 
associations (JETRO) play an important coordinating role between the Japanese 
government, BG and MNCs in promoting Japanese management ideology and 
production systems overseas (e.g. Morris et al., 2018; MacKenzie & Martínez Lucio, 
2014; Stewart et al., 2016). Japanese agencies/business associations are particularly 
important because Indonesia has regulations prohibiting foreign expatriates from 
occupying positions in or directly involved with HRM-IR. HIDA’s operations are 
governed by a bilateral agreement for official development assistance (ODA) 
between Japan and Indonesia. Historically, these Japanese associations have 
collaborated with the host country’s business associations, namely APINDO with 
regard to IR and HR development issues and training, and the Indonesian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) with regard to promoting a better business and 
trade environment. APINDO’s establishment was mandated by KADIN.15 
The established relationships of these Japanese associations are significant 
because APINDO is a collective of local businesses, whereas its collective interests 
and agenda in the form of recommendations are influential mainly at the national and 
international level in terms of organisations engaging in business with Indonesia. As 
noted by Barry and Wilkinson (2011) and Traxler (2004), governmental sponsorship 
of the employers’ association has a wider impact on the national political economy, 
maintaining or even increasing employers’ coordination capacity. 
APINDO has unique resources amongst influential local firms to lobby local 
government and be involved in drafting labour laws. Outside Indonesia, APINDO’s 
extensive networks with governmental and non-governmental agencies provide its 
business members with a competitive advantage. This indicates that its key activities 
are political-economic campaigning and the exercise of power. According to 
international IR scholars (e.g. Sheldon et al., 2018; Ferner & Varul, 2000; Ford, 
2013; Mizuno, 2005), its strong ties with government and its engagement in political 
                                                 
15 APINDO and KADIN are classified as semi-independent business associations in this thesis, given 
their formal establishment supported by local laws and their micropolitical approach to shaping 
national labour market institutions and policies. 
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activities with local and foreign subsidiaries are similar to other organisations across 
Europe and Australia. Furthermore, alliances between local actors and government 
provide institutional support for local actors committed to protecting local systems, 
which is very important for low-power actors in a “weak” institutional setting. 
APINDO has gained a mandate directly from the government to oversee the 
development and implementation of HR and IR policies. Given its organisational 
structure and the government’s decrees, local actors may perceive APINDO as an 
extension of the government’s eyes and ears, as it participates extensively in the 
development of national policy and governance and influences the IR framework. 
This perception arises primarily because Indonesia’s national institutions are deemed 
to be weak and less structured than those of advanced industrial countries such as the 
UK, Canada and Australia (Barry & Wilkinson, 2011; Sheldon & Thornthwaite, 
1999). 
It may therefore be a challenge for JMNCs to diffuse HRM “best practice” to 
their Indonesian subsidiaries, and local actors may respond in various ways to 
JMNCs’ investment practices. This may decrease competitive investment and 
increase the cost of balancing the power of organised employee representatives, 
which will affect the overall Indonesian business climate. APINDO also incentivises 
its members to join and stay within the collective organisation. In order to receive 
HRM-IR training, local firms must respect the range of possibilities in which 
APINDO is interested. Importantly, the training offered in collaboration with the 
ILO and HIDA is not only an incentive, but also a technique to improve, standardise, 
and also protect local HRM-IR systems. 
Overall, Japanese and Indonesian business associations’ institutional 
establishment, networks and allocations of power at sub-national (meso) level 
demonstrate different levels of relationships, resources and potentially power 
capacities in relation to cross-border management transfer. Thus, these 
agencies’/associations’ direct roles, involvement and interests in the mechanism of 
cross-border HRM “best practice” transfer may have an impact on organisational 
capabilities and actors’ participation. 
Therefore, in this thesis it is argued that understanding the mechanisms and 
processes of cross-border transfer relative to power resources and interactions at the 
meso-institutional level may shed light on MNCs’ strategy in configuring types and 
allocations of power. In so doing, this research moves beyond examining subsidiary 
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actors’ strategy (i.e. boycott, resist or ignore) to investigate the strategy underlying 
their coordination with local institutions and associations. 
4.9 Conclusion 
Despite the rise of Southeast Asia’s market economy, Japan is managing to maintain 
its status and geopolitical influence as the world’s third largest economy. New policy 
changes have been designed to revive economic performance, yet the country itself 
has experienced “institutional inertia”. This has triggered JMNCs to change their 
operations and strategies in Southeast Asia (Kingston, 2013). It is imperative to 
understand the cohesiveness of Japanese society and reject the image of Japanese 
institutions as homogenised: an inaccurate view still widely held by the Japanese 
research community. The configuration of Japanese and Indonesian societal 
institutions appears to be shaped by the rules of formal and informal established 
institutions. Stable and democratic institutions promoting economic growth are a 
positive institutional change. Indonesia has managed to move away from the post-
authoritarian types of government prevalent in Southeast Asia. Following a 33-year, 
deeply-rooted oligarchic economy and the severe nepotism of Soeharto’s 
authoritarian regimes, Indonesia has gradually managed to change its institutions. 
Neoliberal changes, guided by democracy, have transformed the country’s 
socioeconomic and political platforms, which are testing the labour market’s 
capacity to respond to increasing numbers of MNCs in Indonesia, and reassuring the 
world of commerce of its political stability. 
The 1997 Asian financial recession redefined the socioeconomic and political 
context of both Japan and Indonesia. The Japanese economy has experienced greater 
turbulence, raising questions about whether it is still a key player in the global 
economy. In contrast, EME countries such as Indonesia have been treated as 
developing economy nations. However, the political-economic reformation has 
impacted positively on the local economy. This dynamic situation and greater power 
distance, where Japan has experienced stagnation while Indonesia’s outlook has been 
improving, suggests more power. It is an engaging case through which to examine 
conditions facilitating inward transfer and how the JMNC maintains its dominant 
influence in the largest ASEAN manufacturing/assembling nation. 
“Classical” Japanese institutions have changed profoundly since World War II, 
and many prominent changes have appeared since the early 1990s (e.g. Yamamura & 
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Streeck, 2001; Vogel, 2006; Witt, 2006; Aoki et al., 2007). Varieties of capitalism 
(VOC) is a particularly influential stream of institutional theory (e.g. Hall & Soskice, 
2001; Wood & Lane, 2011; Thelen, 2010; Witt & Redding, 2014). To advance 
discussion of the “model of institutional change from coordinated to more liberal, 
and to identify organisational diversity as a feature of the change and the new 
emergent system, is to analyse the type/classification of the market institutions and 
the features of the changes within it” (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). Sako (2012) 
claims that Japan’s institutions are moving from coordinated to liberal market 
economy-types as a result of increasing organisational change resulting from 
intensification of competitive pressures. Although the changes have been substantial, 
the Japanese case clarifies that “the historical evolution of corporate governance 
illustrates how institutions emerged in a piecemeal fashion, often fitting together in 
ways that were unintended rather than by design” (Jackson & Miyajima, 2007: 2; see 
also Aoki, 1996; Jackson, 2009). Other researchers argue that Japan’s institutional 
change is incremental, layering the approaches of older institutions by facilitating 
new strategies while leaving old strategies as they are (e.g. Streeck & Thelen, 2005; 
Morgan & Whitley, 2012). 
Institutional and managerial constraints are exemplified in this thesis by JMNCs 
in Indonesia. The host country systematically opposes direct influence from foreign 
actors, and by forbidding foreigners from working in HR functions, Indonesian law 
(decree of the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration no. 40/2012) limits the 
possibility of using expatriates to directly control foreign subsidiaries in the country. 
This suggests that the host country has its own management practices, systems and 
national policy, and is selective in adopting HRM “best practice”. As an EME with 
“weak” institutions, Indonesia may be receptive to these dominant practices. Even 
so, local semi-independent business associations such as APINDO and KADIN may 
be instrumental in either blocking or permitting foreign HRM “best practice”. In 
particular, APINDO is the only authorised employers’ association in Indonesia that 
sits on tripartite national committees (although there are reportedly many sectoral 
employers’ associations) and institutionally involved in HR/IR development. 
APINDO’s voice is strengthened by its composition of government officials and 
BGs (conglomerates) participating in shaping local labour market institutions in 
terms of policy and protectionist interests, and by its established relationships with 
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governmental bodies, international agencies and Japanese quasi-governmental 
agencies. 
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Chapter 5: Presentation of the Case Study 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter is based on data gathered from publicly available archives, such as 
company reports, newspaper articles, and government and agency reports, as well as 
published research and the researcher’s fieldwork diary. Data were gathered and 
analysed from original sources in Bahasa Indonesia, Malaysian, Japanese and 
English, while the final analysis was conducted in English. 
Some difficulties were encountered in obtaining data from official company 
websites and reports. For example, although English site options are available, some 
company websites are not completely bilingual in the original language and English. 
AOP provides an English version of its website, whereas even on the English sites of 
PT Toyota Motor Manufacturing Indonesia (TMMIN, hereafter Toyota), much of the 
information is in Indonesian. Moreover, the English versions are less complete and 
accurate than the Indonesian versions, and the English version sites use Indonesian 
terms and syntax. The author is fluent in all these languages, enabling language 
difficulties to be overcome in order to analyse data from different sources and 
languages. A researcher proficient in only one language might experience greater 
difficulty in gathering and analysing data from this region. 
Furthermore, the author learned about changes in ownership and investor 
structure after the research project had begun, particularly in AOP subsidiaries, but 
some up-to-date information may not be available in company profiles or in the 
public domain. In addition, some company information is poorly presented and even 
unreadable. In spite of these challenging circumstances, the author maintained 
communications with key management informants throughout the analysis and 
writing processes. Keeping this contact enabled the information to be crosschecked 
against reliable sources. 
The presentation of the company analysis in this chapter depends on the 
accuracy of the primary and secondary data. The companies were concerned to 
protect confidential data and information, and the amount of information made 
available varied, which affected the data presented in this chapter. It was challenging 
to obtain sufficient data to provide a balanced analysis of each selected case study, 
while upholding research ethics. 
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The main objective of this chapter is to present the background to the empirical 
studies by illustrating the importance and relevance of the case to the research. The 
four main firms are presented descriptively based on published data and the author’s 
notes. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the background, history, 
ownership and capital structure of Astra and its four automotive divisions by 
reviewing the companies’ profiles to determine what prompted their establishment 
and IJV. The remainder of the chapter analyses the companies’ strategies, examining 
the capital structure, business management practices and activities of the JMNCs 
within Astra Automotive Group (AAG). Three of AAG’s business lines are 
discussed – cars (Toyota and Daihatsu), motorcycles (Honda) and autoparts (AOP) – 
focusing on the mechanisms of JMNCs’ investment in, involvement with and 
assimilation of the Japanese-dominated autoparts supply chain. The background of 
employment relations and unions, and the implementation of Japanese working 
practices are examined in all cases. The chapter also examines the involvement and 
influence of business associations, before drawing conclusions. 
5.2 Business Group: Astra International 
5.2.1 Overview of Astra International 
Astra International (hereafter Astra) is a premier, listed Indonesian conglomerate and 
IJV firm. Its parent company is AAG, and it has four Japanese subsidiaries selected 
as case study firms: car manufacturers, Toyota and Daihatsu; motorcycle 
manufacturer, Astra Honda Motor (hereafter Honda); and automotive component 
manufacturer, AOP. This offers a unique case to examine interactions between a 
dominant foreign MNC and low-power local subsidiaries. In particular, it provides 
an opportunity to understand how the dominant Japanese automotive firm’s work, 
employment and organisation systems are transferred to various sectors of the 
Indonesian automotive industry. Astra is recognised as Southeast Asia’s largest 
automotive group, and is a powerful, leading provider of a full range of automotive 
products. It is a very diversified firm, employing over 223,000 people in its 215 
subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates.16 Thus, exploring the diverse business 
management practices of each business line enables an examination of the patterns, 
conditions and strategies of JMNCs engaged in IJVs with local firms, and the impact 
                                                 
16 As at December 2017 (https://www.astra.co.id/About-Astra, accessed 9 September 2018). 
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of IJVs on firms’ productivity and IR. Detailed findings on Astra’s empowerment of 
local actors are discussed in Chapter 8. 
Jardine Cycle & Carriage, a member of Jardine Matheson Group, owns 50.1% 
of Astra International.17 Although Jardine focuses on the Southeast-Asian market, 
the group has non-Japanese management: Jardine’s headquarters is in Bermuda 
under British management with a long list of non-Japanese/Asian directors and 
managers. Although Jardine has a stake in Astra, the focus of this research is on 
JMNCs’ ownership structures, presence and level of influence over Astra and its 
sub-units. 
Astra was established in Jakarta, Indonesia in 1957 as a general trading 
company under the name of PT Astra International Inc. In 1990 it changed its name 
to PT Astra International Tbk.18 It is one of the largest Indonesian firms in terms of 
the number of employees and business entities, and comprises seven business 
segments: automotive, financial services, heavy equipment and energy, agribusiness, 
infrastructure and logistics, information technology and property (see Appendix C 
for details). 
Astra’s market capitalisation at the end of 2015 was 300.6 trillion Indonesian 
rupiah (IDR). Figure 5.1 illustrates the structure of the firms pertaining to this study, 
showing the four classifications (I-IV) of Astra’s automotive subsidiaries. As shown, 
the focus is on the manufacturing businesses of Toyota, Daihatsu, Honda and AOP.19 
 
Figure 5.1: Astra Automotive Group Structure 
(Source: adapted from http://www.component.astra.co.id/ profile.asp, accessed 30 August 2016) 
This research highlights AAG’s car and motorcycle manufacturing business 
lines and one of its eight automotive component subsidiaries (AOP). (Table 3.1 in 
                                                 
17 Source: http://www.jcclgroup.com/about/overview/ (accessed: 9 September 2018). 
18 “PT” is an Indonesian term meaning “the” in English, while “Tbk” means limited company (“Ltd”). 
19 Astra Motor II combines Toyota’s dealership/sales and manufacturing. 
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Chapter 3 provides details of the 12 cases in this study.) Toyota is a joint-venture 
firm in which Astra has only a 5% stake, while Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) 
Japan owns 95%.20 Daihatsu Motor Company (DMC) and Toyota Tsusho 
Corporation own 68% of Astra Daihatsu Motor (ADM). In Honda, equal stakes are 
owned by Astra and Honda Motor Corporation (HMC) Japan, while AAG owns 80% 
of AOP. Six out of 48 AOP manufacturing subsidiaries21 were selected for this 
study, with varying levels of Japanese capital investment. Astra’s stake ranges from 
25% to 100%. Greater detail about these AOP companies can be found in Section 
5.5.  
Between 1960 and 2010, Astra experienced the ups and downs of Indonesia’s 
economic and democratic development, while continuing to grow by leveraging 
opportunities and maintaining business management synergies in Indonesia. Since its 
establishment, Astra has successfully built its corporate image, with a reputation for 
doing good business, and improving working conditions and employment relations. 
It has become a household name for Indonesian products and services. It has also 
invested and engaged in a range of corporate social responsibility programmes in 
areas such as education, the environment, development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and health and has strongly promoted its achievements and 
reputation in Indonesia and abroad. Such CSR activities are relatively uncommon in 
the Indonesian business context. 
Astra claims to play an active role in ongoing efforts to foster harmonious IR 
and improve the welfare of the Indonesian people at large, rather than of specific 
groups. This intriguing business perspective is probed in this thesis, as it 
demonstrates that Astra’s journey to become the pride of the nation is intertwined 
with the development of the Indonesian people and economy. Crucially, as the 
largest Indonesian employer by number of employees and diversified firms, Astra 
promotes the human capital development (HCD) of its own employees and of its 
subsidiaries, realising that its skilled employees play an important role in many of its 
business accomplishments and in its competitive advantage at national and 
international levels. 
                                                 
20 Toyota is listed not in the company structure but under Toyota-Astra Motor (TAM), with sales and 
distribution owned 51% by Astra and 49% by Toyota Japan. TAM is not the focus of this study. 
21 Since this study was conducted, ownership structures have changed, and foreign (non-Japanese) 
investors now own some AOP subsidiaries. The eight selected AOP subsidiaries in this study have 
only Japanese or Indonesian ownership and were thus appropriate for this research. 
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5.2.2 Brief history of Astra 
This sub-section discusses Astra’s trajectory and important events. Data on Astra’s 
history were gathered and adapted from Sejarah Astra (the History of Astra) and 
other public archives. Table 5.1 highlights elements of importance to this study, 
including Astra’s establishment, varying levels of investment and the Astra-Japanese 
business partnership. Significant years and events in relation to Toyota, Daihatsu, 
Honda and AOP are discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections on each 
firm. 
Table 5.1: History and development of Astra International22 
Year Event 
1957 PT Astra International Inc. commences business as a trading company. 
1969 Granted sole distributorship for Toyota vehicles in Indonesia. 
1970 Appointed as sole distributor for Honda motorcycles in Indonesia. 
1971 
Establishment of Federal Motor (renamed Astra Honda Motor in 2001). 
Establishment of Toyota Astra Motor (TAM) as a sole distributor for Toyota. 
1973 Appointment as sole distributor for Daihatsu. 
1976 
Establishment of PT Alfa Delta Motor as an auto industry trading company, 
assembling and constructing machines. 
1978 
Establishment of Daihatsu Indonesia (TMC Japan acquires 51% share of 
Daihatsu in 1988, and it becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of Toyota in 
August 2016). 
1981 TAM launches the Kijang car as a family car. 
1989 
Establishment of TAM as a Toyota manufacturer, comprising four Toyota-
Astra subsidiaries. 
The World Bank’s International Finance Cooperation (IFC) acquires 6.6% of 
Astra shares. 
1992 
Establishment of Astra-Daihatsu Motor (ADM), a consolidated subsidiary 
owned 61.75% by Daihatsu Motor Japan and 38.25% by Astra 
International.23 
1995 
Establishment of Astra Manufacturing Polytechnic, which provides formal 
diploma-level manufacturing education. Many of its graduates are employed 
by Astra Group. 
1997 Establishment of AOP (under the name of PT Astra Dian Lestari). 
2000 
Restructuring of motorcycle business. Acquisition by a consortium led by 
Jardine Cycle & Carriage of a 40% shareholding in Astra (51% by 31 July 
2016). 
2001 
Establishment of Astra Honda Motor, operating as a subsidiary of Honda 
Motor Co Ltd. 
2003 Restructuring of Toyota business: Toyota-Astra Motor becomes Toyota 
                                                 
22 Source: adapted from History of Astra and Sejarah Astra (available at: 
https://www.astra.co.id/Profile/History-Of-Astra); Bloomberg Business Company Profile (available 
at: http://www.bloomberg.com/Research/stocks/ private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=11712494, accessed 
29 August 2016). 
23 Daihatsu Japan only operates in Japan, China, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
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Year Event 
Motor Manufacturing Indonesia (TMMIN), and a new company, Toyota 
Astra Motor (TAM), is established as a distributor and importer of Toyota 
vehicles in Indonesia. 
Daihatsu-Toyota markets the first jointly-developed cars in Indonesia: 
Toyota Avanza and Daihatsu Xenia. 
2008 Astra-Daihatsu begins to export complete vehicles from Indonesia to Japan. 
2009 AHM manufactures its 25 millionth motorcycle. 
2012 
AOP and Pirelli agree to establish a joint venture (60% Pirelli, 40% AOP) to 
manufacture conventional motorcycle tyres in Indonesia. 
Astra-Toyota AGYA and Astra Daihatsu AYLA launch “Pride for 
Indonesia”, a collaboration between Astra International, Toyota and 
Daihatsu. 
2014 
AOP acquires a 51% share in PT Pakoakuina, a manufacturer of wheel rims 
for two- and four-wheeled vehicles. 
AHM commences construction of its fourth plant in Karawang (KIIC),24 with 
a capacity of 1.1 million units per year. 
IAMI starts construction of a new commercial vehicle plant in Karawang 
with a capacity of 52,000 units. 
2015 
Astra-Daihatsu reaches five million cars manufactured in Indonesia. 
AOP acquires a further 25.8% interest in SKF Indonesia, a bearings 
producer, for a purchase price of 67 billion IDR, raising its shareholding to 
40%. 
 
Astra’s first business partnership with a foreign automotive firm for 
manufacturing was with TMC Japan in 1968. It acquired the distributorship for 
Toyota cars, followed by Honda motorcycles a year later. In 1971, it established 
plants for cars (under the name of Toyota-Astra Motor) and motorcycles (under the 
name of Federal Motor). Five years later, the first AOP subsidiary was established, a 
purely Indonesian firm under the management of Astra and another local firm. All 
three firms went through reorganisations, mergers and acquisitions, as illustrated in 
Table 5.1. These included a capital acquisition by Jardine Cycle & Carriage, and as 
at May 2016, Jardine had a 50.1% stake in Astra. Unlike JMNCs, Jardine appears to 
be more interested in capital investment than in involvement in business 
management practices. This study does not examine Jardine’s capital investment but 
focuses instead on the capital investment and involvement of JMNCs in AAG’s 
business lines I, II, III and IV. 
The complexity of Astra’s reorganisation and the establishment of Toyota, 
Daihatsu, Honda and AOP are illustrated by three important time points relevant to 
                                                 
24 Karawang is a major manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Some company visits and interviews were 
conducted at KIIC (see http://www.kiic.co.id/, accessed 11 October 2016). 
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this research. First, in 1971, Honda was established only to assemble Japanese 
autoparts to make Honda motorcycles. Astra established Federal Motor (rebranded to 
AHM) as its first automotive assembly plant, with the launch of the Honda 
Motorcycle 90 Z/90cc. Second, Daihatsu’s assembly productions started between 
1973 and 1975, and in 1989, TAM (rebranded to TMMIN) started to manufacture 
Toyota cars. As with Honda, all Toyota parts were still exported from Japan (Busser 
& Sadoi, 2004). Astra launched its first national family car under the brand name 
Kijang (“Deer” in English; Irawati, 2011). The joint ventures with Honda and Toyota 
have both been successful. Third, AOP was established in 1997 after two decades of 
re-organisation, renaming and mergers with local autoparts firms. In 1998, it was 
listed as a public company on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). Lastly, 
Daihatsu entered Indonesia and engaged in business with Astra in 1968 to establish 
completely knocked down (CKD) operations and an assembly plant. However, 
although DMC began its manufacturing operations in 1972, it did not establish an 
IJV with Astra until 1992.25 
These four firms have experienced similar business patterns and partnership 
processes with JMNCs. Initially, each firm was granted a licence as sole distributor 
of Toyota, Daihatsu, Honda or Japanese (e.g. Denso and Aisin) autoparts. Gradually, 
Astra-Toyota and Honda became Toyota, Daihatsu and Honda assemblers. As 
Busser and Sadoi (2004) argue, until the late 1980s, Southeast Asia did not have 
adequate technological standards, capabilities and infrastructure, so Astra is unlikely 
to have had the capability to manufacture Japanese automotive products. In 1989, 
Toyota and Honda began to manufacture Toyota and Honda products in Indonesia. 
Similarly, AOP gradually started to manufacture and engineer some autoparts and 
was licensed as a Japanese autoparts manufacturer, serving both Japanese and non-
Japanese clients. Table 5.1 tracks the transformation of Astra’s business entities and 
production, which may be attributable to the investment and involvement of JMNCs. 
It also illustrates similar JMNC business partnerships in the establishment of 
Daihatsu and in other business operations such as training and development. The 
focus of this study is on Toyota, Daihatsu, Honda and automotive component 
producers. 
                                                 
25 Source: https://www.daihatsu.com/company/outline.html; https://www.daihatsu.com/company/ 
databook2017_5.pdf; https://www.daihatsu.com/company/group.html (accessed 9 September 2018). 
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Another important element of Astra’s history has been its management’s 
maintenance of the core vision and mission of its founder. Mr William Soerjadjaya, 
known as “Oom” William (“Uncle William” in English),26 co-founded Astra with 
his brother and business partners. It was originally established in the 1940s as a 
small drink, agricultural and groceries trading business. Oom William’s business 
vision was to establish a company that would grow sustainably with the nation and 
improve the welfare of the Indonesian people. His vision continues to resonate in 
Astra’s business management practices and corporate governance. It translates into 
Astra’s business philosophy of Catur Dharma (Four Forces), a principle that has 
enabled Astra to differentiate its business management practices from those of other 
Indonesian firms, and to gain competitive advantage by selecting foreign firms with 
which to do business to support its vision. Astra’s business philanthropy focuses on 
the interests of the local economy and people. For his business vision, and 
particularly for his business policy on labour relations, Oom William is highly 
respected as a visionary Indonesian businessman promoting better working 
conditions, productivity and harmonious IR. As Indonesia’s largest and most 
prominent business conglomerate, Astra’s business management network and 
operations model are similar to the business conglomerates known in Japan as 
zaibatsu and in Korea as chaebols. 
5.2.3 The 1997 Asian financial recession, diversity of capital and investment in Astra 
As at July 2014, Astra was the largest Indonesian conglomerate by total market 
capitalisation (9.44%), and its automotive sector accounted for 42% of Indonesia’s 
car market.27 Since late 1990, Astra has been registered as a public company, listed 
on the Indonesian stock exchange (IDX) with a market capitalisation, as at 31 
December 2012, of 310.5 trillion IDR. It has grown to become the largest Japanese 
automotive producer and distributor in Indonesia, which has enabled it to become 
one of Indonesia’s most diversified conglomerates. With regard to joint ventures, 
Astra also partners with Daihatsu and Isuzu, in addition to Toyota and Honda.28 
                                                 
26 It is common practice for Indonesians to address people by their first names rather than last names. 
27 The other top-four Indonesian firms by total market capitalisation were Salim Group (3.42%), 
Lippo Group (2.40%) and Sinar Mas Group (2.23%); see http://www.indonesia-
investments.com/news/todays-headlines/top-listed-indonesian-conglomerates-with-largest-market-
capitalization/item2226 (accessed 30 August 2016). 
28 Astra also engages in business partnerships with non-JMNCs, namely Peugeot and BMW car 
dealerships and sales. 
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Importantly, as a result of the prolonged 1997 Asian financial recession (OECD, 
2010), Astra suffered a financial downturn. This had a direct impact on the 
conglomerate because automobile production dropped drastically (Tarmidi, 2004), 
forcing it to undertake further reorganisation. In 1990, Astra had issued an initial 
public offering of 30 million shares listed on the IDX, but this was insufficient to 
bring its financial position to a level where it could operate steadily. The 1997 Asian 
great recession and the 1998 collapse of Soeharto’s regime severely affected 
Indonesia’s economy, and the rupiah depreciated significantly. As a result, in 1999 
Astra signed phase one of a debt restructuring agreement. Then, in 2000, Jardine 
Cycle & Carriage of Singapore acquired a 40% stake in Astra, which had increased 
to 50.1% by 31 July 2016.29 In 2002, Astra signed phase two of the debt 
restructuring agreement, which resulted in it initially settling for debt restructuring in 
2004. 
In May 2003, TMC Japan acquired a 95% stake in Astra’s automotive 
manufacturing. This targeted a reduction of Astra’s one billion USD debt, forcing a 
restructuring of the Toyota-Astra business. While Astra refocused primarily on its 
automotive sales and distribution network, a Toyota-Astra joint venture was 
established to produce Toyota cars with autoparts made in Indonesia. TMC has a 
majority stake in Toyota Indonesia. The reorganisation of both Astra and Toyota 
enabled Astra’s automotive segment to thrive more successfully than the other five 
Astra business segments. In fact, Honda motorcycles and Toyota car sales and 
distribution networks remain the largest in the Indonesian automotive industry. 
Indonesian foreign investment regulations may have attracted JMNCs to partner 
with Astra. Foreign Capital Investment Law No. 1, 196730 and a resolution of the 
cabinet in January 1974 primarily govern foreign investment in Indonesia. Foreign 
investors operating in Indonesia are legally required to have local partners (Gurney, 
1983; Irawati, 2011; OECD, 2014). Although the law does not necessarily require a 
maximum/minimum equity stake (OECD, 2014), it prevents Jardine and JMNCs 
from owning Astra entirely. This may explain the dynamics of JMNCs’ capital 
investment arrangements in Toyota, Daihatsu, Honda and AOP. 
                                                 
29 See http://www.jardines.com/group-companies/overview.html (accessed 30 August 2016). 
30 Amended by Law No. 11, 1970. 
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5.3 Cars 
5.3.1 Development of Toyota Manufacturing Indonesia (TMMIN) 
TMC’s primary interest in entering Indonesia was to secure natural resources, 
prompted by problems relating to the supply of parts and components in Japan (e.g. 
Abo, 2007; Irawati, 2011; Sato, 1998; Wie, 1984). The New Order government 
regime under President Soeharto welcomed Japanese investment. TMC started its 
business with Astra in 1971, and since then, the 47-year Toyota-Astra business 
partnership has established TMMIN as an Indonesian Toyota automaker. TMC 
values the Indonesian market and Astra’s reputation and commitment. Initially, 
Toyota Indonesia was established as a joint venture between TMC (51%) and Astra 
(49%), but its capital and partnership status have changed. Table 5.2 shows the 
TMC-Astra business partnership and status as at December 2015. Toyota Indonesia 
comprises TMMIN, TAM and ADM,31 and the focus of this study is on the 
manufacturing business entities, Toyota and Daihatsu. According to TMMIN’s 
corporate reports, it has been a joint venture between TMC and Astra since its 
establishment in 2003.32 The business focuses on manufacturing, motor vehicle 
exports, machinery and components. 
Table 5.2: Toyota Indonesia’s capital structure and status 
 
 
 
As indicated in Table 5.2, TMC has a controlling stake in TMMIN and ADM, 
but equal capital ownership with Astra in TAM. Understanding the business 
partnership arrangements between TMC and DMC Japan is relevant to the 
orientation of the TMC-TMMIN-ADM joint venture. TMC was interested in 
increasing its stake in order to gain management control of Daihatsu. It began with 
an ownership stake of 51% in 1988, which rose to 100% in 2016, leaving Daihatsu 
with only 0.26% of shares. As a result, Daihatsu became a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of TMC in August 2016. Similarly, TMC began to partner with Astra with a 49% 
                                                 
31 This section refers to TMMIN, TAM and ADM to ease differentiation between these firms. The rest 
of the thesis uses Toyota and Daihatsu to refer to the Indonesian subsidiaries. 
32 There is a minor discrepancy between information on TMMIN’s status reported by Astra and 
TMMIN. This study follows TMMIN’s corporate report, which states that TMMIN is a joint venture 
between the Japanese and Indonesian automotive firms. 
 TMMIN TAM ADM 
Japan TMC 95% TMC 50% TMC 68.1% 
Indonesia Astra 5% Astra 50% Astra 31.9% 
Status Joint venture Joint venture Joint venture 
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stake in car sales and distribution in Indonesia. As Toyota’s sales and distribution 
networks expanded, Astra built a stronger business relationship, and gained status 
and reputation. This satisfied TMC, which has since maintained its business with 
Astra. In 1973, prior to the establishment of TMMIN, Astra was granted the sole 
distributorship for Toyota cars under the name of TAM. Since TAM’s establishment 
as a Toyota car dealer and assembler, Astra and TMC have had equal stakes, 
meaning that they have equal management power. 
In 1981, TMC licensed TAM as a Toyota assembler and launched the first 
Indonesian-made Toyota family car, the Kijang. This was ground-breaking for Astra 
and for Indonesia’s automotive industry. In 2003 TMC increased its stake to 95% 
and established the first Toyota manufacturing plant in Indonesia. Despite their 
differing business status, TMMINN and TAM are clearly subsidiaries of TMC 
Japan. Since its establishment, TMMIN has been well-regarded as a powerhouse of 
automotive manufacturing in Indonesia and has gained in status. Figure 5.2 shows 
how TMMIN dominates car production in the Indonesian automotive industry 
(OICA, 2010-2016). 
 
Figure 5.2: Car production by brand, 2010-2016 
(Sources: OICA and GAIKINDO) 
TMMIN is a joint venture between Astra and TMC Japan. TMC holds a 95% 
and Astra a 5% stake.33 Its union, KSPSI is the largest and oldest union in Indonesia. 
It was originally a military-type union, formed by Soeharto and his regime. Working 
                                                 
33 Source: http://www.toyotaindonesiamanufacturing.co.id/corporate/company-milestone (accessed 9 
September 2018). 
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conditions and employment benefits are both above the national average and those of 
other Astra employees. KSPSI maintains its conventional objective of being 
cooperative with management, yet it is perceived by others as a union that lacks 
solidarity and movement. Both firm and union have been widely studied and appear 
to be getting tougher in granting access to researchers. 
5.3.2 Effects of investment and automotive regulations on the automotive industry in 
Indonesia 
TMMIN appears to be supported by Indonesian national policies. For example: 
In keeping with the spirit of Kijang which was presented in 1977 to meet the 
dream of Indonesian society and government for a car that would drive 
Indonesia’s economy, TMMIN is also committed to developing the 
automotive industry in Indonesia (TMMIN, 2014). 
Studies suggest that Indonesian industrial policy in the automobile sector may have 
had an impact on the inflow of foreign investment and the capabilities of potential 
local manufacturers such as Toyota. This policy may also explain Astra-TMC’s joint 
venture mechanism. In 1969, the Indonesian government began to regulate imports 
of motor vehicles, limiting them to completely assembled and completely 
unassembled units, and requiring the sole agents or brand owners to be of Indonesian 
nationality (Tarmidi, 2004). However, the government did not make local production 
of automobile parts mandatory until 1976. Then in 1982, it expanded its regulation 
of unassembled automobiles manufactured locally in Indonesia (Tarmidi, 2004). 
These policies required JMNCs to invest in manufacturing plants in the host country 
(Busser & Sadoi, 2004). Some scholars argue that the Astra conglomerate has had a 
close relationship with local government, enabling it to lobby for a favourable tariff 
structure and implementation, and investment and automotive manufacturing 
regulations, particularly during the 33 years when Soeharto was in power (see 
Aspinall & Fealy, 2010; Irawati, 2011; Mizuno, 2005; Sato, 1998). However, that is 
not the focus of this study. Of greater relevance is the fact that tightened foreign 
investment and business regulations have not discouraged JMNCs from investing in 
Indonesia. In fact, reports by the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board 
(BKPM) and the Japan Export Trade Organisation (JETRO) in Jakarta suggest that, 
between 1967 and 1980, Japan topped the list of 25 foreign countries investing in 
Indonesia (Wie, 1984). 
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Moreover, this policy has enabled JMNCs to transplant important features of 
Japanese industrial management practices to Indonesian subsidiaries (Busser & 
Sadoi, 2004; Tarmidi, 2004). Astra and Toyota Indonesia company reports suggest 
that federal regulations have further empowered TMMIN to expand its business and 
partnership opportunities with JMNCs. Some notably positive impacts of the 
regulations and business partnerships include increased production, the 
establishment of state-of-the-art engine plants and increased local employment, 
while the population of Japanese expatriate employees has decreased. This suggests 
that Toyota may have benefited from the Indonesian government’s investment 
regulations. Toyota’s business reputation is evidenced in its local market sales, as 
shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Indonesian car sales 2010-2016 
(Source: OICA and GAIKINDO) 
5.3.3 TMC’s capital investment and management involvement in Toyota Indonesia 
TMC’s 95% cent stake and 47-year presence may have contributed to Toyota’s good 
working conditions and business practices. Working conditions on its production 
lines are better than the national average. Furthermore, Toyota has experienced 
almost no industrial action, any such action having been solely to demonstrate 
solidarity. Its conditions and IR practices are well-respected, not only within Astra, 
but also within Toyota’s supply chains (including non-Astra affiliates) and 
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nationally. Toyota’s employment structure and IR record are better than those of 
Honda, Yamaha and AOP. Its HR policies and IR practices are discussed in more 
detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
Much of the transfer of Japanese technology and knowledge may relate to 
Toyota’s preliminary achievements in developing dealer networks and assembly 
plants following its establishment as a sole car agent. In 2007, Toyota remodelled the 
Kijang and Innova family cars, making them its signature automotive products and 
demonstrating localisation in its innovative adoption and development of TPS in the 
Indonesian context. TPS has enabled Toyota to promote management system transfer 
from TMC and implement the Toyotism HRM model (Nakamura, 2004). The latter 
has made a significant contribution to the successful transplantation of TPS to 
Toyota (Hill & Thee, 1998; Irawati, 2011; Nakamura, 2004). The types and levels of 
in-house production illustrated in Toyota’s timeline may be the result of workers’ 
commitment, skills and knowledge transfer (see Appendix G). Toyota’s export 
destinations, production volumes and export performance are illustrated in 
Appendices D to F. These automotive products and exports further suggest that joint-
venture and investment arrangements may have had a positive impact on Toyota 
Indonesia’s business, supply chains and HCD, redefining the local automotive 
industry as a whole. 
As shown in Table 5.3, the 47-year partnership has enabled TMMIN to achieve 
high status as a Toyota car maker. In 1971, TMC started to partner with Astra, 
establishing the latter as a sole Toyota dealer. Three years later, Astra became sole 
agent for the assembly and sale of Toyota products. Then, in 2003 it became a fully-
fledged Toyota-brand automaker (see Table 5.3, years 1971-2003). Since 1982, 
Toyota has demonstrated its achievements, reputation and ability to produce 
unassembled automotive products. 
Similarly, Astra has established its global competence through partnership with 
TMC Japan, a Japanese powerhouse in the automotive industry. The 5% Astra 
ownership, coupled with the long presence and intensification of Japanese 
involvement in HCD, particularly through on-/off-the-job-training, has contributed 
significantly to the establishment of Toyota Indonesia and the transplantation of TPS 
into TMMIN. Knowledge transfer from TMC to TMMIN is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 6. 
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Table 5.3: TMMIN’s businesses and capital investment34 
Year Event Capital 
1971 
Establishment of Toyota Astra Motor (TAM). TAM operates as a 
sole agent, importer and distributor of Toyota-brand vehicles. 
TMC 49%, 
Astra 51% 
1973 Establishment of Multi-Astra, assembler of Toyota vehicles. 
Astra 50%, 
Multi-investors 
50% 
1976 
Establishment of Toyota Mobilindo, manufacturer of vehicle 
bodies. Indonesian Minister of Industry rules on the mandatory use 
of components made domestically.35 
TMC 57.3%, 
Astra 43.7% 
1982 Establishment of Toyota-Engine Indonesia plant.36 
TMC 51%, 
Astra 49% 
1987 TMMIN first exports Kijang super-brand to Asia Pacific countries  
1989 
Merger of four companies of Toyota Indonesia (Toyota Astra 
Motor, Multi Astra, Toyota Mobilindo and Toyota Engine 
Indonesia) under one company name, TAM. 
 
1996 
Establishment of first Karawang plant, an integrated vehicle 
manufacturing facility. 
 
2003 
Reorganisation of TAM to become Toyota Motor Manufacturing 
Indonesia (TMMIN); separation of TAM and TMMIN. 
Establishment of a new TAM as a distributor and importer of 
Toyota-brand vehicles in Indonesia. 
TMIIN-TMC 
95%, Astra 5% 
TAM-TMC 
49%, Astra 51% 
2004 
Production and launch of Toyota Avanza, a collaboration with 
Daihatsu. 
 
2006 
Increase in annual production capacity from 70,000 to 100,000 
units. 
 
2007 TMMIN introduces facelifts for Kijang and Innova models.  
2008 
Awarded Primaniyarta Award by the Ministry of Trade of the 
Republic of Indonesia for the best export performance. 
 
2011 
40-year anniversary of Toyota Indonesia. 
Establishment of the second Karawang Plant. 
 
2012 
Establishment of TMMIN Learning Centre. Annual production 
capacity of the first Karawang plant increases from 100,000 to 
110,000 units, and of the second Karawang plant from 70,000 to 
120,000 units. 
 
2013 
Increased annual production capacity of the first Karawang plant 
from 110,000 to 130,000 units. 
 
2014 
TMMIN establishes a new engine plant. Awarded first place in the 
Energy Management for Large Industry category of the ASEAN 
Energy Awards by the ASEAN Centre for Energy. 
 
2015 
Establishment of Toyota Indonesia Academy. Certified as an 
authorised economic operator by the World Custom Organisation. 
Opening of third engine plant. 
 
                                                 
34 Adapted and translated from Toyota-Astra Motor Milestones 
(http://www.toyota.astra.co.id/corporate-information/profile/#Fact Sheet, accessed 20 January 2015); 
http://www.toyotaindonesiamanufacturing. co.id/corporate/company-milestone?lang=en (accessed 31 
August 2016). 
35 Toyota Engine Indonesia was established in Sunter I, Jakarta and began full operation in 1985. 
Toyota established Toyota Mobilindo to make body components for commercial vehicles. 
36 This engine plant was established in response to the Deletion Programme or Programme Calendar 
issued by the Indonesian government on localising the manufacturing of automobile components 
imported in unassembled form (Tarmidi, 2004). 
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Like Astra’s business management, Toyota underwent several re-organisations 
and mergers with TMC before Toyota was fully established as the Toyota 
manufacturer for Toyota Indonesia. Astra and TMC embarked on a sustainable 
automotive manufacturing business partnership in 2003. TMC’s 95% capital stake in 
Astra suggests that it may have stronger management influence than Astra. However, 
there is a distinguishable business practice common to both Astra and TMC: 
corporate reports suggest that investment in and commitment to HR are at the heart 
of both TMC’s and Astra’s business management. As exhibited in its global value 
reports, TMC is committed to upholding its core business values and spreading them 
throughout its global subsidiaries, regardless of its ownership stake (Busser & Sadoi, 
2004; TMC, 2016). TMC has shown interest in transferring Japanese management 
practices to its Indonesian subsidiary. An identifiable feature of TMC’s core 
management practices in Toyota is the Toyotism HR model, including TPS (Busser 
& Sadoi, 2004; Koike, 2004; Nakamura, 2004). In addition, Astra’s 5% ownership 
does not appear to have discouraged Toyota from adopting this model, nor does it 
indicate that a lower proportion of ownership creates less power to adopt TMC 
management practices. 
In view of the level of Japanese ownership, presence and involvement, the 
dominant business value may derive from TMC. Furthermore, as previously 
discussed, Astra’s corporate reports show that Astra is an Indonesian firm that values 
HCD and is very proud of its results. TMMIN’s HR and IR conditions have been a 
reference for Astra’s HCD results, providing a successful example of Toyota’s core 
management value of “hard work and teamwork”. Similarly, Astra’s corporate 
governance exhibits a desire to “respect individuals and promote team work”, which 
is the foundation of Astra’s human capital management system. This combination of 
TMC’s and Astra’s core business values may strengthen Toyota’s HCD and its 
adoption of the Toyotism HR model, and the implementation of this model may 
affect the work, employment and organisation of Toyota’s joint venture. The joint 
forces of TMC Japan and Toyota Indonesia point to the appropriateness of Toyota as 
a case study for understanding Japanese-Indonesian joint ventures. 
TMC’s 95% stake does not necessarily lead to a higher number of Japanese 
workers at Toyota. On the Toyota shop floor, the number of Japanese expatriates has 
steadily reduced. In 2014, foreign expatriate workers accounted for only 1% of the 
8,800 total, and in December 2016, Japanese workers comprised only 1% of the total 
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9,500 TMMIN labour force. Moreover, since Toyota has been in full operation as 
TMC’s subsidiary automaker, the number of Japanese expatriates has remained at 
1%, with 99% local Indonesian workers in production, non-production and head 
offices across four plants (TMMIN, 2014c). The small proportion of Japanese 
expatriates on the Toyota shop floor appears not to have lessened the extent of 
Japanisation or Japanese management practices. Toyota shows an ambition to 
maintain its international standards, develop the automotive market and localise the 
automotive supply chain in Indonesia. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the 
commitment and skills formation of Indonesian workers in the Japanese-Indonesian 
joint-venture automotive context (Nakamura, 2004). This study examines TMC’s 
joint-venture business practices and mechanisms. 
TMC’s enormous stake and the length of the business partnership may strongly 
influence the level of Toyotism in Toyota and its business networks. Scholars (e.g. 
Nakamura, 2004; Irawati, 2011) contend that TPS has been successfully transplanted 
to Toyota Indonesia and identify the implications of Toyotism for supply chain 
relationships, the development of supplier capabilities and localisation. Published 
research suggests that TMMIN’s organisational culture is based on the kanban (just-
in-time, or JIT) system, a mechanism of TPS (Irawati, 2011; Nakamura, 2004; Sato, 
1998; TMMIN, 2014c). 
In maintaining its global standards, Toyota develops suppliers by training and 
transplanting elements of Toyotism, such as lean manufacturing and improvements 
to the production shop floor, to the more than 300,000 employees of its 1,656 local 
suppliers (2014 figures; see Nakamura, 2004; TMMIN, 2014a, 2014b). Continous 
improvement, kaizen (corporate culture of learning) and long-term supplier 
relationships (genba) in shop floor management practices are common TMC 
management practices that have been adopted by and successfully transplanted to 
Toyota (Irawati, 2011; Nakamura, 2004). Furthermore, TMC implements jishuken 
(problem-solving) activities through the establishment of joint improvement groups, 
enabling suppliers to be more independent and transplant kaizen (Nakamura, 2004; 
TMC, 2016b; TMMIN, 2014a; Toyota Kentucky, 2006-2016). In the Toyota context, 
jishuken is important for dynamic firm capabilities and HR in TMMIN’s first-, 
second- and third-tier component suppliers, suggesting that Toyota has managed to 
adapt the TPS philosophy to the Indonesian context (Irawati, 2011; Nakamura, 
2004). TPS is rooted in two pillars of Toyota management production (Narusawa & 
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Shook, 2009; Ohno, 2012; Rother & Shook, 2003): JIT (making only what, when 
and as much as is needed) and jidoka, which is the ability to stop production lines, 
manually or automatically, in the event of problems, quality issues or late work 
(Toyota Kentucky, 2006-2016). 
TMC’s 95% ownership, combined with its 47-plus years of presence, may have 
promoted a stronger interest in being involved in Toyota’s HR skills formation and 
workers’ commitment. As previously discussed, Toyota applies TPS (see also 
Nakamura, 2004). TMC and Toyota place HR systems at the heart of TPS, which 
was engineered by Toyota to develop an integrated approach to production in 
managing equipment, materials and people in the most efficient manner while 
ensuring a healthy and safe working environment. TMMIN production-line workers 
are provided with important skills in the lean philosophy. Moreover, Toyota, as a 
Japanese joint-venture automotive firm, has sought to establish an international 
reputation and foster competitive advantage in Indonesian automotive 
manufacturing. The reputable Toyota brand has been built by the international 
Japanese automotive firm. Therefore, understanding the history and capital structure 
of the TMC-Astra joint venture reveals the relevance of foreign ownership level, 
length of presence and level of involvement to subsidiaries’ HRM practices. The 
Toyota-Astra alliance appears to promote not only Astra’s business and reputation, 
but also Indonesian industrial development, involving local and foreign investors as 
well as government (Busser & Sadoi, 2004; Irawati, 2011; Tarmidi, 2004). Reports 
on Toyota’s car group (OICA, 2010-2017) suggest that Toyota production has been 
very competitive in Asia, third after China and Thailand, and second in ASEAN 
behind Thailand. The International Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
(OICA, 2014) reports that Toyota Indonesia production surpassed that of Thailand. 
TMMIN states that its overall automotive performance is “proof that products made 
in Indonesia can be recognized globally” (TMMIN, 2018). 
Thus, Toyota Indonesia’s profound commitment to be a global automotive 
player confirms the relevance of exploring how Astra-Toyota has reached and 
maintained its reputation locally and globally, and how Toyota Indonesia impacts on 
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its 1,656 local automotive component suppliers, subsidiaries and (first-, second- and 
third-tier) business partners employing over 300,000 local people.37 
5.3.4 Astra-Daihatsu Motor 
DMC first entered Indonesia in 1968. In 1992 it started to manufacture cars and 
parts, engaged in IJVs and recognised Astra as one of its three main overseas joint 
ventures (in Malaysia, Indonesia and China).38 DMC holds 61.75% of Astra-
Daihatsu and Astra 38.25%. Its HRM-IR policies and practices are similar to 
Toyota’s. Daihatsu formed a business alliance with TMC in 1967, and in 1998 TMC 
officially took over and become Daihatsu’s parent company.39 In 2010 TMC began 
to cooperate with Daihatsu Indonesia. This suggests that Toyota’s work, 
employment and organisation systems have been adopted by DMC. Daihatsu 
Indonesia has since had similar management and work systems to Toyota. 
In 2008 Daihatsu began to export completed vehicles from Indonesia to Japan, 
and in 2013 it opened a new manufacturing plant in Indonesia. In the same year, 
Daihatsu had cumulatively produced three million cars locally, and by 2017 its 
production had reached five million vehicles. Table 5.4 summarises significant 
events illustrating Astra-Daihatsu’s business patterns and production achievements. 
The events show the flow of both foreign capital and knowledge. 
Table 5.4: Astra-Daihatsu’s business patterns40 
Year Event 
1975 DMC enters Indonesia market. Daihatsu Indonesia begins to operate. 
1985 Engine plant established and begins to operate. 
1992 Manufacturing joint venture established. 
1999 First Indonesian-designed Daihatsu car, Taruna hits the local market. 
2002 DMC increases its stake and makes Astra-Daihatsu Motor a Daihatsu subsidiary. 
2003 Daihatsu-Toyota begins to produce jointly developed cars in Indonesia. 
2005 Astra-Daihatsu reaches production of 150,000 vehicles. 
2008 Astra-Daihatsu begins to export completed cars from Indonesia to Japan. 
2010 
TMC-DMC Japan announces original equipment manufacturer (OEM) co-
operations in Indonesia. 
2013 
New manufacturing and engine production plants open. 
Astra-Daihatsu reaches production of three million cars. 
2015 Astra-Daihatsu reaches production of five million cars. 
                                                 
37 Source: http://www.toyotaindonesiamanufacturing.co.id/industrial/supplier-development (accessed 
10 September 2018). Owing to company confidentiality, permanent and contract workers are not 
distinguished in total employee numbers. Numbers of contract workers also fluctuate. Thus, the total 
worker population in this study represents the total number of employees. 
38 Source: https://www.daihatsu.com/company/databook2017_1.pdf (accessed 9 September 2018). 
39 Source: https://www.daihatsu.com/company/databook2017_5.pdf (accessed 9 September 2018). 
40 Adapted from https://www.daihatsu.com/company/databook2017_5.pdf; https://www.astra.co.id/ 
About-Astra/Astra-Group-Structure (accessed 10 September 2018). 
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5.4 Motorcycles 
5.4.1 Astra Honda Motor 
In 1971 Honda pioneered motorcycle production in Indonesia under the name of 
Federal Motor, and it remains the biggest motorcycle manufacturer in Indonesia. 
Astra and HMC signed a joint venture agreement with 50:50 ownership in 2001.41 
By 2013 Honda had a solid market leadership position, with a 61% market share. 
Honda produces motorcycles and genuine parts mainly for national consumption. As 
of December 2017, Honda had 24,659 employees and 25 Japanese expatriates. 
Table 5.5: Astra-Honda event highlights42 
Year Event 
1971 
PT Federal Motor established to assemble motorcycles components. All 
components exported from Japan in complete-knock-down (CKD) form 
2001 
PT Federal Motor merges with other local firms and forms PT Astra 
Honda Motor firm. 
2014 Opens and operates four production plants. 
2015 
Honda Indonesia production reaches 50 million motorcycles, the highest in 
Indonesia and ASEAN. 
 
Historically, Honda was the birthplace of KSPMI, a reformed type of union 
arising from dissatisfaction with KSPSI’s lack of solidarity and action. HR managers 
and union members working collaboratively formed an HR-IR auditor to audit 
Honda’s automotive component subsidiaries, including AOP. The focus on HR-IR 
evaluations has been based on concern over workers’ skills, training and working 
conditions, which have the biggest impact on production and quality standards in 
Honda’s subsidiaries. The Honda HR-IR auditor’s main internal role is to maintain 
Honda’s HR/IR standards and improve working conditions. The internal audit serves 
two roles: advocating Honda standards, particularly to new Honda autoparts firms, 
and minimising industrial action. While KSPSI has the largest number of union 
members, there are three registered unions in Honda: KSPSI, the minority 
Confederation of Indonesian Prosperity Trade Unions (KSBSI), and the 
Confideration of Indonesian Metalworkers Union (KSPMI), the only internationally 
confederated union. Union records suggests conflict between unions in Honda; four 
of the unions provide support to each other, with KSPSI taking a leadership role. 
There is only one union office on the site, which belongs to KSPSI but to which the 
                                                 
41 Source: http://www.astra-honda.com/corporate#sejarah-ahm (accessed 9 September 2018). 
42  Source: http://www.astra-honda.com/corporate#sejarah-ahm (accessed 10 September 2018). 
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other three unions have access for use as office space for IR-related issues. Key 
events in Astra-Honda’s history are shown in Table 5.5. 
5.4.2 Yamaha Indonesia Motor Manufacturing 
Yamaha Indonesia Motor Manufacturing (YIMM, hereafter Yamaha)43 is Honda 
Indonesia’s main rival. It entered Indonesia in 1971 and engaged in an IJV with non-
Astra local firm, Haraban. In 1974 it was established as a motorcycle parts maker 
and seller. Yamaha Motor Parts Manufacturing Indonesia (YPMI) was not 
established until 1996. Prior to its establishment, Yamaha depended mainly on 
exported autoparts, with a small percentage of AOP production. In 1997 YMC 
engaged in Yamaha manufacturing production in Indonesia through a partnership 
with a local non-Astra group to establish Yamaha Motor Nuansa Indonesia. Yamaha 
has gradually increased its manufacturing in Indonesia. In 2006 it opened a 
manufacturing plant in Karawang International Industrial City (KICC) but did not 
begin R&D activities in Indonesia until 2015. This suggests that the JMNC’s capital 
and HCD is less advanced than in Honda. Yamaha remains the second-largest 
motorcycle firm in terms of both production and sales, followed by Suzuki, Honda’s 
rival in Indonesia. Under the Lippo Group, one of Asia’s largest and most diversified 
conglomerates, Lippo’s subsidiary has a 10% stake and Mitsui Japan has a 90% 
stake in Yamaha.44 As of December 2017, Yamaha employed about 11,000 local 
people and 50 Japanese expatriates. Since the rise of KSPMI, Yamaha’s union 
representation has been equally split between KSPSI and KSPMI. However, primary 
data suggest that Yamaha employees are increasingly interested in joining SPMI. 
Furthermore, Yamaha’s HR manager has engaged in HR/IR consultations with 
Honda, and Honda’s HR-IR auditor has been invited to Yamaha’s motorcycle and 
component manufacturing sites. Detailed findings relating to Yamaha are discussed 
in Chapter 8. Table 5.6 summarises key events in Yamaha’s timeline. 
                                                 
43 Source: https://global.yamaha-motor.com/about/history/timeline/ (accessed 9 September 2018). 
44 Sources: https://lippogroup.com/about-lippo-group/; https://www.mitsui.com/jp/en/company/ 
outline/relations/unit/index.html (accessed 9 September 2018). 
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Table 5.6: Yamaha Indonesia Motor Manufacturing event highlights 
Year Event 
1971 Partnership with Haraban Motor corporation and local production begin. 
1974 
PT Yamaha Indonesia Motor Manufacturing (YIMM) established as motorcycle 
parts maker. 
1996 PT Yamaha Motor Parts Manufacturing (YMPI) established. 
1997 PT Yamaha Motor Nuansa Indonesia (YMNI) established. 
2006 
Motorcycle manufacturing factory Yamaha Motor Manufacturing (YMMWJ) 
established. 
2007 
Number of motorcycles produced in Indonesia plants reaches cumulative total of 
10 million units. 
2008 Global Training Centre established. 
2015 PT Yamaha Motor R&D Indonesia (YMRID) begins to operate. 
 
5.5 Astra Auto Parts (AOP) 
AOP’s business lines are classified into Tiers 1, 2 and 3. Its subsidiary production 
lines are spread across Jabotabek, West Java, Indonesia. However, with the 
exception of Denso, the largest automotive component manufacturer located within 
Astra HQ, there are over 48 subsidiaries45 under AOP management, with various 
levels of Japanese shared ownership, producing all automotive parts for Toyota-
Astra, Honda, and other Astra (e.g. Daihatsu) and non-Astra (e.g. Yamaha, Mercedes 
and Suzuki) automotive business lines. Data indicate that organisations with higher 
Japanese ownership remain in Tier 1, and those with lower Japanese ownership are 
in lower tiers. Furthermore, the lower the tier, the less harmonious the IR. Thus, 
AOP has unique qualities. Analysis also suggests that the tier classification reflects 
the level of Japanese ownership, management practices, working environment and 
HCD. Figure 5.4 illustrates AOP’s position in AAG and its number of business lines. 
Importantly, the eight selected AOP subsidiaries represent the diverse ownership 
structure, tier classifications and types of product relating to types of labour, skills, 
and working and IR conditions. These eight AOP subsidiaries are also suppliers of 
Toyota, Daihatsu, Honda and Yamaha; thus, they are in buyer–supplier relationships. 
                                                 
45 This number fluctuates as Astra and AOP continuously reassess current and potential firms. The 
website only lists core subsidiaries. 
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Figure 5.4: AOP business structure 
(Source: http://www.component.astra.co.id/profile.asp?id=1004002&lang=EL, accessed 10 
September 2018) 
AOP has seven main business units, 14 consolidated subsidiaries, 20 joint 
ventures and 11 sub-subsidiaries. In addition to IJVs with Japanese automakers, 
AOP engages in IJVs with firms from the USA, China, Italy, Taiwan and Sweden, 
with Japanese IJVs accounting for 80%. AOP is a subsidiary listed on the IDX, with 
80% share ownership by Astra, and market capitalisation at the end of 2013 
amounting to 17.6 trillion IDR. It manufactures motorcycle and car components as 
original equipment for manufacturers (OEM) and products for the replacement 
market (REM) for motorcycles such as Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki, as 
well as cars, including Toyota, Daihatsu, Suzuki, Nissan, Hino, Mitsubishi and 
Isuzu. 
According to AOP company reports, as at December 2017, AOP employed 
37,064 local people.46 The eight subsidiaries have more than five unions, including 
one internal non-affiliated union (SPTP)47 and one internationally affiliated union, 
KSPMI which is regarded as a radical type of union in Indonesia. SPTP and KSPMI 
have very contrasting union objectives. AOP’s distributed location across the 
Jabotabek international manufacturing site, some distance away from Astra’s head 
                                                 
46 Source: http://www.component.astra.co.id/profile.asp?id=1003039 [accessed 10 September 2018]. 
47 The Indonesian Corporate Level Trade Union, the most favourable type of union for Astra. 
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office, promotes a different kind of IR dynamic within AOP’s subsidiaries. As a 
result of local government autonomy, labour laws and regulations, AOP has 
experienced serious issues in managing its subsidiaries. In general, however, most 
Tier 1 subsidiaries with greater Japanese ownership have experienced harmonious 
IR. 
5.6 Business Associations: HIDA Japan and APINDO Indonesia 
Two important semi-independent business associations are directly involved in the 
cross-border transfer of HRM “best practice”, i.e. HIDA and APINDO. The 
objective of HIDA, a Japanese quasi-governmental agency, is to “contribute to the 
mutual economic growth of developing countries and Japan as well as enhancing 
friendly relations between those countries”. HIDA engages in HR, IR and technical 
training for Japanese subsidiaries, as well as for local firms linked with and 
supporting Japanese businesses. Since its establishment in 1959, HIDA has delivered 
human resource development in developing countries to promote technical 
cooperation through Japanese-type training, using Japanese experts and Japanese 
HRM-IR programmes. It has offices in China, India, Indonesia, Myanmar and 
Thailand. Its training programmes and objectives play an important role in 
supporting JMNCs in diffusing dominant HRM-IR “best-practices” transfer. 
Detailed findings are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. To deliver its training 
programmes, HIDA partners with APINDO Indonesia. 
Since its establishment in 1952, APINDO has had strong national and 
international networks. HIDA has been at the forefront of APINDO’s training 
programmes beyond manufacturing and technical topics, including health and safety, 
HRM, IR, leadership and organisation, for its own members and other participants. 
Cooperation between HIDA and APINDO has led to Japanese-type work, 
employment and organisation training for Indonesian workers, held in Japan, 
Thailand and Indonesia. The role of APINDO in the host country’s business 
environment and IR issues have been discussed in Chapter 3. Details of the 
APINDO-HIDA partnership are discussed in Chapter 8, relating to the Japanese and 
Indonesian agencies’ power at meso level in shaping cross-border management 
transfer processes, mechanisms and outputs. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
With the world’s fourth-largest population and Southeast Asia’s largest economy, 
Indonesia is an engaging case for studying the operation of MNCs in an EME 
setting. Of particular interest are institutional labour market changes arising from 
economic development, as well as substantial socioeconomic and political structural 
changes under a promisingly sustainable government (e.g. Carney et al., 2018; 
McGee, 2009; Thelen, 2010; ASH Center, 2011; Wood & Lane, 2011; Morgan et al., 
2010). Furthermore, following the success of Japanese automakers, and with the 
intensification of business opportunities in Indonesia, which is the world’s tenth 
fastest-growing market economy (Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016; Worldbank 
Report, 2014), the Japanese government, along with JBIC, has unveiled a 
programme to increase and accelerate investment in Indonesia. Obe (2014) reports 
that the Japanese government and JMNCs appear to be labelling Indonesia the new 
manufacturing hub for Southeast Asia. Japan’s coordinated market economy may 
enhance incorporation of subsidiaries’ interests and control of the local economy. 
While the host country’s government and local actors welcome and appreciate 
Japanese commitment to investment, it has incentivised local actors to negotiate and 
bargain with JMNCs to gain some influence in the MNCs’ global networks, in order 
to step up from being an assembler nation. For example, in 2014 Toyota doubled its 
investment to boost its export production from 60,000 to 120,000. Shoji (2012) and 
Mah (2012) report that, along with Honda, Nissan and Suzuki, these JMNCs are 
attempting to turn Indonesia into an export hub. 
OICA reports show that Indonesia’s automotive manufacturing (ranked 15th) 
and automotive market (ranked 14th) are among the top 20 in the global automotive 
industry (see Figure 5.5). Among EMEs, Indonesia is ranked sixth for automobile 
production (behind Brazil, Russia, China, India and Thailand) and fifth for market 
sales. The OICA (2015) also reports that Indonesia’s automotive industry remains 
one of the most competitive in ASEAN (see Appendix H). Therefore, it provides a 
good case study in terms of the operations of Japanese subsidiaries, the amount of 
capital, resources and technology coming into the country, and the level of MNC 
control. 
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Figure 5.5: Top 20 countries for global automotive sales and production, 2014 
(Source: OICA and GAIKINDO) 
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Chapter 6: Knowledge Transfer and the Co-Evolution of 
Japanese Working Practices in Indonesia 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to unravel the complexities of knowledge transfer by examining 
data from a unique study of the transfer of Japanese HRM “best practice” and 
organisational practices in Japanese-controlled plants in Indonesia. Building on the 
work of Minbaeva et al. (2003, 2014), this study contributes to the existing 
organisational learning and absorptive capacity literature by examining (a) the role 
of HRM practices and, (b) the role of inter-organisational networks in developing the 
absorptive capacity of foreign-owned subsidiaries. This study explores 
interrelationships between ownership, value chain position, HRM “best practices” 
and subsidiary employees’ abilities and motivation to acquire knowledge from 
abroad, thereby addressing an important deficit in the work of Minbaeva et al. (2003, 
2014). The findings extend extant research on local employees’ acceptance of 
foreign interventions (e.g. Minbaeva et al., 2014, 2003; Martínez Lucio, 2014b; 
Björkman et al., 2007; Volberda et al., 2010), the role of inter-organisational 
knowledge transfer networks and institutional constraints (e.g. Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Wright et al., 2005; Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2009), and 
specific knowledge transfer processes across different tiers of the automotive 
industry (e.g. Khan et al., 2015; Kumaraswamy et al., 2012; Gereffi et al., 2005; 
Sturgeon et al., 2008). 
This study investigates how subsidiaries’ HRM and IR practices promote local 
employees’ ability and motivation, using primary data from nine firms within the 
same BG, Astra International (hereafter Astra), but with differing levels of 
Indonesian/Japanese ownership within the same BG covering cars, motorcycles and 
autoparts. This unique setting allows home-country, host-country and sectoral effects 
to be kept constant, in order to focus on organisational effects. It explores inter-
organisational relationships between Japanese firms, Indonesian subsidiaries, an 
Indonesian joint-venture partner and Japanese state-sponsored organisations 
involved in cross-border knowledge transfer, as well as intra-organisational 
processes among different actors. The focus is on (particularly HRM) processes that 
support local capacity and motivation to utilise new knowledge, in a host-country 
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environment characterised by less stable institutions (e.g. Fainshmidt et al., 2016; 
Meyer & Peng, 2016). The specific empirical case examines the transfer of Japanese 
organisational concepts, also known as “Japanisation”, a term coined by Turnbull 
(1986) and adopted by other organisation and IB scholars (e.g. Smith & Elger, 1994; 
Womack et al., 1990). The case focuses specifically on the knowledge transfer 
dimension of organisational philosophies exemplified by the Toyota Production 
System (TPS), total quality management (TQM), just-in-time (JIT), Kaizen and 5S. 
Described by Saka-Helmout (2014: 190) as “housekeeping principles”, the 5S are 
seiri or sort, seiton or straighten, seiso or shine, seiketsu or standardised, and shitsuke 
or sustain (Narusawa & Shook, 2009). A fuller appreciation of how Japanese HRM 
“best practices” contribute to absorptive capacity contributes to the more nuanced 
and contextualised approach to knowledge transfer called for by Minbaeva et al. 
(2014), May et al. (2011) and Michailova (2011). This study thereby seeks to 
advance the debate from simply documenting the extent of this phenomenon (which 
has been done largely through quantitative methods) to capturing the nature, 
processes and context of knowledge assimilation. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, it revisits relevant IB literature in the 
EME context and integrates it with HRM contributions. Next, it sets out research 
questions on the hitherto under-explored issues of: 1) absorptive capacity 
mechanisms under diverse levels of HQ direct control; 2) the implications of 
dominant HRM “best practices” for subsidiary employees’ abilities with respect to 
knowledge inflow; and 3) the contribution of IR arrangements to fostering 
employees’ and unions’ motivation to adopt, assimilate and share new knowledge. 
The methodology is then explained, followed by presentation and discussion of the 
findings. 
6.2 Conceptualising Absorptive Capacity in Emerging Market Economies 
Minbaeva et al. (2014, 2003) identify numerous knowledge gaps in understandings 
of the cross-border transfer of HRM practices. Indeed, in their retrospective, they 
contend that although several HRM practices may be identified as potential 
contributors to absorptive capacity, and thus as facilitators of knowledge transfer, 
there is a paucity of empirical research in this area. A particular challenge is the need 
to consider absorptive capacity as “a dynamic rather than static theoretical construct 
that is contingent upon the context in which is embedded” (Minbaeva et al., 2014: 
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58). At the same time, IB (e.g. Meyer et al., 2009; Björkman et al., 2004; Wright et 
al., 2005) and IHRM scholars (e.g. Martínez Lucio, 2014a; Stewart, 2014; Ferner et 
al., 2012) recognise various compelling means of organisational control, motivation 
and capability-coordinating knowledge flow across EMEs, which in situations of 
rapid institutional and economic development offer few stable, tested channels for 
knowledge transfer. This further problematises recipients’ engagement in knowledge 
creation (e.g. Michailova & Mustaffa, 2012; Song, 2014). 
The term “knowledge transfer” is used in many contexts covering a wide range 
of phenomena, from technology embedded in physical capital, through to tacit 
knowledge and management practices. Similarly, absorptive capacity is used as a 
general term to describe the ability to assimilate such knowledge. By focusing on the 
causal mechanisms of the transfer of Japanese work, employment and organisation 
systems, this chapter aims to understand the phenomenon of contested cross-border 
management transfer from the perspectives of power, politics and conflicts of 
interest. The literature on knowledge transfer is rich in open questions related to how 
multinationals transfer knowledge and affect absorptive capacity (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: Summary of literature on knowledge transfer 
Authors Topics Main findings Future research  
Cohen & 
Levinthal 
(1990) 
Organisational 
learning 
Absorptive capacity is 
the ability to recognise, 
assimilate and apply new 
knowledge. 
Examine the mechanisms 
of absorptive capacity and 
the process of knowledge 
transfer at subsidiary level. 
Ghoshal & 
Bartlett (1990) 
The HQ–subsidiary 
relationship 
HQ control hinders 
subsidiaries from 
engaging in knowledge 
transfer and absorptive 
capacity. 
Explore the impact of 
autonomy on developing 
and enhancing 
subsidiaries’ learning 
capabilities and 
innovation. 
Gupta & 
Govindarajan 
(2000) 
Multi-level 
analyses of 
knowledge flows 
from a sender and 
recipient network 
perspective 
Subsidiaries have the 
capacity to adopt and 
motivation to diffuse 
knowledge. Knowledge 
in- and outflows occur in 
the context of inter-
organisational networks. 
Investigate subsidiary 
absorptive capacity and 
knowledge transfer as 
dynamic constructs. 
Tsai (2001, 
2002) 
Relationship 
between 
organisational 
actors and inter-
unit competition 
The central position and 
focal status of an 
organisation within the 
network determine the 
level of absorptive 
capacity to innovate. 
Examine how access to 
knowledge and central 
network position enhance 
absorptive capacity. 
Zahra & 
George (2002) 
Four dimensions of 
absorptive capacity 
regarding 
Social integration is an 
important element in 
assimilating knowledge. 
Examine types of informal 
setting and implications 
for subsidiary-level 
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Authors Topics Main findings Future research  
organisational 
abilities (no 
employee 
motivation) 
absorptive capacity. 
Noorderhaven 
& Harzing 
(2009) 
Social interactions 
among intra-
organisational 
managers. 
Face-to-face social 
interactions are an 
effective communication 
channel for actors’ 
exchange of knowledge 
and learning. 
Explain how sender–
receiver social interactions 
shape the flow of 
knowledge and constitute 
MNC knowledge 
management. 
Almeida et al. 
(2002) 
Communication 
infrastructure and 
mechanisms 
Formal and informal 
communication 
infrastructure and 
mechanisms improve the 
efficiency and 
development of cross-
border knowledge 
transfer. 
Understand how 
interpersonal relationships 
and communication 
between employees affect 
processes and outcomes of 
knowledge transfer. 
Minbaeva et 
al. (2003) 
Relationships 
between HRM 
practices, 
subsidiary-level 
absorptive capacity 
and intra-
organisational 
knowledge transfer 
A key aspect of 
absorptive capacity is 
interaction between 
employees’ ability and 
motivation, determining 
the extent of intra-
organisational 
knowledge transfer. 
Investigate the processes 
of absorptive capacity 
developed within firms 
and examining the role of 
HR practices as an 
important element in 
enhancing absorptive 
capacity and outcomes. 
Björkman, 
Fey, & Park 
(2007) 
Host-country 
institution, HRM 
norms and 
practices, and 
involvement of 
subsidiary in 
knowledge transfer 
processes 
Subsidiary involvement 
and participation in 
knowledge transfer 
motivate subsidiaries to 
adopt MNC HRM 
practices. 
Investigate how MNC 
diffuses HRM practices to 
the host country, and how 
subsidiaries motivate the 
adoption of MNC HRM 
practices. 
Phene & 
Almeida 
(2012); Foss 
& Pedersen 
(2002) 
Sources of 
knowledge 
External and internal 
knowledge sources and 
subsidiary organisational 
learning capabilities 
shape subsidiaries’ use 
of new knowledge. 
Investigate how subsidiary 
organisational learning 
capabilities determine the 
quality and utilisation of 
new knowledge. 
Kostova & 
Roth (2002) 
The level of trust 
affects the process 
of knowledge 
transfer in an 
institutional duality 
context 
Trust reduces ambiguity 
and enhances the 
usefulness of 
mechanisms for adopting 
new knowledge. 
On the basis of host-
country characteristics, 
examine how subsidiaries’ 
cognitive and normative 
profiles facilitate the 
adoption of MNC 
management practices. 
Song et al. 
(2011) 
Two key social 
knowledge transfer 
networks 
External networks in the 
host location are 
promoted by internal 
networks within the 
MNC. 
Explore how a systematic 
and formal external 
network in the host 
country signifies the 
internal embeddedness of 
organisational learning. 
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Björkman, 
Barner-
Rasmussen, & 
Li (2004); 
Boyacigiller 
(1990) 
Expatriate and 
knowledge transfer 
Expatriation promotes 
inter-unit knowledge 
flows and serves as a 
control mechanism for 
HQs. 
Examine the role of 
expatriates and their 
impact on the extent of 
knowledge transfer across 
national contexts. 
Scullion and 
Brewster 
(2001) 
Expatriate and 
knowledge transfer 
Expatriate skills and 
competences deal with 
complex HRM issues 
and problems associated 
with the growth of MNC 
internationalisation. 
Examine the integration of 
various expatriate HRM 
practices in MNCs and 
non-governmental 
organisations. 
 
Minbaeva et al. (2003: 587) define knowledge transfer as “a process of dyadic 
exchanges of knowledge between the source and recipient units consisting of 
initiation, implementation, ramp-up, and integration”. However, the role of HRM 
practices, procedures and policies in cross-border knowledge transfer remains within 
a “black box”, limiting understanding of how and why subsidiaries’ employees 
acquire, apply and share new knowledge (e.g. Jiang et al., 2012; Kang et al., 2007; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Scholars have observed that knowledge transfer 
mechanisms rely on individual and interpersonal interactions (e.g. Mäkelä & 
Brewster, 2009; Felin & Hesterly, 2007). Minbaeva et al. (2014) argue that when 
these are absent, knowledge transfer is limited. In turn, weak interpersonal 
interactions, in turn, diminish ability, motivation and opportunities for knowledge 
processing. According to previous studies (e.g. Wright et al., 2005; Tsai, 2001; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000), the absorptive capacity of the receiving units is 
crucial. To stimulate subsidiaries’ adoption and diffusion of knowledge, MNCs must 
maintain transparent communication among organisational units (Meyer & Peng, 
2016; Björkman et al., 2007). This interpersonal interaction mechanism is an 
interface through which to share expertise and recognise the capabilities of foreign 
subsidiaries, which Minbaeva et al. (2014) postulate as the micro-foundation of 
absorptive capacity. 
Zahra and George (2002) maintain that a firm’s dynamic capability for a high 
level of absorptive capacity stems from high levels of knowledge coordination across 
the organisation and its sub-units. However, knowledge transformation and 
utilisation are enhanced by systems that enable actors’ social integration (Volberda 
et al., 2010). In particular, systemic social integration is the result of established 
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inter-organisational and interpersonal relationships that promote absorptive capacity, 
which McDermott and Corredoira (2010) and Ambos and Ambos (2009) suggest 
acts as an inter-organisational knowledge transfer tool in EME settings. Furthermore, 
Meyer and Peng (2016) argue that both formal and informal knowledge sharing is 
important for knowledge assimilation, given differing organisational learning 
characteristics across firms. Importantly, mechanisms for social integration may be a 
primary avenue for lower-tier firms in a supply-chain network to access knowledge 
and develop learning capabilities where there is competition for new knowledge (e.g. 
Khan et al., 2015; Kogut, 2000). Hence, it is proposed in this chapter that patterns of 
control and interactions between HQ and subsidiaries, especially in complex inter-
organisational networks, affect cross-border knowledge transfer processes and 
outcomes. This leads to the following research question (RQ1): 
How do HQ–subsidiary inter-organisational interactions, in particular 
intensity and forms of direct control, affect subsidiaries’ ability and 
motivation for knowledge absorption? 
Building on work by Aguilera (2007), Björkman et al. (2007) and Minbaeva et 
al. (2014), this study posits the existence of a series of causal relationships in the 
HRM practices of employee participation, communication and knowledge sharing 
engaged in by organisational units. These relationships, in turn, influence 
knowledge-based performance. For instance, the Japanese work organisation 
philosophy of TPS promotes employees’ participation and commitment by 
empowering them in their day-to-day workplace practices. HRM and knowledge 
transfer are likely to interact through different paths, such as employee engagement, 
skills development regimes, retention, teamwork, participation, job rotation and 
communication, all contributing to absorptive capacity. Japanese organisational 
concepts are privileged in the literature, which establishes the importance of their 
embeddedness in Japanese HRM and IR “best practices” (Stewart, 2014; Aoki et al., 
2014; Ferner et al., 2012; Marchington et al., 2016). When Japanese organisations 
internationalise, questions emerge regarding how such specific learning mechanisms 
can be diffused, and what the role of inter-human interactions is in promoting 
subsidiaries’ absorptive capacity. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) observe that 
absorptive capacity is supported by investment in training, which in turn influences 
how a firm manages its HRM practices; however, insufficient is known about which 
forms of training provide such support, and how. For example, Barley et al. (2017) 
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observe that research exploring processes of knowledge differentiation is still under-
developed. 
At the micro level, this study focuses on the importance of formal home-country 
HR training schemes in fostering subsidiary employees’ participation in and 
commitment to Japanisation. It has been proposed that trainer–trainee face-to-face 
interactions influence learning relationships (Khan et al., 2015; Volberda et al., 
2010; Lichtenthaler, 2009), but this is particularly complex in an international setting 
across countries that are geographically and institutionally distant (Jansen et al., 
2005; Lenox & King, 2004; Meyer, 2004). The question of how subsidiaries’ HR 
managers engage local trainees in using skills and knowledge from the MNC’s home 
country leads to RQ2: 
How do home-based training models shape employees’ ability to adopt new 
knowledge? 
Another fundamental factor shaping organisational learning is the structure of 
knowledge utilisation. According to Pfeffer (1998), mechanisms enabling the influx 
of knowledge are key factors in motivating employees to use their acquired 
knowledge in the organisation’s best interests. Especially in the context of 
Japanisation, trust is perceived as a key motivator (Stewart, 2014; Roy, 2012). 
Dhanaraj et al. (2004) also note that strong motivation is based on both trust and 
shared values in inter-human and sender–recipient knowledge relationships (e.g. 
Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Crucially, the inter-organisational 
knowledge transfer network includes actors such as unions and employers’ 
associations (e.g. Michailova & Mustafa, 2012; Levin & Cross, 2004). Therefore, 
HRM practices such as employee participation, job rotation and internal 
communications may be viewed as motivational tools, particularly when they 
contribute to trust among actors (e.g. MacDuffie & Helper, 2006; Levin & Cross, 
2004; Argote et al., 2003; Coleman, 2000; Kostova, 1999). 
Martínez Lucio (2014a) argues that the essence of such HRM practices is the 
expectation of a positive correlation between employment relations and employee 
commitment. Commitment depends largely on management commitment to training, 
alongside the role and effectiveness of unions and employers’ associations. Training 
that focuses on changing the mindsets of employees in relation to accepting or 
tolerating new forms of work, such as Japanese lean production, can be seen as 
promoting either further exploitation or the skills formation of workers. Martínez 
151 
Lucio and Mustchin (2014:119) question whether, in Indonesia, learning is driven by 
the objective of enhancing real skills and technical knowledge to allow employees to 
improve their job performance, or whether it is about creating a more flexible 
workforce for new overseas investors. As a result, while in principle the Japanese 
lean ideology promotes a form of employee involvement, its implementation outside 
Japan varies widely, depending on employee representatives’ level of involvement 
(Stewart, 2014). 
Extending this idea, this study examines how MNCs’ and subsidiary employees’ 
participation practices interact, and how they contribute to a conducive learning 
environment and to changing local mindsets, particularly through the involvement of 
employee representatives. Previous research reveals the potentially counter-intuitive 
contribution of employee representatives’ involvement to the adoption of Japanese 
organisational practices in Central Eastern European subsidiaries (Meardi & Tóth, 
2006), and more broadly to surprising levels of retention and skills upgrades (Meardi 
et al., 2013, 2009), but this has not yet been explored in an Asian context and from a 
knowledge transfer perspective. Analysis of how intra-organisational communication 
and relationships between management, employees and unions or employee 
representatives affect the adoption of Japanisation is particularly appropriate for 
JMNCs characterised by strong employee engagement (Martínez Lucio & Mustchin, 
2014; Stewart, 2014). This leads to RQ3: 
How do subsidiaries’ HR and IR practices motivate local employees and 
unions to acquire, assimilate and diffuse new knowledge across and within 
sub-units? 
6.3 Methodology 
The analysis of the research presented in this chapter is based on a large-scale 
collection of primary data covering a set of JMNC automotive manufacturer’s 
subsidiaries operating in Indonesia. Since the 1990s, Indonesia has been one of the 
largest Japanese FDI recipients (Lindblad, 2015) and the largest Japanese automotive 
manufacturer and market in the ASEAN region (OECD, 2017, 2014). It is one of the 
13 most rapidly growing developing countries and transition economies globally 
(e.g. Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016; Temouri et al., 2016; Wright et al., 2005; 
Hoskisson, et al., 2000). Relevant to this study, Indonesian organisations have their 
own HR policies and practices, supported by local laws that prohibit MNCs from 
direct involvement in HRM and IR issues (e.g. Irawati, 2011; Debrah et al., 2000). 
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These laws add another layer of complexity to the management of knowledge 
transfer from foreign sources. 
The automotive industry has workplaces with large labour forces and high 
technological content, making them particularly relevant to this study, since 
knowledge transfer pertaining to technology and organisation is indispensable (e.g. 
Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016). A single multi-site case study was conducted on 
Astra Automotive Group, an Indonesian industrial conglomerate with subsidiaries 
owned, to different extents, by JMNCs. This case distinguished between three main 
divisions: Toyota (cars), Honda (motorcycles) and Astra Auto Parts (AOP, 
autoparts). This method allowed investigation of the co-variation of foreign control 
and knowledge transfer processes to address RQ1 on direct control and subsidiaries’ 
knowledge absorption; the tracing of causal processes to address RQ2 on training 
and learning abilities; and congruence analysis to address RQ3 on employment 
relations and learning motivation (e.g. Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Following 
approaches pioneered by Eisenhardt (1989), the case study was used to develop 
analytical rather than statistically-generalisable findings from rich empirical data 
with a multi-level research logic. A single-case study is best suited to addressing 
explorative research questions, leading to theoretical propositions that may guide 
further larger-scale studies. 
Rich and extensive qualitative data were gathered from detailed interviews and 
observations at the company level, as well as from two business associations in 
Japan and Indonesia that play an important role in the knowledge transfer network. 
The AOP sites for this study comprised first-, second- and third-tier production 
plants for cars, motorcycles and autoparts. Specifically, the sites were characterised 
by different levels and lengths of Japanese ownership, which are factors associated 
with different levels of direct control, particularly through expatriates. 
Table 6.2: Characteristics of AOP subsidiaries 
Name of firm Japanese stake Japanese presence Tier classification 
Musashi 78% 22 years 2nd 
Denso 75% 40 years 1st 
Aisin 66% 23 years 1st 
Federal Nittan 60% 23 years 1st 
Kayaba 50% 48 years 2nd 
Adiwira Plastik - - 3rd 
Indokarlo Perkasa - - 3rd 
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Data were collected from management, employees and union representatives 
involved in cross-border knowledge transfer in Toyota, Honda and seven AOP 
subsidiaries. Details of the AOP subsidiaries’ characteristics are presented in Table 
6.2. Additional data were collected from two business associations: HIDA in 
Indonesia and Japan, and APINDO in Indonesia. Triangulation of data from different 
actors and organisations allows “a distinct experiment that stands on its own as an 
analytic unit” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 25). These nine sites were selected to 
cover the maximum variation in HRM practices, forms of control and knowledge 
transfer processes. 
The respondents represented various hierarchical levels and functional business 
areas. HR participants were selected on the basis of their knowledge and experience 
of training, especially in Japan and other Japanese automotive training centres (e.g. 
in Thailand and Malaysia). The selection of employees was based on their technical 
and non-technical (i.e. HR- and IR-related) training experience and implementation 
of Japanisation, while agency participants’ selection was based on their involvement 
and experience in facilitating training for Japanese expatriates and Indonesian HR 
managers, employees and union stewards. A total of 102 interviews (10 in Astra, 12 
in Toyota, 25 in Honda, 30 in AOP and 25 in agencies) was conducted with 15 
Japanese and 87 Indonesian participants. Eighty of the Indonesian participants had 
participated in TPS management and production training in Japan, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Qualitative analysis was conducted in line with IB studies 
focusing on experience, views and cross-cultural nuances (Birkinshaw et al., 2011; 
Corley & Gioia, 2011). Further data were collected from Indonesian trade unions 
KSPSI, KSPMI, KSBI, and non-subsidiary union, IDE-JETRO. 
This discourse-based approach deepens understanding of the evolution of 
knowledge transfer in the subsidiaries (Balogun et al., 2011). To meet the objectives 
of this research, micro-level analysis was conducted to explore ways in which the 
organisation had adapted, developed and changed as it received new knowledge. 
This inductive method was appropriate for this study because it generated new 
explanations (e.g. Edwards et al., 2014; Welch et al., 2011) and ways of 
conceptualising the phenomenon of the co-evolution of MNC cross-border 
management transfer (e.g. Klag & Langley, 2013). In addition to this triangulation 
method, reliability was enhanced by collecting and selecting data from a vast range 
of participants at all levels. 
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6.4 Findings 
6.4.1 Inter- and intra-organisational interactions (RQ1) 
Cross-border knowledge transfer is all-encompassing and is crucial for plant 
operations. As an AOP employee remarked: “The impact of implementing 5S is 
beyond technical. It has fundamental work organisation skills which can be applied 
beyond the shop floor [manufacturing]. It can reshape workers’ mentality, discipline 
and understanding in the organisation.” The nine sites (Toyota, Honda, and seven 
AOP supply-chain firms) are characterised by different knowledge transfer 
outcomes: the higher the foreign capital and inter-organisational interactions and the 
longer the foreign presence, the higher the level of subsidiaries’ absorptive capacity. 
The case of Toyota Indonesia suggests that a strong, long-term direct foreign 
presence with more extensive HQ–subsidiary interactions results in an increase in 
absorptive capacity and stronger diffusion of new knowledge. Toyota Japan’s 95% 
stake and 47-year presence are associated with Toyota Indonesia’s positive HRM-IR 
practices and improved working conditions. Interview data from Toyota, triangulated 
with data from Honda, APINDO, IDE-JETRO and HIDA, reveal that working 
conditions on Toyota’s production lines are better than in AOP subsidiaries and the 
Indonesian national average. While cognitive and relational levels of Japanese 
capital positively promote inward organisational knowledge transfer, responses by 
65 interviewees indicated that the dynamic organisational absorptive capacity of all 
organisations involved in the study is contingent on the level of Japanese 
management involvement and presence.  
Across the board, including amongst AOP management, it was reported that 
even lower-tier AOP firms exhibit some nuances of Japanisation to meet internal 
audit standards, albeit more unevenly. However, the interviewees also emphasised 
that subsidiaries with higher levels of Japanese capital, length of presence and 
influence invest more in training (e.g. home-based assimilation training at satellite 
training campuses in Thailand), and have superior working and employment 
conditions that result in better work performance. Toyota Indonesia has invested in 
training and skills development more and for longer than the other observed 
organisations. In particular, first- and second-tier subsidiaries with higher levels of 
Japanese capital (e.g. Musashi, Denso, Aisin, Federal Nittan, Showa and Kayaba) 
have higher levels of Japanisation than third-tier autoparts suppliers with no 
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Japanese ownership (e.g. Adiwira Plastik and Indokarlo), even though autoparts 
suppliers are formally committed to the same Japanese principles (e.g. TPS and 5S). 
As a group of AOP interviewees put it, “With a higher proportion of Japanese 
stakeholders, the workers and unions experience greater access to training resources, 
mentorship and open communications with the Japanese.” In firms lower down the 
autoparts supply chain, informal mechanisms and social integration are more 
important, and knowledge transfer is weaker. For low-tier firms, relationships with a 
Japanese external organisation, HIDA are paramount. HIDA mediates organisational 
learning, HRM-IR training and development, and knowledge resources for 
innovation within local suppliers. Relationships with HIDA’s inter-organisational 
networks offset the weakness of direct channels of knowledge transfer. In these low-
tier, more marginal organisations, inter-organisational channels replace intra-
organisational ones, although they can never be as effective. 
As all nine sites are part of the same Indonesian BG, Astra International, 
knowledge flow is also co-ordinated among subsidiaries that have closer 
relationships with Astra and/or intra-related Astra firms. Astra is subject to internal 
(within Astra) collaboration as well as competition. One area of competition is 
improvement of management practices through enhanced business relationships with 
the JMNC. As Japanese knowledge is highly regarded by Astra, which is interested 
in upgrading Indonesian manufacturing, competition among divisions results in a 
diffused political motivation to acquire and absorb more Japanese knowledge in 
order to acquire higher standing within Astra. 
Another relevant factor affecting absorptive capacity is firm size. Since Toyota 
and its business networks employ over 300,000 local people, the company’s 
commitment and capability to diffuse Japanisation has the critical mass necessary to 
spread to the Indonesian labour market, and particularly to suppliers and business 
networks. Astra, Honda and AOP, and HIDA and APINDO informants claimed that 
Toyota’s mechanisms for organisational knowledge transfer are superior to those of 
Honda and AOP, particularly in the quality of acquisition, implementation and 
integration of Japanese knowledge. As one Toyota HR employee remarked: “It is not 
unusual for our management to be invited by Astra to design the [Japanese-inspired] 
HR training and IR policy framework for Astra businesses, in particular in Astra’s 
automotive business sector.” A former Toyota manager added: 
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Astra’s HR and IR training framework is adapted from Toyota 
[manufacturing Indonesia]. Our firm has always been actively involved with 
the development of Astra’s automotive group HR and IR infrastructures. 
Toyota has been at the forefront of Astra’s motor achievement … and has 
even developed case studies based on ours. 
Indonesian Law (No. 40, 2012) forbids non-Indonesians from occupying the 
positions of HR director, manager, supervisor, analyst or administrator. Toyota, 
Honda and AOP have their own distinct HRM structures, all occupied by 
Indonesians, that selectively support absorptive capacity and regularly report to the 
HQ. Analysis indicates that strong, durable interactions within and between 
organisations stimulate competitive dynamics and the co-evolution of JMNCs’ work 
practices in Indonesia. Direct foreign presence, which tends to grow alongside 
investment share, has an impact on the quality of knowledge transfer and motivates 
both investment in training and involvement in diffusing knowledge, resulting in 
more intensive absorptive capacity in subsidiaries. Between 1971 and 1989, Toyota 
Motor Corporation Japan’s (TMC’s) stake was between 49 and 51%. In 2003, 
Toyota Indonesia’s operation was split into two: sales/distribution and 
manufacturing. Since 2003, TMC has had a 95% stake in manufacturing, and since 
then, Toyota Indonesia has operated in two manufacturing plants (in Karawang and 
Sunter). As a consequence, TMC has greater control and oversight of quality, 
production and performance than Astra. Interviewees from Astra, APINDO, Honda 
and AOP suggested that Japanese inward knowledge transfer is now much more 
rigorous than when TMC only had a 41% stake and when Toyota Indonesia was 
assembling rather than producing cars. AOP interviewees also reported that Toyota 
conducts a much more rigorous HR-IR internal audit of its autoparts supply chain. 
Employees and unions have seen a difference since the Japanese gained influence 
over Toyota Indonesia’s manufacturing. Thus, the HQ’s direct and indirect 
interactions with subsidiaries (i.e. through JMNC- and state-sponsored knowledge 
transfer networks) promote employees’ ability and motivation to accept foreign 
knowledge. 
6.4.2 The role of Japan-based training (RQ2) 
Absorptive capacity in the analysed cases is affected not only by the intensity of 
direct contacts, but also by home-based HRM training. The types of training differ 
across organisations and over time, and specific forms of training, notably those 
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based on direct HQ–subsidiary interactions, appear to facilitate the ability, 
motivation and capability of Indonesian trainees to understand the applicability and 
utilisation of TPS in their organisations. At Toyota, training is more systematically 
and regularly planned, and involves more Japanese expatriates, while Honda 
Indonesia has very few expatriates, and AOP firms have varying numbers. Much of 
the training is in the form of classroom or workshop sessions, led by locals who have 
received extensive training (mainly) in Japan, Thailand and Malaysia, alongside a 
Japanese TPS sensei (master/guru/trainer). This partnership of trainers delivering 
training in the local environment is significant, because the objective of the Japanese 
expatriates and Indonesian Japanese-trained graduates is to shape subsidiary 
trainees’ understanding and motivate them to use TPS in their workplaces. Whereas 
the Indonesian trainer appreciates the local issues experienced by local employees, 
while the Japanese sensei is regarded as a source of knowledge. This mode of 
training illustrates the essence of “localised” TPS and its applicability to the local 
context, equipping trainees with high-quality skills and organisational learning 
beyond the shop floor. For instance, interviewees from Honda and AOP said that 
those who gain knowledge and implement what they learn reflect on their behaviour 
and develop higher levels of professionalism. As a result, they not only perform 
better in their jobs, but also gain respect in their communities. Thus, a home-based 
assimilation type of training may redefine employees’ perspectives and 
understanding of new knowledge. 
The analysis of this study confirms that the human interface serves as a conduit 
for knowledge transfer and boosts employees’ absorptive capacity in the specific 
case of TPS, which relies largely on tacit knowledge. Face-to-face, Japanese HR 
training contributes profoundly to employees’ understanding of the philosophy of 
Japanese work systems and “prescriptions” for lean production. It can be argued that 
this type of training might be driving a management agenda or intervention. 
Although it may be difficult to accept, employees and unions who identify a need to 
improve their skills and working conditions may be motivated to accept and 
participate in the management agenda. In this context, the emphasis on building 
inter-human relationships may be regarded as an organisational tool to shape 
employees’ perceptions. This suggests that relationships between firms override pre-
training behaviour and norms in establishing trust, changing mindsets and facilitating 
knowledge transfer. In addition, the findings from six interviewees in Astra, ten in 
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Toyota, 20 in Honda and 30 in AOP reaffirm that trust between Indonesian 
subsidiaries and the JMNC promotes mutual organisational learning and enhances 
the ability of Indonesian employees and unions to embrace new knowledge. 
One example of the role of inter-human relationships in interpretations of TPS 
by Japanese and Indonesian employees is their changing attitudes toward waste 
reduction and quality control. Japanese and Indonesian interviewees reported 
divergent opinions on this subject. While Japanese employees perceive “waste” 
reduction in the context of the lean production methods of TPS, Indonesian workers 
view “waste” in terms of the generic waste of resources and capital. For instance, 
they see the prescribed replacement of safety equipment such as gloves, regardless of 
their defects, as a waste of resources. Indonesian workers revealed some lack of 
understanding of and subsequent reluctance to adopt the Japanese work system, even 
though using proper tools and equipment promotes safety, productivity and 
performance. Extensive TPS training has changed the Indonesian workers’ opinions 
on “waste management” and health and safety. 
According to 60 Indonesian interviewees, Japan-based training programmes run 
by the JMNC and HIDA last between ten days and ten months, and combine 
technical and HR aspects, emphasising inter-human relationships and supporting the 
dissemination of knowledge across organisational sub-units. In particular, systemic 
social integration is the result of established inter-organisational and inter-human 
relationships, such as those between the JMNC and HIDA, Astra and APINDO. An 
interpersonal knowledge approach may also create strong relationships among 
workers, making them more receptive to Japanisation and the development and 
diffusion of tacit knowledge. Clearly, such agencies facilitate local knowledge 
creation through the adoption of Japanisation and ongoing support, even after the 
training in Japan and Indonesia has been completed. HIDA is vital for lower-tier 
firms that lack knowledge resources, investment in organisational learning and 
absorptive capacity. Actors’ interfaces, through company-based or agency-based 
training, affect Indonesian trainees’ understanding, commitment and motivation to 
use new knowledge related to product quality and innovation. Furthermore, the 
conventional Japanese learning approach of sensei–seito (trainer–trainee) fosters 
trust, thereby making Indonesians more receptive to Japanisation. A Toyota manager 
(former HIDA trainee) referred to this point in discussing his sensei–seito 
relationship with his subordinates: “They [subordinates] can learn and see the 
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implementation of the well-organised and good coordination of TPS by showing 
them the required ability and attitude.” This finding underscores the importance of 
transferring TPS by applying a learning model similar to the interpersonal 
relationships that Indonesian employees learn from their Japanese sensei. 
This study reveals that the combined HIDA/Japanese home-based training 
model emphasises assimilation, human relationships (including socio-cultural 
integration and Japanese working culture) and ongoing learning support, motivating 
Indonesian employees to develop their capabilities. At HIDA Japan, Indonesian 
trainees attend training sessions with other trainees from different countries, and 
harmonious human connections appear to have developed, creating a positive impact 
on Indonesian trainees’ ability and motivation to adopt Japanisation. A Toyota 
Indonesia manager and HIDA alumnus reported: 
I thought to myself that I must do my best [on the overseas training]. I felt 
more and more strongly that I must do something for my fellow Indonesian 
workers’ skills and understanding of Japanese work systems. 
Another HIDA alumnus added: “[HIDA] training in Japan seemed like a discovery 
journey [for me] … Oh, this is the TPS!” HIDA plays an even more important role in 
facilitating combined production and HR management training outside Toyota, as 
reported by interviewees at Astra and in the agencies (APINDO, KADIN and 
GAIKINDO, the Association of Automotive Industries of Indonesia). A HIDA 
alumnus further reported: 
The participants were from 12 different nationalities, and we shared 
information and experiences with each other. It gave me a much wider view 
of how to build good relationships. And from excellent instructors I obtained 
precious insights, such as Japanese management systems. 
Interviews with both HIDA Japanese personnel and HIDA Indonesian alumni reveal 
that an understanding of and commitment to Japanese work systems are fundamental 
objectives of the Japanese training model. The above discussion further corroborates 
the enormous influence of social interactions on employees’ abilities and motivation. 
In fact, both trainee–trainee and trainer–trainee bonds are conduits for knowledge 
transfer. 
The qualitative data also suggest that inter-human interfaces promote 
subsidiaries’ organisational learning and trainees’ skills and competencies, which 
may lead to organisational innovation. Indonesian interviewees indicated that they 
had gained not only technical skills, but also invaluable experience, including the 
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self-confidence to share their aspirations with their Japanese counterparts. Such 
personal interactions may stimulate absorptive capacity by reducing the complexity 
and insecurity surrounding the adoption of new knowledge, and by enhancing 
employees’ understanding from within. Although the overall aim of JMNCs is to 
transfer their working practices to their own subsidiaries, their presence encourages 
knowledge transfer to parts of local firms with no Japanese investment. Japanisation 
has been meticulously adopted, transformed and shared by Toyota, and has then been 
taken up by local businesses. Having seen the positive impact of adopting 
Japanisation at Toyota and Honda, Astra has also been prompted to incorporate 
Japanisation into its own management practices. An Astra HR executive reported: 
In Astra, in particular the Astra Automotive Group, there are Japanese 
companies that bring a number of Japanese manufacturing cultures, such as 
Kaizen, Gembatsu, Gemba and 5S. These cultures were adopted and 
eventually became integral to the Astra system. These working cultures were 
further internalised and crystallised in Astra. 
A Toyota IR director added: 
The Japanese quality control is one [aspect] of Japanisation that Astra 
adopted very well. It works well and it is applicable to us. Since 1985, every 
year Astra conducts an innovation challenge. We call it “Inov-Astra” [Astra 
Innovation]. This competition [is] based on the collection of continuous 
improvement or Kaizen. Astra holds this competition internally. Each 
[subsidiary] sends a small group of employees to represent their firms. 
Toyota Indonesia’s adoption of TPS provides an example of inter-organisational 
knowledge transfer and intra-organisational knowledge sharing with local 
subsidiaries. As the Indonesian trainees have become local experts in TPS, the 
interviewees gave them honorific titles such as “black-belt TPS”. They provide 
training to their fellow Indonesians in other Toyota subsidiaries. Additionally, during 
the fieldwork, the researcher was invited to take part in Astra’s HRM-IR training for 
non-Astra subsidiaries (state-owned oil and gas firms). Astra HR and IR directors 
later explained that they receive and agree to a number of such training requests, 
which was also a motivation for Astra to establish and manage the APINDO training 
centre. Consequently, knowledge flows in both directions. While increasing local 
knowledge, it also facilitates improved transfer and integration of this knowledge by 
inward investors. Indonesian interviewees confirmed that their training experiences 
in Japan are codified in the Astra training programme, particularly relating to the 
applicability of different facets of Japanisation to local firms. In addition, they 
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participate directly in designing and delivering training within the Astra automotive 
group. This intra-organisational knowledge transfer process is key to promoting 
intra-organisational capability. Indeed, the training process is geared to developing 
employees’ motivation and capability. A former HIDA trainee in Toyota’s union 
remarked: 
The training in Japan administered by HIDA and TMC Japan focuses on 
human capital development. It places humans at the core of TPS. This aligns 
with our value of respecting people. By so doing, employees can work 
comfortably, following proper processes and producing high-quality, 
international-standard products. 
Following Astra’s and Toyota’s management practices, Honda has thoroughly 
embraced 5S, modifying it to suit the company’s context and extending it to “5S-
2K”, which includes health and safety. The data indicate that Honda introduces 5S-
2K to new hires at the beginning of the recruitment process and offers a core training 
module to new and existing employees as part of HR. Respondents in different 
organisational roles (Toyota, Honda and AOP) reported that knowledge transfer 
mechanisms similar to those first developed by Toyota and HIDA have been diffused 
across all companies involved in the Japanese automakers’ supply chains. 
Toyota and Honda, AOP’s biggest customers, expect AOP firms to embrace 
their own HRM practices and IR policies. In so doing, facets of Japanisation 
proliferate within the Astra automotive group and throughout the automotive 
industry in Indonesia. Toyota’s audit of suppliers focuses largely on the suppliers’ 
development and mentoring approach to maintaining quality. In fact, representatives 
from Japan come to visit the subsidiaries in Indonesia to ensure compliance with 
Japanese standards. Another co-evolution of JMNC practice is seen in Astra’s 
rotation of its local HR management within its automotive group, particularly those 
who have undergone training in Japan. This HR rotation promotes organisational 
learning, and benefits non-JMNC AOP subsidiaries, such as Indokarlo and Adiwira 
Plastik. 
Job rotation for Astra-, Toyota- and Honda-trained employees within the AOP 
organisation confirms that inter-human relationships are the main channel for the 
transfer of Japanese knowledge. Overall, the empirical case studies confirm that 
Japanese-focused training stimulates organisational learning and the ability to 
acquire, internalise and spread new knowledge. Importantly, face-to-face, home-
based training held in Japan and elsewhere may enhance the quality of training. The 
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cases suggest that Japanese expatriates and HIDA not only play a role in overseeing 
the training, but also address difficulties, such as demotivation, experienced by local 
employees in utilising Japanisation in their workplaces. HQ and subsidiaries are 
engaged in both delivering and examining the quality of training. 
6.4.3 Building relationships between management and unions to promote motivation 
(RQ3) 
The analysed sites differ in their IR arrangements. Interestingly, Toyota has 
experienced almost no industrial action (the rare occurrences of industrial action 
have been solidarity strikes), but this is not the case for Honda and AOP. In Honda, 
management, employees and unions have fair, open communication channels, as 
Honda’s HR director and representatives from three different unions reported: 
In any industrial action, our strategy to minimise impact on the organisation, 
and the type of support unions need from management, are communicated. 
Unions inform and coordinate with management on the number of strike 
participants. On the street [where strikes take place], we do it in an 
organised and presentable way, e.g. clean uniform, wearing helmets. We also 
pay attention to the management’s message – safety first – and are mindful 
that they are representing Honda. 
A former Japanese trainee quickly added, “it’s a Japanese type of organised one 
[strike]”. 
In AOP, antagonistic management–union communications are exhibited 
throughout first-, second- and third-tier firms. However, since management and 
unions have begun to engage in open communications, Aisin and Federal Nittan 
have experienced less antagonism. Interviews with IR actors show that clear internal 
and management–union communications are conducive to knowledge transfer 
through broader actor involvement and employee engagement. Effective 
communication, and especially information and consultation, motivate employees 
and employee representatives to improve organisational performance, and promote 
trust, which stimulates commitment. This sense of trust is recognised by employees 
and unions as vital to establishing equal partnerships. 
An important addition to the training described in the previous section is that 
training opportunities in Japan include Indonesian union representatives, who 
thereby also gain direct understanding and hands-on experience of the “Toyota Way” 
communications model. This is an exposure approach that motivates individual 
employees by providing them with relevant knowledge, job-related experience and 
163 
problem-solving skills. A higher level of Japanese investment and presence 
intensifies Toyota HR management’s commitment to applying the Japanese model. 
Conceptually, the JMNC’s strategy emphasises the role of individuals in the 
organisation in utilising and exploiting new knowledge. This emphasis is reflected in 
intra-organisational knowledge sharing. Given the size of the firm and the resources 
devoted to knowledge transfer, Toyota has adopted the Japanese management–union 
communications model much more rigorously than either Honda or AOP. Impressed 
by the success of Toyota’s management–union communications mechanism, Honda 
and Astra are now imitating that model. 
However, Japanese involvement in HRM-IR training for management and 
employees varies, resulting in uneven levels of employee commitment and capability 
to establish management–union communications. Employees’ abilities and 
motivation to adopt the Japanese style of communications are therefore influenced 
by the JMNC’s investment in and involvement with IR. The subsidiaries’ HRM 
practices provide a context in which to examine the structure of management–union 
communications and their implications for employee motivation. An HR forum has 
been established as a communication platform through which Astra’s HR personnel 
have face-to-face discussions. Similarly, Honda and AOP have established a union 
forum, a communication platform for union members within and outside Astra to 
engage in discussions on many aspects of IR, as well as on technical and safety 
procedures. Unlike the HR forum, the union forum is not exclusively for union and 
employee representatives; HR and management are also invited. The union forum 
operates as a vehicle for sub-units to communicate, establishing and maintaining 
management–union partnerships and knowledge sharing based on mutual trust. The 
creation of a union forum was inspired by the Japanese model of communications, 
particularly in terms of an open management–union communications platform. 
Indonesian trainees had acquired and utilised the Japanese way of communication, 
and some interviewees also stated that employees and union representatives had been 
inspired by the Japanese forum. The interviewees simply wanted to implement the 
new knowledge they had gained from Japan in their workplaces. The Indonesian 
trainees adopted the forum to demonstrate partnership and trust between union and 
management. 
This trust has significant theoretical implications for organisational learning. By 
developing strong and trusting relationships between employees, particularly across 
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organisational boundaries, improved management–union communications may foster 
closer cooperation, thereby supporting knowledge transfer. It is also possible to 
distinguish here between inter- and intra-organisational interactions. Although the 
JMNC was not directly involved in establishing the union forum, Toyota Indonesia 
displays a high level of adoption of Japanese IR practices pertaining to knowledge 
transfer. In the words of one Toyota manager: 
It has been similar in Japan: how we would have dialogue and 
communication with the union, workers’ representatives, then we have an 
“employee voice” to deliver feedback. That has become the norm of this firm. 
Honda (50% Japanese owned) has also demonstrated greater ownership of and a 
firmer commitment to establishing a union forum than has AOP, where Japanese 
ownership varies, with strong implementation at AOP-Aisin Indonesia but less 
interest elsewhere. Therefore, the cases reveal that involvement of IR actors supports 
employees’ and managers’ motivation to adopt and diffuse new knowledge. 
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study extends existing theoretical models of absorptive capacity by exploring it 
at both inter- and intra-organisational levels of analysis. It finds that HQ–subsidiary 
interactions and inter-human relations serve as a conduit for knowledge transfer, as 
well as being an important characteristic of absorptive capacity. Comparison of 
different Japanese auto-manufacturing sites and their supply chains in Indonesia, all 
linked to the same BG, is instructive on how knowledge transfer, which is a crucial 
element of Japanese work systems, is implemented across broad cultural and 
geographical distances. 
The first important finding is that knowledge transfer is built over long periods 
of time and with major organisational investment; it cannot be improvised. The main 
difference across the various sites is associated with the length and extent of direct 
Japanese presence, in terms of investment, the presence of expatriates, and the 
density of direct communications and production networks. For organisations where 
this direct presence is weaker, support for knowledge transfer occurs more indirectly 
through Indonesian and Japanese agencies that invest in training and knowledge-
sharing programmes. By contrast, where Japanese direct presence is very strong, as 
in Toyota, associated channels of knowledge transfer are secondary. The important, 
if contingent, role of inter-organisational knowledge creation networks in the EME 
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context extends Ghoshal and Bartlett’s (1990) concept of inter-organisational 
networks. 
In terms of specific forms of knowledge transfer operating in EME business 
environments (Meyer & Peng, 2016), across all cases, the reported processes and 
evaluations indicate the importance of two channels. The first is face-to-face, home 
country-based training, whether provided by companies or by agencies such as 
HIDA. The second is the involvement of IR actors such as unions, modelled on 
Japanese patterns, which enhance employees’ engagement and subsidiaries’ 
absorptive capacity. 
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) and Minbaeva et al. (2014) argue that larger 
subsidiaries with greater knowledge resources provide opportunities for employees 
to create, retain and transfer knowledge. This study reveals that what matters is the 
quality of the knowledge transfer relationship, which is associated with the level of 
managerial investment in it, in terms of time and resources. This is illustrated by 
differences between Toyota, Honda and AOP. In the case of Toyota, Toyota 
Indonesia has a substantial foreign Japanese stake (95%) and, as a huge MNC, has a 
competitive advantage in terms of overall organisational learning capability and 
resources compared with Honda and AOP. With ample financial resources, it can 
more easily adapt, retain, develop and disseminate knowledge to satisfy local needs. 
On the other hand, firms lacking direct foreign capital investment and foreign 
ownership in their knowledge transfer networks (e.g. HIDA) require indirect 
investment to overcome this shortcoming and facilitate inflows of new knowledge to 
subsidiaries. This contrast suggests that indirect MNC investment remains a crucial 
cross-border management mechanism for stimulating local organisational learning, 
resources and capabilities. 
The AOP case reveals an apparent tension between the JMNC’s and Japanese 
inter-organisational networks’ objective of promoting Japanisation in Southeast 
Asia, in terms of the degree to which this knowledge improves the performance of 
potential competitors. Many dominant firms in EMEs and developing countries have 
structures like that of AOP, with varying levels of foreign involvement (e.g. Khan et 
al., 2015; Kumaraswamy et al., 2012; McDermott & Corredoira, 2010; Zhao et al., 
2005). However, this study has established that, while the extent of Japanisation 
increases in accordance with the extent of Japanese stakeholders, there is potential 
for this trend to spread throughout the organisation and into areas of the business that 
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compete directly with the foreign subsidiary (Kogut, 2000). Thus, the analysis of 
AOP highlights how knowledge transfer permeates the complex and overlapping 
networks of subsidiaries that characterise many large emerging-market firms. 
The AOP subsidiary cases (e.g. Denso, Aisin, Musashi, Federal Nittan, Kayaba, 
Adiwira Plastik and Indokarlo Perkasa) also demonstrate that Japanese work culture 
has become entrenched in local subsidiaries and has boosted absorptive capacity. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the structure of subsidiaries’ HRM and IR practices is 
a significant factor in inter- and intra-organisational knowledge transfer mechanisms. 
Moreover, two levels of absorptive capacity are identified in this study: direct 
knowledge transfer from foreign firms, and spillovers into the wider economy. The 
JMNC has indirect involvement in terms of HR practices, home-based training 
schemes, previous knowledge and expertise (Minbaeva et al., 2014), whereas Astra 
has direct involvement in setting HR principles, guidelines and frameworks for its 
independent (non-foreign-controlled) subsidiaries. Both provide a deeper 
understanding of Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) concept of distinct organisational 
absorptive capacities. 
Since the publication of Minbaeva et al.’s (2003) influential work, the 
subsequent literature has not yet fully examined the mechanisms through which 
HRM practices may develop employees’ abilities and motivation. In addition, much 
of the discussion has focused on how subsidiaries operate in advanced industrialised 
countries (Minbaeva et al., 2014), and on knowledge transfer in mainstream EMEs 
such as China and India. This study has sought to offer new insights into knowledge 
transfer processes in the under-studied and largest EME economy in Southeast Asia, 
as well as the role of inter-organisational networks and HRM practices, to explain 
the mechanism of inward knowledge transfer from an advanced industrial-economy 
MNC (Japan) to its EME subsidiaries (Indonesia). Thus, the findings add granularity 
to Hansen’s (1999) and Lichtenthaler’s (2009) analyses of the highly complex nature 
of absorptive capacity. 
Table 6.3 summarises the main findings in terms of characteristics of the 
subsidiaries, their HRM practices and absorptive capacity, linked to the varying 
degrees of foreign involvement. It indicates the MNC’s contribution to the diffusion 
of cross-border management practices to foreign subsidiaries. All three knowledge 
transfer mechanisms have a positive impact on subsidiaries’ absorptive capacity to 
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acquire, adopt and assimilate new knowledge. However, more research is needed on 
the relative importance of each. 
Table 6.3: JMNC subsidiary characteristics, training practices and implications 
for absorptive capacity 
 JMNC subsidiaries 
Toyota Honda AOP 
Foreign ownership, level 
of involvement 
95% ownership; 
strong Japanese 
influence 
50% ownership; 
weaker Japanese 
influence 
0–78% ownership; 
varied Japanese 
influence 
Japanese entry 1971 1971 1978–1996 
Country-of-origin-
focused HRM training 
Training in Japan 
and Japanese 
mentors 
Japanese training 
in Indonesia Little training 
IR and inter-
organisational knowledge 
transfer networks 
HR–union 
partnership and 
APINDO 
Mixed: HR–
union forum and 
APINDO 
HIDA 
Outcome of knowledge 
transfer, i.e. JIT, TQM 
and 5S 
Strict adoption of 
Japanisation 
Adaptation of 
Japanisation 
Japanisation varies 
in line with 
previous factors 
 
Two important aspects are particularly noteworthy. First, direct foreign presence 
contributes to the mechanism, type and quality of knowledge transfer, as noted in the 
examples of Toyota, Honda and AOP. Second, the type of foreign MNC training and 
the type of IR are relevant. At one extreme, Toyota has managed to transfer most of 
its home-country employee representation policies and practices. By contrast, the 
case of AOP indicates that in non-JMNC (mostly lower-tier) subsidiaries, unions 
lack adequate learning resources and capabilities to retain and assimilate new 
knowledge. Hence, the nine case-study firms reveal that different ownership 
structures and IR practices cause variability in knowledge transfer. Differences in 
training provision, notably in Japan or with Japanese trainers, also appear to be 
significant. Even so, the differences between Toyota, Honda and AOP on this 
dimension are less remarkable. All in all, these findings add credence to Cohen and 
Levinthal’s (1990) assertion that the inter-human relationship mode of training has a 
critical impact on the extent of knowledge transfer. 
This examination of a multi-site case in an EME sheds light on intra- and inter-
organisational processes that support knowledge transfer and balance co-evolution 
and competition across the supply chain. The supply tier system that exists at AOP, 
and between AOP, Toyota and Honda corresponds with the complex co-evolution 
and competition for knowledge discussed by Kogut (2000) in a US setting. The 
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qualitative research of this study, confirmed through triangulation with both 
company actors and external associations, reveals the importance of direct presence, 
supporting agencies, culture-specific face-to-face training, and IR actor involvement. 
Finally, the micro-level evidence of this study suggests that knowledge 
transferred through MNCs has implications for the host country’s wider economy as 
it spills across the labour market. Japanese and Indonesian supporting agencies are of 
paramount importance in this respect. This influence starts with transfers across 
different elements of the Indonesian BG (i.e. Astra International), and also involves 
external organisations (i.e. APINDO and HIDA) in the diffusion and codification of 
new knowledge from the JMNC, thus encouraging more general transference to local 
Indonesian firms. The Astra International BG serves as a particularly compelling 
example of a vehicle for knowledge transfer and competitive governance in a 
situation where there is strong political interest in knowledge acquisition and 
industrial upgrading. 
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Chapter 7: Tracing Power and Influence in Institutional 
Diversity – Competing HR Models in Japanese and 
Indonesian Joint Ventures 
7.1 HRM “Best Practice” in an Emerging Market Economy 
In EMEs, with weak local labour market institutions and human capital ill-prepared 
for FDI, the workplace is vulnerable to control by dominant MNCs. JMNCs have the 
power to impose HRM “best practices” on their subsidiaries. Although globally 
accepted (e.g. Elger & Smith, 1994), these practices may be fiercely resisted by 
subsidiaries’ management (e.g. Mellahi et al., 2013; Ferner et al., 2004; Delbridge, 
1995); yet subsidiaries’ employees and unions may be open to some aspects of “best 
practice” (e.g. employee participation and union roles) because a receptive attitude 
may elevate their voice and power. This may lead to conflict between the JMNC 
management’s interest in diffusing HRM “best practice”, and subsidiaries’ interest in 
protecting local HRM practice. 
This chapter focuses on the use of power in conflicts of interest in Japanese–
Indonesian automotive manufacturing joint ventures. It is proposed that subsidiaries’ 
managers may not fully accept JMNCs’ HRM “best practice” because increased 
employee empowerment may strengthen local bargaining power. Japanese 
management and production systems require Japanese skills, behaviours and 
systems, which subsidiary actors may perceive as unsuited to local relationship-
based norms and regulations. Also, while JMNCs promote equal partnerships and 
open management–employee communications, subsidiaries’ managers may find that 
Indonesian employees and unions lack the necessary understanding, commitment 
and skills to be equal partners. However, the JMNC’s dominance makes it difficult 
for subsidiaries to challenge the transfer and protect Indonesian systems. 
This study applies Ferner et al.’s (2012) paradigm relating to actors’ power to 
overcome conflicts of interest in the context of the dissemination of HRM “best 
practice”. In doing so, it identifies the importance of institutions at the sub-national 
level (e.g. Ferner et al., 2012; Almond, 2011b; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Following 
Delbridge et al. (2011) and Morris et al. (2018), this study also articulates a layered 
assessment of the various systems, society, dominance and corporate (SSDC) effects 
at play in corporate Japan and “capitalist employment relations under Japanese 
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HRM” (Aoki et al., 2014: 2557) in order to understand strategic choice (corporate 
effects) arising from increasing institutional pressures at the meso-level that are 
experienced at the organisational level. JMNCs and Indonesian subsidiaries involve 
non-organisational actors (i.e. associations) in HRM and IR issues, and business 
associations’ peculiar power to circumvent conflict may determine the processes and 
outcomes of power utilisation. This research considers the pivotal role of 
associations which, unlike MNC actors, have the capability and access to engage in 
direct communications with JMNCs and subsidiaries to establish meso-political 
alliances with industry, government and institutions in home and host countries. As 
Morris et al. (2018) argue, the analytical value of the SSDC framework lies in its 
explication of variations in IR practices. This study refines their arguments, first by 
showing how strategic choices are conditioned by other actors, namely business 
associations/organisations, and second by explaining the outcomes of meso-level 
institutional pressures, and the implications of meso-institutional complexity for 
specific organisations pressured by power inequalities, and inequitable and 
systematically antagonistic relations. 
Lean management practices are established in first-, second-, and third-tier 
Japanese automotive subsidiaries through the philosophy of the TPS. This study 
examines their power to circumvent institutional resistance at macro, meso and 
micro levels. A meso- rather than macro-level analysis provides an overarching 
perspective on national institutional factors and the sub-national niches and variants 
in which they are located (Ferner et al., 2012: 170); yet this contested power at the 
meso level has not previously been fully investigated (Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 
2014; Kostova et al., 2008). The central objective of this chapter is therefore to 
identify the meso-level and corporate effects and strategic changes that have 
influenced divergence or continuity in HRM and IR practices. 
This chapter reviews relevant IHRM theoretical frameworks to conceptualise the 
role and involvement of MNC actors and business associations in diffusing the 
dominant Japanese HRM model (i.e. joint labour–management committees, training 
system/skills formation and productivity performance at plant level) to the 
Indonesian context. It discusses agencies’ use of the power of meaning (Lukes, 
1975), outlines the case studies, research approach and design, presents the findings, 
and provides concluding remarks. 
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7.2 MNC and Business Association Actors’ Roles, Power and Resources 
7.2.1 IHRM 
Delbridge et al. (2011) suggest that the IHRM research agenda should include 
evaluation of the roles of multiple actors at multiple levels of analysis to explain the 
mechanisms, structures and implications of IHRM beyond the focal organisation. 
Their SSDC effects framework is applied to this study to broaden the IHRM context 
beyond Asia’s mainstream EMEs (China and India). The System effect applies to 
MNCs operating in capitalist political-economic contexts. While Japan is recognised 
as a coordinated market economy, coordination by Indonesia’s state and institutions 
is low, and the role of the family is high (Fainshmidt et al., 2018). The Society effect 
operates in the formal institutions, norms and customs that shape Japanese and 
Indonesian national business systems. The role of quasi-governmental agencies in 
developing human capital, training and development has a wider impact on society, 
particularly where the national demographic lacks formal education. The Dominance 
effect is evident in TPS nuances of lean management practices, diffused by actors 
using direct power to coordinate states and corporations. The Corporate effects of 
FDI and ownership structures are recognised in the JMNC’s pursuit of 
“legitimisation” of HRM “best practice” and control over subsidiaries’ management 
practices. 
This study also examines systematic (but negotiable) relationships between 
dominant and low-power actors, and subsidiary actors’ efforts to protect local work 
and employment institutions (Delbridge & Keenoy, 2010). In doing so, it broadens 
the political model, leading to a more balanced analysis. 
7.2.2 Power of meaning (management ideology) 
Power is defined in terms of strategies to influence other actors to change their 
behaviour or practices. According to Ferner et al. (2012: 164): 
Power has to be understood in its institutional context. On the one hand, it is 
deployed by powerful MNC actors to shape, sustain and activate macro- and 
micro-level institutions. On the other hand, institutional context provides 
actors with capabilities with which to facilitate, block or modify transfer. 
JMNCs face institutional challenges in diffusing HRM practices at all (macro, meso 
and micro) levels. Foreign investments in the host country are governed by 
investment laws. Although local investment regulations may be perceived as a form 
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of institutional resistance in less-developed host countries, labour market institutions 
may nevertheless remain receptive to control by JMNCs. A robust desire to protect 
national business systems prevails at the macro level, but the need for foreign capital 
and expertise is evident at the micro level. 
Turnbull’s (1986) concept of Japanese production and employment relations has 
deepened understanding of lean production, framed within the paradigm of the 
Japanisation of management control and maintenance of workplace peace (e.g. 
Stewart et al., 2009; Elger & Smith, 1994). However, it has proved difficult to 
theorise the diffusion of Japanisation in the context of institutional power held by 
MNC actors (e.g. Abo, 2015; Womack et al., 1990), or to produce a clear theoretical 
framework to explain how institutional strength, power interactions and 
characteristics of Japanese HRM models have determined the dominant “best 
practice” phenomenon over the last 30 years. Aoki et al. (2014: 2551) postulate that 
“Japanese HRM practice has waned” as a consequence of dramatic changes in the 
ownership structures of JMNCs arising from the 1997 Asian and 2007 global 
financial crises (e.g. Cooke & Kim, 2017; Aoki et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2009). The 
weakening of zaibatsu (Japanese conglomerate) relationships and keiretsu (business 
affiliation) structures, in particular, have impacted on specific HRM “best practices”, 
and particularly management–employee relationships. The lean paradigm of 
management control may also clash with host-country institutions and subsidiaries’ 
HRM practices (Stewart, 2014). To examine this complexity, this research draws on 
nuances suggested by Ferner et al. (2012), who construct power resources and 
actors’ interests at macro, meso (i.e. sub-national) and micro levels, and by Bouquet 
and Birkinshaw (2008), who focus on low-power (i.e. subsidiary) actors’ pursuit of 
influence within the dominant IHRM paradigm. 
Lukes’s (1975) power of meaning (management ideology) also has implications 
for this study, in that it may influence or change actors’ observable behaviour and 
may be deployed by dominant actors where circumstances are institutionally 
constrained. Ferner et al. (2012) highlight that through dialectical relationships, 
MNC actors may, individually or collectively, promote, manage or ignore inward 
transfer as a result of evolving subsidiary actors’ interests and local institutions’ 
legitimate power. Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) framework for understanding 
why and how MNC actors achieve legitimacy can be brought together with Lukes’s 
(1975) power of meaning and Ferner et al.’s (2012) three institutional levels of 
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power. As Ferner et al. (2012) observe, MNC actors’ power may not necessarily 
outweigh that of subsidiary actors. Thus, understanding the power capabilities and 
processes involved in incorporating ideological power and how actors’ interests 
emerge may facilitate analysis of the use of power to diffuse HRM processes and 
outcomes. 
The ideological power centres on shared values and understandings, enabling 
processes to be diffused by overlaying existing frameworks with foreign/new 
normative ones (Crouch et al., 2009). This may delegitimise other actors’ practices 
(Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), resulting in modification of existing behaviour and 
acceptance of foreign interventions (Hyman, 2001), and potentially creating conflict. 
Adding to the complexity, diffusion may also be facilitated by external 
organisations, such as agencies and corporate alliances. Agencies may have different 
capabilities from MNC actors, enabling them to access and negotiate diffusion 
processes. Using the power of ideology, they may thus circumvent the norms, 
practices and understandings of the dominant HRM-IR “best practices”. Although 
JMNC subsidiary actors retain some scope for normative practices and interests of 
their own, this is likely to increase tensions over (re)defining the meaning of HRM-
IR “best practices”. 
The significance of meso-level structures of the power of dominant management 
ideology has been overlooked, specifically with regard to the legitimation of meso-
political influence by MNC actors seeking to impose HRM-IR “best practices” 
outside their home institutions. While macro and micro levels remain important, a 
meso level of analysis aids understanding of the MNC’s and subsidiary actors’ use of 
meso-political power to contest dominant HRM-IR “best practices”. 
Meso-level associations and state agencies develop important influence where 
macro- and micro-level channels of influence are institutionally limited, as is the 
case for JMNCs in Indonesia, where foreigners are forbidden from working in 
HR/IR functions, limiting the use of expatriates. Thus, business associations such as 
employers’ associations and chambers of commerce may be instrumental in diffusing 
dominant HRM-IR “best practices”. Institutionally, Japanese business associations 
(i.e. quasi-government agencies) are protected by international bilateral agreements 
(i.e. ODA policy) and operate according to JMNC and governmental investment 
policies (i.e. FDI). In fact, agencies have exclusive formal capacity to forge cross-
border, cross-organisational alliances with state and non-state organisations and 
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governing bodies. They represent the interests of various organisations, associations 
and governments, rather than MNC actors per se. Thus, this thesis proposes that 
meso-level power influences JMNC–subsidiary relationships by constructing power 
variants and mitigating dominance effects. 
At the macro level, the Japanese state’s active role in business alliances 
contributes to JMNC actors’ power. Diplomatic relationships also create 
opportunities for JMNCs to engage in business activities abroad (Smith & Meiksins, 
1995), in collaboration with business association actors. This home-country 
advantage has allowed Japanese HRM “best practice” to gain international 
recognition, facilitated by the coordinated market economy nature of Japanese 
institutions (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Hence, diffusion of management practices may 
arise from country-specific advantages exploited by JMNC actors (Buckley et al., 
2012) and government alliances with business associations, consistent with JMNC 
and Japanese lean management ideology. 
The kaizen philosophy of lean production (e.g. Stewart, 2014) has transformed 
work practices globally (Martínez Lucio, 2014b). The cross-border training 
infrastructure plays a significant role in propagating Japanese HRM “best practice”, 
for example through expatriation (e.g. Buckley et al., 2012) and the development of 
internal networks such as business alliances, overseas keiretsu and established 
support networks, i.e. business associations of their own, as well as other 
governmental agencies abroad. Furthermore, coordinated state–corporate investment 
provides resources to maintain the Japanese management ideology (Clegg, 2013). 
The globally recognised ideology of Japanisation is thus conveyed by the Japanese 
state, firms and actors, translating country-specific into firm-level competitive 
advantage and contributing to the dominant effect of JMNCs (Morris et al., 2018). 
Through meso-level power, actors achieve a particularly important means of 
influencing subsidiaries’ HRM practices, since host-country institutions 
systematically block HQ actors’ involvement. 
To further assess low-power actors’ use of power as a balancing or defensive 
mechanism, this research empirically explores actors’ motivations (ends) and 
strategies (means) to influence corporate networks to protect their own institutions 
(Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). Low-power subsidiary actors have mainly micro- 
and meso-level sources of power, as EMEs are experiencing institutional change 
resulting from national and international political-economic transitions (e.g. Meyer 
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& Peng, 2016). Subsidiary actors are interested in improving their organisations and 
local labour market institutions to enhance their power capabilities. In seeking to 
gain a legitimate voice in their corporate networks to protect their own practices, 
they must make a deliberate choice to ignore, accept or modify the JMNC’s HRM 
“best practice”. 
In the presence of diverse subsidiary–MNC relationships, ownership structures 
such as BGs (e.g. Dieleman & Sachs 2008), and interests, low-power actors often 
engage in political alliances with business associations to gain power and legitimacy 
(Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005). Actor alliances use tactics to establish, align or re-
construct their means of power (e.g. Morgan & Kristensen, 2006). Micropolitical 
strategies at the firm level are crucial to gaining legitimate influence by engaging 
lower-power actors and building political alliances from the bottom up. 
Management, employees and unions use mechanisms of micro-coalition building to 
strengthen low-power actors’ positions in the corporate system. 
This theoretical discussion of the sources of power held by JMNCs, Indonesian 
subsidiary actors and agencies leads to the following research question: 
How do MNC and subsidiary actors mobilise macro, meso and micro sources 
of power to promote their preferred HRM practices? 
7.3 Methodology 
This research investigates causal processes, management ideology and MNC actors’ 
power in ten case organisations. To examine why actors appear to accept 
Japanisation yet exhibit profoundly different HRM practices, it is necessary to 
identify how power is allocated, how actors are involved/impacted and how conflicts 
are negotiated. Hence, data were gathered from Japanese and Indonesian business 
associations as well as from management. The selected case study subsidiaries have 
an MNC HQ in Japan and a local parent firm, Astra International in Indonesia, while 
two non-Japanese-owned autoparts firms have varying levels of involvement by the 
JMNC and business associations (see Table 7.1). 
The analysis of this study maps onto Delbridge et al.’s (2011) and Morris et al.’s 
(2018) constructs of multiple actors, multiple levels of analysis and varying political-
economic contexts. The ten case organisations represent a reasonably diverse sample 
in terms of their capacity to execute the Japanese lean production ideology. The eight 
selected AOP subsidiaries have different tier classifications, providing empirical 
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evidence of Japanese lean ideology in both direct and indirect JMNC subsidiaries in 
the autoparts supply chain. The resource and capital investment structures of the 
automotive plants, with large labour forces and high levels of capital, demonstrate 
both Japanese management’s power in lean production, and a clear pattern of actors’ 
strategies to sustain or accept Japanese influence in practice (Endo et al., 2015). 
Examining different actors’ understandings of HRM “best practice” enables analysis 
of the power of ideology at three analytical levels. 
Table 7.1: Toyota, Honda and AOP subsidiary case studies 
 
Data were collected through individual and group interviews and on-site visits to 
manufacturing plants and organisations in Japan and Indonesia between November 
2014 and September 2016. Of the 110 individual participants (10 in Astra, 12 in 
Toyota, 25 in Honda, 35 in AOP and 28 in agencies and associations), drawn from a 
wide range of hierarchical levels and functional business areas, 85 had participated 
in formal training facilitated by HIDA and APINDO in Japan. A three-stage analysis 
was conducted, entailing the construction of dominant actors’ episodic interventions, 
and general analysis of the adoption of the JMNC’s ideology, practices and policies. 
This study follows Balogun et al.’s (2011) and Pulignano’s (2002) discourse-based 
approach to deepen understanding of the processes and outcomes relating to 
subsidiaries’ acceptance of and resistance to transfer. Through a three-cycle coding 
process, the analysis was systematically refined to develop a conceptual picture and 
articulate insights. 
7.4 Findings 
This single-case study consisting of ten multi-site cases and covering multiple levels 
of analysis reveals a clear pattern of conflict between the JMNC and its Indonesian 
Firm Japanese ownership Japanese presence Products 
Toyota 95% 1971 Cars 
Honda 50% 1971 Motorcycles 
Musashi 78% 1996 2nd-tier autoparts 
Denso 75% 1978 1st-tier autoparts 
Aisin 66% 1995 1st-tier autoparts 
Federal Nittan 60% 1995 1st-tier autoparts 
Showa 55% 1980 2nd-tier autoparts 
Kayaba 50% 1976 2nd-tier autoparts 
Indokarlo Perkasa 0% - 3rd-tier autoparts 
Adiwira Plastik 0% - 3rd-tier autoparts 
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subsidiaries over the ideology of HRM-IR “best practices”, in terms of employment 
relations, employee participation and disciplinary procedures. For example, Japanese 
disciplinary schemes were perceived by subsidiary actors as “inhumane and 
contradictory to the Indonesian state ideology of humanitarianism; the Japanese 
[model] does not fit with our practices, HR policies and norms” (Astra HRM-IR 
directors). Subsidiaries’ management, employees, unions and agency actors all 
agreed that although TPS is applicable to workplaces other than production lines, 
and that Japanese technology may improve competitiveness, certain Japanese HRM 
practices are profoundly unsuited to the Indonesian context. Both individual and 
group participants referred to the second Pancasila principle of the Indonesian 
constitution. For example, “We are God’s creatures, not Japanese” and “we do not 
live to work…we are not Japanese”. Indonesian management, employees and unions 
saw the Japanese model as being built on Japanese conditions: “Being a part of the 
machine…not a human; we have to live, look after families and live outside the 
workplace; we do not live to work” (AOP employees and union representatives). 
Managers valued nuances of Japanese practices that might help to improve the 
Indonesian workforce. Astra’s HR and IR directors suggested that “our systems are 
built on the Indonesian ideology” and that “Astra systems allow management and 
unions to sit down together…The aim is to give them an opportunity to explain their 
situations.” During a company visit to Aisin Indonesia, the researcher witnessed 
management and union roles in a disciplinary procedure. According to Aisin Japan’s 
guidelines, employment can be terminated after three warnings. However, HR and 
union informants said that “both management and union share responsibility and 
play an important role in making a disciplinary/termination decision”. In this 
disciplinary scheme, management and union engage in open communications as 
partners, exemplifying local management–union relationships in the Indonesian IR 
environment. This suggests that certain Japanese-type union roles are applicable to 
local union participation conditions. While open communications may reflect the 
Japanese approach, the Indonesian-type disciplinary scheme prevails: 
Aisin is really mindful of the employee’s future and family. He is the sole 
breadwinner in his family; his parents were sick, had been in and out of the 
hospital (Aisin union representative). 
We need to consider what would happen to his wife, child and ill parents; 
Indonesia does not have social support for unemployed workers, child or 
elderly care…We do not have it (Aisin management). 
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An Aisin employee interview group added: 
The future of our fellow will be grim…We need to remember that 
unemployment and crime rates in our city remain high. I think it is necessary 
to give him another opportunity. 
The case studies also reveal some consensus on Japanese acceptance. For 
example, Indonesian managers in Astra, Toyota, Honda and AOP admitted that 
subsidiaries working under the world-renowned Japanese automotive umbrella think 
and behave like Japanese. As Toyota Indonesia management and employees 
reported, “‘made in Japan’ resonates with a powerful global quality of acceptance, 
reputation and harmonious employment relations”, promoting a peaceful image of 
the Japanese workplace that inspires Indonesian subsidiaries. 
Nuances of Japanisation are observable in changes to subsidiaries’ behaviour, 
understanding and commitment to the lean management ideology. Lean management 
practices in Japanese subsidiaries (Toyota, Honda and AOP Tier 1) are clearly 
important to the JMNC. Lean behaviour was evident throughout observations of 
management and union offices and in employee facilities, including the canteen, car 
park and prayer areas. Acceptance of Japanisation was also evident in interviewees’ 
comments: 
Japanese values are actually universal values: neatness, cleanliness, and 
craftsmanship. They are actually common values. I think these Japanese 
values are very good values; they have been practised internationally, and 
that is what we want to implement in our workplace (Kayaba employee). 
Subsidiary managers also seek to control the inflow of certain types of Japanese 
HRM-IR “best practices” applicable to their workplaces and organisations which 
will not exacerbate local IR. 
7.5 Sources of Power for JMNCs 
7.5.1 Macro level 
The power of ideology in the Japanese IR of the 1960s and 1970s was reflected in 
JMNC actors’ understanding of host-country labour market development. Since the 
collapse of the 33-year Soeharto dictatorship, JMNCs have exerted their influence, 
although agencies have demonstrated greater understanding of increased worker 
organisation, heightened industrial action and management-union tensions in 
subsidiaries’ IR. Nevertheless, Japanese actors have seen this as an opportunity to 
incorporate the Japanese ideology of workplace peace into local HRM-IR 
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development. This implies that the power of ideology, sharing of JMNC-subsidiary 
experiences and management-union partnerships play an integral role. A JETRO 
agency interviewee suggested that Japanese IR lessons have equipped the Japanese 
with knowledge that may be applicable to the Indonesian context, as a HIDA 
representative echoed: 
In the 1960s/1970s, management and unions were against each other in 
Japan. It was very much a hard conflict during that period. In the end, the 
union side realised that if the company grows, their salaries will also rise, so 
there is a very strong correlation; they realised that management and union 
need to work harmoniously. In the 1960s we had a similar situation [to 
Indonesia now]. 
Furthermore, Indonesia continues to welcome FDI and the highly-skilled jobs it 
generates. The types of job created by JMNCs (compared with Korean and Chinese 
investors) are perceived particularly positively because they provide not only 
security, but also skills advancement and improved working conditions. The positive 
reputation of JMNCs’ practices motivates subsidiary actors to learn more about 
HRM “best practice”. Therefore, the power of meaning may promote greater 
understanding of local workplaces and the host country’s political-economic 
conditions. 
7.5.2 Meso level 
Business associations’ power may modify and neutralise resistance, focusing on the 
applicability of best practice and sharing of cognitive HRM frameworks. Japan has 
been the largest provider of ODA to Indonesia since 1954. Although an independent 
organisation, HIDA is financed by Japanese ODA, has close ties with the Japanese 
government and Japanese and non-Japanese agencies and corporations. HIDA 
spreads the lean ideology by developing local skills and changing mindsets and 
behaviour. Since it operates in the host country without an official local partner, its 
business agenda is to operationalise and closely link the dominant Japanese ideology 
with local institutions and actors. While it serves mainly Japanese-affiliated 
organisations, it also promotes the ODA mission of developing local human capital. 
HIDA focuses on establishing understanding and operational and institutional 
support, including training and on-site coaching of local actors within bilateral 
agreements, while JETRO operates at the level of the overall business or corporation. 
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HIDA transforms the power of HQ management ideology into “Japanese 
business association ideology” through the diffusion process. Many former 
Indonesian HIDA trainees have gained managerial and directorial positions in 
Indonesian employers’ and industry organisations. HIDA mobilises lean ideology in 
subsidiary actors’ interests and diffuses it through an alumni network of former 
trainees and close partnerships with APINDO. According to management, employee 
and union participants, HIDA’s training provides knowledge of Japanese-type HR 
and union participation roles in Japan and enables trainees to apply this knowledge 
to their workplaces. Hence, HIDA focuses on the power of meaning to change local 
actors’ behaviour and layer existing practices with HRM “best practice”. A HIDA 
representative confirmed: 
The goal is to spread out the expertise that is needed, less on disseminating 
perfection of Japanisation. Since the objective is to develop a product and 
business which is associated with the Japanese, spillover is expected. The 
[local] HR development does not necessarily focus on transferring high-tech, 
robot-type skills, but the focus is on the know-how, more on the soft skills. 
This reveals HIDA’s main objective of developing local human capital by 
disseminating Japanese lean ideology and HRM “best practice” to targeted actors. 
HIDA’s interests are met by incorporating corporate and bilateral ODA programmes, 
reinforced by support and training for non-Japanese subsidiaries. JETRO and HIDA 
train local actors in order to make an impact on the wider economy. As one 
interviewee explained: 
JETRO helps Indonesia in the form of sending Japanese expatriates to 
develop local businesses and people, particularly small businesses and 
supply chains that do not have funding to pay Japanese expatriates. 
HIDA partners with JMNCs, as well as with Indonesian agencies such as 
APINDO, ATC and KADIN. In doing so, it empowers local actors to legitimise 
Japanisation in the local context. Its training arrangements illustrate Japanese 
commitment to developing local human capital. A HIDA representative noted: 
These days, Japanese companies want to promote local people—not only 
executives, but also R&D and production managers – because Japanese 
companies want to localise, and at the same time globalise. In order to do 
this, they need local people’s cooperation! 
Also, HIDA’s operations are exempt from local investment policy because it is a 
not-for-profit organisation under ODA. Its alliances cover a wide spectrum of MNC 
actors, institutions, government agencies and NGOs that strengthen its power, since 
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it is able to negotiate directly with MNC actors at home and in the host country. In 
arrangements at the meso-institutional level, actors become not only local agents of 
the JMNC, but also access points for the JMNC to validate consistent HRM-IR “best 
practices”. Therefore, at the meso level, the agency’s power of dominant 
management ideology is deployed to mediate, circumvent or even avoid tensions 
between the JMNC and subsidiary actors. Thus, the JMNC and the state invest 
political resources, knowledge and capital in HIDA. 
7.5.3 Micro level 
Indonesia’s need for technology transfer has enabled JMNCs to access local markets 
and promote the Japanese model. Toyota’s global reputation as a robust and 
employee-centred MNC may enhance subsidiaries’ understanding of the lean 
ideology. Local unions perceive it positively and have welcomed Toyota’s 
establishment because it boosts employee participation and union negotiation roles. 
One Toyota union interviewee offered an insight: 
It is my understanding that Japanese IR promotes management-union 
relationships. The Japanese company values its employees as an asset and 
the union as a partner. There are harmonious relationships throughout the 
organisation: management–employees, and executives–workers. 
The JMNC is interested in partnering with Astra because of its reputation and 
commitment to championing HRM “best practice” by local subsidiaries. 
Subsidiaries’ HRM systems are susceptible to Japanisation; hence, the JMNC’s 
dominant resources may shape the power capabilities of both MNC and subsidiaries. 
7.6 Sources of Power for Indonesian Subsidiary Actors 
7.6.1 Macro level 
Indonesian regulations to protect and organise workers, aligned with Japanese 
regulations promoted by the JMNC and agencies, may contribute to employees’ 
acceptance of Japanese IR practices. One Honda HR-IR audit team interviewee 
offered his view on the JMNC’s practices: 
In terms of policy, it is true that Japan cannot intervene with our HR. This is 
a local affair. However, due to increasingly organised industrial action, to 
some extent, Japan must get involved. Japan has planned to place an “HR 
advisor” in our office. The aim is to provide some advice and expertise. 
It is important to note that protection of workers’ rights and working conditions 
underpins unions’ understanding of nuances of Japanese IR, which is a selling point 
182 
for subsidiaries. Although the level of management control may be overlooked by 
some union members, others regard the rigid, stressful monitoring characteristics of 
Japanese lean ideology as too stringent for the local workplace. Nonetheless, 
Japanese “workplace peace” has strong power of meaning. A Denso union interview 
group reported: 
It is our understanding that the Japanese have a tendency to respect the rule 
of laws, policies and agreements, in particular how to uphold the values of 
harmonious management-employee relationships. 
Organised Indonesian workers are particularly interested in understanding 
Japanese IR regulations, employee participation and union negotiation roles; the 
positive image of Japanese industrial development resonates with Indonesian unions. 
A Federal Nittan interviewee stated: “That is my hope, to see local firms moving 
forward to value their employees and unions as partners. That is what I learned about 
Japanese IR.” The JMNC and subsidiaries’ unions may thus have shared interests. 
The JMNC may be motivated to increase its stake in order to gain control and 
standardise subsidiary practices. As a Japanese JETRO interviewee noted: 
It is a very important factor. Japanese companies always want to increase 
their share…But there are regulations, so at 50/50 this is not a wholly 
Japanese company but a joint venture. So not only relationships between 
management and union but also among the management side have a different 
management style, that is, Indonesian and Japanese management. It is very 
hard for Japanese people to control. 
To balance dominant actors’ control, Astra maintains close relationships with 
local government, enabling it to lobby for favourable tariffs and regulations. 
7.6.2 Meso level 
Heightened institutional resistance and tough business regulations have not 
discouraged JMNCs from investing in Indonesia. In fact, they have been motivated 
to transplant HRM “best practice” into their subsidiaries. This suggests that Astra 
may benefit from Indonesian institutions and political alliances, enhancing its meso-
political power vis-à-vis the JMNC. 
As in Japan, pseudo-government agencies in Indonesia work to protect and 
advance HRM practices and labour market institutions. APINDO is the main 
“independent” employers’ organisation in Indonesia. Given its policy development 
with the Indonesian government, as well as with Japanese agencies such as HIDA 
and JETRO, it has a unique cross-border transfer role, strengthening local 
183 
management’s sources of power. For example, according to one APINDO 
respondent, “APINDO, together with KADIN and other BGs, builds a solid door to 
govern our future”. This is a clear defensive effort. Seeing a lack of government 
participation and manpower to develop the IR infrastructure, these agencies have 
taken bold action, prompting KADIN and APINDO to exercise their power by taking 
an active role in a “weak” IR institution. This view was supported by a Musashi 
union steward: 
The role of government should be to accommodate and mediate IR between 
APINDO, workers and unions. So far, however, the government has not 
played an active role. The government has the capability at least to enact 
laws, policies to protect workers, similar to policies protecting investors. 
A similar view was expressed by an ILO representative: 
If I may blame the government, Indonesian institutions lack infrastructure. 
For example, lack of [HR-IR] inspectors: inspectors lack capability and 
inspection capacity. 
This government deficiency provides APINDO with a source of power. It also 
maintains an institutional outlook in representing the interests of employers and 
establishing closer links with government and policy makers. Hence, meso-political 
alliances appear to be mechanisms for defending and protecting local institutions and 
values. The nature of agential business objectives and internal networks permits 
subsidiaries to gain substantial power and influence. Locally, APINDO’s key role in 
the meso-institutional setting is its involvement in managing local HRM systems. 
The combination of JMNC and subsidiary power resources at the meso level 
suggests that Indonesian agencies’ strength lies at the level of local Indonesian 
institutions, whereas Japanese agencies have power both at home and in host 
institutions. 
7.6.3 Micro level 
Astra is one of the biggest and most diversified firms. In fact, it is the largest 
Japanese automotive producer and distributor in Indonesia. It gains significant power 
from political alliances and institutional networks with federal and local 
governments. This is not only an important defensive mechanism, but also directs 
Astra’s power toward receptive Indonesian systems and values, including the 
micropolitical strategy of lobbying government, industries and associations that 
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promote its interests. Astra’s micro-political strategies were mentioned by several 
interviewees, one of whom stated: 
Some ministers sit in APINDO as executive members. APINDO is able to 
give advice to the “transition” government, to ministries whose capacities 
are in investment, labour, transmigration and industrial relations. That is 
where and how Astra engages and participates in the development of our 
national employment policy (Toyota IR Director). 
Astra has built a corporate reputation for doing good business for the nation and 
improving working conditions for the Indonesian people, and credit was consistently 
given by research participants. According to one group of AOP first-, second- and 
third-tier employees and union representatives: 
With regard to working conditions under Astra’s management, management 
follows and exceeds national and local government policy requirements; 
whereas in non-Astra firms, working conditions adhere to the bare minimum 
of local government requirements. 
Crucially, Astra has a proven record of excellent bargaining with and attraction 
of foreign investors such as Toyota. It accumulates power and influence from them. 
Engagement in business partnerships has enabled Astra to build technological 
knowledge and localise the lean management ideology. As one AOP manager stated: 
Indeed, from Toyota, Honda, Daihatsu, Komatsu, etc., Astra accumulates 
knowledge and expertise to construct in-house quality control. Astra modifies 
it so that it will be applicable not only in local manufacturing sites, but also 
in management, HR and other operations. Hence, I think that is what makes 
Astra extraordinary. 
Astra’s subsidiaries—specifically Toyota, Honda and AOP—have similar 
business partnerships with the JMNC. Although Astra has gained power at the micro 
level, the control of resources remains with the JMNC. The use of power is 
contingent not only on the level of ownership, but also on areas within Astra’s 
management jurisdiction, i.e. HRM and third-tier AOP firms where it can manage 
employee participation and union roles. Although employees do not welcome how 
Astra handles HRM with the JMNC, the JMNC is unable to negotiate with Astra 
because government policy prevents it from becoming involved in managing local 
HRM-IR. 
Technically, Astra has discretion to promote third-tier firms to the first tier and 
position them more closely with Toyota to gain access and resources. It has the 
power to consolidate, take over and eventually wholly manage third-tier firms that 
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have the ability to manage technology transfer and develop human capital. Although 
Astra’s strategy may conflict with AOP management, as well as Japanese partners, it 
requires no approval from other actors. Thus, Astra’s power resources and 
legitimacy uphold its ability to manage local subsidiaries and supply chains. Its 
HRM policies, practices and performance indicate its interest in establishing control. 
7.7 Which Model Prevails and Where? 
The Japanese HRM model emphasises the importance of direct employee 
participation (i.e. without unions), internal skills formation and training systems, and 
high-trust management–labour engagement (e.g. Endo et al., 2015; Almond & 
Gonzalez Menendez, 2014b; Stewart, 2014; Abo, 2007). However, the Indonesian 
HRM model is quite different (e.g. Caraway & Ford, 2017; Napathorn & Kuruvilla, 
2017). Meardi et al. (2009) suggest another (different) example for comparison but 
say nothing about Japan and Indonesia. Characteristics of the two models are 
summarised in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Japanese and Indonesian HRM-IR ideal types 
 Japanese Indonesian 
Employee participation 
High, both direct and 
indirect  
Low, direct 
Management-employee 
communication 
Indirect, formal, strongly 
integrative 
Direct, informal  
Industrial relations 
High trust, company-
based bargaining 
Low trust, politicised 
Skills creation Apprenticeships, in-house School-based 
Teamwork rationale 
High: job rotation and 
comprehensive job 
training  
Medium: less job rotation 
and comprehensive job 
training 
Working time  Flexible and long hours Shorter hours + overtime 
 
A key factor in the Indonesian model is that it is sector-specific, shaped by the 
types of product being manufactured, which links closely with skills formation and 
training, status, and employee participation (i.e. indirect, employee representatives), 
but with low trust and commitment (e.g. Juliawan, 2011; Bondarouk et al., 2016; 
Amengual & Chirot, 2016). For example, the garment sector in Indonesia has much 
lower participation than the automotive sector (e.g. Ford, 2000, 2013). As Meardi et 
al. (2009: 495) suggest, there are “product- and labour-market contingencies facing 
MNCs”. In Toyota Indonesia, where agencies’ role is lower owing to its 95% 
Japanese ownership, the JMNC has managed to diffuse a high-quality form of the 
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Japanese lean ideology. Toyota’s HR manager confirmed the adoption of 
Japanisation: 
Throughout our establishment, we have applied kaizen, TPS and lean. We 
have innovated and improved TPS over time so that we can educate our 
employees, develop their mindsets and skills for over 10,000 Indonesian 
employees. 
Another interviewee justified his interest in adopting the lean mindset, Japanese 
discipline and work ethic with reference to their implications for other subsidiaries’ 
workplaces: 
The Japanese work attitude, character and habit: this type of training 
requires ongoing commitment, and what we need to emphasise is employees’ 
motivation and commitment to work. I think these have not yet been 
demonstrated in our Indonesian workers [outside Toyota]. 
This management ideology of “lean” has contributed to the successful 
transplantation of Japanisation to subsidiaries. In view of the level of Japanese 
ownership, presence and involvement, the dominant business value may derive from 
Toyota Japan. Toyota Indonesia is not disadvantaged by its 95% Japanese ownership 
because Astra is interested in maintaining close links between Toyota Indonesia and 
Toyota Japan and positioning it at the top of the local automotive industry. 
Consequently, , the Japanese model prevails in Toyota. 
Honda Indonesia’s 50% ownership stake affords it greater power. Honda 
Japan’s presence was praised, and some interviewees suggested that the Japanese 
had gradually constructed layers of Japanese HRM “best practice” processes 
democratically. Despite its different share ownership structure, Honda has similar 
practice transfer mechanisms to those of Toyota. In the context of subsidiary sources 
of power at the micro level, Honda Indonesia derives power from its political 
networks and local expertise. Intra-organisationally, Honda’s reputation may bolster 
its power over Astra. However, there may be tension between the JMNC and Astra’s 
management since they have equal stakes. Thus, both Japanese and Indonesian 
models dominate in Honda. 
The implications for AOP extend across its first-, second- and third-tier supply 
chains. Strong diffusion processes by the JMNC and business association actors 
reach even the lower tiers that have no Japanese ownership. This study examined 
eight AOP subsidiaries with different levels of Japanese ownership and length of 
presence (see Table 7.1). The first tier has greater access to resources and relies on 
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direct JMNC transfer, while the second and third tiers derive resources through local 
AOP management, Astra and business associations. The second and third tiers are 
also subject to less negotiation, influence and control by the JMNC, Astra and 
business associations. Therefore, the transfer process in the autoparts supply chain 
highlights a unique HRM “best practice” diffusion phenomenon, exhibiting different 
interests, power and tactics. 
The views of participants from all three tiers of Toyota, Honda and AOP 
substantiate the notion that first-tier AOP subsidiaries have managed to apply the 
Japanese HRM-IR “best practices” model, resulting in more favourable working 
conditions and ER than in the second and third tiers. AOP subsidiaries with greater 
Japanese capital have higher levels of Japanisation than firms with no Japanese 
ownership. The AOP case studies reveal that third-tier firms exhibit less HRM “best 
practice” and interpret the lean ideology differently. Thus, Japanese HRM “best 
practice” appears to empower subsidiaries to appreciate the usefulness of adopting 
Japanisation. This is more prevalent in firms without a direct Japanese management 
presence. 
7.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
The study presented in this chapter demonstrates that while a macro-political 
approach is favoured by multinational firms, a micro-political approach tends to be 
adopted by low-power subsidiaries and local firms. Amid diverse actors’ interests, 
the power inequality and capitalist employment relations of the HRM-IR “best 
practices” model, and strategic choices (corporate effects) shaping change—and 
possibly continuity—occur at the meso level. Actors in both quasi-governmental 
agencies and business associations moderate conflict and are also a means of 
influencing subsidiaries’ HRM practices. MNCs’ strategies have greater impact on 
organisations more embedded in their supply chains, while subsidiaries with looser 
relationships with the parent corporation resist close coordination. As illustrated by 
Astra, such subsidiaries rely on extensive local networks and the interests of local 
stakeholders, including unions and local business associations. As a result, 
interactions occur at the meso level, where quasi-governmental agencies/business 
associations use the power of ideology to overcome conflict and transplant the HRM 
“best practice” ideology throughout the MNCs’ EME networks. Since state-
sponsored agencies have fewer institutional constraints than JMNC actors, they are 
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able to inject JMNCs’ interest in management control into subsidiaries’ workplaces 
through meso-political tactics. Moreover, although JMNCs only have access through 
Japanese agencies, the latter strongly support cross-border diffusion of JMNCs’ 
dominant HRM “best practice”, regardless of the institutional constraints of the host 
country. 
The analysis of this study extends Ferner et al.’s (2012) paradigm which, while 
demonstrating that transfers of practice are contingent on constellations of macro- 
and micro-level power resources, does not address potential conflict at the sub-
national (meso) level. The findings indicate that studying the meso level as an 
important source of power for MNCs is useful in two key ways. First, it 
demonstrates a new way of viewing the contested HRM “best practice” diffusion 
process, or an alternative way of analysing the variety of employment systems and 
management practices (Morris et al., 2018). Second, it centres on dialectical 
processes between dominant and low-power actors rather than linear, top-down 
imposition or structured rejection. This study evaluates the strategic choices of 
Japanese corporate actors experiencing institutional pressures and increasingly 
utilising dominance effects at the meso level. For example, HIDA and IDE-JETRO 
are integral to the transfer of dominant HRM-IR “best practices” and are fully 
supported by Japan’s trade and foreign investment, as well as by Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) policies. 
This study centres on the political-economic influences of MNC sources of 
power. Management, employees, unions and agencies/business associations engage 
in political strategies to mobilise their diverse interests and use power as a means to 
(de)legitimise MNC influence and control other actors’ practices and behaviours. 
Importantly, institutional support greatly influences the power capabilities of MNC 
and agency actors. Subsidiary actors with emerging power resources at meso and 
micro levels mobilise their defence mechanisms not only to overcome dominant 
actors, but also to protect their own systems. Although subsidiary actors have some 
interest in acquiring certain Japanese HRM-IR “best practices” elements, there is 
little or no trade-off to enable low-power actors to control or (de)legitimise the 
values and practices of dominant JMNC actors. 
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Figure 7.1: Managing power and institutional resistance in diffusing HRM-IR “best practices” in an MNC global network 
 
190 
The JMNC’s ownership structure and length of operation in the host country 
influence subsidiaries’ diffusion of Japanese business systems management 
practices. Also, the JMNC’s ownership structure affects efforts to manage local 
HRM, and the length of Japanese presence extends its influence and peculiar power 
to control local subsidiaries. Figure 7.1 illustrates these sources of power, strength of 
influence and diverse management and union interests. Although agencies such as 
HIDA and APINDO may not have a definite agenda, their access to both HQ and 
subsidiary actors stimulates an intensity of power to change subsidiaries’ behaviour, 
leading them to accept the Japanese lean ideology. Power of meaning exerts a 
remarkable influence. While management meaning best serves the MNC, agency 
meaning enables both foreign and local stakeholders to overcome conflict. However, 
employees and unions may remain sceptical because agencies/business associations 
may represent the interests of dominant actors, suggesting a new form of 
management control. Thus, both multinationals and agencies deploy dominant power 
strategies by removing or circumventing assumptions of HRM “best practice”. In the 
EME context, political alliances develop between institutions, legislative bodies and 
other actors within and outside the organisation, conditioning emerging sources of 
power for low-power subsidiary actors. Low-power actors engage in meso-political 
alliances with local and international agencies to achieve legitimate influence in 
MNCs’ global networks. 
These findings reflect Ferner et al.’s (2012: 164) suggestion that “there is little 
sense of what is at stake for actors in confronting the cognitive, normative and 
regulatory conditions that arise when cross-border practices are transferred, adopted 
and executed”. This study scrutinises Delbridge et al.’s (2011) SSDC by examining 
multiple actors’ roles in diffusing dominant capitalist business systems to a specific 
EME context and including the role of agency actors. It also examines multiple 
levels of analysis, including the meso level (Morris et al., 2018). EME subsidiary 
actors should not be perceived as “passive” or powerless (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 
2008). The findings suggest that HRM practitioners should consider cross-border 
management practice transfer and political-economic differences between 
stakeholders, at both the organisational and meso levels. Since the spread of IHRM 
practices is context-specific, it is important to understand the diffusion of dominant 
HRM “best practice” beyond the mainstream Asian EMEs of China and India, as 
well as how it varies by industry, institution and bilateral national relationship.
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Chapter 8: How Do Low-Power Actors Gain Influence, 
Legitimacy and Power in a Global Corporation’s Network? 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the micro-political strategies adopted in pursuit of legitimacy, 
influence and power by a local business group (BG) or conglomerate managing car, 
motorcycle and autoparts manufacturers in an EME. The primary focus is on two 
aspects of the roles and mechanisms of the BG regarding legitimation processes, first 
between the MNC’s HQ and local actors in IJV organisations, and second between 
the JMNC and Indonesian subsidiaries/sub-units. Gaining legitimacy from the HQ 
enables the BG to exert its influence, while legitimacy from local stakeholders 
allows it to mobilise local actors’ interests to form alliances and strengthen its 
negotiation strategy with dominant HQ actors. Ultimately, the BG adopts 
coordinated corporate bargaining strategies and fosters close links with national 
institutions that shape local labour market institutions and the business environment. 
Within the business group literature (e.g. Bhaumik & Driffield, 2010; Douma et 
al., 2006; Guillen, 2000), it is well established that key reasons for the development 
of BGs in EMEs are the lack of functioning capital and weak local labour markets. 
As a result, the existence and roles of BGs are relevant to IHRM. Foreign investors 
are interested in partnering with local BGs and using internal labour markets with 
expertise in managing local issues, as they perceive this as a partial cross-border 
business solution to the missing market problem. 
This study examines BGs’ strategic responses to the influx of FDI and the lack 
of local labour market infrastructure, as well as foreign MNCs’ exploitation based on 
a model that sees local markets as peripheral investment havens. Specifically, it 
investigates the configuration and role of BGs as a vehicle for strengthening low-
power actors’ voice, power resources and influence in negotiating with dominant 
MNC actors. Accordingly, this research investigates the strategies of local BGs that 
have the necessary motivation, interest and power to influence the rules of the 
national HRM-IR game in the EME setting. Astra is not only a conglomerate well-
connected with local institutions but also Southeast Asia’s largest “independent” 
automotive group. It manages the most diversified Indonesian corporations, 
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employing 218,000 local people.48 Whitley and Zhang’s (2013) observation of a BG 
with interwoven financial ownership is that “While many small firms did operate 
independently of each other, large companies and BGs developed broad and deep 
inter-firm, inter-group and inter-industry ties.” 
Thus, although it is difficult to define BGs or conglomerates despite extensive 
literature on the topic (see, for example, Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), this thesis focuses 
on why and how local BGs may constitute a means through which low-power actors 
can achieve status in the global MNC network. Astra has been recognised as one of 
the most prominent and influential Indonesian BGs, particularly because of its 
powerful political ties (e.g. Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Dieleman & Widjaja, 2018; 
Hadiz & Robison, 2013). Additionally, it exemplifies the types of BGs that are 
proactively shaping the host country’s HRM-IR environment with “weak” domestic 
institutions (e.g. Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Beamish & Biggart, 2006). 
Maclean et al. (2017) report that power relations between actors in contested 
inter-organisational fields are not entirely one-way. Similarly, it is argued in this 
chapter that the authoritative power of MNCs should not be seen simply as a top-
down, linear process, or as “structurally weighted in favour of the MNC” (Clark & 
Geppert, 2006: 340). It is also proposed that subsidiary managers have limited power 
because stand-alone actors do not have effective negotiation strategies and power 
resources to counteract the HQ’s dominance. Thus, local management must form 
alliances and establish networks with local institutions and employers’ and 
employees’ associations to construct institutional support (e.g. Almond, 2011a; Sun 
et al., 2012). The local conglomerate may play a major role in configuring two 
dimensions of bargaining strategy—motivations (ends) and mechanisms (means)—
to gain influence in the global MNC network. Subsidiary actors engage in micro-
political coalition strategies not only to maximise their bargaining outcomes but, 
more importantly, to protect local labour market institutions from the hands of 
foreign actors and break down dominant HQ actors’ power. Following Lukes’s 
(2005) notion of power in terms of dominance, and according to Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw (2008), subsidiaries are viewed as low-power actors with disadvantaged 
or low-status positions vis-à-vis other actors. 
                                                 
48 As at December 2017 (https://www.jardines.com/en/companies/astra.html, accessed 7 September 
2018). 
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In this chapter, it is argued that advancing local HRM and IR practices while 
protecting subsidiary management practices and control from foreign actors may be 
core motivations for the local conglomerate. Although Bouquet and Birkinshaw 
(2008) make the case that low-power actors are increasingly interested in 
strengthening their influence in the global MNC network, they fail to explain clearly 
neither their power resources nor their core intention or motivation for gaining 
legitimacy. In an EME with “weak” institutions, the ownership structure 
concentrates power in the hands of a few large and diversified business élite and 
families (e.g. Almond et al., 2013; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; La Porta et al., 1999). 
Moreover, the local conglomerate’s influence in advancing and protecting local 
systems from foreign controls may result in it becoming an attractive agent. Hence, 
conflicts of interest exist between dominant MNC actors and local actors. For 
instance, the conglomerate’s underlying interest is in rectifying shortcomings of the 
local labour market, since JMNC investment may be limited to making the local 
market a manufacturing hub with increasingly organised labour. 
By focusing on the mechanisms through which local actors and the BG increase 
influence in the global MNC network, this research contributes to the MNC and 
IHRM literature by offering two fresh perspectives. First, it reveals how local 
actors—including the conglomerate, subsidiary management, business associations 
(e.g. chamber of commerce and employers’ association) and unions—revolutionise 
adversarial actors’ relationships (e.g. management versus union). Second, it explains 
how the joint force of these actors determines their level of influence, voice and 
power. This chapter draws on a multi-case study of automotive manufacturers. The 
selected case studies have an HQ in Japan and a local parent firm in Indonesia, Astra 
International, which has strong business élite group management. The automotive 
manufacturers, with varying tier classifications, foreign ownership levels and 
workers’ skills formation, demonstrate the micropolitical coalition process at inter- 
and intra-organisational levels, revealing the extent of institutional diversity in the 
EME context. 
Furthermore, Chapter 8 discusses the motivation for the study and identifies a 
theoretical gap. Crafting a research question involved reviewing relevant literature 
on organisational legitimation processes, and conglomerates’ corporate and 
managerial strategies to promote their capabilities and power. This literature review 
194 
is followed by an explanation of the research design, presentation of the findings, 
discussion and conclusion. 
8.2 Gaps in Understanding of MNC-Subsidiary Relationships in EMEs 
The MNC literature has sought to explain the existence of BGs in established formal 
networks and institutions (e.g. Carney et al., 2011). For example, Kostova and 
Zaheer (1999) refer to them as legitimating actors: local power holders with the 
capacity for direct negotiations with the HQ. Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) 
suggest that local management’s motivation is necessarily aligned with that of the 
MNC, and that the concept of “voice” stems from local management. By adopting a 
more explicitly critical functionalist perspective, this study proposes that local 
management, and even the BG, may have limited power compared with the 
dominant HQ. Consequently, the BG’s bargaining strategy would be less effective if 
it were unable to gain legitimacy and institutional support from other local actors, 
namely business associations, subsidiary management and unions. As the central 
local actor, the BG can mobilise its influence and distribute resources and 
information to local actors. Local managers have very limited power, and little is 
known yet about how they elevate their position and form alliances with other local 
actors to construct power. 
The coordinated strategy of local business and IR actors may foster institutional 
support and influence an organisation’s legitimation processes. By examining the 
extent to which local actors may form alliances on a sub-unit or even larger scale, 
this study extends Ferner et al.’s (2005) observation that each actor has diverse 
interests and encounters different institutional constraints. In bargaining with a 
dominant actor recognised as the global player in the industry, an institutionalised, 
unifying type of strategy may attract the HQ’s attention. In particular, an MNC’s 
greater ownership rights may justify activities such as “establishing or closing 
subsidiaries, hiring and firing subsidiary managers” (Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 
2016: 1255). In this study, it is postulated that “lone wolf” bargaining tactics by low-
power subsidiary actors may be ineffective against dominant HQ actors. Conversely, 
forming alliances to unite voices and demonstrate genuine concerns may be more 
effective in attracting the HQ’s attention. In the conventional hierarchy of dominant 
versus low-power actors, MNCs are able to intimidate subsidiaries by threatening 
closure and relocation. However, subsidiaries may have some influence owing to 
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several factors that make the MNC dependent on them, such as the liability of 
foreignness in the local labour market, and local management expertise in managing 
the complexity and uniqueness of local institutions. Therefore, local actors are 
coordinating their efforts to present a united voice that can be interpreted as a 
strategic means of gaining legitimacy. 
8.3 Theoretical Setting: Legitimation Process and Power Interactions in an 
EME 
8.3.1 Low-power actors’ objectives in pursuing legitimacy tasks 
Weber (2009) defines legitimacy as “a form of social approval which facilitates the 
acquisition of power because it determines how social actors are understood and 
evaluated” (cited in Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 480), whereas Meyer and Rowan 
(2015: 50) observe that low-power actors “lack acceptable legitimated accounts of 
their activities” and “are more vulnerable to claims that they are negligent, irrational 
or unnecessary”. Therefore, local actors seek to gain legitimacy from individuals in 
positions of authority, enabling them to exert influence over corporate authoritative 
power. Substantial credence has been given to the notion that legitimacy regulates 
the distribution of power in the global MNC environment (Harzing, 2002; Zaheer, 
1995). A critical factor explaining local actors’ pursuit of legitimacy is recognition 
that their own local business environment lacks competitiveness or has failed to 
develop the capacity to influence MNC decisions. In particular, Kostova and Zaheer 
(1999) note that economic turmoil arising from the 1997 Asian financial recession—
along with the political cataclysm following the collapse of the 33-year Soeharto 
dictatorship—caused local subsidiaries in Indonesia to lose legitimacy with foreign 
actors. Although this situation promoted the MNC’s legitimacy, local firms 
partnering with the MNC may still have to overcome subsidiaries’ disadvantage. 
As institutional theorists (e.g. Hybels, 1995; Maurer, 1971) have argued, one 
factor shaping organisational legitimacy is “the legitimation processes by which the 
environment builds its perceptions of the organisation” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999: 
66). This concept is relevant to this research in three ways. First, these processes 
affect an organisation’s ability to establish and maintain legitimacy. Second, the 
organisation’s complexity arises from its businesses being built from diverse 
subsidiaries (and sub-units/supply chains), which may be fragmented (by 
function/task and location) and have varying levels of interdependence and 
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independence (e.g. Almond & Gonzales Menendez, 2014a). Third, each subsidiary 
faces its own challenges in gaining and maintaining legitimacy, and sub-units may 
muster intra-organisational support for their own legitimacy. Thus, in order to 
achieve and maintain legitimacy, an organisation must become accepted and 
approved by multiple organisations/actors in both home- and host-country 
institutions. Equally, however, a subsidiary’s violation of host-country laws and 
regulations may create serious legitimation problems for the MNC and other actors. 
This study examines the process of organisational legitimation in the context of 
local, ostensibly “weak” actors in Indonesia within the MNC global network of a 
dominant Japanese MNC’s HQ. 
8.3.2 Tracing the complexity of local actors’ legitimation process 
Clarification of the legitimacy process is important because the complex and 
potentially two-way influences between MNC and subsidiaries may create tension, 
challenging how an organisation obtains and manages legitimacy. Kostova and 
Zaheer (1999: 73) suggest that “the legitimation—that is, the process through which 
legitimacy is achieved—is largely sociopolitical and cognitive in nature”. Both the 
organisation and institutions are involved in a legitimation process in which the 
organisation’s legitimacy is continuously contested and redefined. In this process, 
the organisation attempts to make sense of the legitimacy requirements by observing, 
learning, interpreting, and even influencing these requirements. Testing, exploration 
and redefinition of the process through ongoing interactions with multiple actors 
may result in finding some degree of common ground bound by similar objectives. 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) identify two factors that shape the process of 
legitimation. First, the liability of foreignness (LOF) reflects the MNC’s general lack 
of knowledge, expertise and information when operating in the host-country 
environment. This study views the LOF as residing in labour market institutions, 
particularly in terms of systematic host-country and managerial constraints. The 
institutionalist approach to this problem in the MNC literature describes a process of 
bargaining between the inward investor and local stakeholders, with local 
stakeholders being resistant to changes, particularly regarding working practices. 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) see this resistance as fundamental to the problem of 
establishing legitimacy as part of the classic liability of the LOF. They also go 
197 
further in claiming that all local firms may lack legitimacy, and thus, almost any 
non-local firm will immediately be perceived as more legitimate. 
Second, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) identify the problem of legitimacy 
spillovers. They argue that the legitimacy of an organisational unit in a particular 
environment may not be independent of the legitimacy of other organisational 
entities but may be cognitively related. Legitimacy spillovers may come from 
various sources both outside and inside the organisation and may occur in different 
directions. Importantly, both positive and negative spillovers contribute to legitimacy 
processes. Kostova and Zaheer (1999) cautiously suggest that even if a particular 
actor is regarded as legitimate, this legitimacy may not necessarily add much weight 
to the legitimacy of the organisation as a whole. Nonetheless, it is important for 
organisations with established reputations to maintain their earned legitimacy. 
Kostova et al. (2008) assert that local management may use legitimacy spillovers by 
associating their organisation’s reputation with other highly respected legitimate 
organisations. A positive reputation can be used to attract other actors’ attention, and 
potentially to recruit them as allies to support one’s own strategic agenda. Similar to 
the HQ, the local conglomerate management may have extensive organisational 
experience in dealing with legitimacy processes, a valuable expertise that may be 
used for effective negotiation. Hence, Kostova and Zaheer’s (1999) concept of the 
legitimation process may be considered as a primary means of understanding issues 
and types of institutional support. For a focal actor, the legitimacy process may 
provide opportunities to construct strategy, and to mobilise a stand-alone 
organisation or a group of actors. 
8.4 The Business Group’s Organisational Legitimation Processes: Bottom-Up 
and Top-Down Approaches 
Subsidiaries’ influence is traditionally characterised in relation to their size, type of 
product and market location. However, this fails to account for subsidiaries’ tactics 
to strengthen their voice. For example, when actors lack resources, how do they 
coordinate, and with whom do they communicate? 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) depict the variety of subsidiary capabilities and 
suggest that actors may possess critical resources to enable them to exert some 
influence. Ferner et al. (2004) further argue that a subsidiary may gain power if it 
possesses certain resources, a network position, a value-chain mandate or other ways 
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to capitalise on institutional and market conditions. They suggest that subsidiaries 
may not be entirely powerless against the MNC. Other studies (e.g. Forsgren, 2017; 
Andersson et al., 2005) report that subsidiaries must also control specific 
relationships with authoritative actors and access to information/procedures in order 
to secure power. Clearly, subsidiaries have diverse characteristics, and the locations 
and institutions in which they operate and their position in the global MNC network 
may affect their status in that network. 
The current research involves the role of the local BG which acts as the HQ’s 
local partner in managing subsidiaries for two reasons. First, the BG’s local 
management has direct influence and oversees certain management practices because 
HRM-IR is protected by local investment and HR policies. In addition to direct 
access to negotiate with the HQ, the BG has more information and resources than 
stand-alone local actors. Through established networks with local institutions and 
associations, the BG has greater coordination to control access to scarce local 
resources. Second, the efficacy of the BG’s strategy is nevertheless contingent on its 
types of resources, networks and expertise. The importance premise here is that the 
BG may amplify subsidiaries’ voice and strategic power to bargain with the HQ. 
IB and IR scholars (e.g. Ambos et al., 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Ferner et al., 2005; Forsgren et al., 2005) have identified certain aspects of 
subsidiary actors that may elevate their voices. It is argued in this chapter that when 
diverse actors with various leverage positions are combined, they can construct 
networks of mutual support and devise stronger strategies to counterbalance the 
HQ’s dominant power, like worker bees protecting the hive. It is also argued that a 
stand-alone organisation or actor may fail to gain influence, especially if there is a 
pivotal local actor with whom the HQ can negotiate directly. The existence of a 
conglomerate and the roles it plays are important in optimising local actors’ voice, 
influence and coordination, particularly in a cross-border HRM context. However, 
under such conditions, a question remains regarding how low-power actors can be 
mobilised to join the BG’s legitimation agenda. It is not suggested here that all local 
actors have the same objectives. The specific interest of this study is on nuances 
distinguishing between low-power actors with similar interests in gaining legitimate 
status and dominant HQ actors in the context of dialectical actors’ power 
interactions. A local conglomerate with the objective of advancing the local labour 
market may reach out to low-power actors to join forces. However, to generate 
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consensual objectives, the conglomerate must go through a legitimation process with 
both the foreign MNC’s HQ and local stakeholders. Examination of the various 
legitimation processes proceeds with a discussion of the importance of the BG in 
establishing legitimacy in both directions, in terms of both established and joint 
relationships. 
In this study, an established relationship refers to a situation in which the MNC 
needs the local BG to overcome its LOF in the context of changing local business 
systems by partnering with local actors. The BG must thus demonstrate to the HQ 
that it can manage the subsidiaries and ensure that they support the MNC’s business 
objectives in managing local HR and IR issues. The BG must deliver assurances to 
the HQ regarding in-house training, management of strikes and picketing, and any 
other problems affecting global production and international quality standards. 
According to Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2016), attracting the HQ’s attention 
is a politicised subsidiary initiative, so HQ and subsidiary must engage in some level 
of relationship. Others have observed that to attract the HQ’s attention or exercise a 
voice, the subsidiary must highlight distinctive external elements, such as the 
importance of the local market (e.g. Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Cantwell & Mudambi, 
2005). Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2016) also observe the high value of image 
control, for example, by establishing credibility and a reputable track record. Dutton 
and Ashford (1993) maintain that the most effective way to attract the HQ’s attention 
is through framing an issue to conform to the HQ’s preferences. For example, “an 
initiative to obtain a new mandate can be framed as a human-resource issue”. As 
Cowan (1991) points out, to be effective, the BG’s strategy must correspond with the 
HQ’s specific interests, which in this study relate to local HRM- and IR-related 
matters. Thus, it is postulated in this study that the type of relationship established 
between the local BG and the MNC’s HQ is rooted in the IJV partnership 
arrangement and is concerned with solving the problem of a dysfunctional local 
market. 
The joint relationship between the local BG and local stakeholders includes 
governmental bodies, institutions and business associations. The key to such 
relationships is to ensure that the BG (the closest local actor to the HQ) is aligned 
with other local actors. Additionally, the BG must be able to market the prospective 
value of joining forces to generate greater influence and better ultimate outcomes 
than if individual local actors were to negotiate directly with the dominant MNC’s 
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HQ (e.g. Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2016; Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). This 
practice amplifies local actors’ power and voice. Similarly, without local support, the 
BG may be unable to gain legitimacy or the necessary institutional support to allow 
direct negotiation with the HQ. Furthermore, the BG may serve as a power broker by 
breaking down MNC power and strategically investing local actors with power 
resources, which may also act as an assurance in building local institutional 
cooperation. However, the BG must simultaneously support foreign investors’ 
interests, as they have ownership stakes in the conglomerate. In juggling foreign, 
local and its own interests through micropolitical tactics, the BG can distribute 
power across networks, empowering each local actor, and engaging in a participatory 
strategy to safeguard local business systems. In this study, Astra, together with local 
institutions, engineers the national HRM and IR systems. Consequently, the 
conditions and mechanisms for the BG’s legitimation processes may rest on a 
combination of bottom-up established relationships with the HQ and top-down joint 
relationships with local stakeholders. 
8.4.1 Strategic objectives: Controlling access to critical resources 
In efforts to reduce their dependence on the HQ, local actors engage in economic 
exchange relationships, the distribution of which relates to their resource 
dependence. The centrality of resource dependence in controlling critical resources 
“has been used as a general guiding framework to explain the relationships that 
MNCs entertain with a myriad of external actors of the organisations” (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008: 482). In Indonesia, which has been selling off resources in 
exchange for foreign capital, “endowed local vital resources pertaining to the locality 
can exercise power and influence in their own right” (Maclean et al., 2017: 4). 
Agencies and associations may be involved in protecting local resources. 
Nevertheless, non-organisational actors may have their own political agendas that 
are not necessary aligned with organisational actors’ motivations for diffusing 
influence (e.g. Ford, 2014; Dahan et al., 2010; Teegen et al., 2004). Since the 
associations’ authoritative power affects the BG’s strategy, the conglomerate is 
likely to need to engage with them; otherwise, it will be in a disadvantageous 
position if local business associations are not on the same bargaining side. At the 
same time, the BG must remain mindful of the importance of securing corporate 
inter-organisational networks through the MNC for three basic reasons:  its foreign 
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ownership structure, the inadequacy of the host country’s business environment and 
infrastructure to support the legitimation processes, and the comparatively lower 
competitiveness of local institutions compared to their counterparts in countries such 
as Malaysia and Thailand. Under such conditions, the local BG’s influence may 
remain inward-looking, focusing more on local actors’ ends and means. 
Consequently, its strategies to control the flow of foreign systems and distribute 
power resources throughout local alliances may be interpreted as a coalition-building 
tactic. As such, it collaborates to form alliances with local agencies, associations and 
subsidiaries to protect access to local systems and resources, thus keeping them to 
some extent out of the hands of foreign investors. This research emphasises that the 
tactic of controlling critical resources may explain asymmetries in the distribution of 
influence in organisations supported by local institutions. 
8.4.2 Low-power actors engaging in political games: Coalition building 
An emerging IB debate suggests that low-power actors’ coalition-building tactics 
may focus less on controlling critical resources (e.g. Barnett et al., 2000) and more 
on reducing their dependence on and the distributed influence of the local 
environment (e.g. Cantwell et al., 2010). This section further elaborates on local 
actors’ engagement in political games (see Section 2.10). The BG forges industry 
alliances with trade associations and local government in order to shift the IJV’s 
business policy toward increasing manufacturing of value-added products rather than 
assembling imported autoparts. The objective is to secure HQ investment in research 
and development to use local natural resources to create innovative products in the 
host country. This lobbying effort to establish institutional support from local 
associations allows local actors to control local resources and minimises their 
dependence on the MNC. Generally, this coalition-building tactic serves local actors’ 
interests in keeping national business institutions out of the hands of foreign MNC 
actors as far as possible. For instance, the advantage to a local conglomerate with a 
stake in the autoparts industry is that manufacturing more autoparts in the host 
country is likely to enhance its ownership, facilitating local management’s control of 
the inflow of knowledge, technology and innovation. 
Constructing a local institution that supports local actors’ objectives by engaging 
in political games enables local actors to contest HQ decisions and optimise 
micropolitical alliances with local institutions (Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016; 
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Kennedy, 2007; Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005). Via this strategy, they can push their 
agendas through existing networks. Channels may be multi-layered, often created by 
different actors with diverse interests, or by groups of interested actors capable of 
establishing their own intra-organisational networks. To illustrate, a conglomerate 
might lobby the government to establish an official employers’ association and then 
require local businesses to be members of the association (e.g. Sheldon et al., 2016; 
Thornthwaite & Sheldon, 2012). As Ferner et al. (2005) suggest, highly networked 
local actors are likely to be relatively empowered. However, Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw (2008) claim that to make this political strategy work, trade-offs in 
power are necessary to manage the objectives and means of influence. This is 
because management has more capital, resources and influence than other subsidiary 
actors such as employees and unions. As a result, actors in subsidiaries and sub-units 
must use various means of influence concurrently. The emphasis is also on structural 
inertia, where power dynamics within an organisation correspond with changes in 
local institutions and the business environment (Kostova et al., 2008). 
This relational power phenomenon can be explored in terms of micropolitical 
tactics to understand specific coordination efforts by local actors and the BG 
(Maclean et al., 2017; Vissa et al., 2010). Analysing power interactions and 
collective actions from a micropolitical perspective may help unravel the complexity 
of local institutions and the context of actors’ alliances with other actors within and 
outside the organisation, such as coalition building between local actors, institutions 
and associations (e.g. Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016). At the micro-institutional 
level, the conglomerate engages in political coalition building with municipal and 
provincial authorities and the government to strengthen its lobbying efforts with the 
federal government. In comparison with associations such as the chamber of 
commerce and employers’ associations, the conglomerate may have stronger 
networks at municipal and provincial levels through close ties with national 
institutions (e.g. Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). Moreover, as the biggest employer with 
the most diversified businesses, the BG is also interested in coalition building with 
governmental policy makers (e.g. Sheldon, 1999). The BG’s political coalitions with 
federal and provincial governments are appealing to both the HQ and local actors. 
Although this explains the BG’s strategic coordination efforts (Kostova et al., 2008), 
its coordination with subsidiaries and sub-units remains unclear and does not explain 
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the “attention attraction” (e.g. Bouquet, 2005) used by the conglomerate to attract 
potentially adversarial actors, such as unions, to build coalitions. 
Micropolitical formations may explain the concept of “bundles of coalition” and 
mobilise support across organisational boundaries (e.g. Lange & Becker-Ritterspach, 
2016; Geppert et al., 2016). BGs’ political motivation to gain legitimacy and 
influence from other actors may explain their commitment to improving local 
institutions in order to equip themselves and their supporters with resources. 
Maclean et al. (2017) argue that a macro-level perspective on MNCs may be 
insufficient to understand the differentiated contexts within which political struggles 
play out through diverse actors with various capabilities. An appreciation of the 
extent of institutional diversity in MNCs demands a fine-grained analysis that 
complements the broader macro-regional perspective by considering local 
micropolitical specificities (e.g. Morgan, 2011). Hence, at the micro-level, this study 
captures the intensity of interactions and influence as being “primarily the result of 
who interacts with whom” (e.g. Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Responding to the collective interests of local management, employees and 
institutions in the business strategies of dominant power holders is another political 
power game used by local actors to mobilise their collective voice (e.g. Morgan & 
Kristensen, 2006). For example, local workers may view apparently benevolent 
foreign practices as a double-edged sword, or as a Trojan horse through which to 
implant less welcome practices. Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) characterise 
coalition building as a specific power game carried out through collective action 
evolving into a complex set of power interactions. The effectiveness of collective 
power in counteracting a dominant MNC depends on the type rather than the number 
of “good” alliances, since some may be focal and others less important to the MNC 
(Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). For instance, a coalition consisting of a local 
employer, employees’ association and politicians could be more effective in 
curtailing HQ practices that impede local values. 
The key to successful coalition building rests on actors’ capacity to construct 
positive relationships. Not only do different actors have wide-ranging interests and 
objectives but, more importantly, an element of trade-off or exchange is unavoidable. 
This situation arises because less resourceful actors are more interested in 
collaborating with more resourceful actors, yet actors who hold more influence are 
not necessarily interested in coalition building with less influential ones. In this 
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study, the less influential actors are second- and third-tier subsidiaries that must 
engage in some form of trade-off. In addition, less powerful actors (i.e. employees 
and unions) participating in this political coalition-building game must measure their 
resources and capabilities to achieve certain objectives; otherwise, they may be 
worse off, and the results may be chaotic (Butler, 2005). 
Certain types of representation may also be riskier than having no 
representation—for example, by employees’ associations rather than employers’ 
associations (Ford, 2014; Martínez Lucio & Weston, 1994). Westley et al. (2009) 
also contend that the larger the game, the greater the resources won through powerful 
MNC actors. Consequently, actors entering political coalition games must have the 
capacity to adopt complex strategies and more holistic tactics than simple lobbying 
or resilience; autonomy-seeking behaviour, in particular, may not be the most 
effective way. However, political games are nebulous and multifaceted and may be 
played out with the HQ, local actors and institutions, increasing low-power actors’ 
power, capability and legitimacy. At the very least, coalition-building strategies 
benefit less resourceful and influential actors by developing their interpersonal 
relationships with other actors and building their profile and visibility in the MNC’s 
global networks. Examination of the above literature leads to the construction of the 
following research question (RQ): 
How do local business groups engage with local actors in order to establish 
their legitimacy with foreign multinationals? 
8.5 Data and Methodology 
Following Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994), the qualitative data on which this 
research is based were drawn from primary data collected from a multiple-case study 
of the subsidiaries of a JMNC automotive manufacturer operating in Indonesia. The 
selection of Indonesia as the host country was based on a need to find evidence of a 
conglomerate, business associations, management subsidiaries and unions 
coordinating their influence and voices, with the conglomerate taking the initiative in 
shaping the local labour market. Indonesia has its own labour market policies and 
practices, strongly supported by local laws that prohibit foreign investors from direct 
involvement in managing HRM and IR issues. As access to influence and control is 
limited to local management, local actors are equipped with some influence and 
capability to manage and protect local values. 
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The automotive industry also illustrates the evolving influence of Japanese 
management and production systems, as well as local actors’ motivations for 
engaging in political games (e.g. Blazejewski et al., 2011; Stewart, 2014). The 
industry has workplaces employing large labour forces and high technological 
content. It is thus particularly relevant to this study since it exhibits power 
interactions pertaining to inward investment and local protection (e.g. Irawati & 
Rutten, 2013; Irawati & Charles, 2010; Barnes, 2017). At the same time, however, 
these actors are aware that foreign capital may improve the competitiveness of local 
systems. Japanese automotive plants were investigated in order to elicit actors’ 
attitudes toward blocking, rejecting or accepting changes to working practices. 
8.5.1 Data collection 
Data were collected from the first, second and third tiers of JMNC subsidiary 
manufacturers of cars, motorcycles and autoparts to support an in-depth examination 
of the mechanisms and outcomes of low-power actors’ and the conglomerate’s 
management of subsidiaries in the host country’s automotive sector. Data were also 
collected from business associations, including the chamber of commerce, 
employers’ associations, unions and state-sponsored organisations directly involved 
in propagating Japanese management practices and overseeing Japanese subsidiaries’ 
HRM and IR practices. These included JETRO, IDE-JETRO, HIDA, KADIN, 
APINDO and ATC. The selected case-study subsidiaries have an MNC HQ in Japan, 
and their local parent firms are Astra or Lippo, prominent Indonesian BGs (Carney 
& Dieleman, 2011). 
The legitimation processes and influencing strategies of the BGs relative to their 
HQs were derived from responses to questions and observations of the overall 
organisational setting across sub-units in all tiers and at inter- and intra-
organisational levels. In addition to feedback from IR and non-organisational actors, 
market research experts’ views on the host country’s business environment were 
sought. The experts’ opinions were significant because they provided background 
data on the country’s political-economic history and the sustainability of current 
developments. The respondents represented a reasonably diverse sample in terms of 
their capacity to understand the conglomerates’ objectives and coordination 
strategies to modify or sustain HRM-IR practices. To triangulate the findings, 
interviews were conducted with business associates, subsidiary management and 
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unions representing Astra and non-Astra employees. To mitigate potential bias, the 
researcher conducted copious interviews with individuals from a wide range of 
hierarchical levels and functional business areas. Details of the selected case studies 
are given in Table 8.1. The main difference between this study and those presented 
in Chapters 6 and 7 is that Daihatsu and Yamaha were added to enrich our 
understanding of the local BGs’ mobilisation of local actors (even outside their own 
organisation) and of the implications of local actors forming alliances with a 
dominant local BG. 
Table 8.1: Case studies of car, motorcycle and autoparts subsidiaries 
 
A multi-site case study was conducted on Astra Automotive Group (AAG), an 
Indonesian industrial conglomerate with subsidiaries owned, to different extents, by 
JMNCs. This case distinguishes between three main divisions: Toyota and Daihatsu 
(cars), Honda (motorcycles) and Astra Auto Parts (AOP, autoparts). In addition to 
Honda, this research also analysed Yamaha (motorcycles), owned by the Japanese 
Mitsui Corporation and the Indonesian Lippo Group, to examine the extent and 
variety of local BGs’ diffusion of influence and control in managing subsidiaries. 
Specifically, the sites were characterised by different levels of influence by the 
dominant JMNC, a factor associated with varying levels of direct control. As 
suggested by Blatter and Haverland (2012), this setting facilitated investigation of 
the mechanism of foreign control and local strategies to: (1) counteract foreign 
control, (2) trace causal processes, (3) conduct congruence analysis (Burawoy, 
Firm Japanese 
ownership 
Japanese 
presence 
Manufacturing 
Toyota 95% 1971 Cars 
Daihatsu 62% 1992 Cars 
Honda Motor 50% 1971 Motorcycles 
Yamaha Motor 90% 1974 Motorcycles 
Musashi 78% 1996 2nd tier autoparts 
Denso 75% 1978 1st tier autoparts 
Aisin 66% 1995 1st tier autoparts 
Federal Nittan 60% 1995 1st tier autoparts 
Showa 55% 1980 2nd tier autoparts 
Kayaba 50% 1976 2nd tier autoparts 
Indokarlo Perkasa 0% - 3rd tier autoparts 
Adiwira Plastik 0% - 3rd tier autoparts 
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1998), and (4) determine how actors participate in political coalition games (e.g. 
Ferner et al., 2004; Sun et al., 2010). 
8.5.2 Data analysis 
Following the approach pioneered by Eisenhardt (1989), the case study was used to 
glean findings from multi-level analyses of rich empirical data. The research 
participants were from various organisations, hierarchical levels and functional 
business areas. In total, 127 interviews (12 in Astra, 12 in Toyota, five in Daihatsu, 
25 in Honda, eight in Yamaha, 35 in AOP and 30 in external organisations) were 
conducted with 28 Japanese and 99 Indonesian participants. Further data were 
collected from Indonesian trade unions and from Japanese agencies and semi-
independent Indonesian business associations. Interwoven MNC and stakeholder 
alliances contextualise local actors’ coordination tactics to elevate their position in 
the global MNC network, thus expanding the organisation studies and IHRM 
literature. 
8.6 Findings 
This section begins with a discussion of the conflicts and critical events defining 
specific practical problems. It is followed by a discussion of the strategies adopted 
by Astra (the BG) to gain legitimacy from and influence local business associations, 
subsidiaries and unions. Also included are the kinds of assurances used by the BG to 
gain legitimacy from the HQ. To illustrate the extent and effectiveness of Astra’s 
influence and strategy, this section explains how Yamaha, a non-Astra organisation, 
has sought to join Astra to form an alliance. Synthesising the empirical findings in 
this way illuminates the bargaining processes and reveals how the BG exerts its 
influence over both local and HQ actors by coordinating the efforts of local actors. 
Moreover, the impact of the BG’s differing ownership structures of local subsidiaries 
affects coordination throughout first-, second- and third-tier autoparts subsidiaries. 
This fact adds to the complexity. Certainly, the overall findings suggest that the 
process cannot be depicted simply as a top-down, linear or one-way process. 
Actors’ conflicts of interest: The local BG is interested in gaining more 
ownership, for instance by taking a full stake in subsidiaries or preventing local 
subsidiaries from engaging in IJV activities, as well as in protecting and proactively 
influencing local HRM-IR systems. Moreover, both the BG and subsidiary actors are 
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aware that they have diverse interests and sources of power. However, the BG has 
the advantage of having greater power than local actors. While subsidiary actors may 
negotiate with the HQ directly, such strategies have been rather ineffective in 
meeting their own objectives. Astra has identified the challenges confronting these 
subsidiaries and has re-formulated its strategy to address subsidiaries’ interests. 
Consequently, the preferred strategy for low-power actors may be to form an 
alliance with a more powerful local actor, i.e. Astra. Another issue experienced by 
the BG is the need to gain legitimacy from local associations and subsidiary actors to 
build a strong, united voice to influence the HQ. In other words, Astra needs to be 
able to justify that its business agenda represents the voices of local management, 
employees, unions and associations. It should also be noted that the HQ’s interest in 
partnering with the local BG arises from its FOL position, in terms of not being 
allowed to engage directly in HRM-IR issues. Overall, these different interests 
suggest that the local BG may be in a better position than both subsidiary actors and 
the HQ. Being at the centre of this network, Astra may use its power resources to 
engage in micropolitical tactics with local actors, associates and government. 
The findings suggest that three main strategies are employed by the BG to reach 
out to local actors and strengthen its bargaining power. The first is to mobilise local 
actors’ interests to shape the local labour market institution by protecting national 
business systems from foreign influence. Local actors see Japanese management 
practices as gradually replacing human capital with machinery and robotics, which 
may shrink the labour market, downgrade human skills and limit inflows of 
advanced knowledge and technology. In exporting Japanese work institutions, the 
HQ may maintain Indonesia’s dependence on the JMNC, in terms of capital, 
expertise and technology. In contrast, the BG’s interest is in maintaining the inflow 
of Japanese capital and technology to improve Indonesia’s competitiveness, enabling 
it to move away from being a marginal automotive manufacturing and assembling 
nation to becoming a high value-added automotive manufacturer. 
The BG’s second strategy is to empower local actors and business associations. 
It coordinates resources to allow local actors to play their individual roles in 
safeguarding their organisations’ values and objectives for maximum local benefit, 
and to protect local systems from inappropriate foreign influences that conflict with 
local practices. It invests political resources in lobbying local government, 
authorities and business associations. These micropolitical coalition efforts aim to 
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redefine and modify investment policies, regulations and laws in order to limit the 
HQ’s exports of local resources and increase engagement in post-production 
activities such as car sales and services. Evidence from the primary and secondary 
data suggests that, as a result of its lobbying efforts, Astra has been able to invest in 
APINDO’s ATC. Thus, the HRM-IR training agenda is based on Astra’s in-house 
policies and practices and most trainers/facilitators are from Astra. Astra has also 
earmarked current Astra employees in local associations who contribute to national 
policy development, as well as former managers who maintain active relationships.49 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Potential mechanism through which low-power actors gain status 
and influence in the MNC’s global network 
 
The third strategy is to break down the HQ’s power. Given the BG’s deficiency 
of power vis-à-vis the HQ, its tactics include blocking the HQ from reaching out and 
reinforcing its influence over local actors. The BG’s notable competitive advantage 
is its local expertise and understanding of the host country’s unique institutional 
configuration and extensive networks. This unique knowledge affects the scope and 
strength of its influence over local actors. Figure 8.1 illustrates the mechanism 
                                                 
49 To avoid conflicts of interest, in some government and enterprise organisations, individuals are 
prohibited from having more than two managerial or directorial positions. As a result, Astra earmarks 
key people, allowing them to retire from their current positions in Astra but remain committed to 
maintaining Astra’s philosophy. 
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through which low-power subsidiary actors gain status and influence in the MNC’s 
global network. Solid lines denote stronger and strategic means, and dashed lines 
denote “lone wolf” and less effective strategies. This bundle of strategies enables the 
BG to gain institutional support from local actors. The findings reveal three further 
micropolitical strategies adopted by the BG that appear to be effective in redefining 
local institutions and disseminating its systems: 
1. The BG builds networks with local industry and supply chains. It has access to 
scarce resources and autoparts production. Also, it has centralised AOP’s 
position in local automotive value chains, recruiting and buying small local 
autoparts makers. It conducts internal audits of its existing autoparts makers to 
maintain and improve production standards. Such internal HRM-IR audits allow 
Astra to populate its systems. Also, it can either upgrade or downgrade 
automakers from the internal autoparts tier classifications (tiers 1, 2 and 3) and 
take over local autoparts firms. This monopolistic approach suggests an intention 
to control access to local resources and manage local autoparts suppliers. 
2. The BG invests in knowledge assets and builds in-house systems to 
institutionalise the Indonesian alumni networks of overseas trainees. It thus 
acquires and retains advanced knowledge, capital and technology gained by 
Indonesian trainees who were trained by experts in Japan. It selects and places 
the best trainee alumni in influential positions in key associations and institutions 
(e.g. APINDO, ATC and KADIN) that have authoritative influence in the 
specific industry and in government. The aim is to generate institutional support 
and access through the Indonesian training alumni, thereby redefining human 
capital development. The BG and business associates select and recruit the 
“cream of the crop” of Indonesian trainees and dispatch them to Japan to acquire 
Japanese management and production systems skills. 
3. The BG exercises veto power. It determines the flow of the HQ’s influence by 
acting as a gatekeeper in determining the appropriateness of foreign practices to 
local systems and ensuring that these practices do not conflict with the BG’s 
HRM and ER systems. Although the BG understands the importance of foreign 
skills and capital, it is predominantly interested in protecting local systems. It 
holds the veto power to either accept or reject foreign practices implemented in 
Astra’s subsidiaries and value chains. 
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8.6.1 Business group’s strategies to gain influence and legitimacy from business 
associates 
The findings reveal that the strongest motivation for an interested group to engage in 
alliances with the BG and support its strategy is to safeguard local systems and 
labour market institutions. Interviewees reported that “Astra is the champion” in 
protecting local institutions from foreign interventions. Another notable Astra 
strategy is to work with APINDO and HIDA to send local actors (especially those 
opposed to Astra’s business approaches) to Japan, with the objective of reinforcing 
their commitment and gaining legitimacy. One interviewee reported: 
We invited an AOP union entourage to Toyota Japan to see the automated 
automobile workforce. It has a very small number of humans, only 6%. Our 
union fellow was very shocked to witness the work done, controlled and 
switched to automated production. They shared with their colleagues and 
raised the concern with [local] management. 
Astra’s vision may generate employee and union interest in initiating, 
redefining, and even reinforcing their relationships with its management to protect 
their jobs. This view was shared by a group of Honda and Yamaha interviewees: 
Indonesian employees and union stewards/leaders received extensive 
training in Japan. One of the messages we received and spread quickly to 
our colleagues [union members] is that many automotive workplaces in 
Japan are filled with automation. The robotics have replaced humans. 
As a result, employee and union motivations merge to defend local labour market 
institutions using Astra’s capabilities and resources. Also, as the biggest local 
Japanese investment partner and employer, Astra Group is a key conduit for the HQ 
and HIDA to promote the Japanese model. Astra management builds internal 
systems that increase employee participation. Access to local workers is essential for 
the HQ to maintain Japanese-type local employee participation. 
Astra’s strategy also attracts local business members of KADIN and APINDO 
whose interests lie in business expansion and competitive investment. The BG may 
have gained legitimacy from them, as one APINDO representative reported: 
Investors would like to invest in Indonesia with certain guarantees, for 
example, the role of subsidiaries. In comparison to advanced industrial 
countries such as the US and Europe, they do not welcome low-production 
types of investment that cost more in terms of environmental impact than 
economic benefit, even by a country such as China. 
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Indonesia may be considered as a lower-tier manufacturing hub because its 
conditions do not meet global production demands. To address concerns raised by 
interested parties, the BG intervenes and commits to improving the local 
infrastructure, offering them assurances that not only attract further investments but 
also lead to more strategic partnerships with foreign investors. 
8.6.2 Business group’s strategies to gain influence and legitimacy from subsidiaries 
Astra’s tactics of reaching out to join forces with local actors are based on its 
credibility, reputation and commitment to advancing local labour market institutions. 
Astra’s activities to mobilise local actors’ commitment to and interest in alliances are 
evidenced by the fact that Astra-Daihatsu has transformed cars “made in Japan with 
Japanese technology” into Astra-Daihatsu “of Indonesia”: “the Indonesia-specific 
cars incorporate [Japanese and Indonesian] technologies”. In particular, a major 
accomplishment of Astra’s joint venture with Daihatsu Motor Corporation (DMC) 
Japan is that cars manufactured and designed locally—and marketed both locally and 
outside Indonesia (its Sigra and Ayla models)—are now sold by the Toyota group. 
This achievement has important implications in terms of the BG’s efforts to gain 
legitimacy from and influence over local actors.  
Since 2017, Astra Daihatsu Motor (ADM) has been recognised as the largest 
automobile manufacturer in Indonesia (producing 500,000 vehicles annually), which 
has expanded labour market opportunities and attracted investment in high skills and 
technology. This 40-year partnership between Astra Indonesia and Daihatsu Japan is 
a testament to Astra’s commitment to shaping the local labour market. As a 
subsidiary of DMC, Astra began as a car dealer and progressed to manufacturing 
cars. It was initially the only licensed Daihatsu car dealer, and then in 1985, it began 
to engage in complete knock down (CKD) assembly operations. Then in 1992, it 
commenced Daihatsu autoparts production; in 2012, it established a local Daihatsu 
R&D centre.  
Furthermore, Astra’s name is placed in manufactured cars before the foreign 
investor’s name, Daihatsu. The Astra-Daihatsu name demonstrates Astra’s business 
achievement in strengthening Indonesian labour market capabilities to move from 
assembling to manufacturing cars locally. In its other automotive partnerships, the 
JMNC’s name is placed before Astra (e.g. Toyota-Astra and Isuzu-Astra) for car 
production, and even for 60% of autoparts manufactured by Astra’s autoparts group. 
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The name order of Toyota-Astra suggests that much of the credit still remains with 
the Japanese investors. 
Another of Astra’s notable achievements is that motorcycles are manufactured 
and designed locally. Astra’s name also comes first in this case (Astra-Honda 
Motor). Nevertheless, unlike cars, motorcycle technology, skills and production 
systems are not recognised as innovative and sustainable. Motorcycle manufacturing 
may appear inward-looking, limited to the local market, and recognised as a second-
tier automotive technology. Hence, Astra-Daihatsu cars’ reputation resonates with 
local actors as Astra effectively influencing global Japanese automotive networks. In 
addition, Daihatsu Japan is comprised of two global Japanese car automakers: 
Daihatsu Motor and Toyota Tsusho Corporation. To have any influence in 
Daihatsu’s global automotive networks, Astra must be able to secure legitimate 
attention from the HQs. As such, conglomerate attraction tactics oriented toward 
local actors’ bargaining negotiations with the HQs allow the conglomerate to 
amplify its influence and voice. The conglomerate possesses resources, capabilities 
and expertise to negotiate directly with the HQs, providing it with a stronger 
bargaining position than stand-alone organisations or actors. Astra’s achievements 
and reputation may thus encourage local actors to join forces with it. 
An Indonesian expatriate stationed in DMC Japan suggested that Astra remains 
an important local partner for DMC, owing to Astra’s extensive local network 
covering after-production and sales. DMC wants some control over manufacturing 
and is not interested in creating a competitive business environment with Astra. The 
Japanese BG recognises Astra as a key player in the host country, enabling it to 
remain competitive and to produce and market its products where they are 
manufactured. Effective management of resources is crucial. In addition to Daihatsu, 
the ability of Toyota Motor Manufacturing Indonesia (TMMIN) to overcome local 
shortages effectively and deliver quality assurance has been noted by TMC Japan. 
TMC’s recognition is important for Astra as a reputable local BG, representing 
admission to TMC’s global network and credibility in the automotive industry in the 
home country and beyond.50 
                                                 
50 Some innovative Indonesian products are marketed within ASEAN, e.g. motorcycles and autoparts. 
Motorcycles may be the main competitive advantage through which to position Indonesia as an 
important MNC automotive player in ASEAN. Given Indonesia’s EME status, JMNCs may remain 
motivated to allow innovative technology products to be produced in Indonesia because of its lower 
labour costs and available natural resources. 
214 
8.6.3 Business group’s strategy to reach out to the union 
Adversarial actors such as unions may be most interested in joining forces with the 
BG because of a notion that the latter can amplify their voice and influence their 
bargaining with HQs.51 Although the union may need to reassess its strategy in order 
to achieve optimal bargaining outcomes with the HQ, compared with bargaining 
directly with the HQ as a stand-alone union, an alliance with the local BG may offer 
better outcomes. This demonstrates the union’s commitment to partnering with local 
management and means that its voice does not represent only a particular union. The 
union-management relationship is particularly important where an HQ is seeking to 
promote “harmonious” union-management IR. 
Unions have the choice to opt out from the BG’s coordination of their voices. In 
this study, four main local unions with various characteristics, resources and interests 
represent Astra’s automotive employees. The diversity of unions can be categorised 
based on their bargaining characteristics. Fundamentally, a union’s bargaining 
strategy may depend on its resources, networks and capital. For example, an 
internationally affiliated union representing AOP subsidiaries (e.g. SPMI) may gain 
support from other internationally affiliated unions (e.g. Japanese autoworkers or 
metalworkers) and NGOs such as the ILO. Inter-organisational support networks 
with other unions may improve local union bargaining. In this study, the Indonesian 
metal international subsidiary union engages in an inter-organisational relationship 
with the Japanese metal union representing Denso. However, the model of Japanese 
union coordination with JMNCs suggests that Japanese unions are not necessarily 
free from the influence of Japanese management. In realising this trade-off 
arrangement, local unions may seek alliances either with Japanese management (who 
promote technology and robotic types of labour market) or its own Indonesian 
management (whose interests are in protecting local labour markets).  
Superficially, local unions may show, at best, indirect management influence. 
Nonetheless, closer investigation of the unions’ bargaining coordination suggests 
that given the type of Japanese union-management coordination, the local unions 
representing Denso, Aisin and Musashi subsidiaries may not be able to stand entirely 
alone in raising their voices and bargaining with the respective HQs. Receiving 
                                                 
51 The findings do not suggest that ongoing management–union relationships are simple; rather, they 
illustrate particular actors’ interests in gaining legitimate influence from the HQ. 
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support from Japanese unions may not only strengthen local unions’ bargaining 
power, but Japanese unions may also adopt certain Japanese management agendas 
and inject them into local unions. Therefore, local unions must determine the most 
effective bargaining strategy to optimise their bargaining results. However, in 
playing these micropolitical coalition games, unions may need to focus on their long-
term goals and decide whether the BG’s commitment to advancing the local labour 
market fits with the unions’ interest in alliances with the BG. For instance, will it 
serve the unions’ voice in the short term, or will amalgamation with local 
management against foreign management practices amplify union bargaining? The 
three largest locally organised unions representing AOP employees have diverse 
interests, resources and bargaining strategies, making it difficult to raise a concerted 
voice. Astra’s business philosophy mobilises subsidiary actors to protect local work, 
employment and organisation systems. Additionally, its business strategy of 
advancing the local automotive industry attracts the unions’ attention, potentially 
persuading them to join forces with the BG. 
Forming alliances with KADIN and APINDO is another means for unions to 
gain bargaining resources (i.e. skills advancement), because APINDO is involved in 
establishing and administering training locally (outside the organisation) and abroad. 
Network relationships with APINDO may be advantageous by granting access to 
Japanese resources. As described by motorcycle and autoparts informants, although 
employees and unions are able to initiate training requests, non-Astra members, i.e. 
Toyota and Honda, must reach out to unions in Astra. A Yamaha informant claimed 
that since Astra has more members, it has a stronger relationship with APINDO: “If 
training is proposed by Astra, it is more likely to be approved.” Outside Indonesia, 
APINDO has strong networks with JETRO and HIDA, and also with the Japanese 
Trade Union Confederation (RENGO). Management and production training in 
Japan is arranged largely by these institutions. APINDO’s relationships with 
Japanese institutions are particularly important, as training in Japan is coordinated 
through APINDO. Trainees reported that they had been able to obtain access to 
training, resources and opportunities to meet the most influential automotive union 
leaders in Japan. Another informant stressed the importance of establishing 
communications with RENGO, as has been attempted by Yamaha unions. 
As an illustration of local actors’ alliances with other actors to strengthen their 
influence in the industry, Yamaha employees and unions engage with and seek 
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support from unions in Astra, such as KSPSI and KSPMI. Astra’s labour movement 
and union agenda serve as a reference for other unions in the automotive sector 
because, given the number of employees, Astra unions represent the majority of 
automotive workers in Indonesia. At the national union assembly, they have greater 
power: a stronger voice and extended networks with local and international 
institutions. Another example was reported by one Yamaha informant: 
Yamaha [management] follows Honda’s strategies, such as requiring 
workers to love/be proud of its own products. Unlike Honda, Yamaha 
employees must purchase a Yamaha motorcycle. Honda provides one free 
motorcycle per year to its employees. 
Astra unions also participate in union training in Japan. For instance, Yamaha union 
leaders engage in joint training with Astra and Honda, as a Yamaha informant 
reported: 
The importance of Yamaha unions’ alliance with the union in Honda is that 
Honda has one solid union and close connections with APINDO. Yamaha’s 
employee representatives do not have a network, but Honda has. This is the 
problem. As a result, we ally with Honda, and to meet our objectives, we 
share our activities with Honda, seek advice. The main thing Yamaha needs 
to do is to get approval from Honda. 
Above all, the Yamaha unions’ alliances with well-resourced and subsidiary 
unions in Astra indicates the significant role of Honda’s unions. Legitimacy can be 
gained through networks of local institutions and support from management. In other 
words, Honda’s collective unions may be an effective means for low-power actors to 
exert influence. 
8.7 Low-Power Actors’ Ends and Means to Gain Influence in the MNC’s Global 
Network 
8.7.1 Business groups’ and subsidiaries’ motivations (ends) to gain influence 
The automotive industry is recognised as one of the host country’s top ten sources of 
GDP. Therefore, automotive associates with high skills and offering types of 
employment that bring higher wages and better working conditions motivate local 
actors to develop the automotive industry and protect institutions that are able to 
support it. Moreover, driven by competition, local actors have various motivations 
for forming alliances with actors within and outside their own organisations. 
Especially in the autoparts sector, third-tier suppliers were singled out by other 
automakers as a second-class type of employment in the automotive sector. 
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Respondents from Astra, Toyota, Honda, AOP and Yamaha shared the view that 
autoparts workers should earn lower wages than those in Toyota, Honda and 
Yamaha. Although autoparts firms have supply-chain classification systems (e.g. 
first, second and third tiers), autoparts workers reject this classification and believe 
that AOP workers should earn the same wages as Toyota and Honda workers.  
This divergence of interests is an issue for local actors’ achievement of effective 
influence within AOP intra-organisationally and with the JMNC inter-
organisationally. Collective bargaining by Astra unions in the automotive group has 
considerable implications for local automotive firms and may determine sectoral 
wage bargaining. This strengthens the ranking of influential actors associated with 
reputable organisations, in that cars and motorcycles receive a higher rank than 
autoparts. However, respondents from automakers such as Toyota, Honda and 
Yamaha reported that autoparts play an important role in their production, and Astra 
identified autoparts suppliers as a scarce resource in its supply chain. Diverse 
interests were also identified at the intra-organisational level. In AOP, which consists 
of 38 suppliers, actors have considerably differing interests, not just between 
management and unions, but also amongst managers themselves. As an illustration, 
third-tier AOP subsidiaries’ management favours employees joining subsidiary 
unions because their organised labour coordination enables them to negotiate as a 
single voice.52 
As previously discussed, Astra has considerable interest in promoting its 
philosophy and vision to all its subsidiaries, and to local associations such as 
KADIN and APINDO. As organisations commit to adopting its philosophy, Astra 
increases its leverage to manage, and eventually control, the management practices 
of those adopting its system. This can be seen as a strategy to mobilise local 
management to protect the systems in which Astra has invested and on which it has 
been built. One informant reported that the Japanese kaizen approach is stronger than 
Astra’s Catur Dharma, particularly in Toyota. However, Astra has shifted its focus 
from Toyota to Honda, with greater focus being given to protecting AOP. An HR 
                                                 
52 It was reported that non-affiliated or “yellow” unions lack resources and power compared with 
affiliated unions. Employee and union research participants suggested that, as part of their union 
movement solidarity, affiliated unions have helped the “yellow” unions. There appears to be some 
cynicism, because affiliated unions have an impact on IR at the organisational level. Internal or 
“yellow” unions suggest greater cooperation and shared understanding with management. This is a 
classically disputed IR argument. Importantly, non-affiliated trade unions lack the capability and 
resources with which to bargain. Affiliated unions evidently empower non-affiliated trade unions. 
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manager of a third-tier firm explained how Astra is taking over local autoparts 
makers: 
IKP [Indokarlo] was established as a small family business. When it started 
to grow, IKP needed capital. Then Astra came with a great opportunity. 
When Astra took over, it fixed a certain aspect of the organisation, for 
example, the system of employment and production lines that meet ISO 
standards. 
Yet, because of its business model, local autoparts makers are hesitant to join 
Astra or let it take over. A third-tier manager suggested: “Astra remains a for-profit 
organisation. It has a set of profit targets. If Astra identifies that the organisation is 
no longer profitable...it will be released. That is the capitalist system of Astra!” 
Nevertheless, Astra’s political and institutional networks are undoubtedly stronger 
than those of local automotive groups. Toyota, Honda and Denso Autopart Japan, 
with which Astra has established IJV partnerships, are globally respected automotive 
firms in their respective automotive sectors. Having them within Astra’s business 
networks signals Astra’s admission to the ranks of global autoparts players. 
Participants from local management, employers’ associations, employees and 
unions reported that Astra values the Japanese technology and employment system 
as being appropriate and much needed to build Indonesia’s automotive industry. 
However, it has become imperative for the BG to become less dependent on foreign 
capital and expertise, and to emphasise the importance of protecting local institutions 
from foreign MNC dominance. Furthermore, Japanese and Indonesian research 
participants expressed their view that local resources have not been managed well 
and that considerable investment is required to improve human capital as well as the 
business infrastructure. 
Another identifiable motivation for local actors to form alliances with the BG is 
a sense of workplace protection in terms of job retention and competitive skills. 
Training experiences in Japan were reported by research participants to be a double-
edged sword. Although they had learnt skills from the very best to master the latest 
technologies, technology had eventually diminished their jobs and replaced them 
with robots. Indonesian trainees identified that the JMNC is interested in 
implementing automation in their workplaces in Indonesia, whereas the BG is 
interested in creating job markets and developing local human resources. According 
to other Indonesian management, employee, APINDO and union informants, it is 
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necessary to form alliances with local actors owing to a fear of shrinking 
employment opportunities and replacement of human skills by robots. 
8.7.2 Business groups’ and subsidiaries’ means (strategies) to gain influence in the 
MNC’s global network 
The findings of this study suggest that the BG’s mobilisation of local actors’ 
interests (ends) is an effective means for low-power actors to gain status and 
influence. For example, Astra claims that protecting local systems and improving the 
nation’s labour market institutions impacts profoundly on local actors, particularly 
since most Indonesian job seekers still lack higher education, skills and training 
qualifications to operate high-tech machinery as workplaces replace humans with 
robots. Moreover, Astra is committed to seeking foreign investors who are also 
motivated to participate in developing and fostering local employment, for example, 
by limiting the role of foreign expatriates, transferring more knowledge to local 
managers, and localising Japanese systems. Both Japanese and Indonesian research 
participants agreed that Astra prioritises foreign investors that can demonstrate a 
business agenda to improve and participate in developing local human capital. 
Astra’s reputation supports this claim. Toyota Astra has the capability because of its 
proven commitment and its status as one of the largest employers of local workers. 
Thus, respondents described Astra’s role as a strong Japanese partner and a local 
firm. Having a localised management strategy as a tool to improve local systems 
produces positive results that enable subsidiaries to gain influence in the automotive 
network. This view was supported by Toyota and Astra management participants: 
We [Astra] aim to regulate the type of foreign investor entering Indonesia. 
For example, Toyota must have a strategy for how to build human resources 
in Indonesia. Toyota needs to promote the mentality and skills of local 
workers. Toyota Indonesia has 10,000 local employees, with only 60 
Japanese expatriates. All the line management roles are occupied by local 
managers. The role of the Japanese expatriate is to facilitate communication 
with Toyota HQ. 
This shows the extent to which Toyota Astra achieves greater legitimacy from 
TMC. It also exemplifies the BG’s effective strategy and its influence and allocation 
of resources throughout its subsidiaries. Toyota is able to negotiate directly with 
TMC because the latter has built a regional base that allows subsidiaries to make 
inputs at the regional business level, which is the local market for the product. 
Toyota Astra also sees this platform as an important strategy to allow subsidiaries’ 
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voices to be heard at the regional level in the host country. However, it is strongly 
committed to developing the local automotive industry and reducing its dependence 
on foreign investors and interventions. A TMC representative described how the 
conglomerate has gained legitimacy with Japanese automotive firms: 
Having Toyota, Honda and Denso as Astra business partners constitutes a 
degree of influence. Astra is admitted to being a part of influential Japanese 
automotive firms. In the host context, Astra has gained a reputation as an 
important local organisation that can engage with global automotive 
multinational firms. From the home country’s hierarchical point of view, 
Toyota, Honda and Denso’s positions are at the top of the Japanese 
automotive industry. 
This view suggests that Astra’s role and networks with international and local 
institutions qualify it as an élite local partner. Its attention-attraction tactics attract 
the leaders of JMNCs in the global automotive industry. Above all, Astra’s 
accomplishments may convince local actors to give serious consideration to 
supporting its business strategy to develop local human capital and the local 
economy. One of its proudest achievements, offering evidence that the conglomerate 
has gained legitimacy from Toyota and Daihatsu, was stated as follows: 
In the past two years, our local car manufacturers, Daihatsu and Toyota 
have utilised 86% of our in-house autoparts manufacturing. As a result, 
Daihatsu Japan has permitted us to include and put the name of Astra first, 
e.g. Astra Daihatsu Aila, Astra Toyota Agia. Previously it was, for example, 
Toyota Xenia. Why? This is because our Toyota and Daihatsu employees 
design the cars. Furthermore, some of these local products have been 
exported to the Philippines and Middle Eastern markets. 
This achievement is politicised by the conglomerate, strengthening its strategy 
of mobilising the interests of local actors to gain legitimacy and institutional support. 
8.7.3 Business groups’ capacity to manage local issues as an assurance for the HQ 
Astra’s initiative taking and effective handling of local issues appear to be its most 
effective means of acquiring legitimacy from the HQ. For example, in wage 
differentiation between actors in cars, motorcycles and autoparts, Astra handles the 
issue successfully. This promotes its credibility and capability to manage local issues 
which are valued by the HQ. The biggest challenge is that Indonesia is still failing to 
keep up with demand for autoparts production. For example, with its three largest 
Indonesian plants running at full capacity, Toyota is still unable to meet local 
production demands. Respondents from Astra, Toyota Japan and Indonesia 
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recognised this issue and suggested that, in addition to a weak infrastructure and 
increased regulations, a rise in strikes and picketing has also been to blame for this 
inability to increase production and compete with competitors in neighbouring 
countries. This situation may have motivated the BG to intervene to improve and 
oversee the autoparts supply chain and to reassure the HQ that it can handle these 
issues. An HR/IR Toyota director described the importance of autoparts: “Seventy 
percent of Toyota production depends on autoparts suppliers. If the suppliers 
collapse, it will have an impact on Toyota, and even on global production.” 
Therefore, Toyota has a strong commitment to building a sustainable production 
relationship. Toyota has identified that IR is one of the main issues that disrupts 
production and employee productivity. The main challenge arises from non-Astra 
autoparts suppliers. These suppliers have neither compatible HR/IR systems nor 
qualified HRM personnel in their organisations, and Astra’s HR audit team has also 
found that some local SME automakers do not even have HR management in their 
operations. As a result, Astra has intervened and become involved in HR/IR matters, 
as well as introducing systems to these non-Astra subsidiary autoparts suppliers. 
This strategy spreads Astra’s systems beyond its own autoparts subsidiaries, which is 
an advantage for the BG. 
Management participants acknowledged that a good IR system cannot be built 
solely through employee and union participation; management commitment and 
participation are also required. For instance, Toyota has an HR development supplier 
forum through which Toyota-Astra management directly educates, supports and 
continuously monitors the development of suppliers’ HR/IR practices. If a local 
automaker’s management does not have a clear understanding of HR, it will not 
function effectively. Another Toyota-Astra IR manager suggested the importance of 
identifying issues, establishing an organisational strategy and upholding an image as 
a compliant organisation: 
We [Astra] are keen to improve the quality of our IR so that we can influence 
others as well. This is because we can and have the ability to influence 
others. If we do not comply with the laws, it will have an ugly effect, and 
“outsiders” may influence our employees. We have improved cooperation, 
communication and transparency with unions. Indeed, this is not easy. 
A lack of host-country infrastructure makes it difficult to meet global production 
demands, but in-house systems may be an effective means for local actors to 
overcome this issue. Using in-house systems as a solution demonstrates local actors’ 
222 
commitment and capability to gain influence in the MNC network. For example, 
research participants, including some from Yamaha, Mitsui, JETRO and HIDA, 
reported that Astra has invested in and constructed an HRM-IR communications 
scheme that facilitates employee-employer engagement, as well as a complaints 
mechanism, and that IR concerns include Indonesian and Japanese management 
practices. Astra’s in-house systems satisfy the HQ’s requirements because Astra has 
adopted and internalised certain aspects of the TPS. Having TPS in the local 
organisation signals subsidiaries’ adaptability and capability to maintain Japanese 
quality management and production standards. Applying and localising TPS 
provides an assurance that the conglomerate is maintaining Japanese standards. 
Interviews with Japanese MNCs, expatriates and agencies indicate that Astra 
gains legitimacy first because it is the home of the top Indonesian Toyota Japan 
trainees. Second, supported by its networks, Astra has the capability and resources to 
select the best management, employees and unions, and to convince Japanese 
partners to invest in training for locals in Japan and Indonesia. Astra’s management 
has sole responsibility for managing HRM, such as employee participation schemes, 
job rotation and promotions at the intra-organisational level. Furthermore, Astra has 
the capacity to nominate (i.e. appoint) its own members to organisations that are 
closely involved in its business and investment policies and management practices. 
Secondary data obtained from JETRO, HIDA, KADIN and APINDO suggest that 
former Japanese (Indonesian) trainees have gained directorships and ministerial 
positions throughout the host country’s institutions and government. Primary data 
also seem to corroborate this trend: 
It is no secret that former KADIN and APINDO executive members have 
ministerial positions at the federal and provincial levels, and a few remain as 
honourable chairmen in APINDO whilst serving in the ministerial cabinet. 
This shows that both KADIN and APINDO undeniably have strong political 
networks and the power that comes with it. 
Thus, Astra manages human resources that spread certain Japanese ideologies 
throughout local institutions. As a Toyota Japan training alumnus reported: 
Astra has a similar management approach to TMC; the focus is on the 
process. The key is managing and developing human capital. Technological 
applications and product development are a part of the process, but human 
resources are primary. That is how TMC manages its global businesses, one 
of the strongest approaches, and enables TMC to become a global player. 
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A Toyota HR director reiterated how TMC has become a global firm and how 
Astra has worked toward that mission. Astra develops in-house HR/IR systems, 
underlining its development of human capital, infrastructure and mechanisms to 
promote local Indonesian HR. For 47 years, this policy has been the foundation of 
Toyota’s operations in Indonesia for 47 years. Astra’s practices may have profound 
implications for JMNCs operating in EMEs. In maintaining its business philosophy 
of “to be an asset to the nation” and to achieve its vision of being less dependent on 
foreign establishments, the findings of this study suggest that Astra’s strategy has 
been to reduce the number of Japanese expatriates and increase the number of 
Indonesian Toyota trainees throughout its subsidiaries. 
Another informant reported that “the role of Astra is very strong in Aisin; Astra 
is keeping as many managerial posts for Indonesians as possible and reducing the 
amount of Japanese”. In addition, existing labour laws prohibit appointments of 
foreign expatriates to positions dealing with HRM-IR, which restricts the number of 
foreign workers. This may be an example of controlling as well as protecting local 
institutions. In allocating resources throughout local actors, Astra may also serve as 
an information broker, filtering flows of information. As a broker, it gathers 
substantial knowledge of actors’ interests and how to exploit them. Importantly, its 
involvement and role in policy development were confirmed by 100 research 
participants, and Astra and Toyota management described how TMC-Astra and 
Astra are able to “input to the government about foreign investors’ characteristics. 
As Japanese trainees, without hesitation, Astra management recommends Japanese 
MNCs based on their knowledge and first-hand experience of working with and 
being trained by a Japanese firm.” Of relevance here is that while Toyota Indonesia 
may have become an information broker for TMC, Astra has become a power 
broker. Astra has legitimate influence in positioning its ideology as central to host-
country institutions. A respondent provided evidence in this respect: 
In the process of making any federal regulation changes, we [Toyota-Astra] 
are involved. First, if we see that the government lacks knowledge and 
practical skills, as the largest employer investing in R&D, we can supply 
information to the government based on research that we conduct. Valuable 
information is gathered from Toyota Japan. Our advantage is that, as a local 
partner, we get the information first. With such information, we can 
approach the government and get involved in making laws, for example, on 
outsourcing. In addition, we arrange and sponsor members of the 
government and ministerial cabinet to go to Japan to understand the 
implications of Japanese laws in practice. 
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8.7.4 Business groups’ tactics to attract competitors to join forces 
Another conglomerate strategy widely noted by both the HQ and local competitors 
(i.e. Yamaha, Suzuki, Lippo of Indonesia and Mitsui of Japan) is to control access to 
local resources and networks. Yamaha and Mitsui informants reported that Astra’s 
ambition is to be the largest autoparts supplier in the nation: 
The autoparts market is saturated by Astra and there is no sign of Astra 
slowing down; evidently, Astra has intensified its investment by taking over, 
alliancing and buying small and medium-sized local autoparts makers. 
As a result, Yamaha Motor Corporation (YMC) Japan and Yamaha informants 
claimed that: 
Yamaha does not even bother to compete with AOP. Not only is this due to 
market size, but AOP also dominates, almost monopolises, established 
networks in the local autoparts and raw materials sectors. AOP products 
have continuously replaced exported autoparts; more parts are made in AOP 
Indonesia. Astra has diversified its business, covering mining, energy and 
construction, and has held large government contracts. 
Astra’s competitive advantage lies in its systematic networks with local 
suppliers, industries and institutions, and most notably its close relationships with 
local government at federal, provincial and municipal levels. Its business model and 
its Catur Dharma business philosophy—“to be an asset to the nation”—has enabled 
it to gain influence from local actors. Importantly, it has invested in and is committed 
to promoting this strategy and, as observations in the course of this study suggest, 
Catur Dharma resonates for the majority of Japanese, Indonesian and non-Astra 
research participants. Astra’s vision appears to mobilise and codify local actors’ 
motivations, and its business strategy promotes and serves local actors’ best 
interests. In relation to Yamaha’s motorcycle manufacturing, a YMC representative 
reported: “Yamaha’s market share is 25%, Honda’s is 75%, Mitsui invests in 
second-tier motorcycle spare-parts (i.e. materials for autoparts).” In contrast to 
Honda, which employs 25,0000 workers, Yamaha employs 10,000 Indonesian 
workers. Astra has a competitive advantage as the biggest motorcycle employer, and 
unions representing Honda employees also outnumber their Yamaha counterparts. 
Since 1989, there have been seven unions in Yamaha, and the two largest ones 
tend to take opposing views on the labour protection agenda and strategy. For 
example, KSPMI is known as radical and has gained more members (63%), whereas 
KSPSI is the oldest union, formed under Soeharto’s regime. Yamaha’s Indonesian 
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management, as well as employees and unions themselves, reported that having 
seven unions, including two subsidiary unions with disparate union agendas, 
demonstrates the diversity of actors’ interests. The informants also suggested that 
employees are best represented by one united union in an organisation, and that 
having seven unions demonstrates the divided labour agenda that seemed to be 
polarised by union leaders’ interests, rather than representing employees’ voices. 
These divided interests may translate into actors’ different motivations. This 
situation is a problem for Yamaha. Compared with Astra, informants from Yamaha 
and YMC suggested that Lippo lacks the capability and resources to negotiate with 
YMC. Yamaha management and unions also acknowledged that Yamaha is not yet 
in a good position to negotiate with the Japanese directly. However, the informants 
suggested that Honda, supported by Astra, has certain capabilities and resources to 
negotiate with Honda Motor Corporation (HMC) Japan. As an example, since the 
conglomerate has received support from local industry, Yamaha’s management is 
interested in an alliance with Astra’s management. Similarly, Yamaha unions have 
joined with Honda motorcycle unions to intensify Yamaha’s union voice. Thus, 
Yamaha’s management and unions are both interested in alliancing with Astra 
because, overall, the Astra group has the strategy to negotiate with the HQ. 
The major advantage of the BG may be that a large proportion of Yamaha 
autoparts is supplied by AOP. Furthermore, post-production, Honda saturates the 
local market with dealerships and service networks throughout the country. 
Informants repeatedly reported on Astra’s relationships with government. Whereas 
Astra has a strategic business model, Yamaha may not have achieved legitimacy 
from local partners and has limited negotiating capabilities. Astra has gained 
legitimacy in the MNC’s value chain in Indonesia and in wider Southeast Asian 
markets. It is clearly motivated to monopolise the motorcycle and autoparts sectors. 
A Yamaha informant acknowledged that Astra’s effective strategy and localised, 
built-in HRM system is the type of organisation that Yamaha needs: 
I understand Astra has a lot of networks, like Toyota, Honda, Komatsu, other 
industries as well. Astra is able to recruit and retain the best local university 
graduates. Astra selects the best recruits, puts them in a high position within 
the automotive group, such as Toyota and Honda. We [Yamaha] are rotating 
personnel within a group. That is a big difference. 
Therefore, it is clear that Astra derives its mobilisation influence from its 
national and international reputation, extending, building and maintaining local 
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networks and close relationships with government. Institutionally, Astra has support 
from industry and some unions. 
8.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
In applying Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) concept of low-power actors 
strategising their ends and means of influence to re-formulate the balance of power, 
this study evaluates the coordination strategies of actors in first-, second- and third-
tier automotive firms sponsored by the Astra International Automotive Group. The 
Astra BG demonstrates strong micropolitical engagement with local institutions and 
associations to prevent the MNC from wielding further influence and dominance 
over the local automotive market, production and human capital. Astra also invests 
in autoparts manufacturers, viewing autoparts as a scarce resource in car and 
motorcycle production. 
Importantly, AAG sees autoparts as the future of the local automotive industry, 
enabling it to gain status and expertise as a global competence network. This 
supports its efforts to end Southeast Asia’s “manufacturing hub” status, to create 
high-skilled jobs and prevent the local market from being a peripheral assembler 
nation competing with neighbouring countries (namely Malaysia and Thailand). 
Over the past two decades, Astra has been managing AOP both internally, for 
example, by partnering with or buying small local autoparts makers and changing 
their foreign-local ownership structure, and externally, by lobbying government and 
industry in an effort to constrain local institutions from expanding influence. Hence, 
in local organisations lower in the supply chain, low-power actors are more likely to 
be interested in playing risky political games. This study provides examples of 
Yamaha’s alliances with Honda as well as autoparts suppliers’ admission to the 
lower tier of the automotive network. Although local actors are able to negotiate 
directly with the HQ, alliances with the well-connected, well-resourced and 
politically informed conglomerate produce more effective bargaining outcomes. 
The cases in this study reveal that the BG uses both bottom-up (established) and 
top-down (joint) tactics to gain legitimacy and influence. Moreover, the setting of 
this study extends IHRM scholarship on how local actors coordinate to raise their 
voices and influence. This may revolutionise actors’ “adversarial” relations between 
management and unions to create greater bargaining power against the dominant 
HQ. Nuances on the views of low-power actors (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008), local 
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actor/organisation legitimation processes (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and 
micropolitical practices (Maclean et al., 2017; Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016) have 
been examined in the EME setting. This chapter has addressed the notion of the local 
BG, business associations, subsidiaries and unions forming a coalition to engage in 
strategic attention-seeking tactics and determine the nation’s long-term goals, such 
as safeguarding national business systems and reducing foreign dependency. 
Overall, the findings of this study refine recent MNC literature (Maclean et al., 
2017; Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2016; Geppert 
et al., 2016; Whitford & Zirpoli, 2016; Lukes, 2005) by examining the applicability 
of  micropolitical games to an EME setting. According to the findings, micropolitical 
coalitions among local actors are the preferred approach to the bargaining process 
and appear to be effective. This confirms Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008: 492) 
claim that low-power actors’ methods of influence (i.e. “entering political games”) in 
an EME setting are micropolitical coalitions to mobilise diverse actors’ interests and 
form a representative voice to counteract the MNC HQ’s dominance. Also, this 
collaborative strategy is shaped by allocations of resources, knowledge and expertise 
between the BG and three types of local actor (business associations, subsidiary 
management and unions), and between the conglomerate and the MNC’s HQ. 
The current research goes beyond the subsidiaries’ ability to resist the HQ’s 
practices and the concept of power from the individual manager’s perspective. 
Instead, it shows that the collective of local actors, interest groups and unions as a 
joint force of low-power actors counterbalances the dominant MNC actor. Both the 
conglomerate and local stakeholders play various roles that break down the dominant 
actor’s power, redistribute mandates and protect local systems. Astra engages in 
micropolitical strategies enabling it to promote a vision of protecting national 
business systems and shaping the labour market for the interests of local actors. As a 
power broker, the BG configures its tactics through its subsidiaries, segregating each 
subsidiary on the basis of a tiered classification system. Through political networks, 
Astra also serves as an information broker between the MNC’s HQ and local actors. 
Its ultimate goal is to gain legitimacy and to influence both local actors and the HQ, 
enabling it to position itself within local and international automotive networks. 
Applying Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) seminal work, this study 
demonstrates that low-power actors in an EME setting use micropolitical strategies 
to gain legitimacy and influence in an MNC network. Furthermore, the study 
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illustrates that foreign ownership structure, dominant HQ power and influence are 
somewhat contingent on host-country institutions and strategic political games. 
Local actors are able to leverage local networks and expertise to position themselves 
strategically in order to achieve legitimacy, control resource dependencies and gain 
influence within the global MNC network. In pursuing the ends and means of 
influence in MNC networks, local actors distribute, collaborate with and initiate joint 
relationships. 
Qualitatively, this study has applied a multi-level research logic at inter- and 
intra-organisational levels to examine actors’ micropolitical tactics to strategically 
strengthen low-power actors’ voice. Each local actor adopts a different configuration 
to manage its own ends and means, contingent on local business institutions, 
institutional support and conglomerate commitment. Most existing studies on cross-
border HRM concentrate on MNCs’ cross-border management practices in advanced 
industrial countries (e.g. Meyer et al., 2011), although some studies have extended 
their coverage to mainstream EME settings such as China and India (e.g. Chacar & 
Vissa, 2005; Bamber et al., 2016). However, as Meyer and Peng (2016: 4) contend, 
EMEs exhibit far greater variation and frequency of institutional change, and many 
aspects of how institutions affect MNCs’ operations remain under-explored. Bamber 
et al. (2016) and Cooke and Kim (2017) suggest that the IHRM research agenda 
must be broadened to engage with potentially conflicting institutions at different 
levels and with different actors, in order to understand the implications and 
mechanisms of IHRM practices. Specific to this study, organisation studies and IB 
scholars (e.g. Clark & Geppert, 2011; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2011; Schotter 
& Beamish, 2011) maintain that current theory and empirical evidence do not yet 
adequately explain the role of other subsidiary management actors, such as unions 
and interest groups, in coordinating collective interests. Furthermore, while some 
scholars focus on the autonomy of a particular actor (i.e. management) to centralise 
its role, others focus on the antagonistic objectives of other actors, such as 
management versus unions (e.g. Almond & Gonzalez Menendez, 2014a; 
Gammelgaard et al., 2012; Marsden & Laumann, 1977). In general, the literature 
sees actors’ interactions as a product of resistance, and relationships as a form of 
reconciliation to gain influence.  
 In an attempt to respond to gaps in the literature, this thesis makes three major 
contributions to IHRM, IR and IB research. First, its analysis of alliance strategies 
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leading to autonomy-seeking behaviour adds new strands to research on the 
evolution of low-power actors’ strategy coordination, moving beyond a simplistic 
model of HQ power and subsidiary resistance, or low-power actors seeking to gain 
“attention”. It has been suggested that “prior research recognises that subsidiary 
managers have the potential to take initiative” to maximise the autonomy of the 
subsidiary (e.g. Ferner et al., 2004; Andersson et al., 2007). This study’s finding that 
the voices of subsidiaries may stem from organised employees and unions, supported 
by management and local systems, reduces the relevance of an antagonistic view of 
union–management relationships. Consistent with findings by Almond and Gonzales 
Menendez (2014a), locally organised employees and unions are not passive or 
silenced by dominant actors’ power. This study also extends Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw’s (2008) finding that subsidiaries are reforming their “attention 
attraction” types of strategy into more impactful ways of negotiating with the HQ.  
 Moreover, this study offers a specific example of non-focal (i.e. Tier 3) 
organisations and unions, where an integrated union–management voice may 
mobilise their voice to achieve influence at intra- and inter-organisational levels. 
Second, the analysis reveals that the BG’s evolving role is shaped in the 
organisation’s best interests. Even so, to gain institutional support, it must align its 
motivation with other actors and business associations. In an EME setting, a business 
strategy that promotes the protection of local labour market institutions appears to be 
an effective tactic. It is thus important to recognise that injecting an interest in 
political games may adversely affect the processes of legitimacy, relationships and 
reconciliation. The third and most significant contribution is this study’s exploration 
of coordination strategies that affect local actors’ bargaining and the types of alliance 
that they construct to gain influence in MNCs’ global networks. This analysis 
provides an insight into MNCs’ cross-border power configurations and levels of 
influence. In general, this research contributes to the MNC and IHRM literature by 
expanding our understanding of how BG involvement affects actors’ capabilities, 
motivations and roles, as well as interactions that facilitate control and influence the 
cross-border transfer of dominant HRM “best practice”. Each local actor adopts a 
different configuration to manage its own ends and means, contingent on local 
business institutions, institutional support and BG commitment.
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Chapter 9: Lessons from the Empirical Analysis 
9.1 Introduction 
By applying the concepts of dominant Japanese work, employment and 
organisational practices and policies to Japanese subsidiaries operating in an EME, 
this thesis has presented empirical explorations of diverse actors’ power resources, 
interests and strategies influencing the cross-border transfer processes of HRM “best 
practice”. The three main empirical chapters have each extended particular concepts 
of theory, constructed research questions (RQs), and explored their congruence by 
analysing a multi-site case study to encapsulate the generalisability of MNC 
strategies. Chapter 6 has explored the importance of Japanese HQ actors’ power in 
diffusing knowledge, and Chapter 7 has examined the balance of HQ-subsidiary 
power allocations and types of power resources. Finally, Chapter 8 has investigated 
the strategies adopted by low-power actors. 
The analysis covers Japanese-Indonesian automotive firms that manufacture 
cars, motorcycles and autoparts. It is noteworthy that the three case studies vary 
markedly with respect to their HRM-IR practices. This large-scale qualitative study, 
comprising 127 interviews, study groups and observations in participants’ 
workplaces in Japan and Indonesia, has shed new light on HQ actors’ strategies for 
controlling foreign subsidiaries’ performance and subsidiary actors’ power to protect 
local systems and strategies to gain legitimate status in the MNC’s global networks. 
Triangulation has been achieved by collecting primary data from key stakeholders, 
business associations and non-organisational actors. 
The study identifies distinct foreign and local management control that affects 
HRM-IR practices and policies in all three automotive manufacturing sectors: cars, 
motorcycles and autoparts. The degree of foreign ownership, influence and length of 
presence significantly determine the knowledge flow, organisational learning 
systems and adoption of foreign practices. For example, Toyota Indonesia cars and 
first-tier autoparts suppliers, which have higher Japanese stakes and stronger 
Japanese influence, provide clear evidence of the adoption and implementation of 
Japanese HRM-IR practices. By contrast, a higher degree of local ownership and 
strong local management control in second- and third-tier autoparts suppliers 
indicate less integration of foreign management systems. In this case of Honda 
Indonesia motorcycles, both foreign and local management have equal capital and 
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length of presence and lack fully integrated foreign and local management systems. 
Also, Honda experiences dynamic foreign-local management control. These three 
cases exemplify actors’ power resources, capacity and interactions. Hence, in 
scrutinising the concepts of Minbaeva et al. (2003), Ferner et al. (2012) and Bouquet 
and Birkinshaw (2008) in the context of JMNCs operating in an EME setting, this 
research illustrates strong links between the micropolitics of foreign and local actors 
and the diverse power structure and actors, particularly at micro and meso levels. 
Moreover, the study reveals conditions under which actors increasingly and 
strategically utilise power to shape cross-national transfers. 
The presentation of the empirical findings has shown the importance of Japanese 
HQ strategy and HRM-IR “best practices” in diffusing Japanese management and 
production systems (Chapter 6). It has also shown the impact of interactions between 
HQ and subsidiary actors’ power on transfer (Chapter 7) and the strategies adopted 
by low-power subsidiary actors and the local conglomerate to mobilise the means 
and ends of local actors in their attempt to protect local labour market institutions 
from foreign interventions (Chapter 8). The plot of Chapters 6, 7 and 8 is 
summarised in Figure 9.1. 
 
Figure 9.1: Plot of Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
 
This thesis has aimed to empirically operationalise MNC challenges and issues 
in configuring cross-border management transfers. Furthermore, it has applied 
IHRM, IR and IB concepts to an under-studied EME context. Its theoretical 
reasoning is based on Ferner et al.’s (2012: 164) emphasis that “There is little sense 
of what is at stake for actors in confronting the cognitive, normative and regulatory 
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conditions that arise when cross-border practices are transferred, adopted and 
executed.” 
In adopting a regulative constraint perspective, this research has identified 
important power resources at macro and micro levels that facilitate transfer processes 
and circumvent conflicts of interest. Accordingly, this research is actor-centred, 
incorporating actors’ power capacities, interests, motivation and means of diffusing, 
acquiring or accepting certain dominant HRM-IR “best practices” to fill a knowledge 
gap in the MNC literature. This thesis has investigated diverse actors’ interests and 
how actors deal with systematic challenges, reconstructing their strategies and 
redefining their motivations to reach their goals. It has also considered country-of-
origin and host-country institutional effects to investigate actors’ power: why they 
increasingly exercise it and how power interacts with organisational capacity.  
In this specific case, the thesis postulates that the non-organisational actor (i.e. a 
quasi-government agency such as HIDA) plays an important role at meso 
institutional level. The importance of a meso institution is the intermediate level 
between the nation (macro) and the organisation (micro). HIDA plays a prominent 
role in shaping both the mechanisms and outcomes of cross-border transfer. It is 
directly involved in diffusing Japanese HQ management and production systems, 
mitigating and intervening in the institutional resistance of the host country to 
acquire foreign practices. The underlining point here is that the quasi-government 
agency is funded by both the home country government and HQ, and it operates in 
the host-country under ODA (whereas the Japanese HQ operates under FDI). These 
two different types of actors operate under distinct local regulatory regimes. Quasi-
government agencies operate under the auspices of ODA policy; as such, they can 
operate without local private sectors/enterprises. As a result, the quasi-government 
agency’s institutional setting affords it more flexibility in managing the host-
county’s lack of human capital development investment and greater HRM-IR 
involvement practices (and to some extent policy development). 
As this thesis indicates, in spreading and transplanting Japanese HQ 
management and production ideology, HIDA reached out to the non-Japanese 
subsidiaries (e.g. small medium enterprises spread out in provinces, local municipal 
cities and villages) in transforming local business systems. This illustrates that the 
Japanese-coordinated type of enterprise is an important part of a cross-border 
business strategy in managing local institutional resistance. In other words, the 
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Japanese-coordinated type of enterprise is instrumental in a cross-border business 
strategy in terms of managing local institutional resistance, i.e. regulations and 
management. Thus, the thesis findings have refined Whitley’s (1999) argument on 
how “highly” collaborative networking between firms and the state plays out in an 
EME setting, and what constitutes the “highly coordinated” configuration that 
differentiates Japan from other CMEs such as Germany (e.g. Fainshmidt et al., 
2018). 
In scrutinising Ferner et al.’s (2012) regulative constraint perspective, this 
research postulates new strategies adopted by both HQ and subsidiary actors. 
Furthermore, it identifies the importance of power resources at multiple levels 
(particularly micro and meso) that may influence the mechanisms and outcomes of 
the transfer process. It also reveals that actors may strategically utilise specific power 
resources to circumvent conflicts of interest to facilitate transfer. Another key 
finding is that foreign MNC actors configure their strategies to bypass institutions 
and constrain managerial practices. 
The following discussion delineates the theoretical framing, issues and 
contributions to the literature of Chapters 6, 7 and 8. It concludes by highlighting the 
key contributions of the thesis to the existing literature and its managerial relevance 
and by making recommendations for future studies. 
9.2 Theoretical Framing: Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
This study has sought to understand not only the HQ’s systematic circumvention of 
the host country’s institutions, but also local managerial constraints that protect local 
business systems and limit foreign management from managing subsidiaries’ HRM. 
A peculiar host-country condition prevents HQ involvement in local HRM practices. 
However, HQ actors find ways of influencing, standardising and changing 
subsidiaries’ HRM norms, policies and practices. In exploring the power resources 
of MNC actors across Japanese automotive subsidiaries operating in an EME, this 
study analyses the whys and hows of (1) foreign actors’ strategies for controlling 
foreign subsidiaries’ performance, (2) local actors’ power to protect local systems, 
and (3) local actors’ strategies to gain legitimacy and influence in the MNC’s global 
networks. The key theoretical frameworks of this thesis are those of Minbaeva et al. 
(2003), Ferner et al. (2012) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008), as summarised 
below: 
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Table 9.1: Theoretical framing 
Theory 
Human Resource 
Management 
Industrial Relations International 
Business 
Authors 
Minbaeva et al. 
(2003) 
Ferner et al. (2012) Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw (2008) 
Topic 
MNC knowledge 
transfer, subsidiary 
absorptive capacity, 
and HRM 
Power, institutions 
and the cross-
national transfer of 
IR practices in 
MNCs 
Low-power actors’ 
motivations and 
strategies to gain 
legitimate influence 
Implications 
for the 
thesis 
Offers multiple 
methods to 
conceptualise and 
operationalise the 
adoption of Japanese 
management 
practices. Examines 
the effects of 
applying specific 
HRM practices (i.e. 
employees’ ability 
and motivation) on 
the degree of 
absorptive capacity. 
Methodologically 
and conceptually 
explores the 
difficulty of 
operationalising 
actors’ power 
capabilities and 
empirically assessing 
different levels of 
capacity in relation 
to three types of 
corporate power. 
Conceptualises and 
explores local actors’ 
ends and means to 
gain status in global 
MNC networks, when 
low-power 
subsidiaries find ways 
to gain more power. 
 
The difference between the IR and IB frameworks is that Ferner et al. (2012) 
focus on three power resources at three different institutional levels, whereas 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) focus on firms’ ends and means. This thesis argues 
that firms use power according to their interests and strategies. Toyota, Honda and 
AOP have different interests that may be particularly important because they are in 
different sectors and positions in the automotive industry. For example, while Toyota 
appreciates and adopts Japanese ways, Honda and AOP do not prioritise their 
adoption. 
In the EME context, political alliances develop between institutions, legislative 
bodies and other actors within and outside the organisation, conditioning emerging 
sources of power for low-power subsidiary actors. Low-power actors engage in 
micro- and meso-political alliances with local and international agencies to achieve 
legitimate influence in MNCs’ global networks. Power interactions occur at the meso 
level, where quasi-governmental agencies and business associations use the power of 
management ideology to overcome conflict and transplant the HRM-IR “best 
practices” ideology throughout MNCs’ EME networks. Since state-sponsored 
235 
agencies have fewer institutional constraints than do JMNC actors, they are able to 
inject JMNCs’ interest in management control into subsidiaries’ workplaces through 
meso-political tactics. Moreover, although JMNCs only have access through 
Japanese agencies, the latter strongly support cross-border diffusion of JMNCs’ 
dominant HRM-IR “best practices”, regardless of the institutional constraints of the 
host country. Agency actors such as HIDA, JETRO and APINDO emphasise the 
power of management ideology to circumvent conflict. 
AOP subsidiaries adopt complex objectives and strategies to gain status. Astra 
Group’s management is able to break down MNC power and empower local 
management and employees by supplying sources of power to garner influence. Its 
organisational tools include micro- and meso-political influences. The distribution of 
power varies between organisations. In some places (e.g. Toyota Indonesia), 
managers have considerable power to stop Japanese transfer. For instance, while 
some local subsidiaries (e.g. Honda Motorcycle Indonesia) retain power and manage 
employees as they did for 50 years under Soeharto, others (e.g. AOP third-tier 
subsidiaries) do not have the same power as Toyota and Honda because of 
insufficient skills, training, understanding or infrastructure to support work 
organisation systems that will promote productivity and bargaining competencies. 
Therefore, these local subsidiaries are vulnerable to the influence and control of 
dominant actors such as the HQ and Astra. This situation raises questions about the 
impact of subsidiaries with some degree of power and how they find ways to 
augment their power. 
A key feature of the analysis is identifying conflicts of interest between HQ and 
subsidiary actors. Power is an important issue in investigating causal mechanisms of 
cross-border transfer because of the differing interests between HQ and subsidiary 
management in managing HRM-IR specifically. This analysis has been applied to 
the three empirical chapters to examine how actors gain and use power, and to what 
extent. The analytical analysis can be summarised as follows: 
 Macro: The macro level relates to home- and host-country institutions and 
sources of power. The growing local market, export tariffs and geographical 
location (and even the underdeveloped infrastructure) may promote subsidiaries’ 
power, for example, by making it easier to produce and assemble cars in 
Indonesia than to ship them in from abroad. A similar analysis is applied in all 
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three cases because the focus is on home- and host-country institutions and 
national business systems. 
 Meso: The meso level examines how quasi-government agencies coordinate with 
local business associations with a stronghold of local government, policy makers 
and business groups. It explores conflicts of interest that may not be evident at 
the macro level and investigates the formation of actors’ means in the three case 
studies. 
 Micro: Managers’ interests and capacity are fundamental; the analysis reveals 
clear differences between the three cases, ranging from strong to weak. Local HR 
managers and the business group may disagree with the Japanese HQ’s HRM-IR 
policies and practices, and managerial constraints are supported by local and 
national HRM-IR legislation. Thus, subsidiary managers have the advantage of 
being able to impede dominant HRM-IR “best practices”, as well as the capacity 
to manage their own HRM-IR issues. Accordingly, the focus of micro-level 
analysis is on important characteristics, types and modes of power exercised by 
the HQ and subsidiary management in general.53 
The motivation and impact of FDI is relevant to the studies presented in all three 
chapters because it is identified as a crucial issue for the three corporate power 
dimensions. It involves efficiency issues that underscore the reality that without 
power, foreign MNCs may be unable to do business in the host country—and 
without knowledge, skills and technology, local subsidiaries may be unable to 
manufacture automotive products. 
9.3 MNC Power in Diffusing HRM Dominant Practice 
Minbaeva et al.’s (2014) retrospective paper points to a paucity of research on the 
various HRM practices used to develop absorptive capacity and facilitate cross-
border knowledge transfer. Moreover, IR and IB scholars (e.g. Ferner et al., 2004; 
Meyer et al., 2009) recognise various compelling means of organisational control, 
motivation and capability-coordinating knowledge processes across EMEs. Whilst 
the extant literature deals broadly with MNC strategy, Chapter 6 has adopted a more 
nuanced, contextualised approach to provide a fuller appreciation of the complexities 
                                                 
53 This analysis does not focus on the level of unions’ power, as such analysis would be likely to 
focus on different workforces, cultures and organisational levels, rather than on power. 
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of MNC management, employee and union interests, dynamic sources of power and 
organisational learning. 
In applying Minbaeva et al.’s (2003) framework, Chapter 6 has demonstrated 
the significance of JMNC’s HRM practices for employees’ ability and motivation to 
learn, as well as the capacity to influence subsidiaries to adopt and internalise 
JMNC’s HRM-IR “best practices” transfer. Furthermore, this study has examined 
the importance of organisational learning and HRM-IR practices and has shown the 
co-evolution of the MNC and local rivals in the EME setting. The central research 
question of Chapter 6 relates to understanding how Japanese HRM-IR “best 
practice” is translated into EME management practices. 
Chapter 6 highlights the intended HRM practices that are pertinent to knowledge 
recipients, particularly where the host country’s labour market institutions are at a 
developing stage, and hence prone to the influence of foreign MNCs. However, 
differences in how management and unions process the importance of HRM-IR 
dominant “best practices” cause conflicts of interest, influencing the mechanisms 
and outcomes of transfer at inter- and intra-organisational levels. Whereas local 
employees and unions are more receptive to how the foreign ideology might 
empower them (e.g. Mellahi et al., 2013), local management is more selective in its 
adoption of foreign management ideology. Local management has some influence in 
managing the inflow of foreign knowledge. At the same time, foreign knowledge 
may also serve as a source of competition for local actors. Evidently, the intra-
organisational behaviour of first-, second- and third-tier AOP firms exemplifies how 
upper-tier firms monopolise access to sources of knowledge, whilst lower-tier firms 
engage with agencies to bypass intra-organisational hurdles. Consequently, local 
actors’ absorption of foreign practices into their own work environments advances 
the evolution of forms of Japanisation applicable to host-country institutions. 
The setting of the nine case studies of joint ventures in the automotive industry 
has aimed to deepen theoretical understanding of the relationship between 
investment and absorptive capacity. Of the nine cases, two third-tier firms (Indokarlo 
Perkasa and Adiwira Plastik) are directly managed by the local firm, Astra, with no 
IJV. These cases provided useful control cases and comparisons to examine what 
happens in situations where there is no Japanese investment: whether these non-
Japanese firms are still receptive to transfer, and through which channels. Setting out 
the issue in this way has facilitated investigation of organisational mechanisms that 
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influence inward knowledge transfer, inter- and intra-organisational knowledge 
networks and inter-human interfaces. Also, the analysis of Chapter 6 shows that a 
higher level of foreign capital entails a higher degree of control in managing flows of 
knowledge and bypassing local institutional constraints and managerial practices. 
Thus, the JMNC continues to use its power to diffuse its dominant HRM-IR “best 
practices”. More generally, knowledge transfer between the HQ and foreign 
subsidiaries of MNCs may be more complex and uneven in newly industrialised 
countries as a consequence of variations in absorptive capacity. Through the lenses 
of organisational learning and IHRM, Chapter 6 has explored how MNCs engage in 
cross-border knowledge transfer and how certain HRM practices can promote 
absorptive capacity in an EME. Overall, the findings reveal different outcomes 
related to different intended HRM practices, which are associated with different 
investment modes and knowledge access. The direct presence of and control by a 
Japanese HQ affect the forms and efficacy of cross-border knowledge transfer. With 
direct presence, home-country HRM practices are crucial drivers of absorptive 
capacity and co-evolution (e.g. Toyota and Honda Indonesia). However, with less 
direct presence, reliance on quasi-government agencies is more important in 
mediating and supporting knowledge transfer (e.g. JMNC indirect influence through 
HIDA so that third-tier firms can adopt Japanisation). 
Arguably, the adoption of Japanese-type HRM-IR “best practices” for 
employees’ participation promotes organisational learning and has a wider impact on 
the host country’s labour market institutions, yet Chapter 6 has illustrated that 
Japanisation may quickly become a source of competition. In particular, first-tier 
autoparts firms may seek to monopolise access to Japanese knowledge and capital, 
while second- and third-tier firms may compete to acquire knowledge resources. 
Such inter- and intra-organisational competition is a proxy for Japanese influence. 
Thus, in seeking to facilitate knowledge transfer between inward investors and local 
firms, both the HQ and the non-organisational actors that serve as knowledge 
transfer mediators (e.g. HIDA and APINDO/ATC) require a more thorough 
understanding of the nature of cross-border stakeholders and subsidiary networks, as 
co-evolution may quickly become a source of competition that may further 
complicate cross-border transfer. Equally important, the HQ must take into account 
internal knowledge transfer processes in facilitating knowledge transfer to its foreign 
subsidiaries whilst limiting its dissemination to rival firms. The main finding of 
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Chapter 6 is that inter-human relations constitute a significant characteristic of 
absorptive capacity in an EME setting, as they serve as a conduit for knowledge 
transfer. 
9.4 Actors’ Power Resources, Interests and Motivations in Shaping Cross-
Border Transfer 
In integrating Ferner et al.’s (2012) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) concepts, 
Chapter 7 has postulated sources, types and locations of power. HQ and subsidiary 
actors draw power from macro and micro levels; however, the meso-level strategy of 
MNC actors and agencies postulates a strategy for which neither HQ nor subsidiary 
actors have the required capacity. The main focus of Chapter 7 is on understanding 
different actors’ interests and objectives to determine their strategy and impact on 
power interactions and capacities. Institutional (home- and host-country) effects, 
actors’ power and power interactions (e.g. Lange & Becker-Ritterspach, 2016) have 
been assimilated to answer the research question and provide a more comprehensive 
analysis of the causal mechanisms of cross-border transfer in an EME context.  
The key findings of Chapter 7 suggest that, although micro-level relations 
between HQ and subsidiary management may appear consensual, Japanese and 
Indonesian actors engage heavily in political power games through micro- and meso-
institutions to leverage their societal and corporate dominance and to influence 
definitions of HRM-IR “best practices”. In the EME context, political alliances 
develop between institutions, legislative bodies and other actors within and outside 
the organisation, conditioning emerging sources of power for subsidiary actors. The 
HQ also engages in meso-political alliances with local and Japanese agencies to 
diffuse foreign HRM-IR “best practices” transfer within the institutionally 
constrained host-country setting. 
As Chapter 7 has identified, the power of management ideology interactions 
occurs at the meso level, where quasi-governmental agencies reach out to use this 
power to overcome conflict and transplant the HQ management ideology. The power 
of management ideology not only diffuses global management practices, but is also a 
tactic for the HQ to maintain its control, underpinning its ability to tackle diverse 
subsidiary actors’ interests, motivations and understandings. However, the HQ’s 
direct involvement in HRM-IR subsidiary issues is limited, constrained by local 
regulations, management practices and norms/attitudes. Accordingly, Chapter 7 has 
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demonstrated the important role of state-sponsored agencies (rather than FDI or IJV) 
that operate in the host country based on ODA policy to facilitate the Japanese HQ’s 
management ideology. 
The presence of agencies in the host country is particularly relevant to this type 
of research, as it has been shown that quasi-government agencies may act as arm’s-
length bodies of foreign governments and MNCs where local institutions prohibit 
their direct involvement in subsidiaries’ management practices. Through ODA 
policy, agencies such as HIDA experience fewer institutional constraints than do 
JMNC actors. Japanese quasi-governmental agencies do not require local partners to 
operate within the systematic constraints of host institutions. Importantly, the 
analysis of Chapter 7 emphasises how HIDA is able to inject the JMNC’s 
management ideology into subsidiaries’ management and workplaces through meso-
political tactics. Quasi-governmental agencies’ modus operandi in transferring, 
populating and transplanting dominant Japanese management practices to Japanese 
and non-Japanese affiliates in the host country exemplifies a coordinated capitalist 
approach in an EME setting. Chapter 7 has also identified the importance of semi-
independent business association’ roles in MNC global networks, directly 
facilitating, influencing and shaping contested cross-border transfer phenomena. 
9.5 Subsidiary Actors’ Motivations and Strategies to Gain Status in the Global 
MNC Network 
In applying Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) framework to an EME setting, 
Chapter 8 has analysed the alliance strategies of the local BG to mobilise local 
actors’ motivations to protect scarce resources and local systems from foreign MNC 
actors. This study has refined Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) concept of the 
causal mechanisms through which low-power actors gain influence and negotiate 
with dominant actors. As a local management partner of the MNC, the Astra 
business conglomerate has the capacity to negotiate directly with the dominant 
Japanese MNC’s HQ actors. In particular, with a paucity of functioning capital and 
the JMNC’s liability of foreignness in the host country’s labour markets, Astra BG’s 
existence and role allow the foreign MNC to engage more effectively in business. As 
Chapter 8 has indicated, such relationships are a condition for the HQ to conduct 
legitimate negotiations with the local BG. However, the foreign investor also has 
capital ownership in the local conglomerate. For example, Jardine Cycle and 
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Carriage owns over 50% of Astra International group.54 Thus, the local BG must 
carefully balance the interests of the foreign investor, i.e. the MNC, while remaining 
committed to managing the “independent” local firm. With stronger networks, 
resources and close links with local associations, the conglomerate is able to 
strengthen local actors’ power and voice to improve negotiations with the HQ. 
Nevertheless, to gain legitimate influence with the HQ, the conglomerate must gain 
legitimacy from local actors by demonstrating a concern for local actors’ issues. 
The relevance of Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) work to this study lies in the 
mechanisms used by low-power subsidiary actors to gain legitimacy and use power 
to pursue their interest in protecting local business systems, i.e. HRM-IR practices 
and policies, and their status in the global MNC network. The contribution of 
Chapter 8 to the MNC literature is to extend the focus, from how subsidiaries gain 
attention from dominant HQ actors to how they gain legitimate status in the global 
corporation’s network. The study has emphasised low-power subsidiary actors’ 
motivations for gaining status in global MNC networks. It has examined a local 
BG’s use of alliance strategies to mobilise local actors’ interests and hence shape the 
local labour market institution. The more explicit critical functionalist perspective of 
this study is that local management (e.g. Honda, Yamaha and AOP) and even the BG 
have limited power compared with the HQ. Consequently, the BG’s bargaining 
strategy would be less effective without institutional support from other local actors, 
namely Toyota, Honda, AOP subsidiaries’ management, unions and local business 
associations. The local BG has the capacity to influence and distribute resources and 
information to local actors. Thus, Chapter 8 has focused on exploring how local BGs 
engage with local actors in order to establish their legitimacy with foreign 
multinationals. 
Across first-, second- and third-tier automotive supply chain organisations, low-
power actors engage in a trade-off strategy with the local BG to gain power and use 
hidden power to overcome dominant actors’ control and influence. The local BGs’ 
close ties with the local government, policy makers and other businesses provide 
local expertise and access to the market, thereby serving as a source of power. Local 
institutions are a vehicle through which low-power subsidiaries derive power and a 
                                                 
54 Source: https://www.jardines.com/en/companies/companies.html and 
https://www.jardines.com/assets/files/ NewsAndEvents/corporate-press-releases/jardine-
strategic/p180227.pdf (accessed 4 September 2018). 
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means to achieve legitimate influence and centrality. EME conditions may drive the 
emergence of peculiar sources of power for local actors. Chapter 8 has demonstrated 
that micro-political alliances between local BGs and other actors serve as a means 
for low-power actors in supply chain organisations to break down dominant actors’ 
power and gain legitimate influence. 
A key finding from the interviews conducted for this study is that a stand-alone 
low-power actor may be less effective in dealing with the dominant HQ directly. The 
more efficient process for low-power actors to achieve legitimacy is through micro-
political coalitions with local institutions, employers’ and employees’ associations. 
Additionally, this study has illustrated that in a specific context, adversarial actors 
such as unions and management may form coalitions to strengthen their power 
against the intervention of dominant actors’ control and to protect national business 
systems. As a consequence, in an EME, subsidiaries may not be totally powerless 
against dominant MNC actors. Local actors do have a source of power that they are 
increasingly willing to use to elevate their status and influence in the MNC’s 
networks, whereas dominant MNC actors are only partially able to control and 
leverage key actors critical to their competitiveness in host-country environments. 
Andersson et al. (2007) posit that power is constantly contested by the various 
actors, channels and organisations/sub-organisations that constitute the MNC. 
However, it is still unclear how subsidiary managers manage the different 
organisations and the variety of legitimacy processes affecting forms of subsidiary 
power. 
Building on Chapters 6 and 7, the main contribution of Chapter 8 is its analysis 
of the mechanisms affecting low-power subsidiary actors (management, employees 
and employer associations) and the types of power resource they use to gain 
legitimate status in the MNC global network. This provides a fuller understanding of 
the HQ’s power configuration and degree of management control over work, 
employment and organisation. In general, Chapter 8 contributes to the MNC 
literature by analysing the impact of business group involvement on the shifting 
power of actors’ roles, as well as interactions that facilitate flows of influence. 
9.6 Conclusion: Contributions of the Thesis to the Literature 
The main contribution of this thesis is its application of the concept of cross-border 
management transfers to an under-studied EME context. The focus is institutions, 
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power and conflict related to the transfer of Japanese HRM practices to EME of 
Indonesia. Many studies on the international transfer of HRM practices, and 
qualitative studies on Japanese management and production systems in particular, 
have applied theories based on cases in Western countries. Yet, relatively fewer 
studies have applied theories founded on cases in the Asian business system context. 
However, actors’ power relations between home and host countries related to the 
transfer of HRM-IR practices in the Asian context differ greatly from those in the 
Western context.  
This thesis contributes to IHRM, IR and IB scholarship in three ways. First, 
Chapter 7 integrates two seminal works on IR and IB to demonstrate the application 
of Ferner et al.’s (2012) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) studies to an EME 
setting. It suggests that both concepts can be integrated into a coherent framework 
because they further our understanding of the nuances of subsidiary actors’ power, 
interests and strategies against dominant actors. Second, the thesis identifies 
important meso-level factors through an empirical exploration of the role of 
employee networks and representatives, and it exemplifies the types of power and 
strategies adopted by government agencies in cross-border transfer processes. It also 
examines the issue of meso-level layering in the context of Japanese MNCs. In so 
doing, the thesis extends Almond’s (2011b) and Morris et al.’s (2018) works on the 
sub-national (meso-level) embeddedness of IHRM. Third, the thesis analyses the 
increasingly important interrelationship between MNC cross-border business activity 
and sociopolitical economic development of the host country (e.g. Cantwell et al., 
2010). It has depicted MNC competence in creating an evolutionary approach to the 
diffusion process and a structural solution to address the complexity and uncertainty 
associated with the expanding role of EMEs in the global economy. 
Moreover, the research design is structured to examine macro, meso and micro 
processes and the standardisation of Japanisation practices in a selection of Japanese 
and Indonesian joint ventures. The thesis adopts a multi-site case study approach to 
analyse critical incidents related to the normalisation role of intermediate institutions 
and the nature of relations between HQ actors and those at the local level in JMNCs 
in Indonesia. The data on which the thesis draws are novel and useful in exploring 
diverse actors’ interests, motivations and sources of power across automotive 
manufacturers, and organisational capacities. Furthermore, the two phases of data 
collection in Japan and Indonesia provide direct observations of the Japanese HRM-
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IR practices at the global training centre (i.e. HIDA Japan), HQ and local sites (e.g. 
workplaces, management and union training centres). This method enables the 
author to operationalise the concepts of Lukes’ (1975) three-power corporate 
dimensions to understand the impact of MNCs’ activities on cross-border transfer 
mechanisms (conflict, tension, and sense of dynamisms) between HQ-subsidiary 
actors (e.g. Witt, 2018; Witt & Redding 2013; Fainshmidt et al., 2018). In addition, 
this method allows the comparison of data collected from different tiers of autoparts 
supply chain to explore diverse strategies in selecting as well as gaining access to 
learning Japanese HRM-IR “best practices”. It can be argued that the meso level has 
both conditioning institutions and actors. Through this method, we can see 
differences between the power resources in micro- and meso-institutional settings 
and actors’ strategy that make Japanese HRM-IR “best practices” more acceptable to 
the local institution.  
9.7 The generalisability and limitations of the findings  
This thesis suggests that wider institutional actors outside the firm, subsidiary and 
workplace level provide important conditioning influences for the assimilation of 
dominant HRM-IR practices, namely business associations and quasi-government 
agencies (operating under bilateral policy, i.e. ODA). In particular, the meso 
processes can connect institutional changes, both at home and in the host country, as 
well as wider institutional and structural changes in business systems. In so doing, 
this research expands understanding of the impact of JMNCs’ strategic 
configurations at macro, meso and micro institutional levels, and of subsidiary 
actors’ power to exert legitimate influence in global corporate networks. It sheds 
light on challenges facing JMNCs in managing foreign subsidiaries, arising from 
institutional constraints (e.g. Doellgast & Marsden, 2018; Surdu et al., 2018), IHRM 
practices, and influence in Southeast Asian EMEs where many countries have 
strategic management interests (e.g. Cooke & Kim, 2017; Witt, 2018).  
This thesis contributes to international HRM scholarship by broadening the 
debate on EMEs beyond mainstream studies of China and India. This contribution 
has implications that can be generalised for other EMEs, in particular in Southeast 
Asia (SEA) context and will add new dimensions to our knowledge of cross-border 
HRM-IR practices, actors’ power interactions and resources in diverse institutional 
settings. Scholars have argued that Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, described as 
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EMEs (Johnson et al., 2000), share similar business systems and are the three largest 
Japanese FDI recipients in ASEAN since the 1970s (Witt, 2018; Fainshmidt et al., 
2018; Witt & Redding, 2013). Witt (2013) offers institutional similarities/differences 
of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand as shows in table 9.7.1 below: 
Table 9.7.1: Summary of institutional similarities and differences 
Category Indonesia Malaysia Thailand 
Education and 
skills formation 
Weak Weak Weak 
Employment 
relations 
Short, with weak 
unions 
Short, with weak 
unions 
Short, with weak 
unions 
Finance 
Bank-led, state 
guidance and 
relationship 
Bank-led, state 
guidance and 
relationship 
Bank-led, state 
guidance and 
relationship 
Inter-firm 
networks 
Conglomerates/BGs 
and strong 
government ties 
Conglomerates/BGs 
and strong 
government ties 
Conglomerates/BGs 
and strong 
government ties 
Internal 
dynamics 
Top-down decision-
making and little 
delegation 
Top-down decision-
making and little 
delegation 
Top-down decision-
making and little 
delegation 
Ownership and 
governance 
Family and state Family and state Family and state 
Social capital Interpersonal 
Some 
institutionalised 
Interpersonal 
State role Predatory Predatory Predatory 
Source: adapted from Witt (2018) Management in Southeast Asia: A Business Systems 
Perspective, pp. 9-10 
 
The 1997 Asian and 2007 global financial crises had profound impacts on the 
advanced (e.g. Japan) and emerging economies (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand) business systems (Johnson et al., 2000).55 For example, Indonesia may no 
longer see Japan’s declining economy as a desirable model and/or sustainable 
system. On the other hand, the growing prominence of the EME of Indonesia in SEA 
illustrates the success of host countries’ business systems in not only managing but 
also improving the economy of Indonesia amid world-wide recessions. Equally 
important, China’s flourishing 21st-century economy has redefined SEA’s 
geopolitical-economic environment. Since 2007, Japan has been attracted to this 
region’s EMEs and their growing middle class. Facing rapidly escalating 
competition from China, Japan has intensified its SEA investment strategies. 
Consequently, emerging market economies of SEA (including Indonesia) have 
                                                 
55 Johnson et al. (2000) further argue that the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis affected other 26 
EMEs. 
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become markets for their own innovative products and services, but with a lack of 
human capital development investment. The relationship between Japan and 
Indonesia encompasses diverse sociopolitical, economic and business systems. 
Indonesia is dynamic. Its business institutions, which were previously perceived as 
“weak”, are rapidly developing and increasingly important in the world economy. 
Nevertheless, we do not yet fully understand the implications of Asia and intra-Asia 
business relations and their roles in global supply chains, manufacturing and 
services.  
The main contribution of this thesis to IB scholarship is its application of the 
concept of cross-border management transfers to an under-studied EME context. The 
focus is institutions, power and conflict related to the transfer of Japanese HRM-IR 
practices to EME of Indonesia. Indonesia has become a strategically significant and 
powerful player in the global economy for the Japan, U.S. and Europe, even for other 
EMEs such China and India. To comprehend the dynamic opportunities and 
challenges of Indonesia, academics, industry and policy makers need to understand 
the unique sociopolitical economic institutions of Asia and the complexity of intra-
Asian business relationships. EMEs of SEA continue to be a region of strong 
research interest both in relation to the sociopolitical economic development of the 
region and intra-Asia business relations as well as competition in gaining knowledge 
and capital investments. Nonetheless, to date, there has been limited research, with 
few comparative perspectives, on the dynamics of Asian capitalism undergoing 
dramatic sociopolitical and economic changes. 
Furthermore, while much of the existing literature focuses on Toyota and other 
car manufacturers, this thesis offers a more dynamic and comprehensive picture of 
an automotive MNC’s cross-border practices, management control and their 
outcomes in the host country (e.g. Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016; Pulignano, 2002). 
Human capital is a vital factor in analysing interrelationships between features of a 
country’s institutional and firm characteristics and identifying the impact of MNC 
strategies and coordination. As the spread of globally recognised HRM-IR practices 
is context-specific (e.g. Minbaeva, 2016; Mellahi et al., 2013), it is important to 
understand the diffusion of dominant Japanese HRM-IR “best practices” beyond the 
mainstream Asian EMEs of China and India, and how it varies by industry, 
institution and bilateral national relationship. 
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By examining specific types of Japanese HRM-IR “best practices” that facilitate 
inward knowledge transfer, the thesis identifies multiple actors’ roles in diffusing 
dominant capitalist business systems to an EME context, including the previously 
ignored role of agency and business association actors’ involvement, roles and 
strategies influencing the transfer processes and outcomes. Second, it integrates 
nuances of Ferner et al.’s (2012) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) studies and 
analyses actors’ power, interests and strategies at three levels of institutional 
analysis. The impact of actors’ conflict resides at the meso level, and subsidiary 
actors should not be perceived as “passive” or powerless, since political alliances 
and lobbies are apparent in the “weak” institutions of Indonesian subsidiaries (e.g. 
Mellahi & Collings, 2010). Moreover, the analysis of the mechanisms affecting low-
power actors in general is not limited to the manufacturing-hub nations in the SEA 
context; it also includes peripheral economies within the EU member states, such as 
Poland, Portugal and Estonia, and the types of power resource they use to mobilise 
and gain legitimate status in the global MNC network. Hence, this thesis makes two 
empirical contributions. It synthesises the theory of MNCs in general and produces 
new knowledge on home and host countries in the development of Indonesian HRM-
IR. 
Managerial implications: Given institutional changes in home- and host-country 
institutions and issues affecting the operation of MNCs, management practices and 
the international business environment, Japanese and Indonesian managers must 
appreciate the importance of conducting business more sustainably in EMEs. The 
managerial challenges include employee skills formation and delegation in the 
regulatory uncertainty and rapid changes context that are likely to impinge on 
managerial decision-making and actions, i.e. whom to trust, with whom to partner 
and how to maintain relationships. Certain types of cross-border alliances can 
improve strategic alliances such as government-to-government, as well as people-to-
people (small businesses) because for instance, the involvement of quasi government 
agencies. Dominant management practices may not always be the “best practices” 
for others. Understanding the socioeconomic and policy conditions of the host 
country may assist foreign management in developing the best ways to participate in 
the host country’s labour practices and policy development. Similarly, according to 
Cooke (2013, cited in Cooke & Kim, 2017: 424), “local managers have skills and 
attention to the safe operation of the business, but little HRM and IR competence or 
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interest”, while Rupidara and McGraw (2010, cited in Cooke & Kim, 2017: 424) 
observe that “in Indonesia, the IR capacity is very immature at both institutional and 
workplace levels”.  
Indonesia’s attractiveness and vulnerability as an EME should not blindfold 
Indonesian actors themselves. It is prudent for local actors and associations to think 
strategically about how the impact of FDI might sustainably serve national interests, 
socioeconomically and environmentally. Indonesian actors must be committed to 
improving the country’s human resources, business infrastructure and working 
conditions. It is equally important for practitioners and policy makers to engage with 
researchers and scholars in the field to gain insights that may help in the 
development of management and national labour policies. Opening access to 
researchers to conduct further studies might have a positive impact on organisational 
and national policy developments. 
Moreover, it is useful to understand the roles of quasi-government agencies, 
NGOs, think tank organisations and other types of not-for-profit agencies operating 
under ODA to promote sustainable work, employment and organisation practices in 
various forms of business, such as garment making, manufacturing and agriculture. 
Management, labour unions and business associations might partner with such 
agencies. 
In clarifying the findings of this thesis, there are certain salient limitations. First, 
this thesis does not represent MNC practices in all EMEs. This study suggests that 
future research might involve further comparative studies in other EME settings that 
share similar business systems (section 9.8 discusses future study in understanding 
Asian capitalism in three Asian tiger economies: Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand). 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand remain as the global manufacturing hubs, and FDI 
still plays an important role in revolutionalising local industries (in particular 
Japanese automotive) with strong government interests to protect local markets from 
foreign corporate exploitations/practices. Thus far, the developmental states of these 
EMEs of SEA are somewhat within similar institutional frameworks, as Japanese 
power has historically existed in these EMEs in approximately the same time period, 
i.e. the 1940s (Witt, 2018; Fainshmidt et al., 2018). A second limitation is that the 
analysis cannot be generalised in terms of the impact of the cross-border transfer 
processes, mechanism and outputs to all EMEs contexts, since different business 
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systems result in different processes and mechanisms. Also, they affect different 
actors.  
The applicability of the findings may not pertain to other EMEs such as Turkey 
and Mexico because their institutional frameworks differ from those of EMEs in 
SEA. Geographically, Turkey and Mexico are close to their biggest markets: the EU 
and USA respectively. Since 1959, Turkey has aspired to join the Eurpeoan 
Economic Community. The EU-Turkey customs union was established in 1995, 
elevating Turkey’s status as a full membership candidate of the EU. As a result, 
Turkey has harmonised its investment policies and competes with other EU member 
states (Erdal and Tatoglu, 2002). Kaymak and Bektas (2008) argue that Turkey is 
characterised as having a weak external (legal and regulatory) but strong internal 
market control of the family business influence. Mexico is the 3rd largest global 
trading partner of the U.S. and a member of NAFTA since 1994. Mexican 
corporations are required to follow US accounting standard practices and corporate 
governance (Siegel, 2009). Further, Mexico’s cross-border alliances, bank-led are 
different from those of SEA. The FDI regulations do not require a local partner, as 
foreign investors can have whole ownership and no industry limitations in terms of 
where they can invest.In terms of regulations, this market liberalisation differs 
markedly from the Indonesian international business environment. All in all, Turkey 
and Mexico are large and emerging market-based economies with strong adoption of 
western-style governance (convergence western practices) (e.g. Siegel, 2009; 
Kaymak & Bektas, 2008), whereas Asian capitalism is evident in Indonesia and 
other parts of SEA (e.g. Claessens et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000).  
Nevertheless, the findings of this thesis may potentially apply to those EMEs, as 
some aspects of this thesis reflect a developmental state (e.g. developing, emerging, 
advanced). As Siegel (2009) has pointed out, EMEs share common institutional 
features, namely weak legal institutions and strong family controlled businesses and 
business groups. Further, scholars have argued that the core nuance of large firm 
business practices in one EME may have broad applicability to others (e.g. Siegel, 
2009; Johnson et al., 2000; Khanan & Palepu, 2000). Third, the institutions of the 
home and host country are very different. In the case of South Korea, the business 
group, chebol, institutionally and historically has played significant roles in 
advancing local business systems (e.g. Chang, 2003) in comparision to the less 
prominent role of business groups in Indonesia that increasingly influence the 
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national business system. The employer associations of APINDO may have stronger 
and limited influence on the labour market institutions. In addition, the analysis is 
also based on a weaker  role of the state. Indonesia might be an example of a meso 
institution, particularly in comparison to China and India, which are not only bigger 
but also have stronger government control and represent many of the patterns of 
power interaction at the macro level. Therefore, the findings of this study would not 
be applicable to China (i.e. strong state control and communist system) or India (i.e. 
the largest democaracy in the world). Furthermore, actors’ power relations are 
different because China and India are less dependent on FDI than is Indonesia. 
Finally, this study focuses on the automotive industry and large scale businesses. 
However, the author acknowledges that different industries, sectors, sizes (small and 
medium), and non-Japanese affiliates (e.g. Korean, Chinese, German and American) 
have different business systems and actors’ relationships. In addition, since this 
study does not look at the outcomes of the transfer in terms of productivity, future 
research may need to look at this aspect. In terms of the reliability of the data 
gathered, it must be recognised that the data are valid for the period in which they 
were gathered, while conditions in business systems may change over time. Hence it 
would be appropriate to conduct similar studies in the future to understand the 
changes and overcome some contradictions in the primary data that has been 
gathered thus far. The findings explain the mechanisms of cross-border management 
practice transfer and the impacts of forcing practices in the specific understudied 
EME setting of Indonesia. 
9.8 Directions for Future Study 
Building on this thesis, future research might involve further comparative studies of 
the diffusion mechanisms, implications and implementation of dominant HRM-IR 
“best practices” in other EME settings in Southeast Asia (e.g. Mellahi et al., 2013). 
In particular, one might explore different national business systems (e.g. Almond et 
al., 2003), and particularly the converging HRM practices of a JMNC in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand, which Pudelko and Harzing (2008) describe as a golden 
triangle for MNCs. Another avenue for future research is an examination of 
differences in the systems and an exploration of how local institutions and actors 
attract foreign MNCs while protecting local labour market institutions and systems 
that may foster local identity and competitiveness.  
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Through the lens of Asian business systems, comparative research might look at 
Japan’s advanced business systems against those of Southeast Asia’s so-called tiger 
economies, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Pursuing a longitudinal qualitative 
study would enable investigation of how different models of capitalism affect work, 
employment and organisation, and particularly the causal mechanisms of cross-
border management practices. MNC actors’ interactions and power capacities in 
diverse sociopolitical and economic institutions remain important characteristics of 
Southeast Asia. The institutional diversity of this region warrants further in-depth 
comparative studies to test existing theories of institutional variation. 
This thesis indicates that the 1997 Asian and 2007 global financial crises 
profoundly affected Japanese and Indonesian business systems. It is equally 
significant that China’s flourishing 21st-century economy has redefined Southeast 
Asia’s IB environment (e.g. Cooke & Kim, 2017; Jürgens & Krzywdzinski, 2016). 
Since 2007, attracted to Southeast Asia’s EMEs and their growing middle class, and 
facing rapidly escalating competition from China, Japan has intensified its 
investment strategies in this region. Consequently, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
have become major manufacturing hubs, as well as markets for their own innovative 
products and services, but with “punitive employment relations regimes” (Ford, 
2014: 423). Witt and Redding (2013) and Walter and Zhang (2012) identify Asian 
business systems as a theoretical framework for understanding the impact of 
institutional diversity on cross-border transfer which can be applied to more nuanced 
and complex typologies of comparative capitalism in Asian EMEs. Allen (2014) 
suggests the presence of more than one business system within a national business 
system. Considering this multidimensionality, coupled with rapid and diverse 
institutional changes, rather than “clustering” institutional comparisons, future 
research should offer more fine-grained institutional analyses (e.g. political-
economic history and reforms, IHRM infrastructure, and investment outlook) to 
explore the applicability of Whitley’s (1992) national business system to the context 
of the 21st century’s emerging Southeast Asian business systems. Mainstream 
studies “lack a comprehensive and detailed overview of the institutional features of 
Asian economies” (Witt & Redding, 2013: 266). Furthermore, Fainshmidt et al. 
(2016) and Whitley and Zhang (2016) observe major differences between advanced 
Asian and emerging Southeast Asian institutional systems with regard to knowledge 
and human capital formation and labour market organisation. These variations in 
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coordination raise the question of how far Japanese MNCs can induce convergence 
in Southeast Asian business systems through the example of HRM-IR cross-border 
practices. 
Asian capitalism is emerging, transitional, and maturing at different rates. Thus, 
to date, there is no comprehensive understanding of the implications of institutional 
diversity for work, employment and organisation studies. For example, Japanese 
automotive MNCs carry out their highest added value (first-tier) autoparts 
manufacturing in Thailand, with high added value (second-tier) in Malaysia and 
lower added value (third-tier) production and assembly in Indonesia. As a result, 
these countries are competing to produce higher value-added autoparts, which will 
attract greater foreign investment, technology and skills and have a substantial 
impact on the local economy and human capital development. As Cooke and Kim 
(2017: 15) observe, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand “are actively collaborating as 
well as competing with one another, pursuing largely similar models of economic 
growth”. 
The extent to which Japanese subsidiaries create large, high-skilled job markets 
can be tested empirically in three HRM areas: knowledge and human capital, 
employee participation, and lean management practices and TQM. Moreover, rather 
than focusing only on first-tier subsidiaries, deepening understanding of the 
implications, mechanisms and structures of cross-border Japanese business systems 
requires in-depth comparison of differences in first-, second- and third-tier autoparts 
manufacturers in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (e.g. Wood et al., 2016; Khan et 
al., 2015). As indicated by the large-scale study of Japan and Indonesia presented in 
this thesis, there is potential for Japanese business systems to be adopted, modified 
or rejected by all three tiers, not only on the production line but also in management 
offices, with the greatest diversity in autoparts manufacturers (Tier 3). 
Future research could also focus on Japanese automotive affiliates in car, 
motorcycle and autoparts supply chains in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Such a 
perspective would enable comparison of institutional arrangements and provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of key characteristics of business systems in the 
context of the host countries, a conceptualisation of the different business systems 
applied in the host countries, and an exploration of the impact of these differences on 
the host countries’ HRM-IR practices (e.g. Mellahi et al., 2013). In addition to the 
three main IR actors, the data should cover business groups (conglomerates), 
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employers’ associations, and quasi-governmental agencies and NGOs. Oligarchical 
business groups remain influential in the ownership and corporate governance 
structures of these countries, especially where local government remains weak (e.g. 
Fainshmidt et al., 2016; Ford, 2014; Almond, 2011a; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). 
While numerous studies have been conducted, the existing Asian business 
systems literature does not yet offer a comprehensive analysis of Asia’s advanced 
and emerging forms of market economy, business systems structures, and strategic 
linkages between MNCs and host countries. In particular, international value chains 
(e.g. Thailand produces higher value-added autoparts and exports to Indonesian 
assembling plants), coordination of labour-intensive manufacturing (e.g. Indonesian 
migrant workers in Malaysia; Cambodian and Myanmar migrant workers in 
Thailand), and competitive export-oriented production in these regions may affect 
MNCs’ policy development and practices. Moreover, political and economic 
coordination in Southeast Asia has changed considerably, but “weak” institutions 
remain conducive to the influence of powerful actors such as MNCs and business 
groups. Intensified “globalisation” appears to have had a significant impact on the 
role of human capital and coordination of labour market institutions in Japan and 
Southeast Asia. Finally, Southeast Asia’s EMEs, in which many countries including 
the UK/EU, Russia, China and India have strategic investments, are competing for 
strategic influence in this region. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Guides for the Semi-structured Interviews 
Interview questions for Japanese expatriates with experience and knowledge of local 
HRM-IR 
These interview questions serve as a guide for the interviewer to engage in a 
discussion with the interviewee. Please note that any participant can choose not to 
answer any question if he/she feels uncomfortable and/or has no related knowledge. 
Participation in this research is voluntary and participants will be free to withdraw 
from the research at any time with no consequence to themselves. In order to 
maintain professional integrity, the interviewer is bound by the University of 
Warwick’s Research Code of Practice. 
The confidentiality of information and the anonymity of all participants is 
guaranteed. Participants’ names, positions and organizations will be anonymised, 
and any identifying details will be kept separate from the information provided by 
participants. 
1) Background of the participant: 
 Can you tell me how long you have been working in [insert organisation name] 
Indonesia, and in what capacity? 
 Have you been trained in Japan (or outside Indonesia) administered by [insert 
organisation name here] Japan or other associations?  
o How long was the training and what did it entail?   
 Throughout working in [insert organisation name], what have been the main 
types of training that you have facilitated or participated in?  
o Do you think this trainings was Important, why or why not? 
 How would you describe working in [insert organisation name] Indonesia with a 
Japanese presence? 
 Can you share your views to describe the difference between [insert organisation 
name] Japan’s and Indonesia’s working conditions and learning environment? 
 
2) Questions pertaining to HR practices: 
 What is your perspective on the HR practices and policies of [insert organisation 
name] in Indonesia?  
 Do you have any knowledge of the local HR practices/policies adopted from 
[insert organisation name] Japan? 
 What kind of [insert organisation name] Japanese HR practices are applicable to 
[insert organisation name] Indonesia?  
o Can you give me some examples?  
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 In the past five years, can you describe the degree of [insert organisation name] 
Japanese HR practices diffused to/adopted by (directly/in directly) [insert 
organisation name] Indonesia?  
 Can you explain the process of transfer/adoption of Japanese management and 
production practices? 
 Can you share your views on your Indonesian colleagues’ skills and experience 
in adopting Japanese practices? 
 Can you share your experience of working with Japanese expatriates working in 
Indonesia’s working environment and with Indonesian colleagues/workers? 
 In comparison to your Japanese colleagues, can you describe the work ethic and 
discipline of your fellow Indonesian colleagues?  
o Can you talk about any differences between those Indonesian colleagues 
who gained training in or spent time in Japan and those colleagues who 
did not? 
 Can you describe some experiences in which you had difficulty implementing 
Japanese HR practices/policies at [insert organisation name] Indonesia? 
 Can you share with me the type of Japanese best practices [insert organisation 
name] Indonesia has adopted the most, e.g. TQM, JIT/Lean, 5S?  
o Can some of these skills be applicable to the management (not just on the 
production line)? 
 
3) Questions pertaining to industrial relations practices: 
 Do you have any knowledge, views or experience regarding industrial relations 
of [insert organisation name] in Japan, in Indonesia? 
o Can you share your views on it? 
 In what capacity have you been involved in the industrial relations 
practices/policies in [insert organisation name] Indonesia and in Japan? 
 What do you understand about the union at [insert organisation name] Japan 
and/or Indonesia? 
o Can you describe it and any differences between the unions in the two 
countries? 
 Can you describe your understanding of labour unions in Indonesia? 
o How about unions in [insert organisation name] Indonesia? 
  
Interview questions for Japanese expatriate participants 
These interview questions serve as a guide for the interviewer to engage in a 
discussion with the interviewee. Please note that any participant can choose not to 
answer a question if he/she feels uncomfortable and or has no related knowledge. 
Participation in this research is voluntary and participants will be free to withdraw 
from the research at any time with no consequence to themselves. In order to 
maintain professional integrity, the interviewer is bound by the University of 
Warwick’s Research Code of Practice. 
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The confidentiality of information and the anonymity of all participants is 
guaranteed. Participants’ names, positions and organizations will be anonymised, 
and any identifying details will be kept separate from the information provided by 
participants. 
1) Professional background of the participant: 
 Can you tell me how long you have been working with [insert name of the 
organisation] Indonesia and in what capacity? 
 Have you received training in Japan (or outside Indonesia) administered by 
[insert name of the organisation] Japan?  
o How long was the training and did you take part in facilitating the 
training?  
 What type of training have you attended?  
o What was the purpose of the training and did you find it useful? 
 Can you describe your experience working in [insert name of the organisation] 
Indonesia? 
 Can you describe the different working conditions between [insert name of the 
organisation] Japan and Indonesia? 
 
2) Japanese management and production systems in the host country 
 What do you understand about the transfer of Japanese management and 
production practice from Japan to Indonesia?  
 Do you have experience in the transfer processes?  
o Can you describe the inflow of Japanese knowledge skills and practices 
to Indonesia? 
 Would you agree that the degree of Japanisation declines as it reaches the lower 
tier of the supply chain?   
o What forms of Japanisation has taken place? Can you give me some 
specific examples?  
 Can you explain the inflow of Japanese technology transfer or skills and 
knowledge transfer (or both)? 
o What has been the significance of and/or the limits of this transfer? 
 Having gained training and experienced outside Indonesia, what did you find 
unique about [insert name of the organisation] Indonesia?  
 Can you briefly explain your perceptions of your Indonesian colleagues’ skills 
and experiences and understanding of Japanisation?  
 In comparison with your Japanese colleagues, how do you find the work ethic 
and discipline of your Indonesian colleagues?  
 How long will you be in [insert name of the organisation] Indonesia, and after 
your assignment is completed, will you be assigned to work at other [insert name 
of the organisation] (outside Japan, within ASEAN)? 
 Can you describe some experiences you have gained working in [insert name of 
the organisation] Indonesia? 
 Can you explain the type of Japanese best practices that [insert name of the 
organisation] Indonesia has adopted the most, e.g. TQM, 5S, etc.?  
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o Can some of these skills be used for non-technical tasks, e.g. organisation 
or leadership? 
 
Interview questions for Japanese agency participants 
The purpose of this interview is to examine the implementation of Japanese 
management and production systems practised by Japanese firms that operate in 
Indonesia’s automotive sector. The nature of the interview is open-ended. It is 
designed to glean the views, knowledge and experiences of the Japanese agency 
employees who are directly involved in training the Japanese expatriates dispatched 
to the host countries and trainees from the Japanese subsidiaries operating in 
Indonesia. 
According to the results of the first phase data collection, the researcher has observed 
that there is a link between Japanese agencies and Japanese firms in diffusing 
Japanese management and production systems (i.e. Japanisation) to Indonesia. 
However, there are some degrees of variation in implementing Japanisation, such as 
training and development, improved working conditions, including 5S, kanban, 
kaizen, employee-employer communication. 
 
Therefore, this set of interview questions aims to understand the following:  
1. What are the roles of Japanese agencies (e.g. IDE-JETRO, HIDA) in promoting 
the Japanese management system and working practices in Indonesia? 
2. How do you go about facilitating Japanisation in specific Japanese corporations 
in Indonesia?  
3. How have the Japanese agencies helped Japanese firms (and Japanese FDI 
policy) to conduct business in Indonesia successfully? 
4. What are the barriers of implementing Japanisation in Indonesia? 
5. What are the variations in implementing Japanisation in Indonesia? 
The interview will start with the general background and general experience of the 
participant. The questions are designed to elicit data on each respondent’s current 
position held, duration of working with a Japanese agency, responsibility and 
capability. The researcher will then engage in an in-depth discussion about the 
participant’s role in working on a project in Indonesia. 
It is important to note that as a researcher, I am bound by the University of Warwick 
research ethics. The name of the person and organisation will remain anonymous and 
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the collected data are safely and privately stored. Interview data are used solely for 
the specific research purposes of this thesis. Below are some preliminary interview 
questions. 
1) Background of the participant: 
 How long have you been working with [insert organisation name]?  
o What is your current position, and how long have you held this position?  
o Could you briefly describe your role and responsibilities? 
 Do you have knowledge and/or experience of human resources management 
related roles such as managing people, labour policies, employment relations (in 
Japan or Indonesia)? 
 
2) Organisation interests in investing in Indonesia: 
 Can you share your understanding on the competitiveness of the Indonesian 
market? 
 What are the favourable and unfavourable factors of investing in Indonesia? 
 In comparison to other ASEAN countries, what makes Indonesia stand out in 
investing, doing business? 
 What do you understand about Indonesia’s emerging market economy outlook? 
 Is there a specific department/office of your organisation that oversees trade, 
investment and business in Indonesia? 
 
3) Business management practice and policy:  
 Can you describe some important aspects of management practice and policy, 
namely HRM, labour policies and employment relations? 
 Can you share the interests and roles of Japanese investment organisations (such 
as JETRO) and government agencies (such as HIDA, IDE-JETRO) in sharing 
Japanese management and production systems with the Indonesian subsidiary?  
o Is your organisation interested in expanding the training program beyond 
local organisations with investment from the Japanese firms?  
 Can you describe how your firm oversee Indonesian HRM practices and labour 
policies? 
 Can you describe some examples of your organisation’s programs or policies to 
promote the objectives of your organisation regarding “harmonious” 
employment/industrial relations? 
 What do you understand about the Indonesian HRM and IR practices (as well as 
the policies)? 
 Can you share what have been the main issues for your organisation to partner 
with local organisation in promoting Japanisation? 
 
Interview questions for Japanese investment organisations in Indonesia 
The following questions are designed to examine the roles and policy 
implementations of the Japanese agencies/institutions such as [insert organisation 
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name], in facilitating Japanese investment firms conducting business abroad, such as 
in Indonesia and other ASEAN member states. Please note that these questions can 
be adjusted in the merit agreement between the participant and researcher. Some of 
the questions are interrelated, and therefore, participants may refer to previous 
questions when answering a particular question. When and if participants deem 
certain questions inapplicable or inappropriate, they are at liberty to leave the 
question unanswered.  
Please describe your answer as specifically as possible, please feel free to ask for any 
clarification or follow up questions. 
1) Background of the participant and general experience: 
 
 How long have you been working with [insert organisation name]?   
 What is your current position and how long have you remained in this position?  
 Could you briefly describe your roles and responsibilities? 
 Do you have knowledge and/or experience of trade and investment in Indonesia 
or in the ASEAN context?  
 Have you applied similar knowledge/experience to assist firms that have engaged 
in business in Indonesia? And in any ASEAN member states?  
 
2) Questions pertaining to the organisation and its roles: 
 Could you describe the roles of your organisation in supporting investment in 
Indonesia? 
o In the past five years, what have been your firm’s major investments in 
Indonesia? 
 Can you tell me why your organisation maintains a substantial role in supporting 
and promoting the development of Japanese firms abroad, i.e. in Indonesia? 
 Can you briefly describe how your organisation oversees planning and 
negotiating between Japan and Indonesia (e.g. what measures, protocols and 
approaches)? 
 What is the objective of your organisation in undertaking trade and investment 
with consideration of the industrial relations environment and socioeconomic 
impact on the host country, e.g. Indonesia? 
 Can you describe Indonesia's economic conditions and business environments 
which have been seen by [insert organisation name] to have favourable impacts 
on promoting trade and investment for the past three to five years? 
o Have you seen/experienced the difference between three to five years? 
o Can you give some examples? 
 If you can make comparisons between the economic conditions of Japan and 
Indonesia, in what ways can these two countries gain mutual benefits? 
 In comparison to other ASEAN member states, how are current business and 
political risks in Indonesia different? 
o Given your explanation, what have been the main objective of Japanese 
firms doing business in Indonesia? 
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o And how does the Japanese agency help establish business relations with 
local firms? 
 How does the Indonesian emerging market economy outlook favourably support 
Japanese investment in Indonesia?  
 Can you describe how your organisation oversees the Indonesian business 
environment and labour market institutions? 
o Does [insert organisation name] have a collaborative project aimed at 
creating synergy between Japan and Indonesia? 
o Can you give me an example? 
 Can you name a few important lessons your organisation has learned from 
Indonesia’s dynamic business environment? 
 Can you identify some aspects in which Indonesia has learned from Japanese 
management and production systems, and/or the Japanese business environment? 
 Does your organisation have any interest in promoting and facilitating the inflow 
of Japanese knowledge, skills, technology and investment to Indonesian 
business?  
o If so, can you give an example? 
 Can you briefly explain how your organisation became interested in assisting in 
forming Japanese-type skills and training for the Indonesian businesses? 
o If so, can you give an example? 
 Can you provide some examples of how [insert organisation name] staff enhance 
their expertise in facilitating trade and investment in Indonesia, e.g. training, job 
rotation, deployment, etc.? 
 Can you describe how your organisation takes appropriate measures to adjust to 
the changes of the business environment of Indonesia, in particular in the context 
of: 
o Human capital/skill development, and how? 
o Industrial relations, and how? 
o Labour/employment policies, and how? 
o Would any of above factors be considered as the risk factors? 
 Can you tell me what have been the main factors contributing to the Japanese 
business risks in the past five years?  
 And what possible business risks do you foresee over the next five years, in 
particular, with a newly elected president and cabinet? 
 
Interview questions for Japanese research participants in general 
These interview questions serve as a guide for the interviewer to engage in a 
discussion with the interviewee. Please note that any participant can choose not to 
answer a question if he/she feels uncomfortable and or has no related knowledge. 
Participation in this research is voluntary and participants will be free to withdraw 
from the research at any time with no consequence to themselves. In order to 
maintain professional integrity, the interviewer is bound by the University of 
Warwick’s Research Code of Practice. 
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The confidentiality of information and the anonymity of all participants is 
guaranteed. Participants’ names, positions and organizations will be anonymised, 
and any identifying details will be kept separate from the information provided by 
participants. 
1) Background of the participant: 
 How long have you been working with [insert organisation name]? What is your 
current position, and how long have you had this position?  
o Could you briefly describe your role and responsibilities? 
 Do you have knowledge and/or experience of human resources management 
related roles such as managing people, labour policies, employment relations (in 
Japan or Indonesia)? 
 
2) Organisation’s interests in investing in Indonesia: 
 Can you share your understanding of the competitiveness of Indonesian market? 
 What are the favourable and unfavourable factors of investing in Indonesia? 
 In comparison to other ASEAN countries, what made Indonesia stand out as a 
country to invest in or do business with? 
 How do you perceive Indonesia’s emerging market economy outlook? 
 Is there a specific department/office of your organisation that oversees trade, 
investment and business in Indonesia? 
 
3) Business management practice and policy:  
 Can you describe some important aspects of management practice and policy, 
namely HRM, labour policies and employment relations? 
 Can you share the interests and roles of Japanese investment organisations (such 
as JETRO) and government agencies (such as HIDA, IDE-JETRO) in sharing 
Japanese management and production systems with the Indonesian subsidiary?  
o Does your organisation have any interest in expanding the training 
program beyond the local organisation with investment from Japanese 
firms?  
 Can you describe how your firm oversees Indonesian HRM practices and labour 
policies? 
 Can you describe some examples, programs or policies of your organisations to 
promote “harmonious” employment/industrial relations? 
 What do you understand about the Indonesian HRM and IR practices (as well as 
the policies)? 
 Can you share what have been the main issues for your organisation in partnering 
with local organisations in promoting Japanisation? 
 
 
Interview questions for Astra HR, IR and union research participants 
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These interview questions serve as a guide for the interviewer to engage in a 
discussion with the interviewee. Please note that any participant can choose not to 
answer the question if he/she feels uncomfortable and or has no related knowledge. 
Participation in this research is voluntary and participants will be free to withdraw 
from the research at any time with no consequence to themselves. In order to 
maintain professional integrity, the interviewer is bound by the University of 
Warwick’s Research Code of Practice. 
The confidentiality of information and the anonymity of all participants is 
guaranteed. Participants’ names, positions and organizations will be anonymised, 
and any identifying details will be kept separate from the information provided by 
participants. 
1) Professional background of the research participant: 
 Can you tell me how long you have been working with Astra and in what 
capacity?   
 Prior to joining Astra, where did you work and in what capacity? 
 Have you gained some professional training in Japan (or outside Indonesia)?   
 If you have, in which area of training? 
 
2) Questions pertaining to Astra management: 
 How would you describe the management style of Astra?   
 What have been the foundations of Astra management’s approach and practice? 
 How did those management systems come about and/or become adopted? 
 What are the distinguishing features of the management and practice of Astra in 
comparison to other organisations in Indonesia? 
 To support Astra’s philosophy, mission and vision: “Catur Dharma”, can you 
describe your roles and responsibilities in promoting it? 
 
3) Questions pertaining to Japanese management and production systems: 
 What do you understand of 5S, lean management and production systems, kaizen 
and the like?  
o Are you aware of it? 
 What is your view on 5S (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu and Shitake), TQM, 
kaizen, and other types of Japanisation being implemented in Astra?  
o Can you give some examples? 
 Is there any element of Japanisation that can be applied to the local HR or IR 
context? 
o If so, can you give some examples? 
 Can you describe how the nuances of Japanisation can be useful for Astra 
management practices and policy development?  
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 Can you share your views on the constraints/issues you have experienced in 
implementing 5S, lean production and the like? 
o What have been the constraints and/or continuing issues in 
implementing/disseminating elements of Japanisation?  
 Do employees (management and workers) have the opportunity to learn 
Toyotaism in Japan?  
o How about outside Indonesia (e.g. Thailand training centre)?  
o Have the Indonesian trainees gained sufficient knowledge and resources 
to implement what they have learned in Japan (or overseas)? 
 Can you explain how the foreign management practices and policies, business 
objectives and interests can influence Astra’s management? 
 
4) Questions pertaining to management operations in relation to human capital 
development: 
 Compared with other organisations in Indonesia, what would you say is distinct 
or unique about Astra management strategy in promoting human capital 
development? 
 Can you explain the importance of the “People Roadmap” which is described as 
the human capital development platform of Astra?  
 Could you highlight the implications of the Astra Management System (AMS) 
for the human capital development framework in Astra? 
 Astra Learning Center provides Astra Management Development Institute 
(AMDI. Can you describe the difference between HRODP and HRMDP? 
o Is HRODP/HRMDP influenced by Japanese management systems, and if 
so how?   
 Is it is possible to say that 5S or Toyotaism influences Astra’s management 
practices?  
o If so, how? 
 What type of learning environment has Astra employed? 
o How has Astra engaged in learning Toyotaism, 5S, Lean and the like? 
 
5) Questions pertaining to employment/industrial relations: 
 Can you describe Astra’s industrial relations?  
 Can you describe the management-employee communication channels available 
in Astra? 
 Can you describe the industrial relations setting in Astra, i.e. bipartite bargaining 
and communication?  
 Can you share some of your views on how Astra promotes employee 
participation? 
 Can you explain how the Astra Engagement-Based HRM approach influences 
the company’s industrial relations?  
 How is the freedom of employee organisations and collective bargaining 
realized?  
 Which channels of employee communication does Astra use? 
 Can you share your views on how has Astra has engaged in industrial actions or 
strikes?  
o What are the roles of HR and IR in engaging management-employee 
relations?   
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 How is the freedom to organise and engage in collective bargaining realised?  
 Organisation and local news reports suggest that Astra has fulfilled all of the 
“normative” principles as stated at the bargaining table. Above and beyond 
national labour regulations, how would they influence other unions outside 
Astra? 
 In what capacity can Astra make a difference in the development of Indonesia’s 
industrial relations? 
 What is your view on union representation among the current cabinet members? 
 Astra has a number of business networks and supply chains. Data suggest that 
the lower the position in the supply chain, the less harmonious the industrial 
relation is. How do you view that finding? 
 Can you share your views on having the union leaders gain training overseas?  
o Would it help the overall management-employee relations? 
o Would it improve union organisation and leadership? 
 What do you understand of Japanese industrial relations? 
 Do you have some knowledge about shunto? 
o What is your view on Japanese “harmonious” industrial relations? 
o What has Astra learnt about Japanese management-employee relations? 
 
Interview questions for Indonesian business association  
These interview questions serve as a guide for the interviewer to engage in a 
discussion with the interviewee. Please note that any participant can choose not to 
answer a question if he/she feels uncomfortable and or has no related knowledge. 
Participation in this research is voluntary and participants will be free to withdraw 
from the research at any time with no consequence to themselves. In order to 
maintain professional integrity, the interviewer is bound by the University of 
Warwick’s Research Code of Practice. 
The confidentiality of information and the anonymity of all participants is 
guaranteed. Participants’ names, positions and organizations will be anonymised, 
and any identifying details will be kept separate from the information provided by 
participants. 
Overview of the business association, e.g. APINDO 
1)  Structure of the organization: 
 What are the organization’s objectives? 
 How has APINDO delivered its objectives? 
 Over the past five years, what have been the changes or measures APINDO 
has taken? 
 Legally, what can APINDO do to promote Indonesia’s industrial relations? 
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 Formally, what approach/strategy has APINDO followed? 
 Why/how has APINDO played an important role as an employers’ 
organization in Indonesian industrial relations (IR)? 
 
2) Board members and membership 
 What is the composition of the board and non-board members? 
 Who are the key figures of APINDO? 
 Are APINDO’s members exclusively for local Indonesians? 
 Who can join APINDO? 
 Who are the target members of APINDO? 
 Are employee and employees’ representatives able to join APINDO?  
 Can HR and non-HR practitioners join APINDO?  
 Can they (employee, employee’s representative and HR) get involved in the 
APINDO’s board? 
 What is the capacity of exclusive and non-exclusive members to support 
APINDO’s objectives? 
 What are the benefits of joining APINDO? 
 In general, how does APINDO recruit its members?  
o How can these members join APINDO? 
 
3) Activity, plan and strategy 
 How does APINDO operate, e.g. financial support, networks and 
programmes? 
 Who are APINDO’s international partners? 
 What is the value of partnering with local and international organizations? 
 How does APINDO promote its programme and strategy locally and 
internationally? 
 What are APINDO’s tripartite strategy and agenda? 
 Can you describe the structure of the Indonesian tripartite? 
 How does APINDO deliver its commitment as a part of this tripartite?  
 In what capacity are these partners involved in APINDO/ATC (APINDO 
Training Centre) activities? 
 
4) APINDO Training Centre 
 What does ATC do? 
 What are the objectives of ATC? 
 How can ATC fulfil /deliver its commitment? 
 How can ATC support APINDO’s objectives? 
 How does ATC finance its organization and programme? 
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Appendix B: Data Structure 
1st order Concepts       2nd order Themes   Aggregate Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global Japanese management & 
production systems 
 
Japanese influence  Diffusion, implementation & 
application 
Organisational learning & 
management support 
Dynamic HRM-IR practices 
between MNC & subsidiaries 
Dynamic actors’ power 
resources, capabilities & 
interactions  
Conflict of management 
practices 
Mitigating institutional 
constraint 
Understanding dominant practices promote local human capital 
development. 
Exposure of Japanese management nuances at the their workplaces.  
5S, seiri (sort), seiton (straighten), seiso (shine) seiketsu (standardise) and 
shitsuke (sustain). 
Lean production, kaizen, Toyotaism, kanban. 
 
Local employees experiences and views on Japanese practices, technology 
& mind-set/work ethic. 
Understanding the implications of Japanisation to their workplaces. 
The applicability of foreign practices to their local context. 
 
Japanese coordination & investment in diffusing its practices.  
Acquiring new knowledge: adopted, rejected, or localised.  
Motivation & interest in  learning new skills, gaining Japanese-type skills 
& knowledge. 
Local management commitment, learning resources & access. 
 
 
Dominant management-employee typed relationship. 
“Harmonious” Japanese employment relations. 
Degree of employee participations & commitment. 
Different interests & motivations: local-Japanese management & 
employee/employee representative.  
 
 Japanese & Indonesian direct management negotiations. 
Japanese & Indonesian employee/union direct communications. 
Indirect Japanese management & Indonesian employee communications. 
Japanese, Indonesian & international NGOs, ILO involvement in local IR. 
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Appendix C: Astra Group Company Structure 
 
Source: https://www.astra.co.id/About-Astra/Astra-Group-Structure (accessed 9 September 2018). 
Note: This figure lists only Astra’s core companies based on products and services. 
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 Appendix D: TMIIN Export Destinations 
Source: adapted from http://www.toyotaindonesiamanufacturing.co.id/manufacturing/product/vehicle 
(accessed 10 September 2018). 
Note: TMMIN exports five different types of car, 1TR and 2TR engines, component parts, and dies 
and jigs to 14 countries. 
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Appendix E: TMMIN Domestic and Export Production Volumes 
 
Source: adapted from http://www.toyotaindonesiamanufacturing.co.id/manufacturing/product/vehicle 
(accessed 1 September 2016) 
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Appendix F: TMMIN Export Production and Composition 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.toyotaindonesiamanufacturing.co.id/fact-and-figure/production (accessed 10 
September 2018) 
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Appendix G: Toyota Indonesia’s Production Timeline and Export Performance 
 
Cumulative Exports 
Source: http://www.toyotaindonesiamanufacturing.co.id/fact-and-figure/production (accessed 10 
September 2018) 
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Appendix H: Automobile Production and Sales in ASEAN, 2015 
 
 
Sources: OICA and GAIKINDO  
 
